Many have anticipated Trump\u2019s meeting with Putin in Alaska with great attention last week (8\/19\/2025). After all, it was the first time that both leaders met since Trump assumed office earlier this year, and the meeting was promised to result in a ceasefire agreement. However, both leaders cited \u2018great progress\u2019 without explaining what has been achieved. It was clear later on that no agreement had taken place.<\/p>\n
One thing for sure, the absence of Ukraine or any other European countries in this meeting is a troubling sign for Europe. Their absence underscores a further marginalization in high-level negotiation, especially on the issue of Ukraine. Europe was left in the dark about the future of its own continent, as Washington and Moscow discussed issues that directly concern its security.<\/p>\n
This event is only the \u2018tip of the iceberg\u2019 of a more alarming problem. Since the end of World War II, the United States has been the primary security guarantor over Europe. While this provided stability during the Cold War, it has also increased Europe\u2019s dependency on the United States. Today, this dependency is put to the test due to Trump pivoting away from Europe while Russia is knocking on their door. With no certainty over the course of their own security, the idea of a \u2018European army\u2019 has re-emerged onto the scene once more.<\/p>\n
European army: not a new idea<\/p>\n
The idea of a European army is not a new idea. The first, and probably the closest time we ever got to a European army, came in the 1950s<\/a>. After a green light by Eisenhower, the French drew up a proposal to organize European defense on a supranational basis to accommodate Adenauer\u2019s request for German remilitarization. Jean Monnet brought the idea to Rene Pleven, who in turn submitted it to the French National Assembly on 24th October 1950.<\/p>\n This episode led to the signing of the treaty establishing the European Defence Community (EDC), also known as the Treaty of Paris, on 27th May 1952. It was signed by six countries: France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. However, the idea was not fully ratified by all member states and was vetoed by the French National Assembly in 1954.<\/p>\n Since then, Europe has always relied on NATO, and by extension the US, to fill the gap in their defensive capabilities throughout the Cold War. Even after 1991, NATO has remained the dominant actor<\/a> over Europe\u2019s security, exemplified by the Yugoslav War in the 1990s, the 2011 Libya no-fly zone, and the 2021 Afghanistan evacuation. This dependence has left Europe numb. Although the EU has made several attempts to coordinate their defense, such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), nothing comes close to the supranational proposal once envisioned in 1950.<\/p>\n The need of a \u2018European army\u2019 today<\/p>\n This enduring dominance of NATO-US primacy has been criticized by many. In 2019, French president Emmanuel Macron declared NATO as \u2018brain-dead<\/a>\u2019 and that Europe can no longer rely on the US. His remark was controversial, but it captured a hard truth: Europe needs to rely on itself for security. With war happening in their front yard and shifting global power dynamics, a \u2018European army\u2019 could provide Europe with several advantages they needed.<\/p>\n First, it will provide Europe strategic autonomy. <\/strong>Europe cannot take US or NATO guarantees for granted. A European army would allow Europe to take care of their own security without being hostage to US electoral cycles. Trump\u2019s presidency highlighted this clearly, as he criticized<\/a> the alliance multiple times for not meeting the 2% requirements. Furthermore, Trump\u2019s pivot to Asia-Pacific left Europe at a critical time as the Russian army was rolling into Ukraine. A \u2018European army\u2019 would ensure Europe\u2019s decisions are based on its own assessment and not dictated by external actors.<\/p>\n Plus, a unified force is essential for projecting strength and would put Europe\u2019s credibility back into high-level negotiation once more. Europe has always championed itself as a global actor, shaping rules on climate, trade, and human rights. Yet without a credible military to back its diplomacy, its influence is limited. A strong and unified military will position the EU as the world\u2019s third-largest defense spender<\/a> and strengthen Europe\u2019s geopolitical weight in the international arena.<\/p>\n Second, it allows Europe to handle specific EU issues<\/strong>. While NATO is able to respond to the Russian invasion of Ukraine by reinforcing its eastern flank, the EU continues to face hybrid and non-traditional threats that are not tailored for NATO. Instability in the Mediterranean, waves of migration into Southern Europe, cyberattacks, and the rise of jihadist groups in the Sahel are some of the specific EU issues that are out of NATO jurisdiction. Yet, EU missions such as the European Training Mission (EUTM) and the European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) in Mali are often under-equipped, under-funded, and under-manned<\/a>, and they tarnished EU credibility with its Malian partners, which led to the ending of the mission in 2024. A European army could be the solution for Europe in providing rapid deployment forces swiftly and effectively.<\/p>\n Lastly, a European army would improve efficiency and reduce cost.<\/strong> Europe is the home of some of the finest arms manufacturers in the world. Rheinmetall, Fincantieri, Dassault Aviation, and SAAB all peak in their respective domains. Yet, demand is still largely drawn from national lines, with investments drawn from domestic considerations and based on national programming and not taking into account broader strategic and efficiency considerations. As a result, this scatters the EU\u2019s European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) in narrow defense markets, instead of a single integrated and much larger market. This in turn weakens EDTIB, because it foregoes opportunities to mutualize and synchronize investments into common equipment and infrastructure.<\/p>\n Furthermore, this created a fragmentation in the Union\u2019s defense industrial capability. As one case points<\/a> out, the development of a sixth-generation fighter jet has two parallel programs. France, Germany, and Spain are taking part in the so-called Future Air Combat System (FCAS). Instead of taking part in the program, Italy and the United Kingdom are collaborating for the development of another sixth-generation fighter jet program (also referred to as FCAS), alongside Japan, who later joined to form the Global Air Combat Programme. This in turn led to costly duplication, rendered logistics and transnational cooperation on maintenance efforts more difficult, and hampered interoperability.<\/p>\n A \u2018European army\u2019 would pool resources that eliminate these inefficiencies. Shared procurement could decrease costs drastically, while unified training and command structure would increase interoperability. The EU\u2019s European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) is a step in the right direction, as it requires member states to procure at least 40% of defense equipment in a collaborative manner. This precedent shows that a structure for integration already exists, and continuing this path will turn scattered efforts into a coherent force.<\/p>\n In Conclusion<\/p>\n The discussion circling a \u2018European army\u2019 is not merely about military organization but also about achieving strategic autonomy. A common army would enable Europe to pursue its own interest without the influence of external actors and reinforce Europe\u2019s importance in world geopolitics.<\/p>\n Still, the path to a real and tangible European army still suffers due to many things, mainly due to the matter of sovereignty. The matter of defense is a highly sensitive topic, often classified as \u2018high politics,\u2019 and in high-politics issues, member states are more vigilant about protecting their national sovereignty. In 1985, Jacques Delors once pushed for both economic and defense integration<\/a>. The former was pursued with much gusto, but the same cannot be said for the latter. This was highlighted during the Iraq War of 1991 and 2003. During the former, Britain and France were on board Operation Desert Shield. During the latter, they were in a disagreement over the US-led coalition to Iraq. This underscores the classic \u2018high-politics\u2019 and \u2018low-politics\u2019 discrepancies. Member states were more protective over a highly sensitive topic. In relation to this matter, member states right now also face the same division over the perception of a European army.<\/p>\n