{"id":378471,"date":"2025-08-27T20:07:19","date_gmt":"2025-08-27T20:07:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/378471\/"},"modified":"2025-08-27T20:07:19","modified_gmt":"2025-08-27T20:07:19","slug":"europe-rescue-serbia-from-russian-style-rule","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/378471\/","title":{"rendered":"Europe \u2014 Rescue Serbia From Russian-Style Rule"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Serbian summer has been marked by widespread anti-government protests and significant violence<\/a>. Throughout August, police and pro-government activists have attacked demonstrators, some of whom fought back. Offices of the ruling party have been set alight<\/a>, and Russia has promised undefined aid<\/a> to the government of President Aleksandar Vu\u010di\u0107.\u00a0<\/p>\n

But while Serbia has experienced the largest protests in its recent history, the European Union (EU) has merely expressed its \u201cdeep concern<\/a>\u201d amid the escalation of violence<\/a> in which multiple protesters were injured and detained. This hesitation reflects Brussels\u2019 concern that taking a tougher line could push Belgrade closer to Moscow and Beijing, while also jeopardizing access to Serbian raw materials<\/a> at a time of escalating competition over critical resources.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The bloc is, however, missing the bigger picture. It only needs to reflect on other authoritarian crackdowns and draw obvious lessons.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The 2023-2025 protests in Georgia and the Russian-style government response have pushed a fundamentally pro-Western country<\/a> off the path to European integration and onto the rocky road to enduring political repression<\/a>.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

While the EU eventually froze Georgia\u2019s accession and provision of financial aid, the measures came too late and were too weak to alter the course of a determined authoritarian government<\/a>.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

The bloc seems set to make the same mistake again, but at a greater cost. Serbia shares a common border with the EU and has a significant ability to make mischief in its neighborhood.\u00a0<\/p>\n

It is time for a much more hawkish stance on Vu\u010di\u0107\u2019s administration and to hold his loyalists in government, parliament, and the judiciary accountable for their authoritarian policies. The EU should also consider suspending financial aid and preferential market access, as well as scaling up support for civil society and independent media.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The case is only underlined by the government\u2019s continuing behavior. On August 27, the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) disclosed<\/a> that Vu\u010di\u0107 allies had met the UK-based owners of the N1 TV channel to discuss the removal of its independent CEO. The government, its agencies, and a subsidiary of UK-based private equity firm BC Partners denied they were seeking to defang N1<\/a>, which has given significant airtime to opposition demonstrations and corruption investigations.\u00a0<\/p>\n

This is a well-worn path. Hardline governments profoundly frightened by mass protests now have a plethora of policies and technologies available, many derived from Russia and other repressive states \u2014 leaked papers show, for example, that Serbia is secretly expanding<\/a> its advanced Chinese surveillance systems from Huawei. The measures aim to stifle dissent, the work of activist groups, the free flow of information, and ultimately the stamina and financial resources of mass movements. Police violence and imprisonment are no longer the sole tools available to authoritarian administrations.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Left unchallenged, the EU risks losing a would-be ally in a continent increasingly divided between Kremlin-friendly and democratic, anti-authoritarian states. Serbia may become another Georgia.\u00a0<\/p>\n

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In order to impose direct costs without harming the Serbian population, the EU should use targeted sanctions (travel bans, asset freezes, and other tested measures) against enablers of the regime.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

To avoid rapid deterioration in relations and simultaneously show its resolve, the EU needs to swiftly impose sanctions against mid-level officials in Serbia. The initial list may focus on senior security officers, who order violence against protestors, judges, who give harsh sentences to protestors, and issue<\/a> lenient sentences to pro-regime figures.\u00a0<\/p>\n

However, if the regime doesn\u2019t listen to its citizens and their demands for tough action against corruption while continuing to suppress protests, the EU should adopt more aggressive measures and impose sanctions against senior state officials.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The bloc holds considerable leverage. In 2023, it accounted<\/a> for nearly 60% of the country\u2019s trade. This influence is reinforced by the fact that the EU was the source of almost half of Serbia\u2019s foreign direct investment<\/a> (FDI) inflows in 2023 and provides billions of euros<\/a> in grants from the EU budget, as well as loans.\u00a0<\/p>\n

One option is to review the association agreement between the EU and Serbia, which opened the EU market to Serbian goods. Since the agreement is based<\/a> inter alia on democratic principles and human rights, the EU may threaten to suspend it if Belgrade doesn\u2019t alter its approach. The bloc has more than enough reason to complain; Serbia\u2019s track record<\/a> in meeting the requirements for EU membership, a process now underway for 13 years, is somewhere between mediocre and poor.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The EU could also threaten to tighten investment screening and apply stricter scrutiny to FDI flows, particularly in regime-linked sectors.\u00a0<\/p>\n

However, the most immediate measure is to threaten to halt the disbursement of aid from various EU funds. For instance, if Serbia fails to improve its domestic repression, the EU may halt assistance coming from the \u20ac14.2bn ($16.5bn) Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, from which in 2024 it received<\/a> \u20ac83.4m. In addition, Serbia is to be allocated<\/a> \u20ac1.58bn by 2027 under the Western Balkans Growth Plan, which could also be suspended.\u00a0<\/p>\n

While increasing pressure on the government, the EU should at the same time strengthen Serbia\u2019s civil society and independent media, who are the core drivers of democratic resilience. With rising tensions and calls for snap elections, the bloc could increase support for pro-democracy movements in Serbia such as NGOs, grassroots groups, election monitors, and student groups that lead the protests.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

If it decides to remain silent, and thereby appease Vu\u010di\u0107, the EU risks losing credibility as a protector of democratic values, and further undermine its appeal among young Serbs<\/a>, who are already losing faith in the bloc. The greater risk is that Russia and China entrench in the Western Balkans as a corrupt and unpopular<\/a> government is allowed to bully its way back into office.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Andrii Vdovychenko is an emerging expert in international security. He is currently pursuing an Advanced Master of Arts in European Interdisciplinary Studies at the College of Europe in Natolin and holds a Master\u2019s in International Security and Development from Jagiellonian University. His research focuses on emerging technologies and strategic studies.<\/p>\n

Europe\u2019s Edge<\/a>\u00a0is CEPA\u2019s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe\u2019s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.\u00a0CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.<\/p>\n

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\n\t\t\tCEPA\u2019s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America.\t\t<\/p>\n

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