{"id":382373,"date":"2025-08-29T12:02:29","date_gmt":"2025-08-29T12:02:29","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/382373\/"},"modified":"2025-08-29T12:02:29","modified_gmt":"2025-08-29T12:02:29","slug":"germany-wants-to-double-its-defense-spending-where-should-the-money-go","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/382373\/","title":{"rendered":"Germany wants to double its defense spending. Where should the money go?"},"content":{"rendered":"

New Atlanticist<\/a><\/p>\n

August 28, 2025 \u2022 1:58 pm ET<\/p>\n

Print this page<\/p>\n

Germany wants to double its defense spending. Where should the money go?<\/p>\n

\n By
\n Atlantic Council experts <\/p>\n

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has pledged to revitalize Germany\u2019s military. Among other efforts, in June, Berlin announced<\/a> plans to spend nearly \u20ac650 billion over the next five years\u2014more than double its current military spending\u2014to hit NATO\u2019s spending target of 3.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on core defense requirements and transform the Bundeswehr into Europe\u2019s strongest military.\u00a0<\/p>\n

This investment is welcome news. But this shift in German defense spending is a reminder of Germany\u2019s deeply problematic and decades-long underinvestment in its defense.\u00a0<\/p>\n

For years, Germany\u2019s defense capabilities were flashing red. It was only in 2024 that Germany hit NATO\u2019s past spending target<\/a> of 2 percent of GDP, which the Alliance agreed to in 2014. This was the first time Germany had spent 2 percent of its GDP on defense since 1991. As a result of paltry spending, German land forces stand at around 50 percent<\/a> readiness. Compounding the problem are a maintenance backlog<\/a> worth billions of euros and a shortfall of about twenty thousand troops\u2014a gap likely to grow given new NATO force commitments. As it stands, Berlin lacks the personnel or the equipment to stand up the ten brigades by 2030 that it promised<\/a> to NATO\u2019s planners in 2021. Its celebrated Lithuania brigade is struggling to deploy to a friendly next-door neighbor. Earlier this year, Johann Wadephul, who is now Germany\u2019s foreign minister, lamented<\/a> that the military \u201chas nothing at all\u201d when it comes to drones.\u00a0<\/p>\n

All of this is happening at a time when Germany\u2019s strategic calculus must confront both a revisionist Russia waging a genocidal war against its neighbor\u2014and against Europe\u2019s security order\u2014and an increasingly disinterested United States, on which Germany based its security for the past seven decades. In short, Germany\u2019s defense readiness needs help, and fast.\u00a0<\/p>\n

So, what should be the priority? This was a question we posed to the Atlantic Council\u2019s Germany and defense experts, who provide ample ideas on how Germany should allocate its newfound piles of euros.\u00a0<\/p>\n

But beyond projects such as revitalizing its land, air, and naval forces, developing drone capabilities, and aiding Ukraine, what Germany needs is more than just money. If Berlin is to reassure itself, its European partners, and the United States of its newfound seriousness on defense, Germany\u2019s spending must be as strategic as it is sizable. By choosing the right priorities, Merz could mark a real turning point, ingraining a new psyche in Germany\u2019s strategic outlook. Below, our experts lay out the areas where Merz and his team should start.\u00a0<\/p>\n

\u2013J\u00f6rn Fleck<\/a> is the senior director of the Atlantic Council\u2019s Europe Center. <\/p>\n

\u2014James Batchik<\/a> is an associate director with the Atlantic Council\u2019s Europe Center.\u00a0<\/p>\n

\u2013Jack Muldoon, a young global professional with the Europe Center, supported the research for this project.<\/p>\n

\n\t\tEssays\n\t<\/p>\n

Germany must be prepared to operate in and beyond Europe<\/strong><\/p>\n

As Germany undertakes an unprecedented post-Cold War surge in defense spending, it is poised to emerge as a, if not the, top military power in Europe. For that capacity to deliver the greatest value to transatlantic security, particularly its cornerstone, NATO, Germany\u2019s armed forces must be configured to address the full spectrum of challenges emanating not just from Europe, but from around the world.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

To meet that requirement, one should recall an admonition<\/a> credited to General John J. Pershing: \u201clogistics wins wars.\u201d Germany will require a regularly exercised capacity to rapidly surge and robustly sustain significant forces to NATO\u2019s eastern frontiers amid high-intensity conflict. Progress is being made. For example, Germany is actively fulfilling a commitment to station a full brigade in Lithuania by 2027. But that progress cannot be taken for granted in a nation that recently would have struggled to deploy a single combat-ready brigade to Central and Eastern Europe.<\/p>\n

As a leading European military power, Germany must also increase its capacity to operate beyond the continent, particularly in collaboration with the United States. It must be capable, for example, of deploying and sustaining the appropriate and commensurate naval, air, and ground forces to the Indo-Pacific as part of a transatlantic response to the challenges emanating in and from that region. Threats to transatlantic interests are increasingly coming from outside of NATO\u2019s traditional area of operations. Developing logistical capabilities and adopting a mindset that recognizes this will be key to sustaining the United States\u2019 commitment to European security.<\/p>\n

\u2014Ian Brzezinski<\/a> is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy.<\/p>\n

Germany should prioritize integrated air and missile defense<\/strong><\/p>\n

As Europe\u2019s largest economy, Germany has the opportunity to make significant contributions to European security through its promise to double defense spending over the next four years. As part of this new defense spending, Germany should prioritize integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) capabilities. IAMD is a capability that the United States may look to draw down in Europe over the coming years, and it is one that NATO has identified as a priority based on defense plans adopted at the 2023 Vilnius summit.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Specifically, Germany could boost financing and capabilities for the European Sky Shield Initiative, a project aimed at building a ground-based integrated European air defense system that was originally proposed by then Chancellor Olaf Scholz in 2022. Within this architecture (now backed by more than twenty participating European nations), Germany should look to procure European long-range capabilities that the US-made Patriot system currently provides.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

\u2014Torrey Taussig<\/a> is the director of and a senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council\u2019s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Previously, Taussig was a director for European affairs on the National Security Council.<\/p>\n

Beyond money, Germany\u2019s military needs manpower, procurement reform, and innovation<\/strong><\/p>\n

Germany has taken major steps forward to boost its defense spending, but the country\u2019s military buildup still faces a broad range of needs. The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East underscore three hard military priorities: strengthening immediate combat readiness through investments in ammunition stockpiles, spare parts, and rapidly deployable small drones; developing effective counter-drone capabilities and a robust, layered air-defense system; and putting long-range precision-strike systems in place.<\/p>\n

But money and mat\u00e9riel alone don\u2019t guarantee security. For Germany\u2019s increased defense budget to translate into real capability improvements, three enabling factors are vital. First, manpower. Merz has declared<\/a> his intention to build the strongest conventional army in Europe. But recruiting and retaining the soldiers needed to make this a reality will demand new approaches and political will. The political debate on this issue is just getting started.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Procurement reform is another important factor. The new Bundeswehr Planning and Procurement Acceleration Act<\/a>, which would expedite procurement for the military, for example by raising threshold levels for simplified and direct procurement, is a welcome advance, but effective implementation is essential. The proposal has been agreed by the cabinet and is expected to be passed in the Bundestag in September. There is also a strategic opportunity for defense innovation. Germany\u2019s defense-tech startup sector is expanding rapidly, and targeted investment here could serve a double purpose: strengthening national security while building an innovative defense industrial base. Done right, increased defense spending can become a driver of readiness, technological leadership, and economic growth.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Finally, Germany must embed these priorities in a European framework. This can increase cost-effectiveness, amplify impact, and strengthen Europe\u2019s defense posture. This way, Berlin\u2019s defense investments would serve both national security and the collective strength of the European Union (EU).\u00a0<\/p>\n

\u2014Roderick Kefferp\u00fctz<\/a> is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council\u2019s Europe Center and the director of the Heinrich-B\u00f6ll-Stiftung European Union office in Brussels. The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Heinrich-B\u00f6ll-Stiftung.<\/p>\n

To enhance European security, Germany needs to respond to rising drone threats in the Baltic Sea region<\/strong><\/p>\n

The impact of Germany\u2019s increased defense spending on European security will depend not only on how it rebuilds conventional firepower\u2014through new military hardware and a larger Bundeswehr\u2014but also on its ability to counter the asymmetric, low-intensity threats gaining ground in the Baltic Sea region.<\/p>\n

A recent assessment<\/a> by Germany\u2019s Federal Criminal Police Office revealed that between January and March, 536 drones were detected over German military facilities and critical infrastructure. These include liquefied natural gas terminals in Stade, Wilhelmshaven, and Brunsb\u00fcttel, the naval base in Wilhelmshaven, and the US Air Base at Ramstein. Some incidents involved swarms of up to fifteen drones, and several used custom-built or military-grade platforms invisible to standard detection systems. These figures highlight a growing vulnerability in Germany\u2019s defensive posture at home.<\/p>\n

This same threat profile is shaping NATO\u2019s eastern flank, where Germany\u2019s soon-to-be forward-deployed brigade in Lithuania will face a real operational test. In July, two Russian drones crossed into Lithuania from Belarus\u2014one unarmed<\/a>, the other carrying explosives<\/a>. It is not clear whether they were sent into Lithuanian territory intentionally as part of Russia\u2019s strategy of using provocations to test allied defenses and identify vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, the incidents illustrate how unmanned systems can blur escalation thresholds, gather intelligence, and undermine readiness without triggering an immediate military response.<\/p>\n

For Berlin, this is more than a procurement challenge\u2014it is a credibility test. As NATO\u2019s framework nation in Lithuania and a logistical hub for allied forces in Central and Eastern Europe, Germany must demonstrate that it can protect its troops abroad and safeguard critical infrastructure at home, all while fulfilling its formal security commitments to Lithuania. This requires accelerated investment in advanced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (known as ISR), as well as layered counter-UAV systems capable of detecting incursions and defending both military and civilian facilities. Failing to address these capability gaps risks leaving NATO\u2019s front line exposed and Germany\u2019s leadership role in question.<\/p>\n

\u2014Justina Budginaite-Froehly<\/a>, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council\u2019s Europe Center and Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Modernization is the Luftwaffe\u2019s top priority<\/strong><\/p>\n

The German Air Force, or Luftwaffe, is well positioned to convert increased defense spending into a modernized and relevant fighting force for the decades to come. Historically known for low aircraft readiness rates<\/a>, the Luftwaffe must prioritize air power investments to prove it does not intend to be a hollow force.<\/p>\n

The Luftwaffe\u2019s first priorities are onboarding the F-35<\/a> fighter jet in 2026 and retiring its oldest Tornado fighters. This will mark Germany\u2019s transformation into a fifth-generation air force and demonstrate Berlin\u2019s commitment to NATO\u2019s nuclear deterrence mission. The Luftwaffe also intends to retire older Tornado jets designed for electronic warfare and replace them with unique Eurofighter<\/a> variants.<\/p>\n

Germany is a European trendsetter for the incorporation of unmanned Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA), also known as the \u201cloyal wingman,\u201d into its airforce, aiming to field this capability by 2029. The Germans have already signed several CCA industrial collaboration projects, and there are discussions about more. The Luftwaffe clearly seeks to obtain affordable airpower mass through CCA. Investments in autonomy and artificial intelligence (AI) will also be central to these projects.<\/p>\n

Collaboration with France on the Future Combat Air System (FCAS<\/a>), the three-nation (along with Spain) project to field a sixth-generation fighter jet with associated collaborative unmanned platforms, remains the Luftwaffe\u2019s biggest risk. The well-publicized Franco-German disagreements over the FCAS project,<\/a> fueled by an alleged French desire to take over a greater share of the program, will force Germany to reflect deeply on the political and military value of FCAS cooperation. Talks of an additional<\/a> German F-35 purchase shows that the Luftwaffe may be hedging its investment strategy. Solving this dilemma will be among the top German defense priorities over the next four years.<\/p>\n

\u2014Andrew Bernard<\/a> is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council\u2019s Europe Center.<\/p>\n

Germany must reimagine its strategic doctrine and industrial base<\/strong><\/p>\n

Under Merz, Germany\u2019s record \u20ac108.2\u202fbillion<\/a> 2026 defense budget marks a historic shift, supporting a long-term Bundeswehr buildup and redefining Germany\u2019s role in European security and NATO. In today\u2019s disruptive security environment, Germany\u2019s top defense priority<\/a> should be to reimagine the country\u2019s strategic doctrine and industrial base, focusing on four main areas.\u00a0<\/p>\n

First, create a mobile and scalable force by enhancing military capabilities, modernizing the Bundeswehr, boosting readiness, and expanding personnel. The 2026 budget provides<\/a> for ten thousand new soldiers and two thousand civilian posts. The focus should now be on building a more technologically advanced military, which requires investments in cybersecurity, AI, and space technologies to position the country at the forefront of next-generation warfare.<\/p>\n

Second, strengthen the defense industrial base<\/a>. Germany can accomplish this by boosting domestic production capabilities, fostering innovation and cutting-edge technologies, securing stable supply chains, promoting a skilled workforce, and providing sustainable funding. The newly established \u201cSonderverm\u00f6gen,\u201d fund, which provides for a \u20ac500 billion<\/a> Infrastructure Special Budget, can be used for defense industry as well as strategic infrastructure and energy.<\/p>\n

Third, deepen Germany\u2019s European and transatlantic cooperation. Germany is already involved in initiatives such as the European Sky Shield, which is aimed at creating a continent-wide air defense system, as well as strategic deterrence talks with France and the United Kingdom. Such initiatives highlight Germany\u2019s role in safeguarding sovereignty, supporting EU strategic responsibility, and reinforcing NATO cohesion.<\/p>\n

Finally, Germany must build institutional and societal resilience to address traditional and hybrid threats, which will require enhancing comprehensive crisis management capabilities.<\/p>\n

Above all, security and modernization should become societal priorities, extending beyond finances and new technologies to embrace a shift in mindset and public discourse. There needs to be a broad acceptance in Germany and in Europe that, in the words<\/a> of German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier, \u201ctoday, a badly armed Germany is a greater threat to Europe than a strongly armed Germany.\u201d At stake is not only Germany\u2019s credibility but the future of European and transatlantic security.<\/p>\n

\u2014Valbona Zeneli<\/a> is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council\u2019s Europe Center and the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.<\/p>\n

Merz has shown that Germany understands the Russian threat to Europe<\/strong><\/p>\n

Merz is reasserting German primacy in Europe, and that\u2019s a good thing. For far too long, Europe\u2019s largest economy has come up with weak excuses for why it could not provide more military aid to Ukraine and ramp up defense production. Merz well understands the Russian threat to Europe, risks to the transatlantic alliance from Washington, and the economic opportunities that come from Germany taking a leading role as a European defense hub. And most importantly, he\u2019s prepared to do something about it.<\/p>\n

The most significant of these factors is just how brutal and expansive Russia\u2019s war on Ukraine has been\u2014killing thousands of civilians, deliberately launching missiles at schools\u2014and how Moscow has extended the war into Europe in the form of hybrid attacks, including a foiled assassination plot<\/a> against the CEO of Rheinmetall. This has forced many countries to wake up to what a Russian attack on a NATO country could look like. In Berlin, this has motivated the Merz government to take on greater responsibility for Europe\u2019s defense and pursue the economic benefits of reindustrialization. Removing the debt brake was a major positive step toward unlocking domestic investment and opening Germany up to further investment and credit from both European partners and the United States.<\/p>\n

\u2014Andrew D\u2019Anieri<\/a> is the associate director of the Atlantic Council\u2019s Eurasia Center. Find him on X at @andrew_danieri<\/a>.<\/p>\n

A renewed Zeitenwende must prioritize innovation, cooperation with Ukraine, and munitions<\/strong><\/p>\n

The Merz government\u2019s \u20ac500 billion Bundeswehr plan (2025\u20132035) could transform the Zeitenwende, the policy seachange in defense and security policy announced by the previous German government, into a lasting military modernization. This transformation can best be pursued by tackling these three priorities.<\/p>\n

First, a mentality shift. Investment must reflect warfare in the digital age. The German government should work with the L\u00e4nder to roll back restrictive Zivilklauseln at universities, policies that limit defense-related research. New entrants such as Quantum Systems (UAVs), ARX Robotics (autonomous vehicles), and STARK (loitering munitions) thrive at the civilian-military edge. Defining dual-use projects more broadly would enable seamless innovation in biotech, AI, and cyber. Procurement must reward fast development cycles: today a new drone can be iterated in six weeks, while Bundeswehr systems have been known to take thirteen years<\/a> from concept to fielding.<\/p>\n

Second, Ukraine. Germany\u2019s modernization efforts should deepen defense-industrial ties through joint ventures and coproduction in first-person-view drones, naval unmanned surface vehicles, electronic warfare, and command-and-control software. Ukraine produces tens of thousands of drones monthly and leads in battlefield electronic warfare\u2014capabilities Germany lacks. German capital and contracts could scale Bundeswehr stockpiles while boosting Ukraine\u2019s economy.<\/p>\n

Third, munitions. Germany must help close a 155mm shell gap (NATO estimates<\/a> an annual shortfall of more than two million shells). Repurposing idle automotive plants for artillery and medium-caliber rounds could boost output while preserving industrial jobs, learning from Ukraine\u2019s ability to rapidly retool factories under fire.<\/p>\n

\u2014Tyson Barker<\/a> is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council\u2019s Europe Center.\u00a0<\/p>\n

To keep the US engaged, Germany must become a leader in European defense<\/strong><\/p>\n

The era of European security dependence on the United States has permanently ended, making Germany\u2019s future strategic choices critical for sustaining the strength of NATO. As Europe\u2019s economic powerhouse, Germany must embrace this transformation and prioritize security capabilities that simultaneously cement Europe\u2019s strategic autonomy and bolster the transatlantic partnership. This is no easy task.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Germany should first focus on becoming a regional leader in European defense. Its commitment to deploy 4,800 soldiers<\/a> to Lithuania by 2027 should expand into permanent command structures coordinating multinational forces across NATO\u2019s eastern flank. Depending on what comes of the negotiations for a potential cease-fire in Ukraine, Germany must also ensure it is contributing to whatever European forces may be present in or near Ukraine to enforce an eventual peace agreement. This would demonstrate to US policymakers from both parties that Europe, and Germany in particular, accepts primary regional responsibility for security, providing strategic flexibility for US forces to address Indo-Pacific challenges.<\/p>\n

Germany should also adopt a defense industrial integration strategy that balances capability expansion with continued US cooperation. There\u2019s an understandable desire and need for Germany\u2019s defense industry to build its own indigenous security identity. Simultaneously, however, Germany should enhance production and cooperation through joint ventures and coordinated procurement with the United States. This cooperation would ensure that the transatlantic partners can maintain defense industrial ties that will survive political transitions.<\/p>\n

These priorities, which are by no means exhaustive, will help transform Germany from a security consumer to a capable partner, creating structural incentives for sustained US engagement. There truly is no returning to the previous US-Germany defense paradigm. To ensure that cooperation with Germany remains strategically compelling for future US administrations across party lines, Germany must both lead on European defense and maintain transatlantic defense integration.<\/p>\n

\u2014Rachel Rizzo<\/a> is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council\u2019s Europe Center.\u00a0<\/p>\n

\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\"\"\t\t\t\t<\/a><\/p>\n

\t\t\t<\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tTrackers and Data Visualizations\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/p>\n

\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tJun 20, 2025<\/p>\n

\t\t\t\tNATO Defense Spending Tracker<\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tBy
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tKristen Taylor\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t\t\tThe Transatlantic Security Initiative\u2019s NATO defense spending tracker delves into data and figures to analyze current defense spending trends.\t\t\t\t<\/p>\n

\t\t\t<\/a><\/p>\n

Further reading<\/p>\n

\n Related Experts:
\n J\u00f6rn Fleck<\/a>,
\n Ian Brzezinski<\/a>,
\n Torrey Taussig<\/a>,
\n Roderick Kefferp\u00fctz<\/a>,
\n Justina Budginaite-Froehly<\/a>,
\n Andrew Bernard<\/a>,
\n Valbona Zeneli<\/a>,
\n Andrew D\u2019Anieri<\/a>,
\n Tyson Barker<\/a>,
\n Rachel Rizzo<\/a>, and
\n James Batchik<\/a>\n <\/p>\n

Image: The Federal Chancellor in conversation with navy servicemen and women Chancellor Friedrich Merzs inaugural visit to the German Navy Frigate Bayern on the Baltic Sea , Rostock Warnem\u00fcnde Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania Germany Frigate Bayern on the Baltic Sea REUTERS<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"New Atlanticist August 28, 2025 \u2022 1:58 pm ET Print this page Germany wants to double its defense…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":382374,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5310],"tags":[2000,299,1824],"class_list":{"0":"post-382373","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-germany","8":"tag-eu","9":"tag-europe","10":"tag-germany"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/115111955520461069","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/382373","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=382373"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/382373\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/382374"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=382373"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=382373"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=382373"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}