Since the end of Yugoslavia\u2019s breakup wars in 2001, Russia pursued a policy aimed at strengthening its ties to Serbia. The foundation of the bilateral closeness between Serbia and Russia lies in their historical \u2018Slavic Orthodox\u2019 connection. Serbia\u2019s advantageous geographic location and the strong ethnic Serb community across the Western Balkans also make Serbia an attractive Western Balkan partner for Russia. Serbia can indeed be considered a centre of gravity for Russian influence in the entire Western Balkan region.\u00a0<\/p>\n
Russia recognized Serbia\u2019s historic position as one of the most influential countries in the Western Balkans and realized it could use the Kosovo\u2013Serbia dispute as leverage to keep Belgrade within its sphere of influence. The 1999 NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia, launched to end the Kosovo War, also strengthened Russia\u2019s ties with Serbia. Notably, the intervention\u2014conducted without a UN Security Council mandate\u2014was perceived in Moscow as a signal that its interests would no longer be taken seriously in international decision-making.<\/p>\n
In 2008, Russia sided with Serbia in not recognizing Kosovo\u2019s independence, while also barring Kosovo from joining international organizations. Serbia is until this day actively pursuing a policy not to accept Kosovo\u2019s independence, owing to its historical and cultural ties to the country, and to preserve the rights of the ethnic Serb population (particularly in northern Kosovo). The Serbian Orthodox Church also actively seeks support from the larger Russian Orthodox Church for its claims in Kosovo, which is home to some of the Serbian Orthodoxy\u2019s most sacred religious sites. This current \u2018status quo\u2019 between Kosovo and Serbia has, however, detrimental repercussions for Serbia\u2019s EU accession, as the country must normalize its relations with Kosovo as a key condition for EU membership.\u00a0<\/p>\n
\n\u2018Russia recognized Serbia\u2019s historic position as one of the most influential countries in the Western Balkans\u2019<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
Russia so far consistently reaffirmed its willingness to provide Serbia with assurances to block Kosovo\u2019s endeavours in achieving full international recognition. It needs to be stressed that this phenomenon also bolsters the appeal of Russia within Serbian society. This in turn complicates the ability of any Serbian government to adopt anti-Russian measures. Such actions would be indeed politically perilous in light of the Serbian government\u2019s need to avoid the appearance of being less committed than Russia to defend Serbia\u2019s \u2018territorial integrity\u2019\u2014also regarding the Kosovo issue.\u00a0<\/p>\n
Kosovo\u2019s independence also influenced Russia\u2019s historical narrative regarding the annexation of Crimea in 2014, which followed a Russian military incursion and a referendum. The document declaring Crimea\u2019s independence explicitly references the Kosovo precedent and Kosovo\u2019s declaration of independence as a justification for seceding from Ukraine. Crimea was subsequently integrated into the Russian Federation.\u00a0<\/p>\n
Russia\u2019s endeavours to maintain close relations to Serbia are however not unilateral\u2014Serbia is also pursuing a foreign policy aimed at maintaining close relations with Russia. The Serbian government is particularly interested in sourcing inexpensive gas supplies from Russia, in addition to requiring Russia\u2019s diplomatic support on Kosovo.\u00a0<\/p>\n
\n\u2018Russia\u2019s endeavours to maintain close relations to Serbia are\u2026not unilateral\u2019<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
After Russia\u2019s military invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Serbia realized the necessity to further diversify its energy supplies. In 2023, Serbia agreed to import additional gas volumes from Azerbaijan and completed the Serbia\u2013Bulgaria gas interconnection, linking the country to the Southern Gas Corridor and the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), to open Serbia\u2019s gas market for non-Russian gas sources. Despite the fact that Serbia is attempting to diversify its energy supplies, Russia still dominates as a gas supplier\u2014with 92 per cent of Serbia\u2019s gas imports originating from Russia in the first half of 2024.<\/p>\n
Serbia is evidently still eager to source its gas supplies from Russia. This was seen in May 2025, after the Serbian government decided to extend its natural gas supply agreement with the Russian state energy company Gazprom until the end of September 2025. Serbia is also interested in negotiating a new long-term agreement with Gazprom to replace its existing three-year supply contract, which expired in May 2025. Serbian President Vu\u010di\u0107 noted that Serbia has already launched negotiations for a new long-term gas supply contract with Russia, to cover 85 per cent of the country\u2019s total gas needs.<\/p>\n
The close relation between Serbia and Russia is overall contradicting Serbia\u2019s commitment to harmonize its foreign and security policies with the EU, according to the Stabilization and Association Agreement Serbia signed with the EU in 2008. It is important to mention that since the launch of Russia\u2019s military invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Serbia has denounced Russia\u2019s assault on Ukraine at the UN General Assembly. Nevertheless, Serbia simultaneously reiterates its neutrality towards Russia\u2014so far it also refused to join the EU in imposing sanctions on the country.<\/p>\n
\n\u2018It would be very na\u00efve to assume that Russia will willingly relinquish its deep-rooted influence over Serbia\u2019<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
Serbia\u2019s location in the Western Balkans combined with the country\u2019s political influence make it one of the most important actors in the region. It is no secret that the EU perceives Serbia as a crucial partner for its endeavours to facilitate the Western Balkan region\u2019s integration into the EU bloc. The EU\u2019s geopolitical resilience in the region depends on maintaining close ties with Belgrade. However, it would be very na\u00efve to assume that Russia will willingly relinquish its deep-rooted influence over Serbia. It should be kept in mind that Serbia\u2019s close relations to Russia had been forged over centuries\u2014through a shared Slavic heritage, Orthodox traditions, and mutual political support. This bilateral relationship has proven remarkably resilient in view of recent shifting geopolitical realities. The bottom line here is readily apparent, namely that Serbia\u2019s close relations with Russia cannot simply be undone through external pressure.\u00a0<\/p>\n
If the EU truly aims to limit Russian leverage in Serbia, it must first acknowledge that it cannot simply erase these ties. The EU bloc should rather offer Serbia a compelling and credible alternative as a member within the European framework\u2014one that aligns with Serbia\u2019s interests, safeguards its energy needs, and addresses its concerns over territorial integrity, also by facilitating a normalization of Kosovo\u2013Serbia relations. Only by pairing strategic pragmatism with a realistic appreciation of history can the EU foster an enduring partnership with Serbia and, in doing so, reinforce its position in the Western Balkans.<\/p>\n
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