{"id":395691,"date":"2025-09-03T22:44:14","date_gmt":"2025-09-03T22:44:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/395691\/"},"modified":"2025-09-03T22:44:14","modified_gmt":"2025-09-03T22:44:14","slug":"ukraine-war-why-putin-isnt-willing-to-give-up","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/395691\/","title":{"rendered":"Ukraine war: Why Putin isn\u2019t willing to give up"},"content":{"rendered":"

At the height of the Iraq war, bloggers coined the term \u201cFriedman unit<\/a>\u201d in reference to the New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman\u2019s habit of claiming that the next six months would be critical in determining the outcome of the conflict.<\/p>\n

Everything has sped up quite a bit in our post-Twitter era, so perhaps it\u2019s appropriate that the Ukraine war equivalent \u2014 the Trump unit \u2014 is only two weeks. President Donald Trump said last month he would give Russian President Vladimir Putin a \u201ccouple of weeks\u201d to take serious steps toward ending the war before he imposed new penalties on Russia. \u201cI\u2019ll know in two weeks what I\u2019m going to do,\u201d he told CNN<\/a>. Trump has previously given Putin two more weeks<\/a> in April, May, and July<\/a>. (This is not the only issue<\/a> that Trump has promised to resolve in a fortnight.)<\/p>\n

Trump had promised to end the war within 24 hours of taking office, and eight months later, there appear to be two constants: Trump\u2019s frustration that Putin might be \u201ctapping me along<\/a>\u201d as he continues to launch attacks on Ukrainian cities, and his seemingly unshakeable faith that Putin is serious about making peace \u2014 in which case, a resolution to the war may be just around the corner.<\/p>\n

\u201cI think [Putin] wants to make a deal for me, you understand, as crazy as it sounds,\u201d he told French President Emanuel Macron<\/a> in a hot mic moment at the White House on August 18. Two weeks later, he declared himself \u201cvery disappointed<\/a>\u201d in Putin.<\/p>\n

None of this is to say that talks with Russia are pointless; even the most fleeting chance of a negotiated outcome should be explored. But the unfortunate fact is that there\u2019s a high likelihood this war will continue for quite some time.<\/p>\n

Where are each nation\u2019s red lines?<\/p>\n

The biggest change in the war since Trump took office is that the two sides are talking. US officials have been holding direct talks with their Russian counterparts over Ukraine<\/a> since February, a reversal of the Joe Biden-era mantra that there would be no talks \u201cabout Ukraine without Ukraine.\u201d Russia and Ukraine have also held their first direct talks since the first weeks of the war<\/a>, agreeing to several prisoner swaps, but making little progress toward a ceasefire.<\/p>\n

There\u2019s been some softening of the Ukrainian position. It was once an article of faith in Kyiv that it would not agree to an end to the war until Russian troops were expelled from all of Ukraine\u2019s internationally recognized territory. But now, Ukrainian leaders are pushing for a ceasefire that would leave a significant portion of its territory under Russian occupation, with hopes it could be regained later. Battlefield realities probably would have dictated this shift no matter who was in the White House, but Trump\u2019s desire for a quick end to the war, and Ukraine\u2019s need to keep him mollified, probably hastened it.<\/p>\n

As for Russia, while even Putin may accept now that his military is unlikely to topple Ukraine\u2019s government entirely, it\u2019s not at all clear that he\u2019s backed down on demands that would essentially turn Ukraine into a subservient satellite state. Moscow has demanded that Ukraine not only give up territory<\/a> currently under Russian control but that it cede additional territory that Russia has claimed but not yet conquered. Other recently reported demands include international recognition of Russia\u2019s territorial claims<\/a>, Ukraine\u2019s political neutrality, and restrictions on its military and the international military aid it receives. These might just be maximalist negotiating positions, but some Russian observers say there are red lines Putin is unlikely ever to budge on.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe unfortunate reality is that we haven\u2019t really learned very much [about Russia\u2019s willingness to compromise], and that we\u2019re basically in the same position that we were prior to the flurry of diplomacy, and maybe even slightly worse off,\u201d said Andrea Kendall-Taylor, director of the Transatlantic Security Program and the Center for a New American Security.<\/p>\n

\u201cIn this kind of war, you can either win or you lose, and if you lose, it\u2019s disastrous for Russia.\u201d<\/p>\n

\u2014 Andrei Soldatov, Russian journalist and analyst<\/p>\n

Since Trump\u2019s Alaska summit with Putin<\/a> and his meeting in Washington<\/a> with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Europe\u2019s leaders, much of the discussion in European capitals has been around future security guarantees for Ukraine, including what are reportedly \u201cpretty precise plans<\/a>\u201d for post-conflict troop deployments to back up those guarantees. Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio have said the US would provide some backing for these guarantees, though not \u201cboots on the ground<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n

Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov has stressed, however, that Russia wants to be part of the discussions over security guarantees<\/a>, that it wants its ally China as one of the guarantors, and that there must be no foreign troops deployed to Ukraine. As such, all the discussions in Washington, Kyiv, and European capitals over what form these guarantees will take are still a bit theoretical.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe whole question about foreign soldiers on Ukrainian soil, it\u2019s just absolutely a no-go for the Kremlin,\u201d said Andrei Soldatov, a Russian journalist and analyst based in the United Kingdom at the Center for European Policy Analysis. Putin \u201cwould fight until the last soldier against it.\u201d<\/p>\n

Putin has repeatedly said that the \u201croot causes<\/a>\u201d of the conflict need to be addressed, by which he means NATO expansion and the 2014 overthrow of Ukraine\u2019s Russian-backed government<\/a>, which he describes as a Western-backed \u201ccoup d\u2019\u00e9tat<\/a>.\u201d This is, in other words, about much more than \u201cland swapping<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n

Soldatov says the stakes of this conflict for Russian leaders who saw the breakup of the Soviet Union in the years following the Cold War as a period of humiliating defeat for Russia, should not be underestimated.<\/p>\n

\u201cThey believe that this is an existential war, and not just with Ukraine, but with the West as well,\u201d he said. \u201cIn this kind of war, you can either win or you lose, and if you lose, it\u2019s disastrous for Russia.\u201d<\/p>\n

All that being said, Russia is more than willing to continue to participate in negotiations, if only because Trump has been repeatedly unwilling to impose any serious consequences on Russia so long as it is nominally involved in the peace process.<\/p>\n

\u201cPutin thinks he has solved the Trump problem,\u201d John Herbst, a former US ambassador to Ukraine now at the Atlantic Council, told Vox. \u201cTrump has allowed his red lines to be crossed without taking any steps.\u201d<\/p>\n

Does Putin have a breaking point?<\/p>\n

If Putin doesn\u2019t actually want to make a deal just to do Trump a solid, could he be coerced through more pressure?<\/p>\n

In recent days, the administration has touted its tariffs on India (White House spokesperson Karoline Leavitt called them \u201csanctions,\u201d a fairly incendiary term in New Delhi<\/a>) as evidence that the US is getting serious about dialing up the pressure. The road to peace runs, at least partly, right through New Delhi,\u201d said Trump\u2019s trade adviser Peter Navarro<\/a>.<\/p>\n

This is an odd stance: It\u2019s true that India now buys a significant amount of oil from Russia, but China buys even more<\/a>, and the administration has been notably quieter about that. In any event, the tariffs seem to have pushed India closer to China<\/a> rather than away from Russia.<\/p>\n

There\u2019s little bilateral trade to speak of between the US and Russia, so Trump\u2019s preferred pressure tactic \u2014 tariffs \u2014 isn\u2019t well-suited for pressuring Putin. Experts say there are additional steps the US could take, such as cracking down more on the \u201cshadow fleet\u201d of oil tankers<\/a> transporting Russian crude around the world in violation of wWestern restrictions, or seizing Russia\u2019s frozen sovereign assets<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Trump has also suggested removing restrictions on Ukraine\u2019s long-range strikes<\/a> into Russia, which are having an impact on Russia\u2019s domestic energy supply<\/a>. He has called Biden incompetent for not allowing Ukraine to \u201cfight back,\u201d which is notably not what he was saying at the time<\/a>.<\/p>\n

But Samuel Charap, a former State Department staffer now at the RAND Corporation, is skeptical of calls to dial up the pressure.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe bottom line is that there is not a plausible pain threshold that we could cross that would make Putin fundamentally alter his approach to Ukraine,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n

What could presumably give Ukraine as much if not more leverage than any new weapons system or capability or sanctions program, is simply confidence that American assistance will continue. There have been some brief pauses in weapons deliveries to Ukraine<\/a> as well as intelligence sharing since Trump took office, and it was recently reported that the Pentagon has been blocking Ukraine\u2019s use of long-range missiles<\/a>.<\/p>\n

For the time being, so long as Europe pays for the weapons<\/a>, and so long as a Nobel-worthy peace deal looms, Trump seems inclined not to abandon Ukraine entirely. (His vice president may be a different story<\/a>.) But there\u2019s no guarantee that Trump won\u2019t have a change of heart, and that alone is incentive for Russia to keep up the fight.<\/p>\n

\u201cI do think, from the Russian perspective, that there\u2019s still maybe some hope that Trump is going to grow frustrated with this process and walk away,\u201d said Kendall-Taylor of the Center for a New American Security.<\/p>\n

Even if talks lead to peace, it\u2019s going to take a while<\/p>\n

RAND\u2019s Charap, who has been a leading proponent of negotiations since the early days of the war, says we\u2019re still not far enough along into the process to know if there\u2019s a chance for a negotiated settlement. He points out that it took hundreds of meetings to negotiate the armistice that ended the Korean War, and 22 months to negotiate the Good Friday Accords in Northern Ireland. Though Trump has put great emphasis on holding a three-way summit between himself, Putin, and Zelenskyy, the details of these agreements tend to be hammered out over months in much less high profile meetings by much lower level officials. (Trump\u2019s staff cuts have thinned<\/a> out the ranks<\/a> of Russia experts at the State Department, National Security Council, and CIA.)<\/p>\n

\u201cWe\u2019ve seen that Russia is willing to talk,\u201d Charap said. \u201cWhether or not they\u2019re willing to end the war on terms that are acceptable to that Ukraine can live with \u2014 we\u2019ve yet to fully test that proposition.\u201d Testing that proposition, he emphasizes, will take time and patience.<\/p>\n

But how much time does Ukraine have? <\/p>\n

Russia continues to make steady gains on the battlefield<\/a>, albeit at a grindingly slow pace with shockingly high casualty rates. The unfortunate fact, though, is that Russia simply has more people and materiel to throw into the fight and \u2014 North Korea\u2019s soldiers and munitions notwithstanding \u2014 is less concerned about international support. The Alaska summit followed by this past week\u2019s shindig in Beijing<\/a> showed that international efforts to isolate Putin are breaking down. Despite efforts to ramp up production in the US and Europe, Russia is still producing far more ammunition<\/a> than its Western rivals, which \u2014 despite the justified attention<\/a> given to high-tech drones \u2014 is still the key variable for a long, drawn-out war of attrition like this one. Even as the talks have drawn on, Russia has only intensified its efforts to gain ground on the battlefield and inflict damage on Ukrainian cities.<\/p>\n

Past examples also suggest Putin may have time on his side. One widely cited study published in 1998 examining wars between democracies and autocracies<\/a> in the 19th and 20th centuries found that once conflicts reached the 18-month mark, the \u201cadvantage in fighting passes to the autocratic state.\u201d Why? States where leaders are less beholden to public opinion, less concerned about casualties, and more able to turn their entire domestic economy into a war machine tend to have the advantage<\/a>.<\/p>\n

This war passed that point 24 months ago. While Putin may eventually cut a deal, in all likelihood, he\u2019s far from finished.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"At the height of the Iraq war, bloggers coined the term \u201cFriedman unit\u201d in reference to the New…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":395692,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[7655],"tags":[32,285,332,7661,8048],"class_list":{"0":"post-395691","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-russia","8":"tag-donald-trump","9":"tag-politics","10":"tag-russia","11":"tag-russia-ukraine-war","12":"tag-world-politics"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/115142791152477927","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/395691","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=395691"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/395691\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/395692"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=395691"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=395691"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=395691"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}