What\u2019s in doubt is whether growing common cause among European leaders and significant increases in European defense spending can unfold quickly enough to save Ukraine without significant help from the U.S. It also remains to be seen if these factors can restore deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic area to discourage a Russian threat materializing before 2030.<\/p>\n
These days, deterrence must also account for the so-called \u201cgrey zone.\u201d Russia is already eroding NATO\u2019s Article 5 commitment to mutual defense through attacks that fall into this hybrid category, all designed to weaken resolve without triggering a conventional military response. And it is likely to escalate such calibrated provocations including, for example, undersea cable sabotage, cyberattacks on power grids or missile \u201caccidents\u201d near NATO territory. All this is a deliberate strategy to expand Moscow\u2019s influence.<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, on the battlefield in Ukraine, we\u2019re seeing a mix of World War I and World War III \u2014 a real-time case study foreshadowing some aspects of future warfare. Over the last few years, we have witnessed how fast the character of conflict evolves, and how the boundaries between land, sea, air, space and cyberspace fade as we seek to integrate these domains for advantage.<\/p>\n
Here, many rightly point to Ukraine\u2019s ingenuity in adapting under fire, but Russia has innovated at equal speed and scale: deploying cheap drones, electromagnetic jamming, AI-enabled targeting and retooling its economy into an engine of war. This year alone, the country will produce 1,500 tanks, 3,000 armored vehicles and 200 ballistic missiles<\/a> \u2014 matching NATO\u2019s annual output in a matter of months.<\/p>\n