Manchester United recorded the highest revenues in the club\u2019s history last season despite not competing in the Champions League, yet still posted a sixth consecutive annual loss.<\/p>\n
The Old Trafford club\u2019s 2024-25 financial results reveal that total revenues stood at \u00a3666.5m after significant increases in matchday and commercial income.<\/p>\n
Matchday takings rose to \u00a3160.3m \u2014 a record for an English team \u2014 and commercial income hit \u00a3333.3m, to offset declining broadcasting income from the failure to qualify for the Champions League.<\/p>\n
United nevertheless recorded a loss of \u00a333m last season \u2014 down from a \u00a3113.2m in the previous year, but still representing their sixth straight year in the red.<\/p>\n
And despite record turnover last season, United\u2019s announcement details an expected drop in income this season, with revenue forecast at between \u00a3640m and \u00a3660m for 2025-26.<\/p>\n
United\u2019s top line is expected to suffer from a first season without European football in over a decade. The projected drop is however less than the club earned from a run to this year\u2019s Europa League final, meaning revenue improvements elsewhere are built into club forecasts.<\/p>\n
Sir Jim Ratcliffe, United\u2019s minority owner, has overseen a range of cost-cutting measures since acquiring control of the club\u2019s day-to-day business from the Glazer family in a bid to make the club profitable again.<\/p>\n
A restructuring programme \u2014 which saw up to 450 job cuts \u2014 and no Champions League qualification was responsible for United\u2019s wage bill falling to \u00a3313.2m, its lowest level since the 2019-2020 season.<\/p>\n
Yet United\u2019s exceptional costs stood at \u00a336.6m following the dismissal of manager Erik ten Hag and his staff, as well as the restructuring of the club\u2019s operations.<\/p>\n
Earlier this year, Ratcliffe claimed that United were at risk of \u201crunning out of money\u201d by Christmas if they did not cut costs across the club\u2019s operations.<\/p>\n
United\u2019s cash reserves stood at \u00a386.1m at the end of June, although only after an \u00a380m injection of Ratcliffe\u2019s own money at the turn of the year.<\/p>\n
United spent \u00a3279m in cash on gross transfer payments for players last season \u2014 a single-season club record by nearly \u00a360m.<\/p>\n
In an interview with BBC Sport earlier this year, Ratcliffe lamented the amount of money United were still paying in installments for players signed in previous years.<\/p>\n
\u201cIf you look at the players we are buying this summer, that we didn\u2019t buy, we\u2019re buying Antony, we\u2019re buying Casemiro, we\u2019re buying (Andre) Onana, we\u2019re buying (Rasmus) Hojlund, we\u2019re buying (Jadon) Sancho,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n
United\u2019s gross debt totalled \u00a3637.0m \u2014 up from \u00a3546.6m, in part due to borrowing a net figure of \u00a3130m from their revolving credit facility over the course of the year.<\/p>\n
United did not make any further drawdown on their revolving credit facility between March and the end of June, although the imminent, more detailed annual report may reveal borrowings beyond that date.<\/p>\n
United\u2019s pre-tax loss \u2014 the starting point for calculations under the Premier League\u2019s profit and sustainability rules \u2013 stood at \u00a339.7m last season.<\/p>\n
However, as revealed by The Athletic<\/a>, United\u2019s PSR calculations are based on accounts of subsidiary company Red Football Ltd, rather than these results at the New York Stock Exchange-listed plc.<\/p>\n \u2018Cost cuts negated by expensive mistakes\u2019<\/p>\n Analysis by football finance writer Chris Weatherspoon<\/p>\n United posting record revenues in a year without Champions League football reinforces a message long known: they are not like other clubs.<\/p>\n Even as broadcast income fell \u00a348.8m, United still booked \u00a3666.5m turnover, the third highest figure ever for an English club. Only Manchester City have previously surpassed that figure, in both 2022-23 and 2023-24.<\/p>\n There is a caveat. For all United\u2019s revenue growth is newsworthy, years of poor on-field performance are catching up with them. While we can\u2019t say for certain until others release 2024-25 financials, United are likely to have dropped to at least third, and possibly fourth, when it comes to revenue rankings in England. Liverpool are expected to have joined City in topping \u00a3700m turnover; Arsenal may also have gone past United\u2019s top line figure.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n If they have, it will be the first time in the Premier League era United\u2019s revenue has been outside the top three, and only the second time outside the top two. In the current 2025-26 season, United project flat or even declining revenues, underscoring how poor performance is now allowing several rivals to overtake them financially.<\/p>\n Things would have been worse without improvements elsewhere. Commercial income grew by 10 per cent and United\u2019s matchday income of \u00a3160.3m is a club and English record by a long way, \u00a323.2m (17 per cent) higher than 2023-24.<\/p>\n Yet that still highlights the damage of no European football. United played 30 games at Old Trafford last season, generating \u00a35.3m in matchday income per game, a drop on the \u00a35.5m of a year earlier. Average matchday takings are however up \u00a31.2m (29 per cent) since 2022-23, because of increased ticket prices.<\/p>\n Job cuts have been the big story at United since Ratcliffe arrived in February 2024 and, on the face of it, a \u00a351.5m (14 per cent) reduction in the wage bill reflects the significant redundancy programme undertaken at Old Trafford.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Yet that drop is also attributable to a lack of Champions League bonuses and, what\u2019s more, is actually smaller than the \u00a352.8m fall in the wage bill which occurred the last time United missed out on the Champions League in 2022-23.<\/p>\n Moreover, United\u2019s bottom line continued to suffer from poor decision-making. Sacking Erik ten Hag and staff cost \u00a310.4m in October 2024, less than four months after the club triggered a contract extension. Removing Dan Ashworth after just five months<\/a> as sporting director cost a further \u00a34.1m.<\/p>\n Cost cuts have made a difference, but their impact is negated by expensive mistakes.<\/p>\n Player amortisation costs rose to over \u00a3190m, reflecting how much United continue to spend on transfers. Only Chelsea have topped that figure in England before.<\/p>\n United\u2019s transfer debt number won\u2019t be released until the full accounts are, but the drain on resources of heavy spending is clear from Wednesday\u2019s announcement. United spent \u00a3279m cash on transfer fees across 2024-25, nearly \u00a360m more than their previous high mark in 2019-20.<\/p>\n Among English sides, only Chelsea and possibly Manchester City (who no longer publish a cash flow statement) have ever paid out more in a single year than United did last season. Unlike those two, United have relatively little coming back the other way. Their net cash spend on transfers in 2024-25 was \u00a3230m, taking their five-year net transfer outflow to \u00a3685.5m.<\/p>\n Financial debt is never far from the conversation about United\u2019s finances but, at least for today, there\u2019s nothing new to report. Positive exchange rate movements mean the club\u2019s $650m long-term debt reduced in value on the books, but the actual amount owed to American lenders remains unchanged.<\/p>\n Despite exchange movements, United\u2019s overall debt in Sterling is up on a year ago, a result of them dipping into revolving credit facilities (RCFs) across 2024-25. Borrowings on those sat at \u00a3160m at the end of June, \u00a3130m higher than June 2024 even after \u00a350m was repaid at the end of April.<\/p>\n