{"id":469487,"date":"2025-10-02T22:02:18","date_gmt":"2025-10-02T22:02:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/469487\/"},"modified":"2025-10-02T22:02:18","modified_gmt":"2025-10-02T22:02:18","slug":"merzs-germany-inexperience-coalition-crisis-growing-afd-threat","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/469487\/","title":{"rendered":"Merz’s Germany: Inexperience, coalition crisis, growing AfD threat"},"content":{"rendered":"

On May 6, 2025, Friedrich Merz assumed office as Germany\u2019s 10th Chancellor, taking on the formidable task of steering the country through the \u201cZeitenwende\u201d (“turning point”) period, widely regarded as a defining moment in German politics. Leading the newly formed \u201cgrand coalition\u201d between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), Merz returned to front-line politics after a long hiatus and, for the first time, entered a Cabinet position. His appointment, therefore, carried both hopes and anxieties.<\/p>\n

Yet, his first months in office have fallen far short of expectations, shaped by his political past, lack of governing experience, and the growing fragility of German domestic politics. Unable to deliver on key promises, weakened by internal coalition disputes and steadily losing popularity, Merz has also failed to contain the rise of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD).<\/p>\n

Throughout his political career, Friedrich Merz stayed in the eighth Chancellor Angela Merkel\u2019s shadow and was often seen as an unpopular figure. Having spent over 20 years outside the political mainstream and never holding a ministerial role during that time, his appointment as chancellor sparked renewed debates about his lack of governing experience.<\/p>\n

The most obvious sign of this appeared during the chancellor vote on May 6. Due to doubts within the CDU\u2019s centrist wing about his leadership and the fragile coalition, Merz failed to secure a majority in the first round, losing eight votes from within his own alliance. For the first time in German political history, a chancellor was elected despite losing the support of coalition partners.<\/p>\n

This result highlighted that Merz started his term with an image of a weak leader. One political analyst described the coalition as a \u201cforced marriage,\u201d arguing that the CDU and SPD were pushed into this arrangement by geopolitical pressures and strong public demand for a grand coalition. This early setback made it clear that Merz would need to face his opponents and internal divisions within his own party.<\/p>\n

Falling popularity, domestic deadlocks<\/strong><\/p>\n

Merz\u2019s first few months have also caused significant public disappointment. Compared to his predecessors, his standing in public opinion seems notably weaker. Polls taken after his 100th day in office show that Merz\u2019s popularity is far behind Merkel and even his heavily criticized predecessor, Olaf Scholz, during the same period.<\/p>\n

According to respected polling organizations like RTL\/NTV and ARD-Deutschlandtrend, public satisfaction with Merz\u2019s performance has fallen to 29%. Meanwhile, dissatisfaction has reached a record high of 67%. The government\u2019s overall performance is viewed similarly negatively, with nearly 75% of respondents expressing dissatisfaction. Additionally, 77% of the public disapprove of the relationship between the coalition partners CDU\/Christian Social Union (CSU) and SPD.<\/p>\n

These figures show that the Merz government is quickly losing public trust and has failed to inspire confidence in the coalition. Many Germans believe that the coalition has been unable to clearly communicate a plan on key issues like economic uncertainty, migration and social policy.<\/p>\n

Unlike the challenges he faces domestically, Merz has, somewhat unexpectedly, shown notable success in foreign policy. His clear and firm stance on Ukraine, his ability to keep dialogue open with U.S. President Donald Trump, and most importantly, his decision to halt partial arms sales to Israel, breaking a long-standing taboo, earned him the label of \u201cAu\u00dfenkanzler\u201d (\u201cForeign Policy Chancellor\u201d). This move, supported by the SPD, received wide approval from the German public.<\/p>\n

However, these accomplishments on the international stage are still overshadowed by the worsening crises at home. While Merz appears to be a statesman abroad, he has not demonstrated the same leadership and decisiveness in tackling his country\u2019s domestic problems.<\/p>\n

One of Merz\u2019s biggest challenges has been his failure to follow through on many ambitious promises during the election campaign. He pledged to reform the \u201ccitizens\u2019 income\u201d program, cut corporate taxes, tighten border controls (through stricter asylum procedures and the deportation of so-called \u201cunwanted foreigners\u201d), and reduce bureaucracy.<\/p>\n

While tax cuts and stricter border controls were partially implemented, the coalition\u2019s main goal, which was to reform the citizens\u2019 income, was blocked by strong opposition from the SPD. Similarly, the promise to cut bureaucracy has mostly remained talk, with little real progress in Germany\u2019s often complex administrative system. His promise of economic growth has also completely failed; the world\u2019s third-largest economy has not emerged from stagnation in 2025 and is even expected to shrink.<\/p>\n


\n \"Promotional
\n <\/a>
\n Promotional items lie on a table in election campaign booths, Gelsenkirchen, Germany, Sept. 24, 2025. (Reuters Photo) <\/p>\n

Coalition conflicts, AfD factor<\/strong><\/p>\n

One of Merz\u2019s biggest challenges is his ideological and political conflicts with his coalition partner, the SPD. Specifically, the parties\u2019 incompatible positions on social policy and budget issues often bring the government to the edge of paralysis. The main cause of these failures is the deep differences of opinion and lack of trust within the CDU\/CSU\u2013SPD coalition. Serious tensions have arisen over matters like social policy, budget deficits and public borrowing.<\/p>\n

When SPD Labor Minister Barbel Bas dismissed Merz\u2019s comments on the welfare state as \u201cnonsense,\u201d it showed how badly communication within the coalition had worsened. The government\u2019s first major crisis happened over the appointment of a new Constitutional Court judge. Conservative MPs from Merz\u2019s CDU\/CSU refused to support the SPD\u2019s candidate, Frauke Brosius-Gersdorf. The SPD called this a \u201cserious breach of trust,\u201d raising questions about the future of the coalition. Such incidents are seen as some of the biggest obstacles to making more ambitious reforms. Although the coalition partners united due to economic pressures and geopolitical uncertainty, they have not been able to overcome their different political identities and ideological divides.<\/p>\n

Merz\u2019s biggest and most risky challenge in domestic politics has been his fight against the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party. In the last election, the AfD increased its vote share to 20.8%, making it the second most popular party in the country. Additionally, recent polls show that the AfD rose to 26% support, surpassing Merz\u2019s CDU\/CSU with 24%, to become Germany\u2019s leading political force. This result shows that Merz\u2019s pre-election promise to \u201cstop the AfD\u201d has not succeeded.<\/p>\n

No longer just a protest party, the AfD\u2019s rapid rise to the position of Germany\u2019s second-largest political power reflects public dissatisfaction with issues like immigration, the economy, the energy crisis and growing distrust in the current political system. Although the AfD remains ostracized by other parties, especially the CDU, the fact that voting for the AfD is no longer seen as taboo among German citizens highlights that the party is no longer a fringe movement but has instead become part of Germany\u2019s new political landscape.<\/p>\n

The AfD\u2019s explicit goal is to become Germany\u2019s largest party in the next federal election in 2029. In pursuit of this goal, it places Merz in a difficult dilemma: either continue compromising with the SPD, thereby risking accusations from his own base of capitulating to the left, or break the long-standing \u201cfirewall\u201d by cooperating with the AfD at regional or even federal levels.<\/p>\n

This dynamic traps Merz in a political \u201cvice,\u201d leaving him vulnerable to criticism from both the right and the left for almost every move he makes. Against this backdrop, the questions \u201cCan the AfD come to power?\u201d and \u201cWill there be early elections?\u201d are increasingly being raised in Germany. While the AfD\u2019s ascent to federal power remains unlikely for now, its rise intensifies political polarization and calls into question the sustainability of the current system.<\/p>\n

The upcoming 2026 state parliamentary elections in five federal states will mark a turning point for the Merz government. Federal political dynamics could be dramatically reshaped, especially in Saxony-Anhalt, where the AfD is potentially projected to win a minister-president position. For Merz, the 2026 state elections might be his last opportunity to regain public trust. With commentary suggesting the government is already \u201cexhausted\u201d only 100 days after taking office, and with just 52% of Germans believing the coalition will last until 2029, the chances of early elections are increasing.<\/p>\n

Merz must therefore handle both internal coalition tensions and the AfD\u2019s radicalizing momentum. If he fails, Germany\u2019s domestic division and instability could deepen, throwing the country\u2019s political future into doubt. In this context, the 2026 state elections will serve as key indicators of Germany\u2019s path forward.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"On May 6, 2025, Friedrich Merz assumed office as Germany\u2019s 10th Chancellor, taking on the formidable task of…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":469488,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5310],"tags":[8385,8386,2000,299,1945,1824,12823],"class_list":{"0":"post-469487","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-germany","8":"tag-afd","9":"tag-cdu","10":"tag-eu","11":"tag-europe","12":"tag-friedrich-merz","13":"tag-germany","14":"tag-spd"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/115306833783176384","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/469487","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=469487"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/469487\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/469488"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=469487"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=469487"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=469487"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}