<\/p>\n
In\u00a0the weeks since the Trump administration\u2019s push to\u00a0negotiate a\u00a0ceasefire between Moscow and Kyiv stalled, Russia\u2019s full-scale war against Ukraine passed the three-and-a-half-year mark. Russian troops are continuing their offensive in\u00a0central Donbas, which Ukrainian forces have managed to\u00a0slow<\/a> at\u00a0the expense of\u00a0their defense in\u00a0other areas. Meanwhile, Ukrainian cities are facing an\u00a0increase in\u00a0deadly Russian missile and drone strikes, as\u00a0Moscow targets Ukraine\u2019s energy grid<\/a> ahead of\u00a0the cold winter months. With Kyiv\u2019s air defenses under pressure and the frontline becoming increasingly fluid, it\u00a0appears as\u00a0though Vladimir Putin remains steadfast in\u00a0his belief that Russia can outlast and overpower Ukraine. But how much longer can the Kremlin sustain its war machine?\u00a0<\/p>\n In\u00a0an\u00a0interview with The Naked Pravda, Dr. Maria Snegovaya<\/a>, a\u00a0senior fellow in\u00a0the Europe, Russia and Eurasia Program at\u00a0the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), broke down a\u00a0new report<\/a> about the mounting costs of\u00a0Russia\u2019s war effort and outlined four possible scenarios for the war\u2019s future trajectory. The following Q&A, based on\u00a0that interview, has been edited for length and clarity.\u00a0<\/p>\n Listen to\u00a0The Naked Pravda\u2019s full interview with\u00a0Dr. Maria Snegovaya here<\/a>. <\/p><\/blockquote>\n \u2014 How would you describe the current situation on\u00a0the front line and on\u00a0the diplomatic front?<\/strong><\/p>\n \u2014 It\u2019s been three and a\u00a0half years of\u00a0this very bloody war of\u00a0attrition, the bloodiest in\u00a0Europe since the end of\u00a0World War\u00a0II. It\u00a0has led to\u00a0tremendous costs on\u00a0both the Ukrainian and Russian sides, and unfortunately, there is\u00a0no\u00a0end in\u00a0sight. After some initial breakthroughs in\u00a0early 2022, Russia was pushed back<\/a> by\u00a0the Ukrainian army, and it\u00a0adjusted to\u00a0a\u00a0war of\u00a0attrition on\u00a0both the economic and military fronts. As\u00a0of\u00a0now, Russia is\u00a0progressing<\/a> very, very slowly and losing about 100 to\u00a0150 troops per square kilometer, which is\u00a0a\u00a0horrendous number, really \u2014 the highest among most of\u00a0the wars that Russia has fought. Nonetheless, the political logic in\u00a0Russia is\u00a0such that it\u00a0keeps pushing further, hoping that eventually Ukraine\u2019s defenses will collapse.\u00a0<\/p>\n Meduza has condemned Russia\u2019s invasion of\u00a0Ukraine from the very start, and we\u00a0are committed to\u00a0reporting objectively on\u00a0a\u00a0war we\u00a0firmly oppose. Join Meduza in\u00a0its mission to\u00a0challenge the Kremlin\u2019s censorship with the truth.\u00a0Donate today<\/a>.\u00a0<\/p>\n Russia currently occupies approximately 20 percent of\u00a0Ukraine\u2019s territory, and it\u00a0appears that its originally announced goals \u2014 that is, the occupation of\u00a0the rest of\u00a0the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and maybe the remainder of\u00a0the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions \u2014 have remained more or\u00a0less unchanged. Perhaps even more importantly, in\u00a0his public statements<\/a>, Vladimir Putin keeps referencing the \u201corigins of\u00a0the conflict.\u201d That means that, unfortunately, Putin remains quite committed to\u00a0trying to\u00a0revise international security, limit Ukraine\u2019s sovereignty, and \u201cdenazify\u201d and demilitarize Ukraine, and the war will not end anytime soon.<\/p>\n \u2014 In\u00a0your report<\/a>, you write that despite the mounting economic costs and heavy military casualties, Russia continues to\u00a0believe that it\u2019s winning the war of\u00a0attrition. What sustains that belief?<\/strong><\/p>\n \u2014 First of\u00a0all, the Russian political system and Russian power circles are not known to\u00a0adjust their prior [assumptions]. And if\u00a0they were able to\u00a0do\u00a0that, maybe the 2022 war would have never started, because Russia\u2019s 2014 aggression already demonstrated how biased and misguided some of\u00a0the Kremlin\u2019s beliefs about Ukraine were. Ukrainians did not welcome the Russian army, and the Kremlin faced a\u00a0lot of\u00a0issues [trying to] inflame many of\u00a0the regions in\u00a0eastern and southern Ukraine.\u00a0<\/p>\n You\u2019d think that after failing to\u00a0achieve the goal of\u00a0trying to\u00a0subjugate Ukraine and pull it\u00a0back into Russia\u2019s sphere of\u00a0interest, there would\u2019ve been some reconsideration in\u00a0Kremlin circles. Instead, in\u00a02022, we\u00a0saw the Kremlin double down on\u00a0the same goals, this time implementing a\u00a0full-scale invasion of\u00a0Ukraine, seemingly anticipating that Ukrainians would welcome the Russian army.\u00a0<\/p>\n Obviously, that didn\u2019t happen, but even that did not alter Moscow\u2019s strategic logic. It\u00a0did alter Moscow\u2019s tactical approach, and the Kremlin made a\u00a0lot of\u00a0revisions to\u00a0its planning to\u00a0make this war more sustainable. But the strategic goals have remained the same, and more or\u00a0less the same dynamic has unraveled ever since. Unfortunately, it\u00a0seems that the Kremlin leadership, in\u00a0its current state of\u00a0mind, is\u00a0unable to\u00a0radically alter its approach and worldview unless it\u00a0faces truly radical consequences and is\u00a0unable to\u00a0continue, and that has not happened yet.<\/p>\n \u2014 How long can Russia realistically afford to\u00a0continue the war at\u00a0its current pace if\u00a0it\u2019s not going to\u00a0revise its overarching strategic objective?<\/strong><\/p>\n \u2014 Russia has been borrowing very actively from its own future in\u00a0order to\u00a0invest in\u00a0the\u00a0war. Nonetheless, the resources are still basically there to\u00a0sustain the war for at\u00a0least two or\u00a0three years unless things change quite dramatically.<\/p>\n The economic growth the Kremlin induced through spending on\u00a0the military-industrial complex is\u00a0now basically gone<\/a>, and we\u2019re likely to\u00a0see stagnation<\/a> or\u00a0even a\u00a0recession in\u00a0the Russian economy. Nonetheless, the resources are still there to\u00a0just keep issuing more tanks, missiles, and drones, and to\u00a0inflict significant damage on\u00a0Ukraine. Especially given that much of\u00a0the Kremlin\u2019s strategy relies on\u00a0drone attacks<\/a>, and it\u00a0has really boosted its drone production. As\u00a0long as\u00a0sanctions are relatively weak, Russia will circumvent them and continue to\u00a0accumulate significant resources from selling its energy.<\/p>\n The weapons of\u00a0tomorrow\u00a0 The \u2018drone revolution\u2019 rewrote the battlefield in\u00a0Ukraine. Will they upend the West\u2019s way of\u00a0war?<\/a>The weapons of\u00a0tomorrow\u00a0 The \u2018drone revolution\u2019 rewrote the battlefield in\u00a0Ukraine. Will they upend the West\u2019s way of\u00a0war?<\/a><\/p>\n [In terms of] the social dimension, unfortunately, the Russian public continues to\u00a0demonstrate resilience and acquiescence to\u00a0this horrible war, despite tremendous accumulating costs \u2014 including about 1 million casualties<\/a> and significant economic costs. The only notable shift in\u00a0Russian public opinion we\u00a0can trace is\u00a0growing support<\/a> for peace talks, which by\u00a0late August 2025 had reached about two-thirds of\u00a0Russian respondents across multiple surveys. However, there\u2019s a\u00a0caveat here: these groups would like to\u00a0just freeze the war as\u00a0is, while maintaining the occupied territories without necessarily making any concessions. That is\u00a0unlikely to\u00a0be\u00a0acceptable for the Ukrainian side.<\/p>\n There are potential fracture points going forward. When the Russian public starts feeling the cost of\u00a0the war on\u00a0a\u00a0personal level \u2014 be\u00a0it\u00a0drone attacks, attacks on\u00a0refineries that lead to\u00a0higher gasoline prices<\/a> or\u00a0shortages, or\u00a0maybe a\u00a0more direct link between sanctions and the war\u2019s economic costs\u00a0\u2014 then they actually become way more skeptical about\u00a0it. And in\u00a0some ways, that\u2019s exactly what we\u00a0saw in\u00a0the late Soviet period, when the Afghanistan war became very unpopular, in\u00a0combination with a\u00a0major economic crisis. However, while things certainly don\u2019t look great for Russia, we\u00a0are far from a\u00a0serious economic crisis at\u00a0the moment. So\u00a0that means that, unfortunately, public opinion will probably continue to\u00a0acquiesce to\u00a0this war, especially given the intensified domestic repressions in\u00a0Russia and the crackdown on\u00a0independent media that allow the Kremlin to\u00a0control the propaganda coverage of\u00a0this war.<\/p>\n There is\u00a0also a\u00a0demographic dimension. The Kremlin has shifted to\u00a0a\u00a0so-called volunteer recruitment model, offering very, very generous [enlistment] bonuses<\/a> and maintaining a\u00a0sustained rate of\u00a030,000 to\u00a040,000 \u201cvolunteers\u201d per month, which is\u00a0approximately as\u00a0many people as\u00a0the Kremlin loses on\u00a0the battlefield. This makes the war sustainable for the Kremlin, given that it\u00a0more or\u00a0less replenishes as\u00a0many [soldiers] as\u00a0it\u00a0loses. The question is\u00a0how long this will continue. The general price tag per volunteer has been increasing, and some analysts suggest that [this means] it\u2019s actually becoming more difficult<\/a> for the Kremlin to\u00a0attract additional volunteers. However, given the distribution of\u00a0resources in\u00a0Russia \u2014 where huge demand for labor is\u00a0concentrated in\u00a0big cities but there are many rural areas with relatively high unemployment, where people looking for ways to\u00a0make money are potentially available for recruitment \u2014 at\u00a0least as\u00a0of\u00a0now, there\u2019s not enough evidence to\u00a0say that the Kremlin has fully run out of\u00a0that reserve.<\/p>\n The deadliest year yet A new investigation from Meduza and Mediazona shows Russia has lost more than 200,000 soldiers in\u00a0its war against Ukraine<\/a>The deadliest year yet A new investigation from Meduza and Mediazona shows Russia has lost more than 200,000 soldiers in\u00a0its war against Ukraine<\/a><\/p>\n And last but not least, there\u2019s the military-industrial complex. There\u2019s a\u00a0lot of\u00a0information showing that the Kremlin may be\u00a0running out<\/a> of\u00a0its Soviet [weapons] stocks (including tanks) that it\u00a0relied on\u00a0at\u00a0the start of\u00a0the\u00a0war. Having said that, it\u2019s also important to\u00a0keep in\u00a0mind that a\u00a0lot of\u00a0investment<\/a> has been directed toward rebuilding Russia\u2019s military-industrial complex. The Kremlin is\u00a0still producing a\u00a0relatively substantial number of\u00a0missiles and, most importantly, drones. Even with its Soviet stockpiles being eroded, the Kremlin maintains the ability to\u00a0inflict significant damage on\u00a0Ukraine through these horrible, atrocious, [air] strikes against its civilian population, and through other means.<\/p>\n So, from all of\u00a0these perspectives, you\u2019ll see that, unfortunately, the Kremlin has resources and will probably keep pushing to\u00a0gain the advantage and achieve its original goals in\u00a0Ukraine.<\/p>\n \u2014 Your report outlines four scenarios for the trajectory of\u00a0the war that you see as\u00a0the most plausible. Scenario #1 is\u00a0a\u00a0Russian breakthrough and the collapse of\u00a0the Ukrainian military. What would bring about this situation, and how likely is\u00a0it\u00a0in\u00a0your view?<\/strong><\/p>\n \u2014 This scenario was perhaps more likely at\u00a0the start of\u00a0Trump\u2019s second term, when there was widespread talk about cutting off<\/a> all lethal aid to\u00a0Ukraine or\u00a0pushing it\u00a0onto European allies. Under this scenario, a\u00a0drastic reduction in\u00a0Western support would give Russia an\u00a0advantage that could be\u00a0reinforced if\u00a0Ukraine\u2019s air defenses falter or\u00a0if\u00a0European unity is\u00a0undermined \u2014for example, by\u00a0the rise of\u00a0populist actors across Europe unwilling to\u00a0provide additional support for Ukraine.<\/p>\n The Kremlin is\u00a0certainly actively betting on\u00a0this scenario, hoping to\u00a0exhaust Ukraine, cause the frontline to\u00a0collapse, and eventually achieve Ukraine\u2019s capitulation. However, that would require a\u00a0significant weakening of\u00a0Ukraine\u2019s [armed] forces, and that\u2019s unlikely to\u00a0happen overnight. It\u00a0would also probably necessitate some strategic miscalculations on\u00a0the West\u2019s part. And while we\u00a0certainly saw some elements of\u00a0the transatlantic alliance weaken, overall, it\u00a0appears that, with European allies significantly increasing the pressure on\u00a0the U.S., it\u00a0has so\u00a0far been able to\u00a0survive.<\/p>\n More importantly, European countries seem to\u00a0have realized that the war represents an\u00a0existential risk not just for Ukraine, but for the E.U. and European security more broadly. Accordingly, this scenario doesn\u2019t seem very likely at\u00a0this particular moment. But the Kremlin certainly continues to\u00a0bet on\u00a0it, hence the continued pressure on\u00a0Ukraine and the West<\/a>.\u00a0<\/p>\n \u2014 Scenario #2 is\u00a0a\u00a0prolonged low-intensity conflict, otherwise known as\u00a0the \u201cforever war\u201d option. How would this differ from the current state of\u00a0the war?<\/strong><\/p>\n \u2014 This is\u00a0perhaps one of\u00a0the most likely scenarios that, in\u00a0our opinion, is\u00a0not sufficiently talked about.<\/p>\n The low-intensity \u201cforever war\u201d we\u00a0describe in\u00a0our second scenario presumes that the front is\u00a0more or\u00a0less stabilized, with much of\u00a0the action continuing through artillery shelling, drone warfare, and deep strikes, without decisive offensives.<\/p>\n A high-stakes gamble Ukraine has successfully slowed Russia\u2019s advance in\u00a0central Donbas \u2014\u00a0but at\u00a0the cost of\u00a0its defenses elsewhere<\/a>A high-stakes gamble Ukraine has successfully slowed Russia\u2019s advance in\u00a0central Donbas \u2014\u00a0but at\u00a0the cost of\u00a0its defenses elsewhere<\/a><\/p>\n Right now, Russia is\u00a0still implementing an\u00a0offensive<\/a>, trying to\u00a0achieve a\u00a0significant breakthrough into Ukrainian territory. But under scenario two, Russia realizes that it\u2019s unable to\u00a0achieve a\u00a0major breakthrough and basically switches to\u00a0terrorizing Ukraine, primarily through airstrikes. Having come to\u00a0terms with the fact that it\u2019s unable to\u00a0achieve its territorial goals in\u00a0Ukraine, Russia\u2019s long-term goal would be\u00a0to\u00a0prevent Ukraine from joining the E.U. and NATO and turning it\u00a0into a\u00a0so-called limbo state with a\u00a0weakened economy, less Western support, and no\u00a0possibility of\u00a0attracting foreign direct investment.\u00a0<\/p>\n Unfortunately, this would be\u00a0relatively cheap for the Kremlin to\u00a0achieve, especially given the current [rate of] drone production. And, as\u00a0we\u00a0argue, this is\u00a0something Western allies should factor into their plans to\u00a0support Ukraine.<\/p>\n \u2014 Scenario #3 envisions Moscow agreeing to\u00a0a\u00a0ceasefire. Why might Russia decide it\u00a0wants to\u00a0stop fighting?<\/strong><\/p>\n \u2014 Both a\u00a0[ceasefire] and a\u00a0lasting peace settlement would presume significantly intensified pressure on\u00a0Russia and some sort of\u00a0change domestically. Primarily, an\u00a0economic crisis that would undermine Russian morale and essentially expose to\u00a0the elites, society, and even Putin himself that [the military] is\u00a0unable to\u00a0achieve a\u00a0major breakthrough amid intensifying domestic costs.<\/p>\n Right now, one reason the Kremlin can keep pushing forward is\u00a0that it\u2019s not facing significant domestic resistance. Society is\u00a0accepting this reality, and the elites are acquiescing and deliberately being made beneficiaries of\u00a0this new status quo through the distribution of\u00a0assets and whatnot.<\/p>\n The ability to\u00a0push the Kremlin towards a\u00a0ceasefire will only be\u00a0achieved if\u00a0there is\u00a0a\u00a0significant increase in\u00a0the costs of\u00a0continuing this\u00a0war. As\u00a0we\u00a0argue, this will require Kyiv to\u00a0\u201cescalate in\u00a0order to\u00a0de-escalate.\u201d That may involve intensified drone strikes on\u00a0Russian refineries or\u00a0long-range missile strikes into Russia, and a\u00a0really serious toughening of\u00a0sanctions that would lead to\u00a0a\u00a0radical decline in\u00a0economic revenues and force the Kremlin to\u00a0make some serious trade-offs (maybe at\u00a0the expense of\u00a0salary increases or\u00a0spending for its key constituencies).<\/p>\n \u2018What war?\u2019 Independent sociologists spent four weeks in\u00a0Kursk, studying how Russians near the front lines cope without getting political<\/a>\u2018What war?\u2019 Independent sociologists spent four weeks in\u00a0Kursk, studying how Russians near the front lines cope without getting political<\/a><\/p>\n This strategy assumes that Russian morale is\u00a0fragile. Unfortunately, we\u00a0usually tend to\u00a0underestimate Russian resilience analytically, and it\u2019s not very clear how to\u00a0get to\u00a0that particular destination. But one thing is\u00a0certain: to\u00a0increase the possibility of\u00a0a\u00a0ceasefire, the pressure on\u00a0the Kremlin should be\u00a0increased quite significantly, and Russians should feel the cost of\u00a0the war domestically.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n \u2014 Scenario #4 is\u00a0a\u00a0full-blown peace agreement, and you write in\u00a0the report that this seems the least likely because it\u00a0would require a\u00a0major crisis inside Russia. What do\u00a0you mean by\u00a0a\u00a0major crisis inside Russia?<\/strong><\/p>\n \u2014 This scenario is\u00a0broadly modeled on\u00a0other periods when Russia fought unsuccessful wars. Usually, those preceding some revolutions, or\u00a0the collapse or\u00a0radical weakening of\u00a0the existing regime. In\u00a0the 19th century, the early 20th century, and the late Soviet period, there was an\u00a0economic shock so\u00a0pronounced and so\u00a0deep that Russia basically had no\u00a0more resources, and domestic turmoil and public dissatisfaction eventually turned toward the regime, basically forcing it\u00a0to\u00a0make major concessions in\u00a0its ongoing war.<\/p>\n It\u2019s important to\u00a0keep in\u00a0mind that we\u00a0are dealing with a\u00a0very aggressive regime that is\u00a0not driven by\u00a0pure rational logic. For example, the Kremlin is\u00a0currently sacrificing Russia\u2019s future for the sake of\u00a0this very unsuccessful war, without a\u00a0clear, tangible outcome. But nonetheless, given the nature of\u00a0the Russian leadership, Russia [would need to\u00a0suffer] a\u00a0major blow for the current dynamic to\u00a0be\u00a0radically altered in\u00a0favor of\u00a0Ukraine.<\/p>\n And of\u00a0course, it\u2019s important to\u00a0also keep in\u00a0mind that many Russian\/Soviet wars ended with the natural passing of\u00a0the aggressive leaders who started the war in\u00a0the first place. Like, for example, the Korean War in\u00a0the case of\u00a0Stalin. A\u00a0rotation in\u00a0the leadership \u2014 [such as] the natural passing<\/a> of\u00a0Vladimir Putin \u2014 would certainly enhance the possibility of\u00a0this scenario.<\/p>\n