On April 23, 2025, India took a bold and historic step as it decided to suspend the over-six-decade-old Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) with Pakistan. The move came just a day after the horrifying terrorist attack in Pahalgam, where 26 civilians, mostly tourists, lost their lives. The massacre, traced back to Pakistan-based terror group, Lashkar-e-Taiba\u2019s offshoot The Resistance Front (TRF), proved to be the tipping point. For New Delhi, it was not just another tragic incident but a direct blow to India\u2019s internal peace, security and international image. In response, India sent out a powerful message that there would be consequences, and they would not be limited to diplomatic d\u00e9marches or military preparedness\u2014but would now include water.<\/p>\n
The IWT, signed in September 1960 with the World Bank as a guarantor, has remarkably endured three full-scale wars between India and Pakistan\u2014in 1965, 1971, and 1999. It was often hailed in academic and diplomatic circles as a rare beacon of functional cooperation in an otherwise adversarial bilateral relationship. That India has now put IWT in abeyance signals a decisive shift in its strategic posture\u2014one that no longer shies away from leveraging critical resources in the face of unrelenting provocation.<\/p>\n
The IWT divides the six rivers of the Indus Basin between the two countries. The three western rivers\u2014Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab\u2014were allocated to Pakistan, while the three eastern rivers\u2014Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej\u2014were retained by India. Under the treaty, India can use the western rivers in limited ways\u2014for irrigation, transport, and run-of-the-river hydropower projects\u2014but cannot significantly alter their flow. One of India\u2019s key obligations has been the timely sharing of hydrological data, including advance flood warnings, river discharge volumes, and glacier melt patterns.<\/p>\n
This data-sharing has been particularly crucial in times of drought or unexpected monsoons. According to the Ministry of External Affairs, between 2010 and 2020 alone, India provided over 5,000 pages of annual data to Pakistan under the Permanent Indus Commission framework. Even during high-tension periods such as post-Uri and Pulwama attacks, this data flow continued uninterrupted. It included critical information such as flood alerts in July-August seasons, daily water levels from upstream measuring stations, and silt content details necessary for dam management in Pakistan. Such transparency helped Pakistan regulate water releases, manage its extensive irrigation network, and prepare for seasonal agricultural cycles.<\/p>\n
The suspension of these responsibilities is not merely symbolic\u2014it will have tangible and possibly devastating consequences for Pakistan.\u00a0 Nearly 80% of its irrigated land depends on the waters of the Indus River system. The suspension of the treaty could disrupt not just its agricultural cycles but also hydroelectric power generation, which is already strained. Additionally, over 90% of Pakistan\u2019s food production depends on irrigation, primarily sourced from the Indus River system. With per capita water availability having fallen from 5,600 cubic meters in 1947 to just below 1,000 cubic meters today, Pakistan is now classified as a water-scarce country.<\/p>\n
Furthermore, over one-third of its electricity generation is derived from hydropower, with key dams like Mangla and Tarbela relying on steady Indus flow. In the absence of hydrological input and coordinated river management, Pakistan faces the spectre of erratic farming seasons, failed crops, and urban energy blackouts.<\/p>\n
Unsurprisingly, Islamabad reacted sharply. It called India\u2019s decision an \u201cact of war\u201d and retaliated by suspending the 1972 Simla Agreement, which has been a cornerstone of bilateral diplomatic engagement post-1971. The region now teeters on the edge of diplomatic rupture.<\/p>\n
The IWT suspension also reflects a strategic calculation to internationalize the cost of Pakistan\u2019s inaction on terrorism. By disrupting the security of Pakistan\u2019s water supply, New Delhi is compelling the international community to take notice. Countries already wary of Pakistan\u2019s support for non-state actors may now be alarmed by the cascading consequences of its intransigence. Hydro-diplomacy may no longer be a quiet corner of foreign policy but a central theatre of international engagement.<\/p>\n
The implications for Pakistan are acute and wide-ranging. In a country already reeling from political turmoil, economic fragility, and a depreciating rupee, the weaponization of water strikes at its core vulnerabilities. Agricultural output may fall sharply, food inflation could spike, and provinces dependent on the western rivers\u2014particularly Punjab and Sindh\u2014could face unrest over water allocations. Water riots, once speculative, could become a reality.<\/p>\n
For now, it remains to be seen whether India\u2019s suspension is a temporary pressure tactic or a more permanent recalibration. But what is undeniable is that the era of treating water treaties as sacrosanct is over. The age of water wars\u2014once a dystopian theory\u2014is beginning to trickle into geopolitical reality. And for Pakistan, the price of repeated provocation may now be measured not just in diplomatic isolation, but in every drop of the rivers it once thought guaranteed.<\/p>\n
The suspension of IWT marks more than a bilateral crisis\u2014it sets a precedent with potential global repercussions. Water treaties between non-allied neighbours are already fragile. The Tigris-Euphrates dispute between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, the Jordan River Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan, and the Mekong River governance involving China and Southeast Asian nations\u2014all rest on mutual restraint. India\u2019s decision could now become a playbook for states seeking leverage through hydro-politics.<\/p>\n
As rivers dry and treaties erode, the world must prepare for a future where water is not only life\u2014but also leverage. The abeyance of the IWT sends a clear signal that treaties, even time-tested ones, are not sacred when national security is threatened. It could open the floodgates\u2014figuratively and literally\u2014to a new age of hydro-nationalism, where water becomes a strategic lever, not just a shared resource. Many experts have long warned that future wars will be fought over water. This could be the beginning. And for South Asia, the Indus may now carry not just silt and snowmelt, but the weight of strategic consequences.<\/p>\n
Dr. Manjari Singh focuses on contemporary Middle Eastern affairs and is the author of \u2018India and the Gulf: A Security Perspective\u2019<\/p>\n
Facebook
\n Twitter
\n Linkedin
\n Email<\/p>\n
Disclaimer<\/p>\n
Views expressed above are the author’s own.<\/p>\n
\n END OF ARTICLE\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"On April 23, 2025, India took a bold and historic step as it decided to suspend the over-six-decade-old…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":49886,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3843],"tags":[26855,728,26624,70,16,15,26626],"class_list":{"0":"post-49885","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-environment","8":"tag-dr-manjari-singh-blog","9":"tag-environment","10":"tag-india-blog","11":"tag-science","12":"tag-uk","13":"tag-united-kingdom","14":"tag-voices-blog"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/114399691736925474","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/49885","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=49885"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/49885\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/49886"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=49885"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=49885"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=49885"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}