Despite a history of pragmatism and warm relations with leaders of different ideological bents, Brazilian President Luiz In\u00e1cio Lula da Silva is in some ways the antithesis of U.S. President Donald Trump. Lula is a former metalworker and union leader with a vision of a multipolar world with a seat for Brazil at the table; Trump is a billionaire businessman with an \u201cAmerica First\u201d vision where the United States is the dominant superpower.<\/p>\n
Following Trump\u2019s return to the White House earlier this year, many<\/a> analysts<\/a> wondered<\/a> if the two presidents could find common ground. Their previous tenures in office never overlapped, and Trump maintained close ties with Lula\u2019s main political rival, Jair Bolsonaro. On the upside, Lula claimed<\/a> to have had better relations with former President George W. Bush than with former President Barack Obama, despite closer ideological alignment with the latter. Trump also enjoyed positive<\/a> relations with Mexico\u2019s leftist former president Andr\u00e9s Manuel L\u00f3pez Obrador\u2014another populist and enduring political figure, not unlike Lula.<\/p>\n From nadir to reconciliation?<\/p>\n Yet, in the first half of 2025, escalating tensions brought U.S.-Brazilian relations to their lowest point in over two centuries of diplomatic engagement. In February, Trump\u2019s network ramped<\/a> up its criticism of Brazilian Supreme Federal Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes following a temporary suspension<\/a> of Elon Musk\u2019s platform X (formerly Twitter) in August 2024. The suspension stemmed from X\u2019s refusal to comply with a court order to remove or block accounts accused of spreading misinformation and hate speech and undermining democracy.<\/p>\n In early July, Trump railed<\/a> against Brazil\u2019s \u201cUNLAWFUL\u201d crackdown on U.S. tech companies and denounced an ongoing investigation into Bolsonaro for an attempted coup in 2022 as a \u201cWitch Hunt.\u201d A subsequent White House executive order<\/a> imposed a 50% tariff on Brazilian goods, adding a 40% surcharge to the existing 10% duties. The administration cited a range of Brazilian actions, including interference with the U.S. economy, violations of free expression and human rights, erosion of the rule of law, and threats to U.S. interests. Notably, among the countries that were targeted by Washington\u2019s July tariff announcements, Brazil was the only<\/a> one running a trade surplus with the United States.<\/p>\n The Trump administration then sanctioned<\/a> Moraes in July 2025 under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act for his role in Bolsonaro\u2019s legal proceedings and perceived violations against U.S. tech companies. The sanctions later expanded<\/a> to include Moraes\u2019 wife and family business. In response, Lula declared<\/a> that he had \u201cno relationship\u201d with Trump and obliquely criticized the Trump administration\u2019s actions at the UN General Assembly (UNGA), stating<\/a> that \u201cour democracy and our sovereignty are non-negotiable.\u201d<\/p>\n Against this backdrop, the Brazilian government braced<\/a> for retaliation after Bolsonaro was sentenced<\/a> to 27 years in prison for his attempted coup. Yet after a brief exchange<\/a> between Lula and Trump on the sidelines of UNGA\u2014which included an embrace\u2014Trump publicly declared<\/a> he had \u201cexcellent chemistry\u201d with the Brazilian leader, calling him \u201ca very nice man.\u201d This breakthrough led to a 30-minute video call<\/a> on October 6 that both leaders characterized as positive. They have since agreed to meet in person soon. In the meantime, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Brazilian Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira have begun<\/a> a more formal dialogue, with trade being discussed as the most immediate<\/a> concern. But if the truce holds\u2014or even evolves into a pragmatic partnership\u2014ample opportunities for cooperation exist, including in artificial intelligence (AI), a priority area for both leaders.<\/p>\n A mutually beneficial tech partnership<\/p>\n Both Trump and Lula have made the national advancement of AI a central focus of their respective second and third terms in office. In July 2025, the Trump administration released a strategy titled \u201cWinning the Race: America\u2019s AI Action Plan<\/a>,\u201d outlining over 90 federal policy actions aimed at cementing U.S. dominance in the AI space. The administration has advocated<\/a> for a \u201cfull-stack\u201d U.S. export strategy of AI technology\u2014including chips, software, cloud services, and data centers. This represents a direct response to China\u2019s competitive offerings<\/a> that bundle hardware with financial incentives and governance frameworks.<\/p>\n Yet, U.S. efforts to export AI technologies to Brazil may face hurdles, as Lula\u2019s administration has staked its reputation on AI sovereignty<\/a> rather than technological dependence. In fact, one year prior to the Trump administration\u2019s release of its AI action plan, the Lula administration launched<\/a> its own vision, the National AI Plan 2024-2028. The Brazilian plan includes more than 50 actions designed to promote inclusive development and mobilize Global South countries to become active participants in AI governance negotiations. It also emphasizes Brazil\u2019s \u201csovereignty and autonomy\u201d by advancing partnerships that transfer technology rather than create dependencies. More broadly, Brazil\u2019s insistence on digital sovereignty stems in part from its skepticism<\/a> toward U.S. technology governance, which deepened after Edward Snowden revealed in 2013 that the U.S. National Security Agency was spying on<\/a> world leaders, including Brazil\u2019s then-President Dilma Rousseff.<\/p>\n However, the Brazilian government is also wary<\/a> of relying too heavily on China, as that would only swap one dependency for another. This creates an opportunity for a pragmatic, transactional U.S. approach that could advance Brazil\u2019s AI sovereignty while reducing Chinese influence in the region. While the Trump administration is unlikely to endorse Brazil\u2019s full AI sovereignty agenda, mutual interests align in several key areas.<\/p>\n For example, Trump\u2019s team has broken from the Biden administration\u2019s more cautious<\/a> approach and embraced<\/a> open-source AI models as central to American technological leadership. Open-source\u2014or at least open-weight\u2014models align well with Brazilian objectives. Since 2003, Lula has championed<\/a> free and open-source software as a means of reducing cost and dependency on foreign technology. U.S. support for these efforts could help Brazil develop and deploy tailored applications to address critical needs in agriculture, education, environmental protection, and other sectors within its own regulatory framework. U.S. stakeholders could also support digital literacy and capacity-building initiatives, particularly for developing smaller, specialized models in areas of mutual interest, like agriculture or health.<\/p>\n Brazil\u2019s AI advantage in energy and minerals<\/p>\n Deepening partnerships with Brazil could also help address some of the fundamental challenges U.S. tech companies face in scaling up their AI ambitions, including the resource demands<\/a> of compute infrastructure and the precarity<\/a> of the rare earth material supply chain, due in part to China\u2019s chokehold.<\/p>\n Throughout the early part of the Trump administration, tech companies and investors have forged eye-popping deals to build new data centers, including in the United Arab Emirates<\/a> (UAE) and around the United States<\/a>. However, challenges remain despite an explicit mandate from the Trump administration to \u201cBuild, Baby, Build!<\/a>\u201d The partnership with the UAE to build a 10-square-mile AI complex in Abu Dhabi with 5-gigawatt capacity poses<\/a> a host of national security challenges, and recently, allegations of corruption<\/a> and delays<\/a>. Project Stargate, a private partnership with U.S. government backing, plans to invest $500 billion to build five U.S. data centers, with a total planned capacity of nearly 10 gigawatts. Although the project has made some progress, domestic energy supply remains a central challenge<\/a>.<\/p>\n Brazil, by contrast, gets approximately 90% of its electricity<\/a> from renewable sources and has sufficient infrastructure to transport it across the country. Brazil is already positioning itself as a critical actor in the quest to build more compute infrastructure, though not without some scrutiny<\/a>. In 2024, Amazon Web Services committed<\/a> $1.8 billion to expand its data center footprint in Brazil, and Microsoft announced<\/a> a $2.7 billion investment for cloud and AI infrastructure.<\/p>\n To spur additional investment and in response to the Trump administration\u2019s tariffs, the Brazilian government announced<\/a> the \u201cRedata\u201d tax incentive program in September 2025 to attract foreign firms to build data centers. The program offers federal tax incentives for clean energy-powered data center investments in exchange for commitments to R&D, innovation, and national compute capacity. With an abundance of renewable energy and experience working with U.S.-based cloud service providers, Brazil has the potential to become a central actor in efforts to expand AI infrastructure, though it currently represents just a small percentage of the global data center market. However, it will be important for domestic and regional stakeholders to have access to this expanded compute as a way to bolster local innovation and scale technological aspirations.<\/p>\n Brazil also holds<\/a> one of the world\u2019s largest reserves of rare earth elements, which are crucial for AI infrastructure, including semiconductor production and server cooling systems. Rare earth element processing is currently dominated by China, which has recently begun to restrict<\/a> exports as a form of pressure in response to American export controls and tariffs. Although the United States has begun to ramp up domestic production<\/a>, it has also sought supply<\/a> chains<\/a> elsewhere\u2014even going so far as to threaten to annex Greenland, which boasts an abundance<\/a> of rare earth minerals. Further investments in Brazilian mining modernization could help diversify supply chains in an area where U.S. companies are already<\/a> actively involved, but where China maintains a strategic advantage.<\/p>\n With a potential bilateral meeting between Trump and Lula on the horizon<\/a>, easing trade tensions will be the priority. Other issues may also take precedence, including regional challenges related to Venezuela<\/a> and transnational organized crime<\/a>. However, if a productive partnership can begin to take root, tech collaboration will be an area where both parties may find common ground.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Despite a history of pragmatism and warm relations with leaders of different ideological bents, Brazilian President Luiz In\u00e1cio…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":524083,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":"","_share_on_mastodon":"0"},"categories":[5311],"tags":[3907,2106,25910,805,45006,6218,18537,170169,170168,37811,48838,48839,1771,49,978,659],"class_list":["post-524082","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-united-states","tag-article","tag-brazil","tag-commentary","tag-foreign-policy","tag-foreign-politics-elections","tag-geopolitics","tag-international-affairs","tag-latin-america-the-caribbean","tag-latin-america-initiative","tag-order-from-chaos","tag-technology-information","tag-technology-policy-regulation","tag-u-s-foreign-policy","tag-united-states","tag-us","tag-usa"],"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/115427739137678379","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/524082","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=524082"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/524082\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/524083"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=524082"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=524082"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=524082"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}