<\/p>\n
In\u00a0October, we\u00a0asked our Russian-language readers to\u00a0send in\u00a0their most pressing questions about the Russia\u2013Ukraine\u00a0war. We\u00a0received hundreds of\u00a0messages in\u00a0response, and our Explainers team reviewed each one, grouped similar questions by\u00a0topic, and then selected the most representative ones to\u00a0answer directly. In\u00a0part three of\u00a0this series, our military analysts examine casualties and the current size of\u00a0the armies fighting on\u00a0both sides. <\/p>\n
Read part one of\u00a0this series here<\/a> and part two here<\/a>. <\/p>\n Casualties in\u00a0both armies<\/p>\n Is\u00a0there any level of\u00a0losses that would become unacceptable for the Russian army, one that would force Moscow to\u00a0end the fighting? \u2014 Alexey<\/p>\n Roughly how many people are killed or\u00a0wounded each day on\u00a0both sides of\u00a0the front line? \u2014 Viktor<\/p>\n I\u2019d like to\u00a0understand the dynamics of\u00a0casualties \u2014 both deaths and injuries, and the severity of\u00a0those injuries \u2014 on\u00a0the Ukrainian and Russian sides over the past year or\u00a0two, including among Russia\u2019s mobilized troops. How have these numbers changed, what drives the shifts, what might come next? And what happens to\u00a0the wounded; how often are they sent back to\u00a0the front? \u2014 Yegor<\/p>\n How bad are the losses on\u00a0the Russian side? I\u00a0know they\u2019re clearly horrific, but could they lead to\u00a0new waves of\u00a0mobilization, or\u00a0even a\u00a0full-scale one? \u2014 Kr<\/p>\n There\u2019s only relatively complete data for Russian military deaths. After Russia\u2019s Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), stopped<\/a> publishing overall mortality figures (along with much other public data), the country\u2019s National Inheritance Registry became the only reliable and sufficiently comprehensive source for assessing Russian combat losses. Meduza and Mediazona have been jointly analyzing<\/a> it\u00a0since 2023, and our calculations for 2022 and 2023 closely matched demographic estimates<\/a> based on\u00a0Rosstat\u2019s own mortality data.<\/p>\n Our only hope is\u00a0you.\u00a0Support Meduza<\/a>\u00a0before it\u2019s too late.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n By\u00a0mid-2025, between 200,000 and 220,000 Russians had been killed in\u00a0the\u00a0war. This figure excludes foreign nationals \u2014 including Ukrainian citizens who fought for Russia \u2014 and those without an\u00a0official death certificate (for example, missing persons). However, Russian law allows courts to\u00a0declare a\u00a0person dead even if\u00a0no\u00a0body has been recovered. Around the turn of\u00a02024\u20132025, there was a\u00a0sharp increase in\u00a0such court rulings, most initiated by\u00a0military authorities. The Russian Defense Ministry appears to\u00a0have decided to\u00a0reduce the number of\u00a0missing soldiers by\u00a0officially reclassifying them as\u00a0dead. In\u00a0total, between 30,000 and 40,000 court cases to\u00a0declare missing soldiers dead had been opened by\u00a0mid-2025.<\/p>\n Russian military losses rose in\u00a02025, according to\u00a0the inheritance registry data. This can be\u00a0explained only partly by\u00a0the fact that, in\u00a02025, courts recorded the date of\u00a0death for some of\u00a0those previously declared missing (and later legally pronounced dead) as\u00a0the date when the court ruling took effect. (For others, they used the date of\u00a0disappearance listed in\u00a0the commander\u2019s report.) It\u2019s likely that the increase in\u00a0losses is\u00a0real. If\u00a0an\u00a0average of\u00a0200\u2013250 soldiers were killed each day in\u00a02024, the number climbed to\u00a0about 300 during the peak of\u00a0Russia\u2019s 2025 offensive.<\/p>\n No births, no deaths, no data Russia is pulling demographic stats from public view. What\u2019s the Kremlin trying to hide?<\/a>No births, no deaths, no data Russia is pulling demographic stats from public view. What\u2019s the Kremlin trying to hide?<\/a><\/p>\n The number of\u00a0wounded remains unknown. In\u00a0theory, these figures could be\u00a0estimated from federal and regional budget reports, which include compensation payments to\u00a0the injured. But these payments are scattered across multiple budget categories. Data from regional budgets in\u00a0early 2022 (which at\u00a0that time was still published) suggested<\/a> a\u00a0ratio of\u00a01 killed to\u00a01.7\u20131.8 severely wounded \u2014 those discharged from service for medical reasons. However, the nature of\u00a0combat has since changed, and that ratio likely has too.<\/p>\n For reference, U.S. and allied forces fighting in\u00a0Afghanistan had a\u00a0roughly 1:1 ratio of\u00a0killed to\u00a0seriously wounded \u2014 but the nature of\u00a0that war was different. Still, for a\u00a0rough estimate of\u00a0Russia\u2019s irrecoverable losses, the number of\u00a0deaths can reasonably be\u00a0multiplied by\u00a0a\u00a0factor of\u00a0two to\u00a0three.<\/p>\n Only data on\u00a0the severely wounded is\u00a0useful for estimating such irrecoverable losses: soldiers with light injuries are, by\u00a0law, required to\u00a0return to\u00a0duty after recovery, and many have done so\u00a0multiple times. For this reason, U.S. estimates<\/a> of\u00a0\u201cone million killed or\u00a0wounded,\u201d which clearly include lightly injured soldiers, are not especially meaningful.<\/p>\n Estimating Ukrainian losses is\u00a0even more difficult. Since the start of\u00a0the war, Ukraine\u2019s statistical agencies haven\u2019t released mortality data by\u00a0age or\u00a0gender, nor is\u00a0there a\u00a0public registry comparable to\u00a0Russia\u2019s inheritance database. The only option is\u00a0to\u00a0compare name-based lists of\u00a0the dead compiled from obituaries and other open sources. The Russian<\/a> database maintained by\u00a0Mediazona, BBC News Russian, and volunteers contains over 140,000 names, while the Ukrainian<\/a> list is\u00a0nearly half that size. However, Ukraine also has a\u00a0separate list of\u00a0more than 80,000 missing soldiers.<\/p>\n Russia has no\u00a0such comprehensive list of\u00a0the missing, but we\u00a0know that soldiers listed as\u00a0missing in\u00a0action are now being reclassified as\u00a0dead at\u00a0an\u00a0accelerated pace. It\u2019s also likely that the number of\u00a0missing in\u00a0the Russian Armed Forces is\u00a0lower \u2014 in\u00a0recent years, the battlefield has more often remained under Russian control.<\/p>\n Could Russia occupy all of\u00a0Donbas in\u00a0a\u00a0year? And what if\u00a0Ukraine\u2019s \u2018fortress belt\u2019 falls? Meduza\u2019s military analysts answer readers\u2019 biggest questions about the war (part 1)<\/a>Could Russia occupy all of\u00a0Donbas in\u00a0a\u00a0year? And what if\u00a0Ukraine\u2019s \u2018fortress belt\u2019 falls? Meduza\u2019s military analysts answer readers\u2019 biggest questions about the war (part 1)<\/a><\/p>\n Comparing name-based lists can\u2019t provide a\u00a0reliable picture of\u00a0the true casualty ratio: neither list is\u00a0complete, and the likelihood of\u00a0inclusion differs between countries due to\u00a0data collection methods and the availability of\u00a0public obituaries. Still, the data suggests that the number of\u00a0soldiers killed on\u00a0each side is\u00a0roughly comparable. In\u00a0categories where record-keeping is\u00a0more reliable \u2014 for example, lists of\u00a0killed officers \u2014 the numbers are almost identical.<\/p>\n For Russia, it\u00a0can be\u00a0cautiously estimated that by\u00a0mid-2025, irrecoverable losses \u2014 meaning all service members and volunteers who can no\u00a0longer fight due to\u00a0death or\u00a0severe injury \u2014 totaled between 440,000 and 650,000 people.<\/p>\n Exchanging the dead<\/p>\n Why is\u00a0there such a\u00a0large discrepancy between Russia and Ukraine in\u00a0the number of\u00a0soldiers\u2019 bodies exchanged? Russia returns them by\u00a0the thousands, while Ukraine sends only a\u00a0few dozen. Does that mean the losses are really that disproportionate? \u2014 Ivan<\/p>\n The explanation is\u00a0simple: for the past two years, the battlefield has, with few exceptions, remained under Russian control. Weeks or\u00a0months after fighting ends, when the front line moves a\u00a0safe distance away, military burial teams collect the remains of\u00a0the dead \u2014 both their own and those of\u00a0the other side. The opposing sides then exchange the bodies: \u201ctheirs\u201d for \u201cours.\u201d<\/p>\n The last time Russia received more fallen soldiers than it\u00a0returned to\u00a0Ukraine was in\u00a0August 2023, when Ukraine\u2019s counteroffensive in\u00a0the Zaporizhzhia region and near Bakhmut came to\u00a0an\u00a0end, and the Ukrainian army lost the initiative on\u00a0the battlefield.<\/p>\n Will Russia invade the E.U.? Meduza\u2019s military analysts answer readers\u2019 biggest questions about the war (part 2)<\/a>Will Russia invade the E.U.? Meduza\u2019s military analysts answer readers\u2019 biggest questions about the war (part 2)<\/a>Numbers at\u00a0the front<\/p>\n There\u2019s constant talk about a\u00a0\u201cshortage of\u00a0manpower\u201d on\u00a0the front lines. But in\u00a0reality, it\u2019s not at\u00a0all clear how many troops each side actually has on\u00a0the front line as\u00a0of\u00a0late 2025. \u2014 Anton Kh.<\/p>\n It\u2019s difficult to\u00a0make a\u00a0precise estimate, though a\u00a0few rough methods exist.<\/p>\n The first is\u00a0to\u00a0rely on\u00a0field reports. Judging by\u00a0statements from pro-military \u201cwar correspondents,\u201d \u201cvolunteers,\u201d and soldiers themselves, the Russian army doesn\u2019t appear to\u00a0be\u00a0facing an\u00a0acute shortage of\u00a0personnel. However, some individual units are facing manpower shortage after suffering heavy losses. The situation in\u00a0the Ukrainian Armed Forces is\u00a0the opposite: complaints about a\u00a0lack of\u00a0infantry are frequent.<\/p>\n Another way is\u00a0to\u00a0compare the nominal strength of\u00a0the two armies based on\u00a0the number of\u00a0combat units \u2014 measured in\u00a0battalion equivalents (motorized rifle, mechanized, airborne, tank, and so\u00a0on). By\u00a0that measure, the difference isn\u2019t large.<\/p>\n The exact ratio is\u00a0hard to\u00a0determine because both armies have<\/a> a\u00a0large number of\u00a0temporary units and \u201cpaper\u201d formations. The Russian Armed Forces, for example, list dozens of\u00a0\u201cterritorial regiments\u201d \u2014 formations where newly signed contract soldiers are first sent. The Ukrainian military, in\u00a0turn, includes understrength brigades and independent battalions of\u00a0unclear status. Brigades and regiments also vary widely in\u00a0size \u2014 some giant brigades have nine battalions, while others have just three. Still, rough estimates suggest that the authorized strength of\u00a0Russia\u2019s combat units is\u00a0about 10\u201315 percent higher than Ukraine\u2019s.<\/p>\n The Russian army also has a\u00a0far larger number of\u00a0supporting formations \u2014 artillery, engineering, and other non-drone units \u2014 attached to\u00a0its divisions, corps, armies, and military districts.<\/p>\n In\u00a0terms of\u00a0total authorized strength, rough estimates suggest that the Russian forces operating in\u00a0Ukraine outnumber the Ukrainian troops near the front by\u00a0at\u00a0least one-third. But it\u2019s important to\u00a0remember that authorized strength is\u00a0not the same as\u00a0actual strength.<\/p>\n There\u2019s also a\u00a0third method, but it\u2019s only of\u00a0limited\u00a0use. In\u00a0theory, one could try to\u00a0calculate the balance between \u201cinflow\u201d (new recruits) and \u201coutflow\u201d (irrecoverable losses). Applied to\u00a0Russia, it\u00a0yields inflated estimates of\u00a0800,000 to\u00a0one million troops at\u00a0the front. But it\u00a0doesn\u2019t account for other forms of\u00a0attrition, such as\u00a0desertion or\u00a0soldiers leaving their units. Russian authorities themselves claim<\/a> there are about 700,000 troops currently on\u00a0the front lines.<\/p>\n For Ukraine, the balance is\u00a0even harder to\u00a0gauge. Neither its total losses nor the number of\u00a0mobilized soldiers are known. Officials say they are drafting \u201cup\u00a0to\u00a030,000 people\u201d each month \u2014 though they don\u2019t specify exactly how many, and some recruits are assigned to\u00a0rear support units rather than combat roles.<\/p>\n In\u00a0short, the only thing that can be\u00a0said with confidence is\u00a0that Ukraine\u2019s fighting force is\u00a0smaller than Russia\u2019s \u2014 but not dramatically\u00a0so. This is\u00a0also clear based on<\/a> what\u2019s happening at\u00a0the front.<\/p>\n The battle for Pokrovsk Russia is\u00a0closing in\u00a0on\u00a0a\u00a0key city in\u00a0the Donetsk region. Can Ukraine hold the line?<\/a>The battle for Pokrovsk Russia is\u00a0closing in\u00a0on\u00a0a\u00a0key city in\u00a0the Donetsk region. Can Ukraine hold the line?<\/a>Morale<\/strong><\/p>\n How can we\u00a0assess the morale of\u00a0soldiers in\u00a0both armies, and how much does it\u00a0affect the fighting? \u2014 Ivan<\/p>\n Both armies are showing signs of\u00a0war fatigue. What weighs especially heavily on\u00a0soldiers is\u00a0the awareness that their time at\u00a0the front has no\u00a0clear end \u2014 it\u00a0could last as\u00a0long as\u00a0the war itself, or\u00a0as\u00a0long as\u00a0they manage to\u00a0survive. This is\u00a0reflected in\u00a0the growing number of\u00a0deserters: according to\u00a0official data, more than 50,000 Ukrainian<\/a> deserters have been prosecuted, along with another 235,000 who\u2019ve left their units without authorization. In\u00a0Russia, the total number of\u00a0people prosecuted for desertion or\u00a0going AWOL is\u00a0around<\/a> 20,000.<\/p>\n Sign up for Meduza\u2019s daily newsletter<\/p>\n A digest of Russia\u2019s investigative reports and news analysis. If it matters, we summarize it.<\/p>\n Meduza\u2019s Explainers\u00a0team<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"In\u00a0October, we\u00a0asked our Russian-language readers to\u00a0send in\u00a0their most pressing questions about the Russia\u2013Ukraine\u00a0war. We\u00a0received hundreds of\u00a0messages in\u00a0response, and…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":548893,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[7654],"tags":[2000,299,657,7888,7883,7886,7875,7868,7880,7870,7881,7887,7876,7864,7871,7865,7873,7874,7866,7869,7867,7885,7879,7872,7884,7882,7878,7877],"class_list":{"0":"post-548892","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-ukraine","8":"tag-eu","9":"tag-europe","10":"tag-ukraine","11":"tag-7888","12":"tag-7883","13":"tag-7886","14":"tag-7875","15":"tag-7868","16":"tag-7880","17":"tag-7870","18":"tag-7881","19":"tag-7887","20":"tag-7876","21":"tag-7864","22":"tag-7871","23":"tag-7865","24":"tag-7873","25":"tag-7874","26":"tag-7866","27":"tag-7869","28":"tag-7867","29":"tag-7885","30":"tag-7879","31":"tag-7872","32":"tag-7884","33":"tag-7882","34":"tag-7878","35":"tag-7877"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/115492592517862450","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/548892","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=548892"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/548892\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/548893"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=548892"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=548892"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=548892"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}