Strategic thinking will be necessary for the UK to succeed in its aims with Europe. But, warns Jo\u00ebl Reland, it may not be sufficient.<\/p>\n
As the saying goes, history may not repeat itself, but it often rhymes. The UK\u2019s mooted \u2018EU reset\u2019 is a very different proposition from the Brexit negotiations \u2013 a narrow reconciliation not a sweeping divorce \u2013 but there are still valuable lessons to be learned from the past. Unfortunately for those hoping for a significant reset, these are lessons which Keir Starmer\u2019s government does not appear to be heeding.<\/p>\n
The starkest lesson from the original Brexit negotiations is that definitions are destiny. Whoever is able to frame the terms of the talks gains the upper hand. Between 2016 and 2020, the EU managed to dictate the course of proceedings by imposing its timetable for negotiations and setting clear red lines around the possible models for the future relationship.<\/p>\n
Starmer\u2019s government had a good opportunity to set the early agenda this time, given it took office a full five months before the new European Commission was installed. This is an opportunity which has been missed. Labour has done nothing to elaborate on the four EU policies in its manifesto (agreements on veterinary standards, professional qualifications, touring artists and security cooperation), providing no detail on the substance of each agreement, nor whether, as ministers have hinted, there are more proposals to come.<\/p>\n
Unless the UK spells out exactly what it wants, talks cannot begin. And amid the UK\u2019s silence, the EU has filled the vacuum. Despite the absence of political leadership over the summer, officials have briefed repeatedly on which UK proposals they have ruled in (a veterinary agreement) or out (a touring artists deal). Moreover, the EU has outlined a list of pre-conditions which the UK must meet and insisted that a youth mobility deal be part of the talks \u2013 despite heavy recalcitrance on the UK side. Already, it appears that the shape of the reset is being bent to the EU\u2019s will.<\/p>\n
Yet we should not mistake the EU\u2019s assertiveness for enthusiasm. The most significant difference compared to the 2016-2020 negotiations is that, this time around, the EU is perfectly happy to end up in a \u2018no deal\u2019 scenario. If the talks come to nothing, we simply carry on with the status quo \u2013 which the EU considers to be working relatively well. It has not suffered significant economic damage from the new trading relationship, while the UK\u2019s travails have dampened any enthusiasm for copycat exits from other member states.<\/p>\n
Reopening the agreement risks upsetting that delicate balance, as well as distracting from many higher priorities, ranging from defence capabilities and the admission of new member states, to economic competitiveness and the green transition. The EU will not come to the negotiating table unless there are clear and tangible benefits on offer.<\/p>\n
This is something which the UK does not seem to have fully computed, as the incentives it is offering remain scant. The EU certainly sees benefits in closer security cooperation with the UK, but the vaguely-defined \u2018pact\u2019 which Labour has mooted will most likely amount to semi-regular dialogues without formal obligations. The EU can probably live without it. Meanwhile, the UK continues to rule out a youth mobility agreement, even though it is the single issue on which the EU is most keen to negotiate.<\/p>\n
By the time the two sides meet for a special summit this spring, the UK will need to spell out a much clearer set of demands, balancing both sides\u2019 interests. Should the two sides agree to initiate talks, the UK will also have to think about how to enhance its negotiating leverage. In 2016, the EU gained the upper hand by insisting that UK financial obligations, citizens\u2019 rights and Northern Ireland were sorted before the future relationship talks. This time, it might insist that all the reset items are negotiated as a package \u2013 nothing is agreed until everything is agreed \u2013 to maximise its control.<\/p>\n
But this doesn\u2019t mean the UK can\u2019t propose an alternative approach, isolating and linking certain issues. Could it offer the EU more generous access to its fisheries (a matter of major concern in Brussels) in return for an agreement on veterinary standards, given both issues relate to agrifoods? Could a deal on of youth mobility be tied to the UK\u2019s asks mobility-related asks (around professional qualifications and touring artists)?<\/p>\n
As the weaker negotiating partner, such strategic thinking will be necessary for the UK to succeed in its aims. But it may not be sufficient. The inescapable reality is that the EU does not feel much pressure to change the status quo. Unlike in 2020, the costs of inaction are low, and the risks of distraction are high.<\/p>\n
It is the relative stability of the of the UK-EU relationship which, ironically, makes a significant reset of relations less likely.<\/p>\n
By\u00a0Jo\u00ebl Reland<\/a>, Senior Researcher, UK in a Changing Europe<\/strong><\/p>\n