<\/p>\n
Since November 10, Russia has been running<\/a> an\u00a0experiment it\u00a0calls SIM card \u201ccooling\u201d \u2014 temporarily cutting off mobile Internet access for cards that have either connected to\u00a0foreign networks while roaming or\u00a0remained offline for more than 72 hours. SIM cards returning from abroad are automatically disconnected for 24 hours, though users can, in\u00a0theory, restore service sooner by\u00a0completing a\u00a0CAPTCHA. Officially, the measure is\u00a0meant to\u00a0prevent Ukrainian drones equipped with LTE modems from connecting to\u00a0Russian mobile networks during attacks. In\u00a0practice, though, it\u2019s a\u00a0major inconvenience for travelers, residents <\/a>of\u00a0border regions, and even foreign<\/a> visitors, whose SIM cards are also \u201ccooled.\u201d Whether the system actually improves security in\u00a0practice, however, is\u00a0an\u00a0open question. At\u00a0first glance, it\u00a0looks plausible \u2014 it\u2019s no\u00a0coincidence that Ukraine has discussed<\/a> a\u00a0similar approach. In\u00a0reality, though, the benefits are limited, and this new layer of\u00a0protection is\u00a0easily bypassed. Meduza explains how drones utilize mobile networks during attacks and whether \u201ccooling\u201d can do\u00a0anything to\u00a0stop them.<\/p>\n First, a\u00a0quick explanation of\u00a0what this new \u201ccooling\u201d mechanism actually is.<\/p>\n Russia\u2019s Digital Development Ministry has begun testing a\u00a0new policy in\u00a0which mobile operators are required to\u00a0block Internet access for SIM cards that have recently connected to\u00a0foreign networks while roaming, as\u00a0well as\u00a0for cards that have been inactive for more than 72 hours.<\/p>\n During the blocking period, users can still access websites on\u00a0government-approved \u201cwhitelists\u201d \u2014 including the state services portal Gosuslugi, Russian social networks, and search engines.<\/p>\n A\u00a0user can lift the block by\u00a0completing a\u00a0CAPTCHA through a\u00a0link sent by\u00a0their mobile carrier. For now, the system doesn\u2019t work with all operators, and, naturally, the CAPTCHA method isn\u2019t available on\u00a0devices that lack a\u00a0compatible interface. The goal of\u00a0the measure is\u00a0to\u00a0completely prevent SIM cards installed in\u00a0Ukrainian drones from connecting to\u00a0Russian mobile networks.<\/p>\n Other restrictions serve the same purpose, and some of\u00a0them are even more disruptive for civilians. These range from a\u00a0ban<\/a> on\u00a0transferring SIM cards to\u00a0other people to\u00a0indefinite shutdowns<\/a> of\u00a0mobile Internet in\u00a0certain areas. It\u2019s clear that if\u00a0\u201ccooling\u201d were the only \u2014 yet effective \u2014 way to\u00a0counter drones, it\u00a0would be\u00a0a\u00a0far better alternative to\u00a0a\u00a0full-scale shutdown.<\/p>\n No SIM city Russia\u2019s plan to\u00a0stop drones has left tourists cut off from mobile Internet<\/a>No SIM city Russia\u2019s plan to\u00a0stop drones has left tourists cut off from mobile Internet<\/a>So\u00a0how do\u00a0Ukrainian drones actually connect to\u00a0Russian mobile networks?<\/strong><\/p>\n First, it\u2019s important to\u00a0note that most military drones flying over Ukraine, Russia, and the front line between the two armies don\u2019t use mobile communication at\u00a0all.<\/p>\n Almost all drones on\u00a0the battlefield are controlled directly by\u00a0operators via two-way radio or, in\u00a0some cases, fiber-optic cable. Still, in\u00a0recent months, drones equipped with LTE modems have begun appearing more frequently in\u00a0the rear areas of\u00a0both armies \u2014 mostly over Ukrainian territory.<\/p>\n Long-range drones used for strikes deep inside Ukraine and Russia typically rely on\u00a0a\u00a0standard navigation suite that includes an\u00a0inertial system \u2014 which isn\u2019t vulnerable to\u00a0electronic warfare but gradually accumulates internal errors \u2014 and a\u00a0satellite navigation system that helps correct those errors. The latter, however, is\u00a0highly susceptible to\u00a0interference: the weak signals from navigation satellites can be\u00a0jammed or\u00a0replaced with fake ones. The goal of\u00a0such electronic countermeasures is\u00a0to\u00a0reduce the precision of\u00a0enemy drones, missiles, and guided bombs to\u00a0the point that they can no\u00a0longer effectively hit their targets.<\/p>\n The main defense against jamming and \u201cspoofing\u201d \u2014 that is, falsified signals \u2014 lies in\u00a0increasing the complexity of\u00a0the receiver antenna. Russian Shahed\/Geran drones, for instance, are equipped with complex navigation systems featuring more than 10 satellite-signal receivers. The data from these receivers are processed by\u00a0an\u00a0onboard computer capable of\u00a0comparing and filtering out false signals.<\/p>\n Both sides routinely complain that the accuracy of\u00a0their drones, missiles, and bombs \u2014 including Western-made ones \u2014 can suddenly drop in\u00a0certain areas because of\u00a0enemy interference. But those problems are often resolved through relatively simple hardware and software updates.<\/p>\n The weapons of\u00a0tomorrow\u00a0 The \u2018drone revolution\u2019 rewrote the battlefield in\u00a0Ukraine. Will they upend the West\u2019s way of\u00a0war?<\/a>The weapons of\u00a0tomorrow\u00a0 The \u2018drone revolution\u2019 rewrote the battlefield in\u00a0Ukraine. Will they upend the West\u2019s way of\u00a0war?<\/a><\/p>\n In\u00a0theory, connecting to\u00a0mobile networks could help overcome these issues, since civilian devices like smartphones often rely on\u00a0cell tower signals for navigation. But mobile networks \u2014 unlike satellites \u2014 can be\u00a0switched off entirely, making them unreliable in\u00a0combat. For that reason, both sides use mobile connectivity only as\u00a0a\u00a0supplementary tool, and most long-range drones operate without it\u00a0altogether.<\/p>\n Still, both sides note that long-range drones that have crashed without detonating do<\/a> in\u00a0fact contain<\/a> mobile communication modems \u2014 though such findings are reported mainly by\u00a0Ukrainian experts, since similar evidence on\u00a0the Russian side is\u00a0likely concealed by\u00a0military censorship. These modems often contain Russian, Ukrainian, or\u00a0even foreign SIM cards.<\/p>\n The main purpose of\u00a0these modems is\u00a0to\u00a0transmit<\/a> telemetry data from the drone back to\u00a0command. In\u00a0theory, this feedback could help planners refine future strikes, avoiding areas with heavy satellite jamming or\u00a0air-defense systems. All of\u00a0these zones lie far beyond the range of\u00a0standard radio communication.<\/p>\n In\u00a0some cases, both sides also use mobile modems to\u00a0transmit video from onboard cameras. But this too has its problems: the signal suffers from significant lag, making it\u00a0nearly useless for hitting moving targets. The only viable option is\u00a0striking relatively stationary but important targets that move occasionally \u2014 for example, military aircraft parked at\u00a0airfields but capable of\u00a0taxiing between spots. For the most part, though, long-range drones continue to\u00a0strike fixed targets with known coordinates, where real-time video isn\u2019t needed.<\/p>\n More often, camera-equipped drones \u2014 at\u00a0least on\u00a0the Russian side \u2014 are used for strikes and surveillance in\u00a0the near rear. Shahed\/Geran drones, for example, have repeatedly attacked railway infrastructure, including trains at\u00a0front-line stations. Such strikes clearly required real-time target identification. Fixed-wing drones used for attacks on\u00a0armored vehicles and other key targets in\u00a0the rear also sometimes carry<\/a> mobile modems. It\u00a0remains unclear, however, how effective freezing SIM cards that have recently connected to\u00a0roaming networks could be\u00a0against them.<\/p>\n Finally, LTE modems with SIM cards can play a\u00a0role in\u00a0high-profile \u2014 and militarily painful \u2014 special operations. In\u00a0June 2025, Ukrainian intelligence used<\/a> small kamikaze drones equipped with mobile communication to\u00a0attack Russian long-range and strategic aircraft at\u00a0Air Force bases deep inside the country. The drones were piloted by\u00a0operators located thousands of\u00a0kilometers away, inside Ukraine. The communication lag was overcome with the help of\u00a0ArduPilot, an\u00a0open-source UAV autopilot system.<\/p>\n Untangling Operation \u2018Spiderweb\u2019 Arms control expert Pavel Podvig explains what Ukraine\u2019s surprise drone strikes reveal about Russia\u2019s strategic nuclear forces<\/a>Untangling Operation \u2018Spiderweb\u2019 Arms control expert Pavel Podvig explains what Ukraine\u2019s surprise drone strikes reveal about Russia\u2019s strategic nuclear forces<\/a><\/p>\n Russian security services fear another strike of\u00a0this kind \u2014 and it\u2019s likely that all relevant agencies, including the Digital Development Ministry, have been ordered to\u00a0devise countermeasures. Still, it\u2019s not hard to\u00a0see that the SIM \u201ccooling\u201d system won\u2019t solve the problem. Ukrainian operatives could simply purchase dozens of\u00a0Russian SIM cards and \u201cunfreeze\u201d them according to\u00a0the official reactivation rules.<\/p>\n Ukrainian experts claim their military has learned to\u00a0block SIM cards on\u00a0enemy drones \u201cin\u00a0flight.\u201d The exact mechanism and effectiveness of\u00a0such technology remain unclear, but it\u00a0may work by\u00a0targeting SIM cards that move between cell towers at\u00a0speeds of\u00a0several hundred kilometers per hour.<\/p>\n So\u00a0does that mean the SIM card \u2018cooling\u2019 system won\u2019t help stop drone attacks?<\/strong><\/p>\n That\u2019s what it\u00a0looks like. The new measures may complicate the planning of\u00a0certain operations, but they won\u2019t be\u00a0enough to\u00a0halt Ukrainian drone strikes deep inside Russia.<\/p>\n Meduza is\u00a0the world\u2019s largest independent Russian news outlet. Every day, we\u00a0bring you essential coverage from Russia and beyond. Our independence lets us\u00a0tell the stories others can\u2019t and help you make sense of\u00a0one of\u00a0the world\u2019s most enigmatic regions. Explore our reporting\u00a0here<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0follow us<\/a>\u00a0wherever you get your news.<\/p>\n Meduza\u2019s\u00a0Razbor\u00a0(\u201cExplainers\u201d) team<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Since November 10, Russia has been running an\u00a0experiment it\u00a0calls SIM card \u201ccooling\u201d \u2014 temporarily cutting off mobile Internet…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":570246,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[7655],"tags":[332,7888,7883,7886,7875,7868,7880,7870,7881,7887,7876,7864,7871,7865,7873,7874,7866,7869,7867,7885,7879,7872,7884,7882,7878,7877],"class_list":{"0":"post-570245","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-russia","8":"tag-russia","9":"tag-7888","10":"tag-7883","11":"tag-7886","12":"tag-7875","13":"tag-7868","14":"tag-7880","15":"tag-7870","16":"tag-7881","17":"tag-7887","18":"tag-7876","19":"tag-7864","20":"tag-7871","21":"tag-7865","22":"tag-7873","23":"tag-7874","24":"tag-7866","25":"tag-7869","26":"tag-7867","27":"tag-7885","28":"tag-7879","29":"tag-7872","30":"tag-7884","31":"tag-7882","32":"tag-7878","33":"tag-7877"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/115549148718703027","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/570245","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=570245"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/570245\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/570246"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=570245"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=570245"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=570245"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}