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\nThe Monument to Party Founding, Pyongyang, North Korea (Steve Barker\/Unsplash)<\/p>\n
It was October 2001 in Pyongyang. The North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam-sun was agitated. He asked me to \u201cplease explain\u201d the US Air Force squadron, which had recently flown over the Korean Peninsula to land at Osan Air Base in South Korea. He recalled as a boy seeing US military aircraft arrive to backstop allied forces \u2013 including 18,000 Australians \u2013 still fighting on the ground at what was to be a turning point in the Korean War.<\/p>\n
I tried my best, describing the sweeping re-orientation of US military assets around the globe in the immediate aftermath of the 9\/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. The Alaska squadron was deployed, I said, to rebalance after a US aircraft carrier had begun moving from North Asia to the Gulf.<\/p>\n
But Paek would not be mollified. To him, all guns were metaphorically pointing at Pyongyang.<\/p>\n
Our visit to North Korea came at the best of times. After Australia had decided to renew the bilateral relationship with the Democratic People\u2019s Republic of Korea (North Korea) in 2000, in support of South Korea\u2019s then president Kim Dae-jung\u2019s \u201cSunshine Policy\u201d and moves by the US Clinton administration to visit the Hermit Kingdom, Australia\u2019s Ambassador David Irvine in Beijing presented credentials in Pyongyang. Our visit was designed to offer further food and energy assistance to North Korea and discuss deepening diplomacy including North Korea\u2019s admission to regional ASEAN-centred forums. I was Irvine\u2019s Seoul-based delegate and North Korean officials were intensely focused on my perspectives from the South.<\/p>\n
But a year later, North Korea had been caught out reprocessing nuclear material and soon after openly declared its clandestine nuclear weapons program.<\/p>\n
\nThe Monument to Party Founding, Pyongyang, North Korea (Steve Barker\/Unsplash)<\/p>\n
Twenty years on, and the third generation Kim is now showcasing his now formidable nuclear weapons capability \u2013 literally on a stage together with the Asian nuclear powers, China, India and Russia (yes, look it up: Russia has a Pacific coast). He has repudiated 70 years of commitment<\/a> by both Seoul and Pyongyang to strive for \u201cdenuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula\u201d. Beijing has effectively recognised North Korea as a nuclear armed state. Russia has probably encouraged Kim and provided him with nuclear technology since their 2024 renewed defence pact and provision of North Korean troops, ammunition and rockets to assist Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine.<\/p>\n In this Trump era, doubts are arising among commentators in Seoul and Tokyo about US extended nuclear deterrence. Japan\u2019s new conservative Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi is mulling a review<\/a> of the principles which had elevated Japan to a global leader on nuclear non-proliferation, including a ban on placing nukes on its territory. South Korea\u2019s progressive President Lee Jae-myung has gained traction in acquiring nuclear submarines<\/a> and polls indicate a majority of South Koreans believe<\/a> their government should have a nuclear arsenal to repel the North.<\/p>\n Fundamental rethinking \u2013 albeit insufficiently urgent \u2013 is underway as the world edges towards nuclear breakout and the expiry in February 2026 of the last US-Russia nuclear arms control treaty, New START. Russia\u2019s Vladimir Putin has reportedly proposed extending<\/a> the treaty\u2019s limits informally and resuming bilateral arms control talks. But experts are sceptical about his intentions amid current confusion over the latest US-Russia Ukraine war deal, and the fact that Putin\u2019s efforts will eschew the verification measures critical to real nuclear warhead draw downs.<\/p>\n Asian partners and allies need to hear the US President say that the nuclear taboo remains cogent.<\/p>\n