In early 2022, Russia and China famously declared their friendship had \u201cno limits,\u201d right before Vladimir Putin ordered the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.<\/p>\n
More than three years later, that relationship is looking increasingly lopsided, and apparently doesn\u2019t include friendly discounts, as Moscow relies heavily on Beijing to cushion the blow of Western sanctions.<\/p>\n
A recent report from the Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies<\/a> found that the median price Russia paid for Chinese exports of sanctioned products soared 87% between 2021 and 2024. For exports from other countries, however, prices of sanctioned goods rose just 9% during that time.<\/p>\n Researchers highlighted ball bearings, which is on the European Union\u2019s list of high-priority items. While the value of Chinese ball-bearing exports to Russia jumped by 76% from 2021 to 2024, the quantity of exports actually dropped by 13%, indicating that the unit price doubled.<\/p>\n And for tapered roller bearings, the unit price nearly quadrupled. Both types of products are critical industrial inputs that could also be used in Russia\u2019s weapons sector.<\/p>\n \u201cOur general results, illustrated here with two simple examples, lead us to conclude that trade sanctions have been successful in their aim of limiting Russia\u2019s access to critical goods,\u201d the Bank of Finland said.<\/p>\n To be sure, China wasn\u2019t the only country that was able to squeeze higher prices from Russia. The report said Turkish export prices of sanctioned goods to Russia were up 25%\u201355% compared to other exports.<\/p>\n Overall, prices of sanctioned products were 40% higher than prices of non-sanctioned products.<\/p>\n A separate note from Capital Economics said total bilateral trade between Russia and China fell 9% during the first nine months of 2025 compared to a year ago. That\u2019s after trade more than doubled between 2020 and 2024. \u00a0<\/p>\n China now accounts for 30% of Russia\u2019s goods exports and 50% of its imports. On the flip side, Russia accounts for just 3% of China\u2019s goods exports and 5% of its imports.<\/p>\n As Chinese firms fear potential fallout from Western sanctions on Moscow, there\u2019s little sign that China is expanding supply chains in Russia, while foreign direct investment remains limited.<\/p>\n \u201cOverall, the Russia-China relationship is\u2014and will remain\u2014asymmetric,\u201d Capital Economics said. \u201cChina is more important for Russia economically than Russia is for China. And Russia wants and needs more from the relationship than China is willing to provide.\u201d<\/p>\n The reports come amid signs that the Kremlin has proposed business deals with the U.S.<\/a> as part of talks to the end the Ukraine war and lift sanctions.<\/p>\n Meanwhile, Putin\u2019s wartime economy is hitting a wall<\/a> as production bottlenecks, labor shortages, tighter government spending, and the lack of Western technology are increasingly causing strains.<\/p>\n \u201cTo produce substantially more equipment or recruit and train far more soldiers, Moscow would have to shift to a more comprehensive war footing by directing all available resources toward military needs, as it did during\u00a0World War II, or commandeering civilian production lines for military purposes,\u201d Alexandra Prokopenko, a fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center\u00a0and former Russian central bank advisor,\u00a0wrote in\u00a0Foreign Affairs<\/a>\u00a0last month.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"In early 2022, Russia and China famously declared their friendship had \u201cno limits,\u201d right before Vladimir Putin ordered…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":602294,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[7655],"tags":[1395,332,2663,123829],"class_list":{"0":"post-602293","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-russia","8":"tag-china","9":"tag-russia","10":"tag-sanctions","11":"tag-ukraine-invasion"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/115635758318737272","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/602293","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=602293"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/602293\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/602294"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=602293"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=602293"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=602293"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}