{"id":606255,"date":"2025-12-02T00:00:43","date_gmt":"2025-12-02T00:00:43","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/606255\/"},"modified":"2025-12-02T00:00:43","modified_gmt":"2025-12-02T00:00:43","slug":"why-spain-is-not-meeting-nato-spending-targets","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/606255\/","title":{"rendered":"Why Spain is not meeting NATO spending targets"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>              <img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/12\/spain-military-spending-article-image-1024x683.jpg\" alt=\"Why Spain is not meeting NATO spending targets\"\/><\/p>\n<p>When NATO allies agreed this year to significantly raise their defense spending, one country stood apart: Spain. In June, under US pressure, NATO adopted a new goal of spending 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense by 2035, with 3.5 percent going toward core military needs and 1.5 percent designated for related areas such as cyber and infrastructure. Spain, however, was the only member of the thirty-two-nation Alliance that refused to commit to this target. Instead, Prime Minister Pedro S\u00e1nchez <a href=\"https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/nato-spain-trump-defense-spending-8b554694c18511a3b835e44a15042694\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">secured<\/a> a special exemption for Madrid, insisting Spain would cap its military budget at approximately 2.1 percent of GDP, a level he <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/trump-threatens-tariffs-spain-over-refusal-boost-nato-defense-spending-2025-10-14\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">described<\/a> as \u201csufficient and realistic.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>This opt-out has made Spain an outlier within the Alliance. In October, US President Donald Trump even <a href=\"https:\/\/www.elmundo.es\/internacional\/2025\/10\/09\/68e812b6e4d4d8e3658b45b1.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">suggested<\/a> that NATO should consider Spain\u2019s expulsion over its unwillingness to contribute more, calling the country a \u201cvery low payer\u201d and hinting at potential trade retaliation.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Spain\u2019s persistent spending shortfall<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Spain\u2019s defense spending has long fallen short of NATO\u2019s benchmarks. Under the previous NATO benchmark of reaching 2 percent of GDP in military spending by 2024, Spain consistently underperformed, spending only about <a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/trump-suggests-booting-laggard-spain-from-nato-over-defense-spending\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">1.2 percent<\/a> in recent years. In 2024, its military budget stood at approximately \u20ac17.2 billion, or <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/nato-countries-approve-hague-summit-statement-with-5-defence-spending-goal-2025-06-22\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">1.24 percent<\/a> of the country\u2019s GDP, the lowest among NATO members as a percentage of economic output.<\/p>\n<p>Meanwhile, most allies have increased spending to levels closer to or above 2 percent in response to Russia\u2019s aggression in Ukraine. As Atlantic Council Fellow <a href=\"https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/blogs\/new-atlanticist\/experts-react\/nato-allies-agreed-to-a-5-percent-defense-spending-target-in-a-low-drama-summit-now-what\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Andrew Bernard noted<\/a>, Spain\u2019s promise to reach 2 percent, which it only committed to <a href=\"https:\/\/english.elpais.com\/economy-and-business\/2025-10-16\/spain-increases-arms-purchases-from-the-us-reaching-its-highest-expenditure-ever.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">in April<\/a> of this year, has yet to translate into the modern military capabilities the Alliance needs. Although Spain contributes approximately <a href=\"https:\/\/emad.defensa.gob.es\/en\/prensa\/noticias\/2025\/02\/Listado\/250214-ni-GTLegion-STDT25.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">three thousand<\/a> troops to NATO missions from the Baltics to the Sahel, deployment alone does not substitute for investment in equipment, readiness, and modernization.<\/p>\n<p>Few within the Alliance <a href=\"https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/blogs\/new-atlanticist\/experts-react\/nato-allies-agreed-to-a-5-percent-defense-spending-target-in-a-low-drama-summit-now-what\/#:~:text=While%20Spain%20prides%20itself%20on,have%20to%20dig%20out%20from\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">believe<\/a> Spain can meet NATO capability requirements by spending just over 2 percent of its GDP. This gap only deepens the impression that Spain is benefiting from NATO without fully contributing to it.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Domestic politics: The main barrier to higher spending<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Why does Spain lag so far behind in defense spending when it is one of the fastest-growing economies in the eurozone? The answer lies mainly in domestic politics and public opinion.<\/p>\n<p>S\u00e1nchez leads a fragile minority coalition dependent on left-wing and regional nationalist parties that are skeptical of increased military spending. His Socialist Party governs in partnership with the far-left parties Unidas Podemos and Sumar, and it relies on small Basque and Catalan nationalist parties to maintain a parliamentary majority. These partners view military investment with suspicion, fearing that higher defense budgets would come at the expense of social spending programs.<\/p>\n<p>As Ione Belarra, one of the leaders of Podemos, bluntly <a href=\"https:\/\/www.europapress.es\/nacional\/noticia-podemos-critica-sanchez-dispuesto-llegar-gasto-defensa-antes-2029-lame-botas-trump-20250307170949.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">put it<\/a>, these parties refuse to help the government \u201ccontinue licking the boots of the United States.\u201d Pro-independence Catalan and Basque parties are equally unwilling to strengthen the Spanish army, which they historically distrust.<\/p>\n<p>Public opinion reinforces these pressures. The legacy of Francisco Franco\u2019s dictatorship left Spaniards skeptical of the military for decades, and while the armed forces have gradually gained trust through peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, there remains limited enthusiasm for large budget increases. In a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.elconfidencialdigital.com\/articulo\/defensa\/encuesta-cis-revela-que-6-cada-10-espanoles-apoyan-gastar-mas-defensa\/20250311050000941092.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">recent poll<\/a> by the national polling institute CIS, only around 14 percent of Spaniards supported significantly increasing the military budget, as most prioritize healthcare and education.<\/p>\n<p>Spain\u2019s official neutrality during both world wars and its largely peripheral role during the Cold War helped shape a political culture that views defense as secondary to social welfare.<\/p>\n<p><strong>A weaker ally means weaker influence<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Spain\u2019s unwillingness to spend on defense comes at a cost, particularly to its image abroad. Eastern European NATO members such as Poland and the Baltic states, which are investing heavily in defense, may interpret Spain\u2019s stance as a troubling lack of solidarity at a critical time. Burden-sharing in NATO is ultimately about sharing risk. Spain\u2019s refusal to invest in new capabilities raises concerns over its willingness to do so. And that reluctance carries risks of its own, given the security challenges it faces at home, including tensions with Morocco over the bordering Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla, migration pressures, and instability across the Mediterranean, which could require NATO support in the near future.<\/p>\n<p>The practical implications of this credibility gap are already visible. Diplomatically, Spain has found itself sidelined in some high-profile discussions on European security. In August, for instance, S\u00e1nchez did not take part in a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/content-series\/fastthinking\/was-trumps-summit-with-zelenskyy-and-european-leaders-a-turning-point-for-russias-war-in-ukraine\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">White House meeting<\/a> of key European leaders on Ukraine, a signal of its second-tier status among allies. If Madrid is perceived in Washington or Brussels as an unreliable partner on defense, it risks further losing influence, not just on defense and security issues, but in crucial areas such as trade, as well.<\/p>\n<p>The spectacle of being publicly singled out by the US president only deepens the damage. Trump\u2019s sharp criticism of Spain and his threat of tariffs have reinforced the country\u2019s image as an underperforming and unreliable ally. The idea that S\u00e1nchez leads <a href=\"https:\/\/www.economist.com\/international\/2025\/09\/09\/meet-the-leader-of-europes-anti-trump-resistance\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">\u201can anti-Trump coalition\u201d<\/a> may play well domestically, but it has done little to strengthen Spain\u2019s standing abroad. In reality, no such coalition exists, and the Spanish government has failed to find allies or present any credible alternative approach, leaving Spain isolated and exposed. Consequently, Spain\u2019s internal vulnerability is translating into external weakness.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Spain needs to make hard choices<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Spain now faces a strategic choice. On the one hand, the S\u00e1nchez government can continue trying to appease its domestic political partners, delaying or limiting defense investments to maintain the support of far-left and regional factions. This path may ensure short-term governmental stability, but it will likely further erode Spain\u2019s standing within NATO and Europe.<\/p>\n<p>On the other hand, it could make the hard political choices needed to shift course, accepting that Spain\u2019s internal fragility is already damaging its international credibility. Until then, Spain will continue to be seen as NATO\u2019s easy target.<\/p>\n<p>The S\u00e1nchez government cannot have it both ways. A country cannot expect to benefit from NATO membership with deterrence, geopolitical influence, and allied solidarity, while not meeting the targets that almost all allies, even poorer ones, are striving to meet. If Spain wants to become a reliable ally, it will need to demonstrate, not just declare, a stronger commitment. That means real budgetary increases that translate into modern jets, ships, and infrastructure.<\/p>\n<p>Ultimately, the more Spain appears divided and hesitant on defense, the more it invites actors such as Russia to exploit those divisions within NATO. With Europe\u2019s security environment the most dangerous it has been in decades, the margin for underperformance is thin. The country\u2019s friends and even some of its critics would welcome a Spain that robustly funds its defense and contributes its full weight to transatlantic security, in accordance with its status as the European Union\u2019s fourth-largest economy. But getting there requires the political courage to prioritize long-term national and allied security interests over short-term parliamentary survival. Until that shift occurs, Spain\u2019s own political choices will continue to undermine its international credibility and Europe\u2019s collective defense.<\/p>\n<p>Jacobo Ramos Folch is an international policy consultant, Contributor at Newsline, and a visiting professor at Universidad de Navarra and IE University. He is part of the Atlantic Council\u2019s European Leadership Accelerator program.<\/p>\n<p>                            Further reading<\/p>\n<p>                        <a href=\"https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/in-depth-research-reports\/books\/demographic-shifts-in-spain-call-for-reinvigorated-reforms\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/12\/Spain-chapter-image-scaled-e1738378470336-500x350.jpg\" alt=\"Why Spain is not meeting NATO spending targets\" class=\"gta-horizontal-featured--img\"\/><\/a><\/p>\n<p class=\"gta-horizontal-featured--heading\">Tue, Feb 4, 2025<\/p>\n<p>                      <a href=\"https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/in-depth-research-reports\/books\/demographic-shifts-in-spain-call-for-reinvigorated-reforms\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Demographic shifts in Spain call for reinvigorated reforms<\/a><\/p>\n<p class=\"gta-horizontal-featured--tax\">\n                                                      Freedom and Prosperity Around the World<br \/>\n                                                                                By<br \/>\n                                                                                Toni Rold\u00e1n Mon\u00e9s\n                        <\/p>\n<p>\n                          While Spain continues to perform well in the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes, sustaining this performance will involve overhauling the education system, pursuing political reforms to enhance institutional strength, and preserving fiscal sustainability amidst changing demographics.                        <\/p>\n<p class=\"ac-single-post--marquee--caption\">Image: The President of the Government, Pedro S\u00e1nchez, appears before the media after his meeting with the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Friedrich Merz, at the Moncloa Palace, on September 18, 2025, in Madrid, Spain. Photo by A. Perez Meca\/Europa Press\/ABACAPRESS.com via Reuters Connect.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"When NATO allies agreed this year to significantly raise their defense spending, one country stood apart: Spain. In&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":606256,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5312],"tags":[2000,299,104],"class_list":{"0":"post-606255","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-spain","8":"tag-eu","9":"tag-europe","10":"tag-spain"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/115647036463864532","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/606255","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=606255"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/606255\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/606256"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=606255"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=606255"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=606255"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}