{"id":610543,"date":"2025-12-04T00:09:17","date_gmt":"2025-12-04T00:09:17","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/610543\/"},"modified":"2025-12-04T00:09:17","modified_gmt":"2025-12-04T00:09:17","slug":"what-nationalism-is-doing-to-germany-again-the-rise-of-the-far-right-in-germany","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/610543\/","title":{"rendered":"What Nationalism Is Doing To Germany (Again): The Rise Of The Far-Right In Germany"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Did we learn nothing? Hitler utilized ethnocentric nationalism<\/a> to unite the \u201cAryan\u201d Germans against Jews based on their belief in racial superiority. This led to one of the most horrific genocides in the past century, drastically changing how countries approach international relations, human rights, and economic policy. Yet nearly a century later, Germany faces a disturbingly familiar pattern. So while the outward symbols have changed, the political mechanics, like exclusion and fear, are parallel. Germany\u2019s far-right revival, brought by the Alternative f\u00fcr Deutschland (AfD), demonstrates once again that history repeats itself.<\/p>\n

History lessons are often remembered as abstract concepts, as if there is a physical barrier between the past and the present. Germany\u2019s post-war constitution<\/a> was designed to prevent another Hitler, yet nationalist rhetoric has crept back into mainstream politics. Today, the AfD capitalizes<\/a> on the same conditions that once invigorated the Nazi Party: cultural anxieties, economic uncertainty, and mistrust in institutions. The resurgence of the far-right in Germany illustrates how ethnonationalist and populist rhetoric, which Hitler once weaponized, has returned to Germany in a new form. By exploiting citizens\u2019 fear, social division, and political dissatisfaction, the AfD threatens the foundations of Germany\u2019s post-war democratic stability.\u00a0<\/p>\n

To prevent history from repeating itself, it is imperative to understand Hitler\u2019s rise. Many nationalists, such as Hitler, employed populist tactics to achieve their goals. Populist politics typically emerge as a reaction against globalization,<\/a> and their proponents use straightforward inclusion and exclusion to reach their base and win electoral majorities. As noted by Harvard sociologist Bart Bonikowski, populism serves as a \u201cdiscursive tool of political outsiders\u2013usually elites themselves\u2013who seek to gain power by eschewing mainstream politics.\u201d1<\/a> This dynamic reflects a growing trend today \u201camong political elites to channel public grievances into ethnoracial resentment and political distrust.\u201d2<\/a>\u00a0<\/p>\n

Furthermore, in political scientist Panayota Gounari\u2019s words, fear politics utilize an ethnic, religious, linguistic, or political minority \u201cas a scapegoat for most if not all current\u201d problems of the country, subsequently construing the other group as dangerous and threatening.3<\/a> These explanations of nationalism and how it uses populism as its means perfectly align with the rise of the Nazi Party in the 1920s and 1930s. Following its defeat in World War I, Germany faced staggering economic hardship, in part due to the extensive monetary reparations required by the Treaty of Versailles. By framing Jewish people as responsible for Germany\u2019s problems, Hitler was able to reach his white Germanic base around an imagined national purity and gain popularity. Today, similar forces are again shaping German politics.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The Alternative f\u00fcr Deutschland, or AfD, is a populist far-right political party in Germany that became the second-strongest party after receiving 20.8 percent of the vote<\/a> in the 2025 federal election. The party initially started gaining traction after adopting xenophobic and Islamophobic positions following the refugee crisis in 2015<\/a>, when almost one million asylum seekers settled in Germany. The crisis led to many political tensions, such as concerns<\/a> over the strain on social services, the integration of refugees, and increased crime rates. While overall crime and total victimization rates<\/a> actually declined, the AfD exploited this fear to gain support and create an ingroup as their base of power.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The party\u2019s rhetoric portrays migrants and refugees as invaders who threaten German culture and security. In 2021, the leader of the AfD party in the state of Thuringia, Bj\u00f6rn H\u00f6cke, concluded a political campaign speech with the words, \u201cEverything for our homeland, everything for Saxony-Anhalt, and everything for Germany!<\/a>\u201d The last part of his speech is banned in Germany because it was the slogan associated with the Nazi Sturmabteilung stormtroopers<\/a>, who played a key role in the Nazi Party\u2019s rise to power. This slogan once again emphasizes cultural purity and exclusion. Further, in 2017, Bj\u00f6rn H\u00f6cke referred to the Holocaust memorial in Berlin as a \u201cmonument of shame<\/a>,\u201d stating that the Germans\u2019 mental state continues to be that of a \u201ctotally vanquished people<\/a>.\u201d H\u00f6cke\u2019s remarks test the limits of democratic tolerance, which is the willingness to accept the civil rights and liberties of all citizens, regardless of their opinions. While this is central to any democracy, unlimited tolerance should be cautioned, however, because \u201cit may lead to the disappearance of tolerance<\/a> itself.\u201d The Nazi movement has shown that when unlimited tolerance is extended to those who are intolerant, the tolerant will be destroyed. H\u00f6cke reframes national memory as something to be rejected instead of respected, dangerously telling Germans to ignore the lessons the past gives.<\/p>\n

Germany\u2019s post-war constitution<\/a> specifically places limits on far-right and other extremist speech. Due to its increased radicalization, Germany\u2019s domestic intelligence agency, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), put AfD under surveillance as a potential threat to the constitution. The BfV concluded that the far-right wing of the AfD had \u201cextremist intentions<\/a>,\u201d and that the AfD\u2019s \u201cvehement anti-migrant rhetoric online was leading to violence in the real world<\/a>.\u201d Furthermore, the BfV assessed that about one-third of the AfD party members are inclined towards right-wing extremist violence.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Along with anti-immigration stances, the AfD has also embraced<\/a> anti-LBGTQ+, anti-environmental, and pro-Russian positions, among others. In Thuringia and Saxony, several wings and organizations of the party have even been deemed \u201ca threat to the liberal democratic order<\/a>.\u201d The AfD party\u2019s leaders consistently oppose support for Ukraine<\/a> and refuse to label Putin a war criminal, claiming Russia is a victim of Western aggression. By aligning with Russia in the war, the AfD appeals to Germans skeptical of NATO and frustrated by Germany\u2019s role in global conflicts.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Dr. Karl-Rudolf Korte of the North Rhine-Westphalia School of Governance explained that AfD mobilized as a \u201cprofiteer of fear<\/a>,\u201d and thrived because it filled in the emotional and ideological gaps left by traditional parties. Since June 2023<\/a>, AfD has received more support from the German people in opinion polls than the ruling chancellor\u2019s party, the Social Democrats (SPD). In June 2023<\/a>, the AfD won its first county administrator post in a runoff election in Sonneberg in the eastern German state of Thuringia, where the AfD is classified as a \u201cproven right-wing extremist<\/a>\u201d by the BfV.\u00a0<\/p>\n

AfD profits from fear and agitates resentment, passively collecting dissatisfied voters of other parties. Harmony, consistency, or agenda is irrelevant to AfD voters. AfD, rather than having a base of ideologically committed voters, \u201ccollects communities<\/a> of disappointed and mistrustful voters from other parties.\u201d AfD, as a sponge for resentment, benefits from fears that typically accompany societal modernization: the dissolution of traditional roles and the loss of security. This manifests in fears of downward social mobility, which is usually blamed on the influx of immigrants. These fears translate into a desire for a return to the \u2018good old days,\u2019 when German society was supposedly more homogeneous and stable. They try neither to convert nor lecture voters; instead, they mobilize on issues where other parties remain silent because they lack common positions, for instance in economic stances. Political scientist Achim Goerres <\/a>has found that the economic preferences of AfD voters are very mixed, which leaves little potential for strategy blurring. Many AfD voters feel ostracized in Germany and find appeal in AfD\u2019s stances. Any weakness of parties in the center becomes support for the AfD.<\/p>\n

The aftermath of COVID-19<\/a> has led to feelings of social isolation, economic turmoil, and fatigue from constant change. This perceived instability creates a \u201cbreeding ground for authoritarian temptations<\/a> that promise simple answers and idyllic worlds.\u201d AfD\u2019s appeal can be boiled down to those concerns: its promise to protect \u2018ordinary people\u2019 from globalization, immigration, and out-of-touch elites.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Support for the AfD is not evenly distributed across genders and demographics. Pew Research Center <\/a>says in a 2024 report that \u201caround one-in-five Germans (19%) see AfD favorably, but a large majority (79%) have a negative opinion of the party.\u201d However, men \u201chave more positive views of AfD than women do (26% vs. 11%), and the share of men holding this opinion has risen 10 points since 2022.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>\n

This gender gap can be attributed to several factors. Economic instability has hit working-class men the hardest, particularly in more rural areas. As technology continues to develop, it changes the market and leads to a decline in traditional manufacturing jobs. Shifting social values have also led some men to lose the sense of identity and pride once tied to earlier social roles. This phenomenon has been called the \u201cstatus threat<\/a>\u201d by Diana Mutz. The feeling of being left behind economically prompts a defensive reaction from those who believe that it\u2019s been stolen from them.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The AfD taps into this alienation by insisting upon traditional masculinity, order, and national pride. By framing immigration and feminism as threats to the stability of Germany, AfD produces cultural resentment. This, combined with economic insecurity, pushes many men toward the far right.<\/p>\n

The rise of AfD has already shifted the German political scene. AfD Party leaders Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla increasingly undermine trust in Germany\u2019s democratic institutions by questioning election results, disparaging public broadcasters as \u201cstate propaganda<\/a>,\u201d and promoting conspiracy theories about migration. At AfD\u2019s party conference to select candidates for the European Parliament, many party members were openly promoting theories such as the \u201cGreat Replacement<\/a>,\u201d which holds that political elites are \u201cdeliberately introducing<\/a> non-white migrants into Europe to supplant the white race.\u201d<\/p>\n

These tactics gradually delegitimize democracy; as a result,<\/a> voters lose trust in their government, the media, and elections, becoming more susceptible to authoritarian ideas. Further, in regions where AfD is the strongest, such as Saxony and Thuringia, hate crimes and political intimidation against refugees, journalists, and even public officials have increased<\/a>. The normalization of extremist rhetoric and violence has also blurred the line between political discourse and hate speech.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The presence of AfD forces mainstream parties to adjust<\/a> their rhetoric in turn; as a result, more centerist parties have adopted tougher stances on migration or national identity to avoid losing voters to AfD. This is one of the most dangerous signs of populist politics: when the center begins to echo extremism.\u00a0<\/p>\n

If populist politics feed on fear and disconnection, then overcoming it requires reestablishing trust and inclusion in democratic institutions. The AfD has a highly fluid voter base, especially in East Germany, where political disillusionment runs deep. Many voters choose<\/a> AfD not out of firm ideological convictions, but because they feel ignored or unrepresented by mainstream politics and media.\u00a0 In a 2023 poll by DeutschlandTrend<\/a>, \u201cabout two-thirds of those who supported AfD said they did so in protest of over other parties, rather than because they were convinced by the far right\u2019s policies.\u201d Increasing political polarization has caused many voters to avoid the center and vote instead for the far-left Greens party or for far-right AfD. A 2024 European Council on Foreign Relations public opinion poll<\/a> highlighted immigration at the most important issue shaping how Germans look at their future. Centrist parties, however, have developed no clear approach to immigration, some \u201cadopting populist and AfD-lite tactics and creating internal divisions<\/a>.\u201d Rather than uniting, this pushes voters already disillusioned with the centrist parties further towards the AfD, while AfD voters are not likely to won back by underdeveloped version of AfD\u2019s policy stances.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Political scientist Teresa V\u00f6lker<\/a> finds in her study that \u201cwhen mainstream parties mimic the anti-immigration rhetoric of the far right, they bring such ideas from the fringes into the mainstream debate,\u201d thereby legitimizing the far-right\u2019s demands. A study by Cambridge University<\/a> in 2025 found that accommodating far-right agendas instead leads to more voters defecting to the radical right, with the effect being more pronounced when the far-right pary is more established.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Thus, this breakdown between the party in charge and the voters leads to voters turning to alternative media and the AfD. Echoing the American-German Institute (AGI), political success depends on seeking \u201cproximity to the lives of citizens<\/a>.\u201d Centrist parties should address issues such as housing shortages, healthcare access, and local economic development, and not simply copy AfD\u2019s stance as an attempt to win back voters. By focusing on practical results and distinct stances, democratic parties can regain credibility from the AfD. The AGI puts it best: \u201cPeople vote for parties that get things done<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n

Ultimately, democracy\u2019s resilience depends on addressing conditions that make extremism attractive, rather than suppressing dissent. The past must be confronted, not as a history lesson in a textbook, but as a living reminder of how fragile democracy can be.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The rise in AfD\u2019s popularity indicates that nationalism can never truly be eradicated; instead, it lies dormant, waiting for fear of change and social division to revitalize it. Germany\u2019s history demonstrates to all of us how easily democratic institutions can break down when citizens lose trust in each other and their leaders. AfD\u2019s capitalization on the swirling resentment and harkening to past traditional roles represents a test to Germany\u2019s post-war constitution and its ability to prevent another far-right rise to power.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Yet history need not repeat itself. If Germany\u2019s centrist and democratic forces can rebuild citizens\u2019 trust, they can restore the promise of a society in which everyone, regardless of background or situation, is accepted. Beyond defeating AfD at the ballot box, Germany\u2019s goal should be to address the conditions that allow its messages to take root with its citizens; democracy cannot endure through complacency.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Germany has faced this test before. The world is watching again to see if this time, it will pass.<\/p>\n

Featured\/Headline Image Caption and Citation: AfD, Image sourced from\u00a0Heute<\/a>\u00a0|\u00a0CC License<\/a>, no changes made<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Did we learn nothing? Hitler utilized ethnocentric nationalism to unite the \u201cAryan\u201d Germans against Jews based on their…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":610544,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5310],"tags":[2000,299,1824],"class_list":{"0":"post-610543","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-germany","8":"tag-eu","9":"tag-europe","10":"tag-germany"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/115658395712184509","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/610543","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=610543"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/610543\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/610544"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=610543"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=610543"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=610543"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}