Brexit left the UK with higher trade barriers<\/a>, weaker productivity growth and a complex web of paperwork that particularly affects exporters of food, drink and manufactured goods.<\/p>\nBut rejoining the customs union is wishful thinking, Europeans think. Their message is blunt. The way back is hard, and won\u2019t deliver the expected benefits. <\/p>\n
Here\u2019s why:<\/p>\n
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EU-UK trade is already integrated<\/p>\n
In Brussels, the idea that Britain could simply \u201crejoin\u201d the customs union is seen as a misunderstanding of how the system works.<\/p>\n
At its core, a customs union means that participating countries remove tariffs between themselves and apply the same tariffs to goods imported from the rest of the world. <\/p>\n
That common external tariff removes the need for \u201crules of origin\u201d checks \u2013 the paperwork firms now face to prove where a product was made in order to qualify for zero tariffs under the EU-UK trade deal. <\/p>\n
But the economic gains of doing this are narrower than many assume. The main benefit would be removing rules of origin costs, which can add to the cost of some exports.<\/p>\n
\u201cA customs union can be helpful,\u201d says Fabian Zuleeg, chief executive of the European Policy Centre (EPC), a Brussels-based think-tank. \u201cBut EU-UK trade is already very integrated. We don\u2019t really have the kind of internal barriers which will make the customs union really that effective.\u201d<\/p>\n
Membership is for EU states<\/p>\n
But a customs union does not, on its own, remove border checks, regulatory inspections, VAT\/excise duty payments, safety controls or sanitary rules, unless Britain agrees to far deeper alignment. <\/p>\n
Nor does it guarantee frictionless trade in services. In practice, it is just one piece of a much larger regulatory and legal framework \u2013 which is why experts warn it is often oversold as a quick fix.<\/p>\n
EU officials stress that the existing EU customs union is not an \u00e0 la carte arrangement but part of the bloc\u2019s core economic architecture. Membership is effectively reserved for EU states, plus microstates Andorra, Monaco and San Marino, as well as long-time candidate country Turkey.<\/p>\n
All 27 EU states need to agree<\/p>\n
There is no off the shelf route back in for the UK. Any change would require a new treaty \u2013 negotiated from scratch and approved unanimously by all 27 member states.<\/p>\n
That alone makes it a formidable political undertaking. Several EU capitals remain wary after years of fraught Brexit negotiations, and Brussels is now focused on delivering stability rather than reopening complex talks that could quickly become toxic.<\/p>\n
It would hit existing trade deals<\/p>\n
The price Britain would have to pay is also high. A customs union would require the UK to align its external tariffs with the EU\u2019s \u2013 effectively surrendering its independent trade policy. <\/p>\n
That would mean revisiting or unravelling recent UK trade deals with countries such as the US, India, Australia and New Zealand. In future trade disputes, Britain could also be forced to mirror EU tariffs even where its own interests diverged \u2013 decisions that would require more political courage than the current Government has been willing to show so far.<\/p>\n
It would mean freedom of movement<\/p>\n
EU officials warn that the customs union offered by Brussels in 2018 during the Brexit negotiations would no longer be on offer \u2013 and would likely include demands for free movement.<\/p>\n
\u201cOf course, we\u2019re open to closer ties,\u201d said one European Commission official. \u201cBut the UK should know what rejoining the customs union is really about. There are benefit and there are obligations too \u2013 including free movement. And it doesn\u2019t look like Britain is in a place where it can have a serious debate about the trade-offs needed.\u201d<\/p>\n
David Henig, director of the UK Trade Policy Project, says that while most figures in Brussels do not give much thought to Britain rejoining the customs union, they have hardened their position.<\/p>\n
\u201cThe very clear message is, \u2018If you want any more, you have to give us what we want. And what we want is more on mobility and more on financial contributions,\u2019\u201d he says. \u201cThis reflects the longer-term concern that Britain is still trying to cherry-pick with a trade-only relationship with the EU.\u201d<\/p>\n
It could take years to negotiate<\/p>\n
As there is no standard form in which a customs union takes, the European Commission has scope to determine its shape. Henig says: \u201cIt would take time: these are two-, three-, four-year processes. So, the talk about rejoining right now seems like wishful thinking. The same old UK talking to itself routine as has been going on for 10 years.\u201d<\/p>\n
For many EU policymakers, this is the core issue. A customs union only works if all members trust each other. That trust would require strong alignment on trade defence and freedom of movement \u2013 areas where the UK has explicitly sought flexibility.<\/p>\n
The EU doesn\u2019t want to reopen Brexit talks<\/p>\n
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<\/a><\/p>\nThere is also little appetite in Brussels to push the issue. EU officials are focused on incremental co-operation under the existing EU-UK Trade and Co-operation Agreement \u2013 including veterinary agreements to reduce food checks, energy market links and youth mobility schemes \u2013 rather than reopening the Brexit settlement wholesale.<\/p>\n
That leaves Labour facing a familiar dilemma. Talking up the economic damage caused by Brexit resonates with voters, but proposing a customs union risks reopening old divisions and colliding with both domestic red lines and new EU demands.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Wes Streeting has revealed the level of debate about rejoining the customs union within Labour Rejoining the EU\u2019s…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":650432,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5226],"tags":[802,748,6852,2000,299,5187,1699,4884,528,199093,16,15],"class_list":{"0":"post-650431","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-brexit","8":"tag-brexit","9":"tag-britain","10":"tag-customs-union","11":"tag-eu","12":"tag-europe","13":"tag-european","14":"tag-european-union","15":"tag-great-britain","16":"tag-labour-party","17":"tag-politics-analysis","18":"tag-uk","19":"tag-united-kingdom"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/115769117683907452","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/650431","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=650431"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/650431\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/650432"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=650431"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=650431"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=650431"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}