Does the European Union \u2014 27 states, 450 million people, politically fractious even in the best of times \u2014 need to expand even more? The answer, in the European way, is a qualified and equivocal yes.<\/p>\n
Nine countries are officially in line to join the bloc, and EU officials have recently hinted some may be added by 2030. The European Commission\u2019s latest progress report exposes the gap between ambition and readiness. Tiny Montenegro has quietly done much of the hard work required for accession; Albania, Moldova and Ukraine are far behind. Others are unlikely to join anytime soon, according to the Tribune News Service.<\/p>\n
If handled well, enlargement can enhance Europe\u2019s security and credibility as a democratic bloc. It could prove particularly helpful at the moment, as Russia\u2019s aggression, America\u2019s inward turn and China\u2019s expanding footprint have made regional integration more of a strategic imperative. The likely alternative is a union ringed by fragile, easily coerced states whose instability could spill across Europe\u2019s borders.<\/p>\n
Economically, too, the logic of expansion is sound. A previous round of entrants in 2004 lifted the new members\u2019 gross domestic product per capita from 59% of the EU average to 81% by 2022; living standards rose sharply, alongside huge improvements in infrastructure, services and life expectancy. Existing members gained a larger market, smoother supply chains, more regional stability and hence greater prosperity: Income per person is about 10% higher than it would\u2019ve been.<\/p>\n
But such gains aren\u2019t automatic, and any additional enlargement must be handled with prudence. Adding small countries such as Montenegro and Albania is a low-cost, high-leverage option. It should bolster a vulnerable region, strengthen border and migration management, and reward genuine reform efforts. The benefits of such additions are likely to significantly outweigh the risks.<\/p>\n
Ukraine\u2019s bid demands a subtler calculation. Its size, industrial capacity and military resilience could one day make it a strategic asset. Yet a live conflict, vast reconstruction needs, governance problems and political sensitivities all complicate the case. Here the EU needs a more flexible approach that prioritises deepening ties under existing agreements for matters such as trade, energy, and customs and regulatory alignment, while laying the groundwork for full membership down the road.<\/p>\n
Two further principles should guide the enlargement process.<\/p>\n
One is that the EU should be mindful of how it wields leverage over aspiring members. It has long insisted on judicial independence, transparency, rule of law and other good-governance benchmarks as prerequisites to accession. But leaving candidates in a perpetual waiting room erodes the bloc\u2019s credibility and potentially cedes leverage to outside powers. The EU should offer better interim rewards for progress \u2014 such as earlier market access, sectoral integration and deeper participation in EU programmes \u2014 while imposing clear penalties for backsliding.<\/p>\n
Next, the EU must reform itself if it wants to stay governable. It should allow for more key decisions (in foreign policy, sanctions and other areas) to be made through qualified majority voting, rather than requiring unanimity among members. It also needs to strengthen its single market: Removing friction in cross-border capital markets, banking, energy and other areas should be paired with reforms to reduce red tape. This isn\u2019t just about enlargement: Without such changes, even the current union will struggle to remain functional.<\/p>\n
Europe\u2019s founding purpose was to bind nations together in peace, prosperity and democracy. The EU can help renew that mission by pragmatically embracing more countries on its periphery. It might also save itself in the process.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Does the European Union \u2014 27 states, 450 million people, politically fractious even in the best of times…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":656642,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5174],"tags":[14040,25029,140079,200828,2000,299,5187,1699,20999,3120,193287,7922],"class_list":{"0":"post-656641","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-eu","8":"tag-a","9":"tag-be","10":"tag-better","11":"tag-bigger","12":"tag-eu","13":"tag-europe","14":"tag-european","15":"tag-european-union","16":"tag-must","17":"tag-one","18":"tag-too","19":"tag-union"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/115788109796870648","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/656641","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=656641"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/656641\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/656642"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=656641"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=656641"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=656641"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}