\u201cUkrainian forces will have to leave the territories they currently occupy, and then the fighting will stop. If they don\u2019t, we will achieve this by military means,\u201d President Vladimir Putin said<\/a> in late November.<\/p>\n But behind the official rhetoric, the reality of the war is more complicated.\u00a0<\/p>\n \u201cTheir progress so far has been lackluster, with high losses that didn\u2019t achieve stated objectives,\u201d military analyst Michael Kofman told<\/a> The Washington Post of Russia\u2019s battlefield performance in 2025.<\/p>\n The war now resembles less a conventional campaign by a regular army and more a conflict sustained<\/a> by small infiltration units, volunteer-funded supplies and the mass deployment of cheap technologies.<\/p>\n Putin has claimed that Russian forces captured<\/a> nearly 5,000 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory in 2025.<\/p>\n Moscow pushed Ukrainian troops out of their bridgehead in the Kursk region this spring and briefly crossed into Ukraine\u2019s Sumy region, though the advance there soon stalled and the front line barely shifted afterward.<\/p>\n In eastern Ukraine\u2019s Donetsk region, Russian forces nearly completed the capture of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad after almost two years of fighting.\u00a0<\/p>\n \t\tnews \t\t\t\tRussia\u2019s Claimed Capture of Pokrovsk Comes at a Steep Cost By the end of the year, they also claimed to have taken control<\/a> of Huliaipole in the Zaporizhzhia region as well as Siversk<\/a> in the Donetsk region, where Ukrainian defenses that had held for more than three years collapsed within weeks due to manpower shortages.<\/p>\n Progress<\/a> was uneven elsewhere on the front, with Russian units advancing dozens of kilometers in some sectors and just hundreds of meters in others.<\/p>\n Yet despite the advances, Russia has yet to achieve a decisive victory.<\/p>\n \u201cThe Russian army has held the strategic initiative since 2023. In 2022, Russia failed to achieve a quick victory, and this became a turning point in the war. Since then, the war has turned into fighting on attrition, and almost all changes on the front are tactical, not strategic,\u201d BBC News military analyst Pavel Aksenov told The Moscow Times.<\/p>\n Small-unit warfare replaces mass assaults<\/p>\n Taking advantage of Ukraine\u2019s shrinking pool of manpower, Russian forces in 2025 increasingly relied on small assault groups rather than large armored formations. These units probe weak points, infiltrate<\/a> Ukrainian positions and gradually build up forces in key areas, enabling incremental territorial gains over time.<\/p>\n This approach proved effective around Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad and has been replicated across several sectors, analysts say<\/a>.<\/p>\n It reflects a broader shift away from traditional large-scale attacks, which have become increasingly costly<\/a> in an environment saturated with surveillance and strike drones.<\/p>\n \t\t\t\t \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tDestructions in the town of Sudzha in the Kursk region on March 13, 2025. The \u201cgrey zone\u201d between Russian- and Ukrainian-held territory has expanded to several kilometers in some areas.\u00a0<\/p>\n Drones dominate the airspace, while small infantry units operate on the ground in dispersed formations, relying on concealment under constant threat of attack.<\/p>\n Drone advantage tilts toward Moscow<\/p>\n According<\/a> to analysts at the Atlantic Council, the drone war began to tilt in Russia\u2019s favor in late 2024, a trend that accelerated in 2025.\u00a0<\/p>\n Russian commanders prioritized scale and reliability, deploying fiber-optic drones guided by physical cables that are largely immune to electronic jamming.<\/p>\n These systems played<\/a> a key role in Russia\u2019s early 2025 operation to force Ukrainian troops out of the Kursk region, where fiber-optic drones targeted ammunition trucks and disrupted supply lines.\u00a0<\/p>\n Moscow later applied similar tactics on southern and eastern fronts, ambushing<\/a> Ukrainian vehicle columns well behind the front line.<\/p>\n By late 2025, Russia had created centralized drone units that train operators through a master-apprentice system and conduct targeted strikes against Ukrainian positions and supply routes.\u00a0<\/p>\n Neutralizing Ukrainian drone teams has become a key objective in order to give Russian operators greater freedom to maneuver closer to the front.<\/p>\n \t\tnews \t\t\t\tRussian Low-Cost Drones Are Changing the Face of Its War in Ukraine Still, Aksenov argued that drones alone do not explain Russia\u2019s battlefield success.<\/p>\n \u201cYou cannot say that drones became a silver bullet that fully changed the character of the war. They are indeed very important, but not the only factor. For example, guided aerial bombs<\/a> are also very important for Russia, as well as artillery and precision missiles,\u201d he said.\u00a0<\/p>\n Russia has made extensive use of guided aerial bombs, including heavy munitions weighing up to three tons, to destroy Ukrainian defensive positions.<\/p>\n Logistics strain<\/p>\n While the Kremlin replenishes its forces with new contract soldiers and the defense industry has been fully mobilized \u2014 often using imported components from countries like China and Iran \u2014 analysts say<\/a> the Defense Ministry has failed to establish a reliable and centralized supply system.<\/p>\n Volunteer groups, pro-war bloggers and private initiatives raise money<\/a> from soldiers and civilians to purchase<\/a> drones, communications equipment, body armor, vehicles and even basic items such as tires<\/a>.\u00a0<\/p>\n Modified civilian vehicles<\/a>, many of which survive on the battlefield for just a few days before being destroyed, are used for logistics support and troop transport.<\/p>\n This informal wartime economy has helped sustain operations but remains chaotic and uneven. Some units are well supplied with drones and equipment while others operate with minimal support.<\/p>\n \t\t\t\t \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tRussian soldiers in the Ukrainian city of Pokrovsk on Dec. 1. Aksenov said these problems reflect a fundamental mismatch between Russia\u2019s pre-war planning and the realities of a prolonged conflict.\u00a0<\/p>\n A slow war of attrition requires a different economic and industrial model, one that Russia has struggled to build, he said.\u00a0Despite this, Russian forces continue to advance because they have found tactics that work and adapted to drone- and artillery-heavy warfare.<\/p>\n False reporting clouds battlefield reality<\/p>\n Another persistent issue plaguing Russia\u2019s army is its practice of inflating its reporting from the front. <\/p>\n Russian field commanders frequently report settlements captured before fighting has actually ended, a practice that pro-war bloggers refer to as \u201ccapture on credit.\u201d Troops are then sent into costly assaults to make those claims real.<\/p>\n Commanders first reported<\/a> in August that Russian forces had captured Kupiansk in Ukraine\u2019s Kharkiv region, even as fighting for the city continued. Ukrainian forces retook the eastern railway hub in September.<\/p>\n The Russian army claimed to have captured Kupiansk again on Nov. 20, but by December had still failed to secure the city, despite senior officers reportedly receiving<\/a> awards for its capture. Ukrainian officials said counterattacks later regained<\/a> parts of the city.<\/p>\n False claims about battlefield achievements happen on both sides, but Russian commanders exaggerate their success more often, Aksenov said.\u00a0<\/p>\n Once a town is officially declared captured, units still fighting in the area may receive less support, leaving them especially vulnerable to new attacks.<\/p>\n \t\t\t\t \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tUkrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky during a trip to Kupiansk, which Russia claimed to have captured, on Dec. 12. \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t No path to decisive victory<\/strong><\/p>\n Overall, analysts say Russia has adapted more effectively to drone- and artillery-heavy warfare over the course of 2025, shifting toward small-unit operations supported by unmanned systems.\u00a0<\/p>\n At the same time, Ukraine\u2019s defensive capacity continues to erode due to shortages of manpower and equipment, which gives Russia local opportunities to push the front forward.\u00a0<\/p>\n But without a decisive breakthrough, those dynamics are unlikely to change, Aksenov said.<\/p>\n \u201cI don\u2019t think Russia can shift toward making decisive offensives. Even if they manage to break through the Ukrainian front, a breakthrough requires a significant number of troops,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n \u201cRussia does not currently have a substantial enough force on any section of the front. Ukraine achieved exactly this kind of deep advance in the Kursk region, but we all saw how that ended,\u201d he concluded.<\/p>\n A Message from The Moscow Times:<\/strong><\/p>\n Dear readers,<\/p>\n We are facing unprecedented challenges. Russia’s Prosecutor General’s Office has designated The Moscow Times as an “undesirable” organization, criminalizing our work and putting our staff at risk of prosecution. This follows our earlier unjust labeling as a “foreign agent.”<\/p>\n These actions are direct attempts to silence independent journalism in Russia. The authorities claim our work “discredits the decisions of the Russian leadership.” We see things differently: we strive to provide accurate, unbiased reporting on Russia.<\/p>\n We, the journalists of The Moscow Times, refuse to be silenced. But to continue our work, we need your help<\/a>.<\/p>\n Your support, no matter how small, makes a world of difference. If you can, please support us monthly starting from just $2. It’s quick to set up, and every contribution makes a significant impact.<\/p>\n By supporting The Moscow Times, you’re defending open, independent journalism in the face of repression. Thank you for standing with us.<\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\tContinue\n\t\t\t<\/p>\n \t\t\t\t Not ready to support today? \u00d7<\/p>\n \t\tRemind me next month<\/strong><\/p>\n \n\t\t\tThank you! Your reminder is set.\n\t\t<\/p>\n
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