The UK government saw control of its fisheries policy as one of the major prizes of Brexit, promising<\/a> to make the UK an \u2018independent coastal state\u2019 able control the level of access of foreign boats to its waters.<\/p>\n This involved exiting the EU\u2019s Common Fisheries Policy<\/a> (CFP), which sets annual limits<\/a> on the total permitted catches for commercial fish stocks, supposedly based on estimates of what is consistent with sustainability, with member states then receiving a quota for each stock based primarily on<\/a> historic catch data.<\/p>\n Many UK fishers felt the distribution of quotas under the CFP was an historical injustice dating back to when the UK joined the European Economic Community in the 1970s. Typically, EU fishers took around half<\/a> of the total catch in UK waters, and the relatively large size of the UK\u2019s fishing zone meant EU fishers benefited more from access to UK waters than vice-versa. From 2012-2016, EU fishers landed five times more<\/a> fish, by value, from UK waters than vice-versa (and eight times more by volume). There is also evidence that<\/a> small-scale fishers had relatively fewer catching opportunities under the CFP.<\/p>\n The historic administration of the CFP was also criticised<\/a> by the Scottish government for its \u2018inflexibility\u2019 in the face of \u2018perverse outcomes\u2019 like the incentivisation of overfishing. Fishers would take catches beyond their share and then discard excess fish in order to meet the quota limit. The CFP was reformed in 2015 to oblige fishers to land all fish caught.<\/p>\n A desire to retain control of their fisheries is a key reason why Iceland and Norway did not join the EU. As members of the European Economic Area (EEA), they participate in the single market but are not subject to the Common Fisheries Policy.<\/p>\n How has Brexit changed the UK\u2019s fisheries policy?<\/strong><\/p>\n Brexit meant the UK and EU had to come to a new agreement on access to each other\u2019s fishing stocks. The UK initially wanted<\/a> the EU to give up 80% of its existing catch share in UK waters, which the EU countered with an offer of 15-18% (having initially argued<\/a> for a maintenance of the status quo).<\/p>\n Ultimately, the two sides agreed that the EU would return 25% of its catch share, phased in over five and a half years. That amounts to an increase of under 10% to the UK\u2019s catch share within its own waters, with the biggest increases<\/a> concentrated in a few large offshore fisheries like western mackerel and North Sea herring and sole. Overall, the EU has seen its quota shares reduced in 55 of 87<\/a> shared stocks.<\/p>\n There was almost no increase<\/a> in UK catch shares within its inshore fisheries (6-12 nautical miles off the coast) in which only smaller vessels (under 12m in length) are permitted, despite some groups having pushed<\/a> for the UK to reclaim exclusive control of its \u201812 mile zone\u2019. Around 80%<\/a> of UK vessels are under 10m in length, though they take only 5% of the total UK catch by volume and 12% by value.<\/p>\n UK and EU fishers retain mutual access to non-quota stocks in each other\u2019s waters (such as<\/a> edible crab, greater Atlantic scallop, whelk, European lobster, pilchard), including the 6-12 mile zones. Non-quota stocks account<\/a> for roughly a quarter of the value of the total catch by UK vessels, and they are an important resource for smaller vessels, which land three times more non-quota than quota fish \u2013 but take only 1% of UK quota catches.<\/p>\n UK and EU fishers now require licences to access each other\u2019s waters (the UK government granted<\/a> over 1,800 licences to EU vessels in 2021) and the UK also has to undertake annual consultations with other countries on the management of shared stocks: for example bilaterally with the Faroe Islands<\/a> and Norway<\/a>; trilaterally with the EU and Norway<\/a>; and multilaterally<\/a> with the EU, Faroe Islands, Greenland, Iceland and Norway.<\/p>\n How has the fisheries chapter been working so far?<\/strong><\/p>\n The UK and EU undertake annual consultations<\/a> to agree \u2018total allowable catches\u2019 from which quota shares are derived. Fisheries management is also discussed regularly at the Specialised Committee on Fisheries, which has met nine times<\/a> to date, making it the most active<\/a> of all the specialised committees sitting under the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA). Both the UK<\/a> and EU<\/a> consider this system to be working effectively.<\/p>\n Yet cooperation has not always been plain sailing. In 2021, the French government threatened<\/a> to cut off energy supplies to the UK and Jersey after they refused to<\/a> grant licenses<\/a> to 110 smaller French vessels \u2013 because they apparently did not provide evidence of historic fishing activity. The row was eventually settled<\/a> with the provision of a further 83 licences.<\/p>\n The UK has also gained greater autonomy over the environmental management of its waters, which led it to introduce a ban on the fishing of sand eels<\/a>, which are a vital food source for endangered marine life including puffins and porpoises. This has prompted to the EU to open legal proceedings<\/a> against the UK on the grounds<\/a>\u00a0that it amounts to de facto discrimination against Danish vessels, which take 99% of the sand eel catch. A tribunal ruling, on whether the UK must drop the ban, is expected next week<\/a>.<\/p>\n Belgium is also set to lodge<\/a> an official complaint, reporting in April 2025 that five of its fishing boats \u201cwere treated like pirates\u201d by UK authorities who intercepted the boats in the Bristol Channel, arrested the skippers and confiscated their computer drives.<\/p>\n What is at stake in the renegotiation of the fisheries chapter?<\/strong><\/p>\n After the five-and-a-half year phase-in period (ending on 30 June 2026), quota shares for the UK and EU\u2019s 87 shared stocks will be subject to annual negotiation, on the basis of existing quota sharing arrangements, unless both sides agree to a longer-term settlement.<\/p>\n The EU is keen to avoid annual discussions, which create greater uncertainty for its fleet, and is thus pushing for a longer settlement lasting multiple years. It is not asking for increased access rights. The UK has not set out specific negotiating aims.<\/p>\n Though there is more than a year until the chapter expires, the EU wants the issue sorted as soon as possible \u2013 ideally before the 19 May UK-EU summit. Some member states regard finding a long-term solution to fish as a necessary precursor to any further deepening of the relationship between the UK and the EU, whether on defence and security cooperation or on trade.<\/p>\n The French government in particular has<\/a> repeatedly<\/a> emphasised that it will not sign off on any new agreements until the issue of fishing rights has been resolved, though some EU officials have pushed back<\/a> against this position. The UK government says<\/a> there will be \u2018no linkage\u2019 between fishing rights and a security \u2013 or any other \u2013 agreement.<\/p>\n The fisheries agreement expires on the same day as TCA\u2019s chapter on energy cooperation: a deliberate signal by the EU that any UK attempts to curtail EU fishing rights could result in disruption to energy supplies. That said, the UK and EU want to deepen energy cooperation as part of the EU \u2018reset\u2019 and, to aid this, would like the energy chapter rolled over by a year \u2013 as the TCA provides for<\/a> \u2013 before the 19 May summit.<\/p>\n Why is fishing such a sensitive issue?<\/strong><\/p>\n Not because of its economic value. Fishing is a very small \u2013 and declining<\/a> \u2013 part of the UK and EU economies. Fishing and aquaculture accounted for<\/a> 0.4% of the UK\u2019s total economic output in 2024, while the EU\u2019s fishing fleets<\/a> generated under 0.1% of its total economic output<\/a> in 2022 \u2013 even after you add in the more valuable<\/a> fish processing industry.<\/p>\n Yet the industry is highly concentrated, meaning it remains important to certain communities. Spain alone accounts for<\/a> a quarter of employees in the EU fishing industry, while Italy, Greece, France and Portugal make up another 50%. In France, the largest industries are found in politically important regions<\/a>, like the Hauts-de-France in Northern France \u2013 a stronghold of Marine Le Pen\u2019s Rassemblement National \u2013 and Brittany, a historic holdout of the centre-left. <\/p>\n In the UK, Scotland accounts for around 70%<\/a> of the fishing sector\u2019s value. This means the Scottish government is very engaged in fisheries issues, while the UK government may also be concerned that some of England\u2019s larger fishing ports \u2013 like Grimsby, Plymouth and Hull \u2013 sit in constituencies where Labour is potentially vulnerable to the Conservatives and Reform.<\/p>\n How have UK fishers been affected by Brexit?<\/strong><\/p>\n UK vessels landed 719,000 tonnes<\/a> of fish in 2023 \u2013 an increase of 14% compared to 2019, with the value of catches having increased by 8%. But that does not all come from increased takes in home waters. In that period, UK fishers landed 12% more fish by volume and 5% more by value in the UK, while the volume and value of fish landed by UK boats abroad increased by 17%.<\/p>\n This growth is driven predominantly by Scottish fishers, who have seen a 27% increase in the volume of their UK landings and a 17% increase in value. Northern Irish vessels have seen similar increases (but constitute a much smaller share of the overall UK fleet) while English vessels have seen a fall of 13% by volume and 8% by value.<\/p>\n A select few Scottish ports like Peterhead and Lerwick have taken<\/a> most of the additional post-Brexit catch. The volume of fish landed by UK vessels in Scottish ports is up 22% since 2019, but down 3% in England and 20% in Wales. Hull-based UK fisheries had to make<\/a> 72 fishermen redundant between 2021 and 2022, blaming it on reduced access to Arctic cod due to the UK no longer being part of the EU-Norway fisheries deal.<\/p>\n In terms of the type of fish caught, there has been a 60% increase in UK landings of \u2018pelagic fish\u2019 (key species include mackerel and herring) typically caught by the very largest vessels (>40 metres). Catches of \u2018demersal fish\u2019 (key species include cod and haddock) and shellfish, typically taken by somewhat smaller vessels, have declined \u2013 but remain much more valuable than pelagic catches.<\/p>\n This reflects changed quota shares and a lack of domestic demand for certain types of seafood, now that it is harder to export catches from Great Britain to the EU due to post-Brexit paperwork and checks. GB exports of bivalve molluscs (oysters, scallops, mussels etc.) to the EU are now de facto banned<\/a> on health grounds.<\/p>\n This has all had a clear and sustained negative impact on UK fish exports to the EU, which fell 29% by volume and 10% by value between 2019<\/a> and 2023<\/a>. This has not been offset by exports to the rest of the world, which have fallen 16% by volume and 21% by value, and remain worth less than half the value of the EU export market.<\/p>\n UK landings by foreign vessels are down by over 60% in 2023<\/a> compared to 2019<\/a> \u2013 reducing economic activity for ports which service those landings \u2013 as they opt to land more frequently in the EU to avoid Brexit-related export bureaucracy. The increased landings in Northern Ireland may reflect its unique position under the Windsor Framework \u2013 which means fish and other agrifoods can be exported seamlessly into the EU market.<\/p>\n How have EU fishers been affected by Brexit?<\/strong><\/p>\n The European Parliament reports<\/a> that reductions in UK quota shares cost EU fishers \u20ac107m between 2021 and 2023 \u2013 with over a quarter of that loss (\u20ac28m) falling on French fishers alone.<\/p>\n There has been an very stark drop-off in exports of EU fish to the UK \u2013 down by roughly a quarter<\/a> since the end of the Brexit transition period \u2013 though this has to some degree been offset by imports of non-EU fish.<\/p>\n Do British fishers have anything to gain from an \u2018EU reset\u2019? <\/strong><\/p>\n While the UK-EU fisheries agreement has not dramatically increased most UK fishers\u2019 catches, Brexit has made it much harder to send seafood to the EU \u2013 the UK\u2019s key export market \u2013 evidenced by the marked fall in exports. New paperwork adds cost, while checks at the border add time \u2013 a major problem when exporting fresh seafood which perishes quickly.<\/p>\n The UK and EU are discussing the possibility of a sanitary and phytosanitary (\u2018SPS\u2019) deal, which would involve UK alignment with EU animal and plant health rules, in exchange for the removal of border checks on food and plant products. This would make it easier to export fish to the EU, and it is estimated that this might increase UK exports of plant and animal products by 1-2%<\/a> and add around half a percent<\/a> to UK GDP.<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/Fish-1-1.png\"\/)
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