![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/uXKobgH7EIKIWbR4eGWQxewnp6rquFLMko8ICP1c.n7tm.jpg\")
\n Photo. State Security Service Of Georgia\/Facebook<\/p>\n
\n Photo. State Security Service Of Georgia\/Facebook<\/p>\n
Georgia is indeed a strategic transit country in the South Caucasus and a partner of the European Union in the fields of security, energy diversification, and further enlargement policy. For Poland, the political direction of Georgia and its position in the region are of particular importance, especially in the context of Russia\u2019s aggressive policy and Europe\u2019s search for stable supply routes, including in the energy sector.<\/p>\n
Despite this role, Georgia\u2019s ruling party, Georgian Dream, has increasingly been placing its European partners in a difficult position. In recent months, pressure on the opposition has reached an unprecedented level, raising serious concerns among EU member states. Opposition leaders and civil society activists are regularly arrested or forced into exile. Actions are also being taken to exclude competing parties from political life and limit the participation of Georgian citizens living abroad in elections. At the same time, concerns are growing that ahead of the 2028 elections, the government will seek to transform the fragmented opposition into controlled, fa\u00e7ade entities, thereby maintaining only the appearance of political competition.<\/p>\n
In an interview with Tamar Kekenadze<\/strong>, a Georgian opposition politician For Georgia) and international security expert, a troubling picture emerges. Georgia appears to be drifting away from its European commitments, facing growing internal repression, and risking deeper isolation at a time when cooperation with partners such as Poland has never been more important.<\/p>\n A Growing Weak Point in Europe\u2019s Strategy <\/p>\n Since 2022, European Union has tightened sanctions against Russia, particularly in the energy sector. This has put transit countries like Georgia under increased scrutiny. It was only a matter of time before European analysts began asking uncomfortable questions, such as:\\Are there indications suggesting that Russian oil and gas are reaching Europe via Georgia under altered labels? Could Georgia be used as a transit channel for dual-use goods destined for Russia?<\/p>\n These concerns do not necessarily stem from the belief that Georgia has become an open ally of Moscow, but rather from the fact that weak institutions, corruption risks, and a lack of transparency create opportunities for sanctions circumvention<\/strong>. This may involve, for example, relabelling or blending of petroleum products, insufficient tracking of the origin of oil and gas, as well as the leakage of dual-use goods through civilian trade channels.<\/p>\n According to Kekenadze, these concerns are not unfounded. In her view, those currently in power \u2013 namely, politicians from Georgian Dream \u2013 are corrupt, and there is therefore a real likelihood that they could benefit from the reselling or blending of Russian crude oil, for example, with Azerbaijani products.<\/p>\n It should be noted, however, that sanctions are not violated at the level of political declarations. Instead, they are quietly circumvented through technical legal loopholes. For Brussels, this is a red flag. Weak transparency in Georgia not only undermines EU policy but also risks creating loopholes that Moscow can exploit, thereby compromising European unity.<\/strong><\/p>\n Transport Corridors and Strategic Competition in the South Caucasus <\/p>\n The proposed Zangezur Corridor illustrates how rapidly Georgia\u2019s position in the region can shift, in this case to its disadvantage. While energy pipelines are geographically fixed, transportation and logistics routes are quite flexible and subject to change. Rail connectivity through Armenia could redirect significant cargo flows away from Georgian territory.<\/p>\n For Poland, which supports the Middle Corridor as a non-Russian alternative linking Europe with Central Asia and China, Georgia\u2019s marginalisation would be strategically disadvantageous. A weaker Georgia means not only fewer diversification options, greater dependence on unstable or disputed routes, but also reduced EU leverage in the South Caucasus. In other words, a weakened Georgia would mean a less reliable East-West connection, undermining Europe\u2019s broader connectivity and diversification strategy.<\/p>\n Authoritarian Drift and the Collapse of Political Trust <\/p>\n In recent years, Georgia has experienced a growing concentration of power. In November, the prosecutor\u2019s office announced criminal charges against eight leading opposition politicians, including former president Mikheil Saakashvili. At the same time, the ruling Georgian Dream party has been tightening its control over state institutions and the public discourse.<\/p>\n Kekenadze openly acknowledges mistakes made by the opposition \u2013 including the prolonged boycott of parliament \u2013 but defends her party\u2019s decision to return to the legislature<\/strong>:<\/p>\n \u201dThe boycott did not work. Taking up our mandates was the only way to continue the fight and ensure that voices of dissent would still be heard.\u201d<\/p>\n She also describes a climate of fear deliberately cultivated by the government:<\/p>\n \u201dGeorgian Dream shows people images of a devastated Ukraine and tells them that the same will happen to Georgia if the opposition comes to power.\u201d<\/p>\n For Polish readers, these images are impossible to ignore. The case of Georgia illustrates the familiar paradox in which a government that pledges to protect stability systematically dismantles the institutions meant to guarantee it.<\/p>\n Why investors are turning away? <\/p>\n Just a decade ago, Georgia was portrayed as an easy entry point for European investors into the Caucasus. It was open to foreign capital, friendly to startups, and attractive in terms of tourism and logistics. Today, that model is beginning to unravel. The key issue is no longer profitability, but predictability. The judiciary is not independent. Laws can change unpredictably. Investors fear they may be unable to protect their businesses.<\/p>\n For Polish companies (especially SMEs) this is critical. Georgia is no longer an environment that can be managed with relative ease or one in which risk can be taken without serious concern. Although sectors such as tourism, renewable energy, and IT still hold potential, political risk has become the dominant factor. As Kekenadze warns, prolonged instability could push Georgia into self-isolation, cutting it off from European capital and expertise.<\/strong><\/p>\n The myth of neutrality in a hard-power region <\/p>\n Georgia\u2019s current authorities increasingly present their policy of \u201ebalance\u201d or \u201eneutrality\u201d as a pragmatic choice. Undoubtedly, this narrative can resonate with parts of Georgian society. In reality, however, neutrality in the South Caucasus is neither a strategic position nor an achievable one. On the contrary, it creates a vacuum \u2013 one that is inevitably filled by stronger actors.<\/p>\n Can Georgia truly maintain a balance between the EU, the United States, Russia, and China?<\/strong><\/p>\n Kekenadze\u2019s answer is unequivocal:<\/p>\n \u201dNeutrality is unreachable in our region. For us, integration with the EU and NATO is not an economic issue \u2013 it is an existential one.\u201d<\/p>\n She also points to declining U.S. engagement, including the year-long absence of a U.S. ambassador in Tbilisi. For Poland, a strong transatlantic presence in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus is seen as essential. Any withdrawal by Georgia from cooperation would most likely weaken the entire eastern flank, to the benefit of none of NATO\u2019s member states.<\/strong><\/p>\n A message to Europe \u2014 and to Poland <\/p>\n Asked what she expects from the European Union, Kekenadze issued a modest yet firm appeal:<\/p>\n \u201dAt the very least, do not sever formal ties \u2013 visa-free travel, free trade. If we lose them, it will be ordinary, pro-European Georgian citizens who suffer, not politicians.\u201d<\/p>\n At this point, Poland\u2019s role becomes crucial. Warsaw has consistently advocated for Eastern partners, understanding that abandoning them breeds greater instability in the region rather than reform. Supporting Georgian civil society, transparency mechanisms, and the enforcement of sanctions is not an act of charity \u2013 it is rather a matter of strategic self-interest.<\/p>\n Georgia is not merely a distant country in the Caucasus. Above all, it is a key transit state with a substantial impact on Europe\u2019s energy security. At the same time, despite its strategic importance and positive role, it may become a test case for the credibility of the EU\u2019s enlargement policy and a potential weak link in the sanctions regime against Russia.<\/p>\n What is happening in Georgia today has direct consequences for EU security, sanctions policy, and East\u2013West transit routes \u2013 and thus also for Poland\u2019s strategic interests. As Europe redraws its security map, the question remains whether Georgia will move closer to Europe or gradually drift into a grey zone in which Moscow feels most at home.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Photo. State Security Service Of Georgia\/Facebook Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Copy link Send email Georgia is indeed a strategic…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":681797,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5174],"tags":[2000,299,5187,1699,2307,2301,2046,332,81813],"class_list":{"0":"post-681796","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-eu","8":"tag-eu","9":"tag-europe","10":"tag-european","11":"tag-european-union","12":"tag-georgia","13":"tag-moscow","14":"tag-putin","15":"tag-russia","16":"tag-tbilisi"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/115858530947117778","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/681796","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=681796"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/681796\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/681797"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=681796"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=681796"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=681796"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}