Washington\u2019s snatch-and-grab in Venezuela is the most dramatic proof yet that Donald Trump\u2019s White House sees the world through spheres of influence, a worldview closer to Vladimir Putin\u2019s than Europe\u2019s. \u00a0<\/p>\n
Following the US\u2019 unilateral move to capture Venezuela\u2019s president, Nicol\u00e1s Maduro, in a spectacular raid in Caracas, the EU\u2019s reaction was cautious. Twenty-six member states \u2014 Hungary abstaining \u2014 urged respect for international law and Venezuela\u2019s democratic but stopped short of condemning the operation.<\/p>\n
\u201cThe EU must defend the international rules-based order clearly and decisively, rather than publicly displaying internal divisions,\u201d Tinatin Akhvlediani, research fellow at CEPS, told The Parliament.<\/p>\n
The lesson from Venezuela, Akhvlediani argued, is not that the rules-based order \u2014 the post-1945 framework of treaties, norms and institutions intended to constrain power through law rather than force \u2014 is fictitious, but that it requires sustained political commitment and enforcement. \u201cWithout that, it cannot deliver stability or predictability.\u201d<\/p>\n
The raid has since ignited a wider debate across capitals over what other territories in the US\u2019 own \u2018sphere\u2019 might be next. That of course includes Greenland, with Trump\u2019s rhetoric growing more bellicose by the day.<\/p>\n
For some, the episode proves the rules-based is obsolete or even that it never existed in the first place; for others, it shows precisely why Europe must fight to preserve it.<\/p>\n
The rules-based order <\/strong><\/p>\n The multilateral system built after World War II aimed to secure peace, democracy and human rights through international law and institutions such as the United Nations. For decades, the US was its chief guarantor, defending sovereignty, territorial integrity and peaceful dispute resolution until Trump\u2019s return to the White House spelled the end to that era. \u00a0<\/p>\n \u201cThe United States clearly demonstrates that it is not going to enforce a rules-based order, but rather undermine it,\u201d Ilke Toygur, Director of the Global Policy Centre at IE University, told The Parliament.<\/p>\n Toygur said there had been violations of international rules in the past, but at least the US pretended that rules existed. \u201cRight now, nobody is pretending.\u201d<\/p>\n Yet the erosion didn\u2019t begin with Trump. Rising nationalism, intensifying US\u2013China rivalry, economic shocks and climate failures have all weakened the system.<\/p>\n CIDOB\u2019s fellow Carme Colomina pointed to selective adherence to norms as another accelerant. For example, the contrasting responses to the wars in Ukraine and Gaza have fuelled accusations of double standards, echoing long-standing criticism from countries in the Global South that multilateralism disproportionately serves Western interests.<\/p>\n \u201cWhat\u2019s changed [under the Trump administration] is that the US is now openly articulating what it practiced covertly: treating Europe as a sphere to be disciplined, not a partner to be consulted,\u201d Alberto Alemanno, professor of EU Law at HEC Paris, told The Parliament.<\/p>\n To Alemanno, however, this isn\u2019t really a \u2018return\u2019 to spheres-of-influence logic \u2014 because great powers like Russia never abandoned it in the first place.<\/p>\n The case for \u2018principled pragmatism\u2019<\/strong><\/p>\n Since the beginning of Trump\u2019s second administration, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has played down concerns over US commitment to the alliance, urging Europeans to increase defence spending inside NATO rather than pursue autonomy outside it.<\/p>\n However, Washington\u2019s own National Security Strategy, published in December, undercuts that message, recasting Europe as a burden rather than a partner.<\/p>\n Of course, what most glaringly gives the lie to any claims of alliance is Trump\u2019s threats to seize Greenland \u2014 an autonomous territory of Denmark. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen even warned on Monday that a US takeover of Greenland would mark the end of the transatlantic alliance.<\/p>\n \u201cWe need principled pragmatism and a common foreign policy independent from Washington,\u201d Beatriz Abell\u00e1n, political analyst at FEPS, told The Parliament. \u201cWe shouldn\u2019t let Trump bully us.\u201d<\/p>\n \u201cMany Baltic countries and even Poland find it very difficult to understand that the United States is no longer there to protect them,\u201d Abell\u00e1n added, “and I think it would be dangerous to think otherwise.\u201d<\/p>\n Europe\u2019s<\/strong> autonomy gap<\/strong><\/p>\n The EU has pledged to rearm and reduce reliance on US security by 2030, but the gap between aspiration and capacity is wide. Europe\u2019s security is tied to the outcome of the war in Ukraine, but the EU neither sits at the negotiation table nor possesses the arms capacity to sustain Kyiv alone.<\/p>\n \u201cEurope\u2019s challenge, therefore, is to strike a balance,\u201d said Akhvlediani. \u201cStrengthening its own strategic agency while preserving transatlantic support.\u201d<\/p>\n To that end, analysts and policymakers continue to urge the familiar fixes: streamline EU decision-making, advance a common foreign policy and accelerate Europe\u2019s military, digital and payments-system autonomy.<\/p>\n \u201cThis is less about being a great global power and more about rethinking the European integration project in the 21st century,\u201d Toygur said. She said Europe must complete the single market, strengthening security across all domains \u2014 including energy and technology \u2014 and advance enlargement.<\/p>\n Until now, the EU has relied on ambiguity to manage tensions in other regions. Trump\u2019s escalating threats over Greenland, however, could soon expose the limits of that strategy and force Europe to a choice.<\/p>\n \u201c2026 could be a crucial year for the resilience of the European model,\u201d Colomina said. \u201cOr the year it reaches its political limits in a European Union caught between internal fractures and external threats.\u201d<\/p>\n