{"id":688438,"date":"2026-01-11T07:32:19","date_gmt":"2026-01-11T07:32:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/688438\/"},"modified":"2026-01-11T07:32:19","modified_gmt":"2026-01-11T07:32:19","slug":"europe-on-high-alert-in-the-face-of-trumps-strategic-onslaught-international","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/688438\/","title":{"rendered":"Europe on high alert in the face of Trump\u2019s strategic onslaught | International"},"content":{"rendered":"

Europe has entered a new state of alert in the face of increasingly explicit signs that the United States not only no longer wants to bear the burden of guaranteeing the continent\u2019s security, but is also displaying open hostility<\/a> in areas that go beyond simple economic and technological competition and touch the deepest core of strategic and security issues. <\/p>\n

Donald Trump recently asserted that his country needs Greenland<\/a> \u2014 an autonomous territory belonging to Denmark, a NATO ally \u2014 for \u201cnational security,\u201d a day after U.S. forces staged an incursion into Venezuela, during which Nicol\u00e1s Maduro was captured<\/a> and transported to New York. \u201cFor the United States to secure the Arctic region, to protect and defend NATO and NATO interests, obviously, Greenland should be part of the United States,\u201d Stephen Miller, the White House deputy chief of staff, said during a subsequent interview with CNN<\/a>. <\/p>\n

At the beginning of December, Washington published its new National Security Strategy<\/a>, in which it launches an explicit attack on the EU<\/a>, describing it as an entity that \u201cundermines political liberty\u201d and promotes \u201ccensorship of free speech and suppression of political opposition,\u201d while promising to \u201ccultivate resistance to Europe\u2019s current trajectory within European nations,\u201d which means a campaign of support for European nationalist forces that seek to dismantle the community integration project and harassment of those who promote them.<\/p>\n

Another serious example of hostility surfaced in late December, with the sanctions imposed by Washington on former European Commissioner Thierry Breton<\/a> \u2014 former head of technology regulations on online content moderation and hate speech \u2014 and on leaders of organizations that combat illegal and extremist content. This is yet another pressure tactic by Washington to get Brussels to soften its rules for American companies and to benefit the tech oligarchs who are now part of the Trumpian ecosystem.<\/p>\n

The U.S. initiative, while not binding on sitting political leaders, is \u201cextremely serious,\u201d says a senior EU source. \u201cIt is further proof that Washington sees Europe as a colony, wants to maintain its subservience, and will do everything possible to impose its rules here,\u201d says the source, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss this highly sensitive matter.<\/p>\n

These episodes exemplify a hostile attitude from the U.S. toward Western Europe unseen since the end of World War II<\/a>. There are others, ranging from threats or insinuations of withdrawing the security umbrella that covers NATO allies \u2014 an organization to which the U.S. contributes not only vast capabilities and irreplaceable leadership, but also the crucial issue of nuclear deterrence \u2014 to the trade war.<\/p>\n

\u201cThey want to destroy us\u201d<\/p>\n

\u201cAs far as Europe is concerned, Trump and his administration have shown great consistency and predictability: they want to destroy us,\u201d warns Nathalie Tocci, director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali. \u201cToday, the United States considers liberal democracy and European integration to be adversaries.\u201d<\/p>\n

It\u2019s not all bad news coming out of Washington for Europe. Last month, Congress approved a 2026 budget for the Pentagon that includes measures that break with Trump\u2019s policies and seek to solidify the security relationship with Europe. The legislation includes, albeit meager, aid for Ukraine \u2014 $800 million spread over two years \u2014 and, most importantly, provisions to limit the Secretary of Defense\u2019s ability to reduce U.S. troop numbers in Europe to fewer than 76,000 (a deployment estimated at around 84,000 earlier this year by the Council on Foreign Relations). It also prohibits the head of the U.S. European Command from relinquishing the title of Supreme Allied Commander of NATO.<\/p>\n

This piece of legislation shows that within the American political establishment \u2014 as well as the military \u2014 there remains broad consensus on the strategic importance of maintaining a strong security relationship with Europe. However, unlike during Trump\u2019s first term, these positions are not represented in his administration.<\/p>\n

In light of these events, even the most pro-NATO European countries are reassessing their strategies, understanding the profound risk of relying on U.S. support. In December, Denmark\u2019s military intelligence services defined the U.S., for the first time, as a potential threat to its national security. \u201cThe United States uses economic power, including in the form of threats of high tariffs, to enforce its will and no longer excludes the use of military force, even against allies,\u201d its report emphasized<\/a>. <\/p>\n

In the wake of the U.S. operation in Venezuela, European leaders issued a statement urging Washington to respect Greenland\u2019s integrity. \u201cUnfortunately, I think the American president should be taken seriously when he says he wants Greenland,\u201d Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said <\/a>last Monday. \u201cBut I will also make it clear that if the U.S. chooses to attack another NATO country militarily, then everything stops, including NATO and thus the security that has been established since the end of the Second World War.\u201d <\/p>\n

If the hostility of the United States is compounded by the activities of a Russia that continues its aggression against Ukraine and deepens its sabotage actions in Europe<\/a>, the perception of risk increases.<\/p>\n

Dependency<\/p>\n

The key factor driving Europe\u2019s state of alert is its heavy reliance on the U.S. for security. This has a direct impact on its capacity for independent self-defense and an indirect effect on shaping Europe\u2019s position across the entire spectrum of its relations with Washington.<\/p>\n

EU countries invest a considerable amount in defense \u2014 approximately \u20ac380 billion ($447 billion) in 2025, a figure higher than that of China or Russia in nominal terms \u2014 although not if calculated in purchasing power parity.<\/p>\n

However, that figure is misleading, as it does not translate into a truly deterrent, autonomous defensive capability. Among other reasons, this is because Europe depends on the U.S. for key operational aspects, and because the total expenditure on paper ignores a reality marked by national fragmentation. The only effective coordinating body is NATO, dominated by Washington.<\/p>\n

The dependencies are both quantitative \u2014 with limitations in arsenals and industrial production capacity\u2014 and qualitative.<\/p>\n

A report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies concludes that Europeans are dependent on the U.S. for key activities such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, for which they lack sufficient air and space assets. Other hardware deficits include inadequate air defenses and long-range missile capabilities. In the software arena, for example, Europe lacks sovereign cloud computing capabilities. With regards to nuclear weapons, two countries possess the capability (France and the U.K.), but their arsenals are far smaller than those of Russia and the U.S.<\/p>\n

In a clear symptom of the connection between Washington\u2019s political and cultural attack on Europe and the issue of defense, U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance said in a recent interview<\/a>: \u201cFrance and the U.K. have nuclear weapons. If they allow themselves to be overwhelmed with very destructive moral ideas, then you allow nuclear weapons to fall in the hands of people who can actually cause very, very serious harm to the U.S.\u201d<\/p>\n

In this context of American disengagement and weariness, an exclusive report by Reuters in early December sparked alarm. According to the report, Washington wants Europe to take over most of the continent\u2019s conventional defense capabilities by 2027, an extremely early date for matters of this magnitude. The message, according to the report, was conveyed to several European delegations by Pentagon representatives at a meeting in the U.S. capital.<\/p>\n

\"AtaqueDanish soldiers during military exercises in Greenland in September.Guglielmo Mangiapane (REUTERS)<\/p>\n

The 2027 deadline has been met with dismay in some circles. However, the U.S. has not formally or informally informed all its allies of this intention, according to NATO sources. Furthermore, these same sources say that it is \u201chighly unlikely\u201d that this transfer will happen in the short term. Within the military alliance, there is a tendency to avoid political discussions and to seek distance from the noise and pronouncements of the Trump administration. It\u2019s as if addressing the issue would accelerate a divorce that could change NATO forever.<\/p>\n

Another report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates that to replace the conventional capabilities \u2014 that is, excluding nuclear ones \u2014 that the U.S. has allocated to the Euro-Atlantic scenario, European states would need to invest around $1 trillion above current investments to cover a 25-year defense cycle.<\/p>\n

Jamie Shea, a researcher at the think tank Friends of Europe and a senior NATO official until 2018, argues that it is unrealistic for Europeans to be self-sufficient in terms of capabilities, defense spending, and nuclear deterrence. \u201cEurope has an interest in retaining as much U.S. capability as possible in Europe and NATO for as long as possible to allow for a more strategic and military transition. But it must maintain this effort even if the U.S. posture becomes less hostile,\u201d he asserts. \u201cThe old Cold War U.S.<\/a> is not coming back,\u201d Shea stresses. \u201cEurope must have a clear strategy and the resources to achieve credible self-defense by 2030.\u201d<\/p>\n

Luis Sim\u00f3n, director of the Brussels office of the Elcano Institute, believes that a reduction in U.S. capabilities and presence in Europe is very likely, as Washington wants to focus on other scenarios, but he does not believe it will be total.<\/p>\n

\u201cToday, Europeans are not in a position to maintain a command structure with all that it entails, and they won\u2019t be in a position to do so for the next five or even 10 years. They lack the technical capacity, and no state has the political legitimacy to replace the U.S.,\u201d says Sim\u00f3n. \u201cSo, if it isn\u2019t done in a coordinated and structured way, with the U.S. leading the charge and maintaining command positions within the NATO structure, it would surely be a chaotic and divisive process, which could lead to fragmentation and a command and deterrence structure in Europe centered around subregional groups,\u201d notes the expert, who is also a professor at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe underlying issue is that the U.S. wants Europeans to take charge of their defense, but the Trump administration has opted for a very ideological strategy that wants a divided Europe, dominated by nationalist forces<\/a>, thus hindering the development of capabilities at a European scale, under the EU umbrella or as a European pillar within NATO,\u201d says Pol Morillas, director of the CIDOB think tank.<\/p>\n

This political attitude, this hostility, also casts a shadow over Europe\u2019s weaponry. The specter of the \u201ckill switch\u201d \u2014 mechanisms by which the manufacturer can remotely disable the system \u2014 is haunting the sector. Even without total inoperability, the mere interruption of software updates can severely impair the operational capabilities of key assets such as F-35 fighter jets<\/a> or European naval vessels operating with the Aegis system.<\/p>\n

This concern arises in an unfavorable context. Data compiled by Juan Mejino-L\u00f3pez and Guntram B. Wolff of the Bruegel Institute show an increase in purchases from the U.S. in recent years. European NATO countries spent 50% of their military equipment investment on purchases from the U.S. in the 2022-24 period, compared to 28% in the 2019-21 period.<\/p>\n

\u201cThis makes sense considering the threat situation in Europe and the war in Ukraine<\/a>. A significant portion of purchases are directed to the American defense industry because there is limited production capacity in Europe,\u201d says Mejino-L\u00f3pez. \u201cThe problem is that in a context where you see signs of hostility from the Washington administration every month or even every week, this dependence comes at a very high price when it comes to decision-making, as we have seen with the trade agreement,\u201d the expert says.<\/p>\n

But the path to overcoming this dependency is hampered not only by ideological resistance from nationalists, but also by minor albeit serious clashes of national interests. Morillas \u2014 author of In the Senior Citizens\u2019 Playground: Europe Facing a Hostile World (Debate) \u2014 points, for example, to the failure to get the FCAS project off the ground, a new-generation fighter jet system that Dassault, Airbus, and Indra were supposed to develop, but which is languishing due to the power struggle between France and Germany.<\/p>\n

Progress<\/p>\n

All of this does not mean that Europe is not making significant progress. EU military spending has risen from \u20ac260 billion ($304 billion) in 2022, the year of Russia\u2019s major invasion of Ukraine, to \u20ac380 billion ($445 billion) this year. Many countries have introduced new mechanisms to increase their troop numbers<\/a>. The 27 member states have agreed to use the significant instrument of common borrowing both for the SAFE program, which aims to finance coordinated arms projects, and to provide financial stability to Ukraine, and have agreed on an escape clause in the fiscal stability pact regarding military spending.<\/p>\n

Likewise, the industrial sector has taken steps in recent years toward increasing production capacity, while on the political front a core of European countries has formed an informal council that has gained a certain degree of influence in the negotiations related to Ukraine.<\/p>\n

Several analysts believe that to move forward, it is necessary to abandon systems that require unanimity and instead form coalitions of volunteers. \u201cIt\u2019s the only way I see possible, to do it outside of established structures, outside of discussions requiring unanimity,\u201d says Morillas. \u201cThat ties in closely with the pragmatic federalism that Mario Draghi talks about,\u201d the expert points out.<\/p>\n

The loan recently granted to Ukraine through the issuance of eurobonds without the participation of Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia is an example.<\/p>\n

As a top priority to reduce dependencies and this enormous vulnerability, Europe should try to replace the 20,000 troops the United States deployed at the start of the Ukraine crisis, who will most likely be withdrawn (Washington has already pulled some from Romania), emphasizes a report from the Belfer Center at Harvard University, coordinated by researcher Daniela Schwarzer. \u201cAn alliance that remains overly dependent on Washington faces the risk of fracturing. A Europe that remains without adequate defense could suffer a military defeat, dealing a blow to security and prosperity on both sides of the Atlantic,\u201d it states<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Sign up for our weekly newsletter<\/a> to get more English-language news coverage from EL PA\u00cdS USA Edition<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Europe has entered a new state of alert in the face of increasingly explicit signs that the United…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":688439,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5174],"tags":[1395,32,2000,299,5187,13858,8875,660,33109,9655],"class_list":{"0":"post-688438","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-eu","8":"tag-china","9":"tag-donald-trump","10":"tag-eu","11":"tag-europe","12":"tag-european","13":"tag-j-d-vance","14":"tag-kiev","15":"tag-kremlin","16":"tag-mario-draghi","17":"tag-thierry-breton"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/115875305466151835","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/688438","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=688438"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/688438\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/688439"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=688438"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=688438"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=688438"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}