{"id":693002,"date":"2026-01-13T10:49:12","date_gmt":"2026-01-13T10:49:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/693002\/"},"modified":"2026-01-13T10:49:12","modified_gmt":"2026-01-13T10:49:12","slug":"a-just-peace-settlement-for-ukraine-remains-elusive","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/693002\/","title":{"rendered":"A just peace settlement for Ukraine remains elusive"},"content":{"rendered":"

Donald Trump has recently suggested negotiators have made ‘tremendous progress’ on a Russia-Ukraine peace agreement. A fair and durable settlement, however, remains\u00a0elusive. According to Dennis Shen<\/strong>, an outcome that is overly accommodating of Russia\u2019s war aims\u00a0would\u00a0only deepen present\u00a0global geopolitical tensions and compound fiscal and economic challenges<\/p>\n

In\u00a0November,\u00a0Ukrainian and European officials made a\u00a019-point counter-offer<\/a>\u00a0to an original\u00a028-point peace Russia-US plan<\/a> devised by Trump negotiator Steve Witkoff and Kremlin official Kirill Dmitriev. The counter-offer aimed at preserving Ukraine\u2019s sovereignty while reducing elements Ukraine’s government\u00a0has\u00a0seen\u00a0as being too favourable to Moscow. Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy concedes that much of the revised document ‘could be accepted’. This, at least, suggests a degree of openness\u00a0on Zelenskyy’s part towards further refinement.<\/p>\n

Kyiv rightfully\u00a0continues to seek NATO Article 5-style security guarantees as a part of any peace arrangement. Zelenskyy recently\u00a0revealed he asked for US security guarantees lasting\u00a0for\u00a0half a century<\/a>\u00a0to help\u00a0deter future Russian aggression. Current US security\u00a0guarantee\u00a0proposals under discussion set out a 15-year term with the\u00a0possibility\u00a0of\u00a0an extension. Such guarantees, if confirmed by the US Congress, would\u00a0have to be combined with pledges by nations\u00a0of\u00a0the\u00a0so-called Coalition of the Willing, alongside possible European Union membership,\u00a0to form any more reliable security network for Ukraine.<\/p>\n

\n

Any guarantees of security from the US would need to be combined with pledges from the Coalition of the Willing and EU membership to form any more reliable security apparatus<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Nevertheless, following the failures of the 1994\u00a0Budapest Memorandum<\/a>, the Ukrainian government, understandably, remains cautious\u00a0about\u00a0any\u00a0non-binding security pledges.<\/p>\n

Constitutional obstacles to peace negotiations<\/p>\n

Many aspects of\u00a0the\u00a0original 28-point plan would have been\u00a0nearly impossible for Ukraine and Europe to accept. The Ukrainian Constitution states\u00a0the nation is\u00a0‘indivisible’. Any ceding of territory may thus be subject to a national referendum; it could not\u00a0be granted unilaterally.<\/p>\n

Russian President Vladimir Putin\u2019s 2022 decision to annex the Donbas, alongside Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts, restricts his\u00a0space for negotiations. At Putin’s request, lawmakers amended the Russian Constitution banning the relinquishing of\u00a0such\u00a0territory\u00a0\u2013 curtailing his\u00a0space\u00a0for manoeuvre.<\/p>\n

Finding\u00a0any\u00a0agreement acceptable to both sides remains tough<\/p>\n

The core challenge\u00a0remains\u00a0reaching any\u00a0hypothetical\u00a0agreement that may be\u00a0acceptable to both Ukraine and Russia. The latest draft of an agreement might\u00a0be\u00a0less favourable to Moscow, leaving Zelenskyy and US President Trump to decide\u00a0on many\u00a0of\u00a0the most sensitive issues. However,\u00a0Moscow has signalled<\/a> reservations about the updated conditions, and it remains unclear how dedicated Moscow is to achieving peace. The leak of the initial 28-point plan blindsided Ukraine, Europe\u00a0and most US policymakers, underscoring the need for clearer coordination.<\/p>\n

\n

The core challenge\u00a0for negotiators remains\u00a0reaching an\u00a0agreement acceptable to both Ukraine and Russia<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

A contentious point\u00a0in\u00a0the original plan was\u00a0the\u00a0proposal to shift\u00a0US$100bn of frozen Russian assets to US investment funds. The money was intended for US-spearheaded efforts to rebuild Ukraine and\u00a0facilitate\u00a0US-Russian investment projects. This proposal interrupted EU talks around plans for the same assets.<\/p>\n

The\u00a0EU\u00a0settles on a temporary funding solution for Ukraine<\/p>\n

The proposal to use frozen Russian assets for a US-led peace plan intensified pressures on the European Union\u00a0to agree on whether, or how, to make frozen Russian assets held in Europe available for financing\u00a0Ukraine’s war efforts and current spending requirements.<\/p>\n

EU leaders\u00a0last month opted to fund<\/a> Ukraine for\u00a02026\u201327\u00a0through\u00a0a\u00a0\u20ac90bn loan based on EU borrowing on the capital markets. That might have been a disappointing outcome for many who had argued\u00a0it\u00a0as\u00a0being vital to activate frozen Russian assets<\/a>\u00a0for funding Ukraine, so Russia pays for the war. Ukraine has hefty financing requirements of around $50bn a year and more than $200bn by the end of this decade.<\/p>\n

The\u00a0geopolitical and economic risks<\/p>\n

In the end, any fuller ceasefire or settlement that\u00a0is\u00a0too favourable for Russia may only exacerbate geopolitical and economic risks\u00a0for Europe.<\/p>\n

\n

Any ceasefire or settlement too favourable to Russia\u00a0may\u00a0exacerbate geopolitical and economic risks<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

And any scenario\u00a0allowing\u00a0Russia to consolidate\u00a0its territorial gains since 2022 \u2013\u00a0especially if accompanied by further concessions and\/or sanctions relief \u2013\u00a0would, as history has taught, heighten the risk of renewed or expanded conflict.<\/p>\n

Such elevated geopolitical uncertainty after a hypothetical Russia-friendly settlement would only place added pressure on European defence spending, challenging already strained arms budgets. And just as the onset of Russia\u2019s full-scale war in 2022 contributed to\u00a0a\u00a0broader global cost-of-living crisis, such uncertainty might undermine global\u00a0economic stability.<\/p>\n

What comes next?<\/p>\n

After the recent talks in Berlin, President Zelenskyy described another\u00a0draft peace plan with the US as being \u2018very workable<\/a>\u2019. He nevertheless cautioned that\u00a0the same\u00a0core\u00a0points of contention \u2013 notably what happens to Ukrainian territory, the fate of the Russian-controlled Zaporizhzhia\u00a0nuclear power plant, and\u00a0postwar security guarantees for Ukraine\u00a0\u2013 remain unresolved.<\/p>\n

As hostilities\u00a0continue, \u200asome divergences between Ukraine and Russia appear to be slowly narrowing, especially as Ukraine\u2019s negotiating position shifts. Ukrainian forces face growing operational strain, whereas\u00a0Russian forces are making only slow gains in the contested Donbas. Ukraine\u00a0recently suggested a referendum<\/a> around\u00a0territorial concessions or, alternatively, holding general elections if a ceasefire was achieved. Both proposals were swiftly\u00a0shot down<\/a>\u00a0by the Kremlin. Trump\u2019s relentless pursuit of peace at any price has\u00a0probably moved the needle\u00a0somewhat.<\/p>\n

However, the\u00a0conflict, soon to enter\u00a0its fifth year, looks\u00a0set\u00a0to drag on well into 2026.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Donald Trump has recently suggested negotiators have made ‘tremendous progress’ on a Russia-Ukraine peace agreement. A fair and…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":693003,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[7654],"tags":[14543,31610,32,8877,2000,299,47954,2046,1757,657,753,333,2601],"class_list":{"0":"post-693002","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-ukraine","8":"tag-crimea","9":"tag-defence-spending","10":"tag-donald-trump","11":"tag-donbas","12":"tag-eu","13":"tag-europe","14":"tag-military-expenditure","15":"tag-putin","16":"tag-trump","17":"tag-ukraine","18":"tag-ukraine-war","19":"tag-vladimir-putin","20":"tag-volodymyr-zelenskyy"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/115887404645371789","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/693002","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=693002"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/693002\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/693003"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=693002"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=693002"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=693002"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}