During Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine and following the re-election of Donald Trump, two things have become clear to European decision-makers. First, space-enabled mili\u00adtary capabilities would be decisive in a\u00a0potential conflict between Russia and NATO. Second, the availability of US space capabilities cannot be taken for granted under any and all circumstances.<\/p>\n
The war in Ukraine has underscored that\u00a0satellite data are essential for military operations, including the identification of targets. Thus, such capabilities are not only targets of interest for adversaries but can also be subject to political instrumentalisation. In the spring of 2025, the Trump ad\u00administration withheld satellite data from Ukrainian forces and used them as leverage to pressure the Ukrainian government to enter into negotiations with Russia under unfavourable conditions. Ukraine is not an\u00a0isolated case in this regard: many of the capabilities on which Europe relies for its defence are based on US satellite systems, particularly in the fields of intelligence and navigation. Given the growing threat posed by Russia and declining trust in the US as a\u00a0reliable partner, it is therefore imperative that Europe develop and expand its own space capabilities.<\/p>\n
Europe\u2019s Capacity to Act in Space<\/p>\n
In defence, there are four core capabilities based on satellite services: communications, intelligence, navigation and missile early warning. In order for there to be any ben\u00adefit from satellite systems, additional en\u00adablers are required, such as launch capabil\u00adities and the ability to maintain accurate space situational awareness. Europe remains highly dependent on the US, particularly in\u00a0the areas of intelligence, navigation and early warning. Moreover, space situational awareness relies in part on data provided by\u00a0the US, while European satellites are often launched into orbit by US private com\u00adpanies.<\/p>\n
Expanding Europe\u2019s own capabilities \u2013 and thereby increasing its capacity to act \u2013 is a process, and there may not be a clearly defined endpoint in the associated pursuit of\u00a0autonomy. For Europe, the process begins with the reduction of dependencies, which will demand certain trade-offs: a capability that can be scaled up quickly is not neces\u00adsarily the one needed most urgently. To what extent a given capability is necessary depends both on the degree of dependence and on how severe the consequences would be if the US were no longer to provide that capability.<\/p>\n
The timeline that should now be devel\u00adoped must strike a balance between what is feasible and what is necessary. In military intelligence, capabilities can be scaled up relatively quickly through the use of com\u00admercial data. But in space-based missile early warning, it makes more sense to develop Europe\u2019s own capabilities. Initially, these could complement US systems rather than replace them in full.<\/p>\n
Europe is not a homogeneous actor in space. Individual European states have their own space capabilities and participate in multilateral structures such as NATO and the EU. The Atlantic alliance neither pro\u00adcures nor operate its own satellites but instead coordinates the capabilities of its member states. The EU, by contrast, already operates two satellite constellations: one for observation of Earth (Copernicus) and one for navigation (Galileo). At the same time, it\u00a0is pursuing the deployment of a communications constellation (IRIS2).<\/p>\n
Launch Capabilities<\/p>\n
A fundamental prerequisite for autonomous space actors is the ability to launch satel\u00adlites with one\u2019s own rockets. Currently, the majority of European satellites are launched by the US company SpaceX. Thanks in part to its reusable rocket engines, SpaceX offers the most frequent launch services and, fur\u00adther\u00admore, is\u00a0comparatively cost-effective.<\/p>\n
To date, SpaceX has proved reliable. Nevertheless, relying on just one US com\u00admercial provider entails risks; and this would be especially the case if SpaceX were to become a single point of failure. From a purely economic perspective, it is unlikely that the company would turn away Euro\u00adpean customers; but an interruption due to political reasons cannot be ruled out. For instance, priority could be given to US satel\u00adlites used for military purposes. While the risk of losing access to all SpaceX services is low, such an eventuality would have severe consequences, as Europe\u2019s capabilities to independently launch satellites into orbit are very limited.<\/p>\n
The European heavy-lift launch vehicle Ariane 6, which has been financed and de\u00adveloped by the member states of the Euro\u00adpean Space Agency (ESA), would be capable of reaching the strategically important geo\u00adstationary orbit (at an altitude of approximately 36,000 km above Earth); however, it is still unclear how frequently the launcher can be used. The current near-term goal is for Ariane 6 to carry out up to\u00a010\u00a0launches per year, but if and when such a launch cadence can be achieved remains unknown.<\/p>\n
Several obstacles complicate Europe\u2019s efforts to establish its own launch market. First, the European satellite market is com\u00adparatively small and thus demand for launch services is low, accounting for approximately\u00a01 per cent\u00a0of the global launch market. How\u00adever, the interdependence between the satellite market and launch capabilities sug\u00adgests that the planned expansion of Euro\u00adpean space capabilities and the associated commercial growth, are likely to have a positive impact on the European launch market.<\/p>\n
Second, a structural transformation is required \u2013 one in which European demand is consolidated. Only in this way can suffi\u00adcient demand be generated and the launch market made competitive. To this end, the European Launcher Challenge by ESA and the European Flight Ticket Initiative by ESA and the EU have been established. Both ini\u00adtiatives provide financial support to launch companies, with ESA serving ultimately as\u00a0anchor customer. As both are still at an early stage of development, it is too soon to\u00a0assess how successful they will be.<\/p>\n
Europe has demonstrated that it can develop and launch its own rockets. The key challenge now is for ESA and the EU to\u00a0structure the launch market efficiently so that European launch capabilities are economically attractive for regional com\u00adpanies.<\/p>\n
Space Situational Awareness<\/p>\n
Space situational awareness enables the monitoring of events and potential threats in space, as well as the tracking of one\u2019s own satellites. Threats can include other satellites equipped with weapons systems or surveillance technology. For instance, in September 2025 Germany reported that a Russian satellite appeared to be shadowing a\u00a0communications satellite\u00a0used by the Bundeswehr, presumably with the intent to commit espionage. Continuous monitoring of the space environment is therefore cru\u00adcial for the protection of national satellite systems.<\/p>\n
European space actors use ground-based radar stations to collect data on the space environment. Some of these data are shared through multilateral vehicles, such as the EU Space Surveillance and Tracking (EU SST) system. However, for operationally relevant information \u2013 such as when hos\u00adtile satellites are approaching one\u2019s own \u2013 European capabilities are insufficient and Europe has to rely on the more detailed data provided by the US military. Thus, a gap is evident in Europe\u2019s space defence and deterrence capabilities.<\/p>\n
Continuing to share data with Europe is in the United States\u2019 interest, as this prac\u00adtice helps create a safer space environment. Nevertheless, there is a risk of the US being unable to provide its data or able to do so only with a delay, which could have serious consequences. Such a scenario might materi\u00adalise if the United States were to become involved in a conflict \u2013 and particularly if American satellite systems themselves were targeted.<\/p>\n
Building a comprehensive space situational awareness system is a complex under\u00adtaking that requires massive investments. The barriers to Europe developing independent capabilities are significant, not least owing to its starting position. Even in the United States, the development process is not considered complete: over the next four years,\u00a0US$1.7 billion\u00a0will be spent solely on the country\u2019s ground-based radar capabilities. With substantial financial resources, Europe could expand its capa\u00adbilities; however, structural and political issues still need to be addressed. Right now, it remains unclear whether individual states will continue to invest in their own capabilities or whether a multilateral sys\u00adtem within the EU or ESA is to be pursued.<\/p>\n
Satellite Communication<\/p>\n
Satellite communication is essential for modern defence, including for command and control purposes and the networking of\u00a0sensors. Europe possesses some national capabilities that enables satellite communication, while NATO consolidates the\u00a0com\u00admunications satellite systems\u00a0of France, the\u00a0United Kingdom, Italy and the United States.<\/p>\n
For this reason, Europe\u2019s dependence on the US in the field of satellite communication is comparatively low at present. How\u00adever, demands on communication networks are increasing: more bandwidth is needed as the volume of data to be processed in\u00adcreases in sensor-rich battlefields. In prac\u00adtice, this means that a resilient network is required to connect sensors and transmit data in a timely manner. This is underscored by the German armed forces\u2019 vision of\u00a0Multi-Domain Operations\u00a0(MDO), which is also being pursued by NATO. MDO entails military operations across all domains, for\u00a0which synchronisation is essential. It demands a network that not only provides sufficient bandwidth but is also resilient and interoperable. To achieve this data capacity, it is very likely that at least part of\u00a0the network will have to be space-based. The war in Ukraine provides a pointer on how this might work, at least in relation to drones: SpaceX\u2019s Starlink satellite constel\u00adlation offers connectivity with high data capacity via an internet connection and can thus be used for drone operations. Thanks to the simple internet connection, the sys\u00adtem is interoperable without requiring additional linkages. Moreover, software up\u00addates have proved that it is highly resilient.<\/p>\n
However, European dependence on Star\u00adlink would be risky \u2013 and not just because it is potentially a single (not to mention com\u00admercial) point of failure. According to\u00a0anonymous\u00a0sources, the Trump adminis\u00adtration instrumentalised Starlink on one occasion and used it as a political lever, although SpaceX CEO Elon Musk has denied that happened. Media reports suggest the Trump administration was acting in rela\u00adtion to Ukraine, despite Poland having paid SpaceX around\u00a0US$50 million\u00a0per year to maintain the service for Kyiv. While, ulti\u00admately, the service was not suspended, the incident demonstrated that the political interests of the US government could over\u00adride the commercial interests of a company.<\/p>\n
Europe is in possession of several communications satellite systems that enable military communication. These systems form part of the capabilities of the major European space actors \u2013 France, the UK, Italy and Germany. However, even if they are able to provide high data capacity and fast transmission, it is unlikely that demand can be met in full without commercial service providers. Furthermore, there is the question of resilience: building a resilient system requires both diversity and redun\u00addancy.<\/p>\n
Europe would need a system similar to Starlink to connect a large number of sen\u00adsors via satellite networks and ensure seam\u00adless interoperability. Potential European alternatives \u2013 such as the commercial OneWeb constellation or the planned EU constellation IRIS2\u00a0\u2013 remain qualitatively inferior or come with uncertainty as regards their timeline for completion. Thus, while Europe is independent in satellite communication for command and control, it is not\u00a0yet autonomous in sensor networking.<\/p>\n
In order to meet demand, Europe will have to establish a constellation \u2013 in other words, hundreds of satellites. Such an undertaking faces several challenges, par\u00adticularly regarding production capacity and scaling. At present, European companies have no experience in the mass production of satellites, owing to what, historically, has been insufficient demand. Moreover, there are deficiencies in the supply chains. Many components are imported: among other things, Europe\u00a0relies\u00a0on supplies of elec\u00adtrical, electronic, and electromechanical parts, as well as software, from outside the region. That reliance could prove critical in the event of a conflict. Consequently, states should encourage their domestic industries to assess whether components would remain available in times of crisis. Further\u00admore, companies should be asked to ensure that components \u2013 especially security-relevant or highly innovative ones \u2013 are adequately protected against sabotage and industrial espionage.<\/p>\n
Some of these challenges, including pro\u00adduction and scaling, could be addressed simply through increased funding. The cost of the newly planned satellite factory in Berlin of the US company\u00a0Planet Labs, is in the eight-figure range, which illustrates the high initial investment required to build such infrastructure. Projects of this kind need to be supported financially not only by individual European states but also by the EU so that European companies remain in the region and Europe itself is able to benefit from their products and services.<\/p>\n
Finally, bureaucratic hurdles further com\u00adplicate cooperation among European com\u00adpanies. A unified legal framework is still lacking. Although the EU has published a draft\u00a0European Space Law, that legislation is not expected to enter into force until 2030. Therefore, it remains to be seen to what extent the new law will create more favour\u00adable conditions for industry in which capac\u00adities can be pooled and scaling facilitated.<\/p>\n
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)<\/p>\n
Satellite imagery enables secure, rapid and precise reconnaissance; and, for this reason, it is an important component of modern warfare \u2013 for example, in target acquisition. Space-based intelligence data are cur\u00adrently shared by NATO members, with the US possessing by far the most ISR satellites. The number of satellites is relevant because it is not only the resolution of a satellite image that matters but also the\u00a0revisit rate\u00a0(that is, the frequency with which a satellite passes over the same point on Earth, allow\u00ading the data to be updated).<\/p>\n
At the same time, it is important to note that the United States has used the exchange or provision of intelligence data for\u00a0politi\u00adcal purposes, namely, in March 2025, when the flow of satellite data to Ukraine was suspended. This affected not only data from the US military but also from the commercial provider Maxar. Even though the pro\u00advision of data to Ukraine was not within the framework of NATO but on a bilateral basis, it cannot be ruled out that the US will also withhold reconnaissance data from Euro\u00adpean NATO states \u2013 at least temporarily \u2013 perhaps to encourage European countries to invest more in their own capabilities.<\/p>\n
In addition, the process of data sharing within NATO is not a trouble-free one, even under \u201cnormal\u201d conditions. Different IT sys\u00adtems complicate that process; and in some cases, real-time transmission is not possible. This means that it is not even necessary to deliberately withhold intelligence data \u2013 a\u00a0delay in US release could in itself under\u00admine a European mission. And as is the case in space situational awareness, data could be delayed or only transmitted in part owing to increased US internal demand.<\/p>\n
Europe\u2019s own space-based intelligence capabilities are limited. They consist of small constellations owned by Germany, France and Italy that enable military recon\u00adnaissance through optical and radar sen\u00adsors. The United Kingdom, Spain and Poland are planning to have capabilities in this area, too. Thus, the\u00a0revisit rate\u00a0of Euro\u00adpean capabilities is currently low, preventing a comprehensive, continuously avail\u00adable situational picture from being formed.<\/p>\n
The hurdles to building Europe\u2019s own reconnaissance satellites on a large scale are similar to those for communications satel\u00adlites: gaps exist, above all, in production capacity, scaling and supply chains. How\u00adever, unlike in the communications sector, there are already suitable commercial pro\u00adviders on the market that could fill these gaps, such as the Finnish company ICEYE. But in contrast with the United States, the integration of commercial services into mili\u00adtary structures is proceeding only slowly in Europe. NATO wants that to change, but it remains uncertain how suc\u00adcessful the\u00a0ini\u00adtiatives planned\u00a0by the alliance will be.<\/p>\n
The continued resistance towards commercial integration will require a cultural shift in order to overcome this historic lack of investment. Europe\u2019s total spending on space over the past 40 years amounts to just\u00a015\u201320 per cent\u00a0of the investments made in\u00a0US space activities over the same period. In the United States, the potential value of\u00a0commercial actors was recognised at an early stage and procurement processes modernised. If Europe is to seek the closer integration of its commercial capabilities into military operations, stronger support will be required at both the national and EU level. That means long-term contracts, which will allow industry to plan and in\u00advest, as well as an overhaul of procurement processes. Moreover, it will be up to NATO to integrate these partners into military infrastructures and enable unified, time-critical data transmission. In addition, per\u00adsonnel will need to be trained to analyse the data and processes optimised.<\/p>\n
Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT)<\/p>\n
PNT services are essential for command and control and critical for weapons systems that rely on navigation signals for guidance, such as precision\u2011guided munitions. The US Global Positioning System (GPS) for troop command and control is used by NATO and integrated into all weapons systems guided by satellite\u2011based navigation signals. Theo\u00adretically, this gives the United States the ability to degrade or even disable the capa\u00adbil\u00adity of supplied weapons systems to receive GPS signals \u2013 for example, through software updates.<\/p>\n
Ultimately, the extent of Europe\u2019s depend\u00adence on software updates in weapons systems depends on the respective system. But as long as Europe continues to procure US weapons systems, limitations in range or\u00a0targeting accuracy remain at least a\u00a0theo\u00adretical possibility, not least if \u2013 for political reasons \u2013 the United States were to dis\u00adagree about the intended use of the weap\u00adons or the target. Even in the event of a collective defence scenario under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, the US could consider certain targets too escalatory, especially if it\u00a0were not a direct party to the conflict.<\/p>\n
The EU possesses its own navigation satel\u00adlite system, Galileo, which could, at least in theory, reduce Europe\u2019s dependence on the United States. The system was origi\u00adnally designed for civilian use, but the in\u00adtroduction of the Galileo Public Regulated Service provides an encrypted signal for gov\u00adernmental users. The German armed forces plan to develop multifunctional receivers for their equipment so that they can receive both GPS and Galileo signals. However, the timeline for completion is not yet known. Also unclear is whether the receivers can be integrated into US systems, which make up a\u00a0large part\u00a0of Europe\u2019s arsenal.<\/p>\n
At the same time, it must be ensured that Galileo signals can be received in the event of a conflict, as it is relatively easy to\u00a0disrupt satellite signals. Russian armed forces have significant electromagnetic war\u00adfare capabilities, such as jammers. In the event of a confrontation with Moscow, Euro\u00adpean systems would need to prove them\u00adselves against Russian systems, which have been developed over many years, received massive investments and are\u00a0combat\u2011tested.<\/p>\n
While European projects aimed at enhanc\u00ading resilience in navigation already exist, they remain in the planning phase. Meanwhile, the UK government has an\u00adnounced plans to develop a\u00a0terrestrial long\u2011range navigation system, which could be operational by 2028. Other European states should invest in ground-based alter\u00adnatives, too; and these should be integrated into NATO\u2019s navigation infrastructure. Technology is not a barrier here, as long-range navigation systems were still being operated in Europe until just a few years ago. The main obstacles are political \u2013 for example, there is a lack of awareness of how vulnerable the electromagnetic spec\u00adtrum is.<\/p>\n
Missile Early Warning<\/p>\n
Infrared sensors in space are capable of detecting the heat signature generated by a missile launch. Thus, they provide an early warning capability and generally give the attacked party more time to respond than ground-based radar systems. At the same time, space-based sensors make it possible to obtain a global overview of missile launches. At present, the United States is the only Western country to operate such a system.<\/p>\n
As long as the US remains a member of NATO, it can be expected to share its mis\u00adsile early warning data with other members of the alliance in the event of an attack. Washington has no interest in the destruction of European territory, not least because European infrastructure \u2013 for example, the RAF Fylingdales radar station in northern England and NATO\u2019s Allied Air Command headquarters in Ramstein, Germany \u2013 con\u00adstitutes an integral part of US capabilities. Therefore, concerns regarding the availability of early warning data are related, above all, to the risk of a potential overload on the US side, which could delay the transmission of data to Europe.<\/p>\n
In the event of such a delay, Europe would have to rely solely on ground-based radar capabilities. Highly manoeuvrable and more advanced missile systems, such as\u00a0hypersonic missiles, would likely be de\u00adtected\u00a0only at a late stage. Several projects aim to complement European radar capa\u00adbilities with space-based sensors. They in\u00adclude TWISTER with its space component,\u00a0ODIN\u2019S EYE, as well as JEWEL, which was recently announced by Germany and France and builds on\u00a0ODIN\u2019S EYE.\u00a0However, no precise timeline has yet been established for either project. As a result, European missile defence \u2013 particularly with regard to space-based sensor capabilities \u2013 will remain dependent on the US at least in the medium term.<\/p>\n
The obstacles to becoming more independent from the United States in missile early warning can be overcome. Europe has\u00a0already invested in infrared technology and possesses the necessary technical know-how, although further investments are required. However, it is political issues that pose the greater challenge: as with space situational awareness, it must be clarified whether capabilities are to be procured multi\u00adlaterally and how they should be operated ultimately. Because of the ways in\u00a0which data sharing and the warning of member states are organised, missile early warning can function only within the NATO framework. In the medium term, the most realistic option is for European data to\u00a0complement US capabilities.<\/p>\n
Policy Recommendations<\/p>\n
Europe\u2019s dependencies on the United States in the field of space technologies are signifi\u00adcant. To build and further develop its own capabilities, Europe must prioritise space systems in order to avoid being overwhelmed by the scale of the task.<\/p>\n
Navigation signals, data for space situational awareness, reconnaissance and mis\u00adsile early warning are capabilities whose availability is most at risk. At the same time, the requirements for space-based intelligence could be met relatively quickly through commercial means, provided that private companies received sufficient sup\u00adport. Further, the resilience of navigation signals could be improved in the short term if the issue were to be accorded more atten\u00adtion from policymakers.<\/p>\n
By contrast, expanding European capabil\u00adities in space situational awareness and mis\u00adsile early warning is a long-term process \u2013 one that requires the resolution of struc\u00adtural questions regarding ownership and integration. In space situational awareness, the challenge is not only to expand existing capabilities but also to establish new pro\u00adcesses; this could be achieved if more atten\u00adtion and funding were forthcoming. Simi\u00adlarly, the projects already initiated in the area of missile early warning require greater political focus and higher levels of invest\u00adment.<\/p>\n
Although the list of essential measures is\u00a0long, these processes should be pursued simultaneously. Since they have different starting points and deal with different com\u00adponents, effective coordination would allow for parallel development without exhausting resources.<\/p>\n
In the areas of launch capabilities and communications satellites, US economic interests remain aligned with European demand. Nevertheless, Europe should en\u00adsure that it does not become fully dependent on the United States in either area. Exist\u00ading processes in European capability development must be continued and sup\u00adported financially. And, particularly in the\u00a0area of launch capabilities, European demand needs to be consolidated in order to enhance the overall competitiveness of the continent\u2019s space industry and enable organic growth of the launch market.<\/p>\n
All of this requires not only the develop\u00adment and expansion of capabilities but also coordination within Europe and clear sig\u00adnalling toward the United States that space security is being taken seriously. To expand capabilities in a targeted manner, existing expertise and the state of domestic industry must be assessed at the national level. In its 2021\u00a0Integrated Review, the UK government introduced the \u201cown, collaborate, access\u201d procurement framework. Such an approach is advisable for all European states. It should be deployed, together with space security strategies, to determine which capabilities are needed and how they can best be pro\u00adcured: at the national level, in cooperation with partners or through commercial ser\u00advices. These national assessments must be followed by efficient coordination and com\u00admunication so that duplication at the Euro\u00adpean level can be avoided and burden-shar\u00ading within NATO managed more effectively. Given that the EU and NATO have different approaches, it is essential that they con\u00adtinue to engage in dialogue. Moreover, a security of information agreement between the two would be beneficial.<\/p>\n
As these processes are designed to take place over the long term and US space capa\u00adbilities will remain indispensable for Europe in the short to medium term, Europe must signal its willingness now to invest and to build its capabilities. Later, these capabilities could be integrated into US-led pro\u00adcesses, such as intelligence sharing and mis\u00adsile early warning within NATO.<\/p>\n
In the area of space-related issues, Germany has assumed a pioneering role in Europe \u2013 a role that the government out\u00adlines in its recently published\u00a0Space Secu\u00adrity Strategy. In 2025, German defence spending increased by more than\u00a0\u20ac10 bil\u00adlion\u00a0compared with 2024; and Defence Minister Pistorius has announced that\u00a0\u20ac35 billion\u00a0will be spent on military space capa\u00adbilities over the next five years.<\/p>\n
The German government should leverage this role to advance decision-making pro\u00adcesses within Europe and make cooperation more efficient. To this end, it should ensure that knowledge is accessible, that new capa\u00adbilities are handled transparently and that interoperability is considered from the out\u00adset. In addition, it must clarify which capa\u00adbilities can be shared multilaterally or, as in the case of missile early warning, bilaterally (with its partner France). Given that Ger\u00admany\u2019s Space Security Strategy foresees a \u201cEuropean space security architecture\u201d, it appears that this approach is already taking hold. Furthermore, an open and honest exchange with domestic industry and co\u00adordi\u00adnation among the Federal Ministry of Defence, the Federal Foreign Office, and the Ministry of Research, Technology and Space are necessary. In order to advance a regional approach, it is the German government\u2019s responsibility to engage in (potentially chal\u00adlenging) discussions with its European part\u00adners aimed at clarifying the threat landscape and raising awareness of the impor\u00adtance of the space dimension.<\/p>\n
About the Author:<\/p>\n
Juliana S\u00fc\u00df<\/strong> is a researcher in SWP\u2019s International Security Research Division.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"During Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine and following the re-election of Donald Trump, two things have become clear to…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":137055,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5174],"tags":[2000,299,5187],"class_list":{"0":"post-697508","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-eu","8":"tag-eu","9":"tag-europe","10":"tag-european"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/115898839946827700","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/697508","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=697508"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/697508\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/137055"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=697508"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=697508"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=697508"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}