{"id":724542,"date":"2026-01-27T16:56:14","date_gmt":"2026-01-27T16:56:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/724542\/"},"modified":"2026-01-27T16:56:14","modified_gmt":"2026-01-27T16:56:14","slug":"nato-needs-a-drone-wall-ukraines-playbook-shows-how-to-build-it","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/724542\/","title":{"rendered":"NATO Needs a Drone Wall. Ukraine\u2019s Playbook Shows How to Build It"},"content":{"rendered":"

Russia\u2019s military launched <\/strong>roughly 415 explosive-laden kamikaze drones towards Ukraine on September 9 last year\u2014the majority Shahed-136s of Iranian design, which followed pre-programmed navigational instructions before plummeting down to the ground and exploding.<\/p>\n

During the raid, 20 drones<\/a> flew straight into the airspace of neighboring Poland. The powerful radars of Patriot air defense batteries tracked the drones but didn\u2019t fire to conserve their precious multi-million dollar long-range missiles<\/a>. Instead, scrambled Dutch F-35 and Polish F-16 jets downed just four drones. Security forces nonetheless recovered 13 more which crashed on Polish and Latvian soil, fortunately without warheads. The effective breach of airspace prompted Poland to exercise its right for emergency consultation with NATO under Article 4 of the alliance\u2019s defense treaty.<\/p>\n

The incident revealed just how unprepared NATO\u2019s ostensibly more advanced militaries were to deal with massed strike drone attacks compared to Ukraine\u2019s<\/a> war-weary defenses, which on average destroy two-thirds of the drones in Russia\u2019s massive raids. <\/p>\n

That situation must change, as the strike drones<\/a> could pose a pancontinental threat, according to Samuel Bendett, an expert on Russian drones at the Center for New American Security (CNAS) think tank. <\/p>\n

\u201cIranians built a very cheap drone they could use against U.S. allies in [the Middle East] region,\u201d Bendett explains. \u201cA lot of [Shahed drones] can go well beyond Ukraine into central Europe.\u201d <\/p>\n

Indeed, if the claimed maximum range of 1,500 miles is accurate, Shahed might potentially reach Berlin, Rome or Paris when launched from Belarussian soil. Seeing as a Yemeni strike drone based on a different Iranian design apparently flew over 1,600 miles to attack Tel Aviv in 2024, this maximum range isn\u2019t implausible.<\/p>\n

Crucially, Shahed-136s can be mass-produced from civilian parts for just $20,000 to $40,000 each. The resulting plywood aircraft can fly hundreds of miles and carry up to 200 pounds of explosives. Unlike predecessors with long thin wings, Shahed-136\u2019s delta-wing configuration offers greater stability, more compact stowage, and improved weight capacity. Russia is currently mass-producing 5,500 of such strike drones per month, while continuously tweaking them to improve accuracy, destructiveness, and survivability against defenses.<\/p>\n

According to Bendett, the Shahed\u2019s cheapness and simplicity means it\u2019s also being widely replicated across the globe.<\/p>\n

\u201cChina and Turkey have a Shahed clone,\u201d Bendett says, \u201cand it wouldn\u2019t surprise me if North Korea has a clone built with parts and components built by the Russians.\u201d<\/p>\n

Admittedly, Shaheds haven\u2019t been tremendously effective against military targets, says Bendett. He explains that Russians are mainly using the strike drones on poorly-defended, stationary civilian targets. Because of this tactic, Shahed raids inflict enough terror and economic damage that Ukraine\u2019s military must devote prodigious resources defending against them at risk of exhaustion. In other words, the Shahed is both a military and psychological weapon, according to Bendett. <\/p>\n

\u201cThat\u2019s what makes it really deadly,\u201d he says. <\/p>\n

Admittedly, their slow speeds\u2014maxing at 115 mph\u2014mean there can be ample advance warning of Shahed raids, providing time for defenders to mobilize, people to take shelter, and interceptors to position themselves to begin thinning out the incoming waves. However, maintaining tracks of low-flying Shaheds masking themselves against terrain requires a geographically distributed network of sensors, or they may only become visible at the last minute. <\/p>\n

But even when the sensors are in place for long-range tracks, using traditional air defense missiles is too pricey to destroy Shaheds sustainably. Even short range Sidewinder and Stinger missiles cost several hundreds of thousands of dollars. Likewise, the Army\u2019s newly selected Freedom Eagle drone-killer missile rings in between $150,000 and $200,000\u2014enough to produce three or more Shahed-136s.<\/p>\n

So what can be done about the Shahed threat when relying on traditional air defense weapons would assuredly break the bank? There\u2019s no one simple answer\u2013but rather several scalable methods that combined together could attrit Shahed raids at sustainable costs.<\/p>\n

Laser-Guided Rockets<\/strong><\/p>\n

Arguably the only guided missile able to cost-efficiently down Shaheds are laser-guided rockets, notably America\u2019s AGR-20 Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System II (APKWS), which costs roughly $35,000 per shot. APKWS mates a laser seeker and maneuvering fins to ordinarily unguided 70-millimeter Hydra rockets. Laser seekers are cheaper than infrared or radar seekers but can still engage moving targets\u2014provided there’s a separate laser targeting pod on a nearby vehicle which can mark said target until the rocket hits.<\/p>\n

However, APKWS II can only defend a limited area from ground launchers like the Navy\u2019s combat-tested VAMPIRE system. But mounted on helicopters or jet fighters, APKWS have the speed to potentially engage multiple drones in one sortie. Currently, U.S. Air Force F-16 fighters\u2014and now increasingly Ukrainian F-16s\u2014employ APKWS as their standard anti-Shahed weapon, reportedly scoring many kills. Unfortunately, simply flying a jet fighter may cost the same amount as manufacturing an entire Shahed drone, with flight hour costs typically ranging from $20,000 to $44,000. Russia also recently began arming some Shaheds with air-to-air missiles to threaten intercepting fighters, making relying on mounted APKWS even riskier.<\/p>\n

Electronic Warfare<\/p>\n

Electronic warfare also helps combat Shaheds, as it can misdirect drones by using radio frequency jamming, which drowns out access to control links and satellite navigation that drones depend upon to execute their missions. Unfortunately, that\u2019s no panacea. Most Shaheds aren\u2019t completely disabled by jamming their remote control signal because they can default to pre-programmed waypoints upon losing their control signal.<\/p>\n

While jamming satellite navigation can throw Shaheds off course\u2014or at least degrade terminal accuracy\u2014Russia has already integrated course-correction methods including inertial navigation, mesh networking with other Shaheds, and even hijacking local cellphone networks to compensate. Eventually, AI may enable optical navigation by matching images of the terrain below to a map of the Earth like an old-school human navigator would. <\/p>\n

Point Air Defense <\/p>\n

Point air defense designed to protect limited areas against attacks are also key to killing Shaheds\u2014 including World War II-style heavy machine guns and flak guns. Ukraine even employs machine gun pickup trucks as ground-based interceptors rushed into the flight path of Shaheds, as well as autonomous 7.62 millimeter and .50 caliber machineguns as fixed Shahed defenses.<\/p>\n

Bigger autocannons assisted by optical and\/or radar detection as well as automated fire control computers\u2014like the Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft vehicles Germany has supplied to Ukraine\u2014can destroy Shaheds even more reliably thanks to greater range, computer-assisted accuracy and reaction times, and proximity-bursting shells that don\u2019t require direct hits. Similarly, warships under drone attack in the Red Sea have sometimes employed their howitzer-like main guns and CIWS gatling self-defense autocannons to avoid expending expensive anti-aircraft missiles. <\/p>\n

Energy Weapons<\/p>\n

A newer point defense approach with lower collateral damage risks involves directed energy weapons\u2014expensive to build but very cheap per shot. Sufficiently powerful lasers can burn through key drone components, while microwave weapons can potentially knock out the electrical systems of multiple drones simultaneously, though at a shorter range. While the U.S. has struggled to move lasers from testing to regular operational use, last year Israel finally deployed smaller prototypes of its 100-kilowatt Iron Beam air defense laser with a respectable range of around 6 miles, reportedly killing 40 Hezbollah drones as of May 2025.<\/p>\n

However, energy weapons have high power requirements and shorter range in foggy weather, and may struggle to disable drones during their terminal plunge attack, due to lacking kinetic \u201cpush.\u201d Overall, while point defenses are vital, the most effective kinds with radars and automatic guidance like the Gepard have non-trivial unit costs. <\/p>\n

More Drones?<\/p>\n

Perhaps the cheapest way to kill a kamikaze drone is another kamikaze drone. But it\u2019s challenging to design a cheap drone interceptor with the speed and control systems necessary to overtake and ram an already airborne drone.For example, jet-powered Coyote Block 2 drone interceptors used successfully by the U.S. Army in the Middle East typically cost between $120,000 and $200,000 each\u2014still several times more than a Shahed-136.<\/p>\n

However, in 2024 Ukraine began large-scale deployment of home-built interceptors which cost just four figures. Videos showed destruction of hundreds of Russian reconnaissance drones, though these early interceptors lacked capability to consistently defeat Shaheds. The following year, Ukraine finally began fielding a \u201cShahed Killer\u201d called Sting costing around $5,000 per shot. Separately, former Google CEO Erick Schmidt has quietly funded development of the Surveyor AS3 interceptor costing $15,000 per shot operational with Ukraine and now Poland. Reusable interceptors armed with net guns or energy weapons have also been combat-tested, though these may struggle against Shahed-sized aircraft.<\/p>\n

Given the massive scale of Russian and Chinese strike drone production, the U.S. needs more interceptors in the price range of Sting and Surveyor to exceed strike drones in number and to enable spreading interceptors out geographically for broader protection. Even then, affordable interceptors alone won\u2019t cut it. <\/p>\n

More Military Technology<\/p>\n

\u201cNo single technology is enough to interdict all incoming Shaheds,\u201d Bendett says. <\/p>\n

Rather, there\u2019s a need to develop multiple layered solutions, and command and control and sensor networks coordinating disparate air defenses to ensure high interception rates while rationalizing efficient use of defensive interceptors. Yet even with effective layered defenses, individual strike drones are tricky enough to track that some will inevitably get through, Bendett warned, meaning passive defenses like alert systems and fortification are also warranted.<\/p>\n

The best way to create a genuine \u201cdrone wall,\u201d says Bendett, is by learning from the only country currently experiencing sustained Shahed attacks.<\/p>\n

\u201cJust look at what Ukraine has done,\u201d explains Bendett, referring to the country\u2019s diverse anti-Shahed capabilities, \u201cthere\u2019s no need to reinvent the wheel.\u201d<\/p>\n

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S\u00e9bastien Roblin has written on the technical, historical, and political aspects of international security and conflict for publications including 19FortyFive, The National Interest, MSNBC, Forbes.com, Inside Unmanned Systems and War is Boring. He holds a Master\u2019s degree from Georgetown University and served with the Peace Corps in China. You can follow his articles on Twitter<\/a>.\u00a0<\/p>\n