{"id":760643,"date":"2026-02-13T00:47:11","date_gmt":"2026-02-13T00:47:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/760643\/"},"modified":"2026-02-13T00:47:11","modified_gmt":"2026-02-13T00:47:11","slug":"europes-machinery-and-pharma-strengths-give-leverage-over-us-and-china-report-finds-euobserver","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/760643\/","title":{"rendered":"Europe\u2019s machinery and pharma strengths give leverage over US and China, report finds \u2013 EUobserver"},"content":{"rendered":"

Europe\u2019s hold over machines, pharmaceuticals and other products in global supply-chains give leverage over the United States and China, according to a report<\/a> published Friday (13 February), ahead of the Munich Security Conference<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The study, Relearning the Language of Power, argues that these dependencies are \u201cuntapped sources of geo-economic power\u201d. <\/p>\n

Rather than focusing only on de-risking, European leaders should actively use that leverage.<\/p>\n

\u201cPooled geo-economic leverage should become the cornerstone of a new European strategy,\u201d write Jonathan Barth and Andreas Eisl of the Paris-based Jacques Delors Institute<\/a>, part of a 13-member Geo-strategic Europe Task Force.<\/p>\n

Together with other small and middle powers, the authors argue, Europe could build a \u201ccredible power base that protects against coercion and hedges against global volatility and US unpredictability.\u201d<\/p>\n

More than just chips<\/p>\n

Dutch chip machine maker ASML, Europe\u2019s most valuable company and the world\u2019s only producer of high-end lithography machines, is often cited as Europe\u2019s main point of leverage over China and the US.<\/p>\n

But the report argues the continent\u2019s power extends far beyond one semiconductor champion. Europe possesses other \u201csignificant tools of power,\u201d the authors write.<\/p>\n

In total, the analysis identifies 41 products for which China relies on the EU for more than 80 percent of its imports. For the US, that number stands at 67.<\/p>\n

China is almost entirely dependent on European suppliers for products such as insulin, pharmaceutical intermediates and seamless stainless steel tubing used in oil and gas drilling.<\/p>\n

It also imports much of its advanced textile, paper and industrial processing machinery from Europe. <\/p>\n

US dependencies are concentrated in advanced manufacturing equipment, construction machinery, agricultural processing systems and pharmaceutical ingredients, including insulin and protein-based hormones.<\/p>\n

Untapped \u2018chokepoints\u2019<\/p>\n

These \u201cchokepoints,\u201d the authors argue, are \u201cnot easily substitutable\u201d and could be used to project power and actively shape the behaviour of \u201csystemic rivals\u201d like China and the US.<\/p>\n

The report is published ahead of the Munich security summit where EU leaders are set to discuss how to respond to US invasion and tariff threats and Chinese manufacturing dominance.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The EU, so far, has focused much of its energies on signing bilateral trade agreements, most notably with India<\/a> and Mercosur<\/a>.\u00a0<\/p>\n

EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen told MEPs in Strasbourg on Wednesday that Europe must \u201celiminate the bottlenecks in our most strategic value chains.\u201d<\/p>\n

\u201cWe can do this by expanding our network of reliable partners,\u201d she said, pointing to recent trade agreements with India and Mercosur as evidence of Europe\u2019s strategy to secure \u201cthe global rules through bilateral agreements\u201d as the trade-based system built on WTO-rules, crumbles.<\/p>\n

But the report argues Europe focuses too much on de-risking, and uses too little of its leverage to shape US and Chinese behaviour.\u00a0<\/p>\n

\u2018Middle-powers\u2019 playbook\u00a0<\/p>\n

According to the report, the EU could amplify its power through coalitions with \u201cmiddle powers like Japan, South Korea, Canada, and Australia but also South Africa and Brazil remains.\u201d<\/p>\n

Canada\u2019s prime minister Mark Carney struck a similar note at Davos<\/a> last month, saying that \u201cin a world of great power rivalry\u201d middle powers can \u201ccombine to create a third path\u201d rooted in \u201clegitimacy, integrity and rules.\u201d<\/p>\n

Coordinated export controls with Canada, for example, would increase Europe\u2019s geoeconomic deterrence against the United States by 138 percent, the analysis suggests. A coalition with Japan would boost leverage against China by 118 percent.<\/p>\n

The authors urge Europe to move beyond trade deals, and start building power blocks\u00a0around shared priorities such as decarbonisation and energy security.\u00a0<\/p>\n

\u201cEurope\u2019s recent success in defending the territorial integrity of Greenland should not obscure that European leaders have repeatedly confused sovereignty with geopolitical power,\u201d it states. <\/p>\n

\u201cDe-risking and resilience may preserve freedom of action, but they do not translate into power.\u201d<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Europe\u2019s hold over machines, pharmaceuticals and other products in global supply-chains give leverage over the United States and…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":760644,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5174],"tags":[217083,2000,299,5187,223473,223471,223472],"class_list":{"0":"post-760643","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-eu","8":"tag-typedefinedterm","9":"tag-eu","10":"tag-europe","11":"tag-european","12":"tag-identifier4417","13":"tag-namegeopolitics","14":"tag-termcodegeopolitics"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/116060569289713461","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/760643","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=760643"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/760643\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/760644"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=760643"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=760643"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=760643"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}