{"id":782821,"date":"2026-02-23T03:17:13","date_gmt":"2026-02-23T03:17:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/782821\/"},"modified":"2026-02-23T03:17:13","modified_gmt":"2026-02-23T03:17:13","slug":"why-us-eu-defense-industrial-cooperation-matters-more-than-ever-politico","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/782821\/","title":{"rendered":"Why US-EU defense industrial cooperation matters more than ever \u2013 POLITICO"},"content":{"rendered":"

As the war in Ukraine rages on, U.S. production lines must operate at capacity to supply munitions other nations cannot, such as U.S. air defense systems and their interceptor missiles and F-16 ammunition and spare parts. This is particularly true as the U.S. strives to meet its own defense production needs as well as those of our allies across the world. For the U.S. to continue supplying the armaments Ukraine and NATO member countries need requires orders sufficient to justify their production and the resources to pay for them.<\/p>\n

With that in mind, the United States has expressed concerns about how EU defense initiatives like Security Action for Europe (SAFE) and the European Defense Industry Program (EDIP) restrict market access for American companies. Such exclusionary measures undermine our collective defense by limiting competition, stifling innovation and depriving these companies of the orders they need to maintain production at the levels required to meet our allies\u2019 needs.<\/p>\n

EDIP and SAFE mandate the EU maintain control over the design, configuration, and future modification of defense systems. And these requirements threaten intellectual property rights, constrain supply chains, and impede transatlantic interoperability. Additionally, these programs impose a 35 percent cap on U.S. industrial participation, limiting the possibility of U.S.-EU joint defense ventures.<\/p>\n

\"\"EU policymakers considering the future of defense cooperation face a clear choice. | Armend Nimani\/AFP via Getty Images<\/p>\n

Looking ahead, we are especially concerned about the Commission\u2019s plan to incorporate \u201cEuropean preference\u201d in the Defense Procurement Directive in 2026. Revisions to the Directive are critical because they will directly impact how EU countries spend their national money on defense procurements. Our view is that EU countries should have the full sovereign autonomy to make decisions about defense procurements \u2014 including where to make purchases \u2014 without the EU imposing additional eligibility criteria similar to those present in SAFE and EDIP.<\/p>\n

Similarly, if the goal of the European Commission\u2019s proposed \u20ac90 billion loan to Ukraine is for Ukraine to defeat Russia, the EU should allow Ukraine to purchase what it needs as quickly as possible. Otherwise, the loan appears to serve more as an economic development initiative that favors certain EU countries\u2019 defense industries.<\/p>\n

Let us be clear: We welcome member countries\u2019 efforts to ramp up their defense budgets and the EU utilizing financial levers to encourage more defense spending. But not at the cost of decades of cooperation by fragmenting the defense market and reducing the effectiveness of joint efforts.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"As the war in Ukraine rages on, U.S. production lines must operate at capacity to supply munitions other…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":782822,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":"","_share_on_mastodon":"0"},"categories":[5311],"tags":[2594,23404,191965,22707,473,7057,32,7058,1302,2598,64032,7061,8720,811,6648,657,49,978,659,335],"class_list":["post-782821","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-united-states","tag-air-defense","tag-ammunition","tag-andrew-puzder","tag-armaments","tag-defense","tag-defense-budgets","tag-donald-trump","tag-european-defense","tag-innovation","tag-missiles","tag-munitions","tag-procurement","tag-resilience","tag-security","tag-supply-chains","tag-ukraine","tag-united-states","tag-us","tag-usa","tag-war-in-ukraine"],"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/116117782220869219","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/782821","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=782821"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/782821\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/782822"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=782821"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=782821"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=782821"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}