\u00a0\u201cA ceasefire is not on the Iranians\u2019 agenda right now. A ceasefire may come after we\u2019ve imposed costs high enough that the Americans don\u2019t willy-nilly attack us again.\u201d So declares Hassan Ahmadian, an Iranian strategist and defense theorist seen as close to the Islamic Republic\u2019s security establishment.<\/p>\n
I spoke by phone to Ahmadian on Thursday evening as the United States and Israel carried out some of the war\u2019s most intense aerial bombing yet. Ahmadian \u2014 who teaches at the University of Tehran and, before that, served as an analyst at the regime-linked Center for Strategic Studies \u2014 sounded remarkably calm, all things considered.<\/p>\n
\u201cMostly, I hear sounds,\u201d he tells me. (We spoke in Persian; all translations are mine.) \u201cI watch the news and speak to friends, [and] there\u2019s talk of hits. I saw two to three places near me that were hit. But you have to remember, Tehran is incredibly vast, and in order to cover the span of the place [with bombs], you have to work really hard.\u201d Still, \u201cthey\u2019re hitting everything: clinics and such in addition to military, paramilitary, and police targets.\u201d<\/p>\n
Even so, he insists, the operation isn\u2019t remotely close to its original aim of allowing the Iranian people to \u201cseize control of your destiny\u201d as President Trump put it in his initial statement announcing the war. In other words: regime change.<\/p>\n
\u201cThis Islamic system is deeply institutionalized, and with parallel institutions,\u201d Ahmadian tells me. \u201cFrom the day they assassinated Mr. Khamenei until now, I haven\u2019t felt any vacuum. Each governmental unit fulfilled its respective function. The military does its work, the civil servants do their work. If anything, overall control has increased because it\u2019s wartime conditions.\u201d<\/p>\n
That message is echoed by analysts in the West\u2019s realist or foreign-policy-restraint camp: that despite its unpopularity among important segments of Iranian society \u2014 the urban and the educated \u2014 the regime represents a systemic, as opposed to personal, state. It also benefits from Iran\u2019s status as a coherent, ancient polity, notwithstanding the ethnic and sectarian fault lines that crisscross it.<\/p>\n
\u201cThis is a sharply polarized society,\u201d Ahmadian grants. \u201cJust last month, there were protests that eventually were violently confronted. And members of the security forces were also killed. People aren\u2019t satisfied economically at all. But to translate that into the idea that \u2018these people want to overthrow the regime\u2019 \u2014 sure, some people have this opinion, but they are a minority.\u201d<\/p>\n
\u201cThe majority of the country,\u201d he adds, \u201cis in the middle. They\u2019re not necessarily supporters [of the regime], or they have serious grievances. But they absolutely aren\u2019t prepared to accept foreign invasion.\u201d<\/p>\n
Since the invasion, some have taken to the streets or their balconies to voice celebration, scenes highlighted in Western media and on social networks. But there have also been pro-regime and nationalist demonstrations whose sheer size is a reminder that the Islamic Republic has a social base, conservatively estimated at about 15% of the population. That base includes people who genuinely believe in the regime\u2019s project for religious reasons, and who additionally enjoy a kind of regency, with access to perks not available to seculars (like my family). They aren\u2019t close to giving up.<\/p>\n
Fantasies of a huge majority that could serve as the West\u2019s foot soldiers, Ahmadian insists, were just that. \u201cI saw a BBC report that showed celebrations in three locations in response to the bombing. But of course, there are many, many others who\u2019ve had the opposite reaction. It\u2019s propagandistic to show only the activities of a minority. And the bigger problem is that if you keep engaging in propaganda, after a while it traps you inside it. You come to really believe it. Or you keep digging in because you feel your credibility depends upon it being true.\u201d<\/p>\n
Unmentioned by Ahmadian, of course, is that the Islamic Republic was similarly ensnared in some of its own propaganda, not least assertions about the strength of the so-called Axis of Resistance that proved illusory after Israel set about dismantling it in the wake of the Oct. 7 terror attacks.<\/p>\n
Still, it was possible to overestimate Tehran\u2019s relative weakness \u2014 and that\u2019s just what happened as a result of missteps by Iran during last summer\u2019s 12-Day War.<\/p>\n
\u201cAccepting the ceasefire then,\u201d Ahmadian says, \u201cnurtured the notion that Iran is weak. But that wasn\u2019t so. Both sides were firing. Even at the last minute, Iran fired a dozen missiles that did extensive damage in Beersheba\u2026. It was a caricature of Iran, to imagine that an attack would cause its rapid collapse. It was the Israelis [who] promoted this account.\u201d<\/p>\n
But nations, especially nations at war, don\u2019t remain static. Since the humiliations of the 12-Day War, Iran has strived to counter the impression of weakness operationally. \u201cBefore the [new] war, the commanders and Mr. Khamenei himself warned that \u2018if you attack Iran, we will hit regional targets.\u2019 They described everything that has transpired.\u201d Since then, \u201cIran concluded that if the other side is going to attack every six months, we will impose such a high cost that they can\u2019t keep coming back \u2014 even if it means we also bear a serious cost.\u201d<\/p>\n
\u201cFrom the day they assassinated Mr. Khamenei until now, I haven\u2019t felt any vacuum.\u201d<\/p>\n
In a word: deterrence \u2014 \u201cpart punishment, part credible threat against future action,\u201d as Ahmadian defines it.<\/p>\n
Dragged around by Israeli initiative, Ahmadian argues, the Americans didn\u2019t consider the obvious steps Iran was bound to take. \u201cOne huge problem with American decision-making is that it really takes place in a bubble,\u201d he says. \u201cThat is, the Americans imagine they\u2019re the only ones who think. They forget that there is another actor who is equally capable of initiative, foresight, and planning.\u201d<\/p>\n
Then, too, he thinks Washington has insufficiently thought through its ultimate objective. \u201cRubio said we had an imminent threat [from Israel], and we knew that if Iran was attacked, we, too, would get attacked, so we decided to go for it first. Then there\u2019s JD Vance, who says this was intended to stop the nuclear program, but that\u2019s nonsense, because Iran has had no chance to restart its nuclear program. And Mr. Trump himself said this was to \u2018obliterate\u2019 Iran\u2019s nuclear program and navy (never mind that Iran has no real navy to speak of, except some speed boats and such). And at the beginning, Trump said the goal was regime change. Now Hegseth says the goal is to degrade Iran\u2019s capabilities so it doesn\u2019t threaten the region.\u201d<\/p>\n
This collection of justifications and objectives, Ahmadian says, amount to a \u201ccircus.\u201d He thinks what really happened was that the Israelis managed to persuade the Trump administration that Iran is weak \u2014 a little push and the regime would fall \u2014 and the moment was golden. But since the rapid collapse hasn\u2019t come to pass, the Americans are straining to come up with new aims and justifications for a costly step.<\/p>\n
Another such justification is that the operation was a bold Trumpian move in 4-D chess, intended to block China from an important source of oil and gas. \u201cThis notion that the Americans are trying to beat China is another after-the-fact justification. China getting hurt? Right now, America\u2019s regional allies are taking a beating. What was supposed to have been a source of security\u201d \u2014 the presence of US bases \u2014 \u201chas turned into a source of menace. The cost on America is much higher than any borne by China over the course of a three- or four-week war. Because China buys energy from everyone, and its Mideast energy sources aren\u2019t going to dry up permanently.\u201d<\/p>\n
In the event, he says, \u201cboth sides are now hitting. Iran had the experience of the last war. We thought through certain preparations and are now using them, and I doubt Iran\u2019s plan is for the war to end soon. \u201cWe want to deplete Israel\u2019s defensive weapons: David\u2019s Sling and the THAAD batteries. I\u2019ve heard from informed people that Israel has about 10 days\u2019 worth of defensive capability. Iran\u2019s biggest missile attacks haven\u2019t even started; they will only start after about 10 days.\u201d<\/p>\n
But haven\u2019t the US military and the Israel Defense Forces struck many of Iran\u2019s missile launchers and the underground \u201cmissile cities\u201d that supply them? \u201cAgain,\u201d Ahmadian replies, \u201cinformed people here say that the US and Israel have hit a lot of decoys: paintings, fake launchers.\u201d Then, too, he says, it\u2019s telling that the Iranians are going out of their way to telegraph a no-ceasefire approach. It suggests that they don\u2019t feel the level of weakness ascribed to them by more sanguine Western analysts.<\/p>\n
What about the prospects of ethnic separatists getting involved, perhaps with covert ground support from the CIA, the Mossad, or even Army special operators? \u201cThis Kurdish question is obviously a serious national-security issue for Iran,\u201d Ahmadian counters, \u201cso of course we have all sorts of contingency plans of which violence is only the last resort.\u201d<\/p>\n
Tehran, he says, boasts strong relations with most of the Kurdish parties inside Iraq, \u201cand we also have the Baghdad government and the [Shiite] popular mobilization forces. These are conditions on the ground that Iran has created. So if you enter Iran, you run into problems in Iraq, too.\u201d<\/p>\n
Could it be, though, that by targeting so many actors across the region, not all of which are overtly hostile toward the Islamic Republic, Tehran is turning itself into a 21st-century Napoleon, raising the enmity of a regional or even global coalition?<\/p>\n
Ahmadian disagrees. If anything, he contends, it\u2019s America that has forced its regional allies to rethink their dependence upon Washington. \u201cI have lots of friends in these countries,\u201d he says. \u201cThey understand that this isn\u2019t their war \u2014 that it\u2019s America and Israel. Yes, they\u2019re unhappy with Iran\u2019s attacks, but they don\u2019t view Tehran as the ultimate reason for this turmoil.\u201d<\/p>\n
The Arabs, he goes on, \u201ccomplain that civilian infrastructure is being hit, but we insist these are legitimate targets because they are being used by America in its attacks on Iran. If they didn\u2019t agree for their countries to be used as platforms for assaulting the Islamic Republic, then that shows they need to reassess their relationship with Washington. And if they did consent, well, then that answers their objection as to why they\u2019re under attack.\u201d<\/p>\n
\u201cBe that as it may, the fact that the Arabs keep saying this isn\u2019t our war shows these countries know that they shouldn\u2019t enter this war, and that they have a sharper understanding of the Iranian regime \u2014 that it\u2019s not a regime that you can easily change.\u201d<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, the American and Israeli bombs keep dropping, to ends that Washington itself struggles to articulate, much less persuade American majorities to accept. And while the Trumpians now speak of a long war, while refusing to rule out a ground operation, the Iranian security establishment appears serene for now.<\/p>\n
\u201cIf we get to 10 days,\u201d Ahmadian says, \u201cmy belief is that Iran will launch really crushing attacks and that will raise costs\u2026. The notion that [the Americans and Israelis] want to extend the war, the implication is that regional security and the global economy are put on pause. What I\u2019ve heard is that life in Persian Gulf states is disabled. And so it is in Israel. And so it is in Iran.\u201d Therefore, \u201cI think this talk of an extended war is wartime posturing.\u201d In other words, the Americans \u2014 beholden to the stock market and prices at the pump \u2014 won\u2019t endure much more.<\/p>\n
Maybe that\u2019s true. Or maybe it\u2019s a Persian bluff. In the end, only one man knows Donald Trump\u2019s mind, and that\u2019s Donald Trump. Iranian strategy \u2014 once a black box whose decoding employed a whole industry of analysts \u2014 is by contrast a model of clarity.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"\u00a0\u201cA ceasefire is not on the Iranians\u2019 agenda right now. A ceasefire may come after we\u2019ve imposed costs…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":809243,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[9739,233868,83163,837,12,26],"class_list":{"0":"post-809242","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-world","8":"tag-ceasefire","9":"tag-hassan-ahmadian","10":"tag-iran-war","11":"tag-israel","12":"tag-news","13":"tag-world"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/116185733910299043","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/809242","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=809242"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/809242\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/809243"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=809242"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=809242"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=809242"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}