On 9 March, Oxford Law Society and Oxford Speaks hosted a talk with Lord Neuberger, the former President of the UK Supreme Court and Non-Permanent Judge of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal. He\u00a0 reflected on the rule of law and its vulnerabilities, the evolving constitutional role of the Supreme Court, and the art and burden of writing legal judgments.<\/p>\n
The Rule of Law Under Scrutiny<\/strong><\/p>\n Lord Neuberger began by focusing on\u00a0 the everyday fragility of the rule of law. It is easy, he suggested, to speak of this\u00a0 as a grand principle \u2014 something inscribed in textbooks and invoked in speeches \u2014 but\u00a0 it\u00a0 is harder to sustain it in practice.<\/p>\n For Neuberger, the rule of law is not merely a slogan or a constitutional ornament. It demands that the law is accessible, that citizens know what their rights are, and that courts are meaningfully available to enforce them. A country, he implied, cannot call itself fully civilised if people cannot realistically vindicate their rights.\u00a0<\/p>\n The greatest threat to this ideal, he argued, is not a sudden constitutional rupture, but slow financial erosion. Cuts to legal aid and cuts to resources have strained the criminal, public, and family courts. Legal representation, he insisted, is not a luxury. When litigants appear without lawyers, judges must spend time explaining procedure and principles, stretching hearings and increasing systemic pressure. What may seem cost-saving could, in practice, create greater delay and expense elsewhere.<\/p>\n There was something sobering in this diagnosis. Neuberger highlighted that the rule of law, often imagined as a shield against tyranny, can also be weakened by administrative fatigue, insufficient funding, procedural backlog, and the quiet narrowing of access.<\/p>\n Neuberger contrasted this domestic strain with the relative resilience of international commercial law and private international law. He highlighted that London remains a global centre for dispute resolution, not because its system is flawless, but because international commerce depends upon rule-based frameworks. Contracts, trade, and investment require predictable enforcement. Ultimately, he believes that the global economy, in this sense, rests on legal trust.<\/p>\n When he turned to broader international law, his tone was pragmatic rather than idealistic. He suggested that suing powerful states is\u00a0 unrealistic, but abandoning rules-based international norms altogether would be worse. In his view, legal structure prevents political conflict spilling into economic instability, particularly in trade and commercial disputes. Imperfect international law, he warned, is preferable to none at all.<\/p>\n The Supreme Court in the 21st Century<\/strong><\/p>\n Turning to constitutional law, Lord Neuberger reflected on how profoundly the judiciary\u2019s role has evolved. In nineteenth-century accounts of the English constitution, he noted, judges barely featured. They were present, certainly, but peripheral \u2014 operating quietly in the background of parliamentary sovereignty.<\/p>\n Today, that quietness has vanished.<\/p>\n Courts are now central to constitutional controversy. Judicial decisions are dissected in headlines, debated in Parliament, and discussed in living rooms. The judiciary, once institutionally reserved, has become a visible constitutional actor.<\/p>\n Yet, visibility, Neuberger cautioned, must not slide into dominance. Judicial power, even when exercised in defence of constitutional principles, must remain restrained. Appointments to the bench must avoid politicisation. Once judicial selection becomes openly partisan, he warned, trust in the judiciary risks being eroded. He pointed to the United States\u2019 system, where Supreme Court nominations are overtly political battlegrounds, as a cautionary example.<\/p>\n