For decades, Germany operated within clear and well-defined societal parameters. Extremist ideology was branded as marginal and, until 2017, had no representation in the Bundestag. In conservative circles, criticism of Washington was perceived as anti-Americanism, whilst warnings about Russia\u2019s aggressive intentions led the left to associate them with attempts to revise the outcome of the Second World War. On the international stage, Germany remained in the geopolitical \u2018shadow\u2019 of the US. The world\u2019s third-largest economy by nominal GDP, for a number of historical and social reasons, was unwilling to translate its economic clout into political influence. The entire foreign policy concept of the modern German state was based on European solidarity, Euro-Atlanticism, and the primacy of diplomacy and peacekeeping. But following two momentous events \u2013 the start of Russia\u2019s large-scale aggression against Ukraine and Trump\u2019s return to the presidency \u2013 Germany\u2019s political class was forced to urgently reassess its priorities.<\/p>\n
The current government, comprising the conservatives (CDU\/CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD), has repeatedly made strong foreign policy statements on the need to strengthen the European Union, oppose \u2018Trumpism\u2019 and contain Russia in the long term. It appears that Germany intends to play a key role in this process, and these statements are backed up by concrete actions. However, three challenges currently facing Berlin could hinder these ambitious plans.<\/p>\n
Pressure at home<\/p>\n
In Germany, parliamentarism and federalism are the main factors \u2018cementing\u2019 the entire system of government. The key to the success of the \u2018German machine\u2019 is the synchronised work of all levels and branches of government. But now, the ideal model of German statehood has developed a noticeable crack.<\/p>\n
The far-right party \u2018Alternative for Germany\u2019 (AfD) does not merely criticise all other political forces in the country, but in fact proposes a development concept steeped in anti-migrant sentiment, ethno-nationalism and exaggerated Euroscepticism. It opposes the foundations of the social contract that has been in force in Germany since the country\u2019s reunification, yet consistently tops the polls, holds the second-largest parliamentary group in the Bundestag and has a significant presence in all state parliaments. The party has ceased to be an \u2018East German phenomenon\u2019 and has doubled its popularity in western Germany over the past five years, as demonstrated by the recent elections in the state of Baden-W\u00fcrttemberg.<\/p>\n
\nA phenomenon of nostalgia has emerged in society for the era of Angela Merkel\u2019s rule, which is associated with stability and predictability.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
The AfD is constantly dogged by scandals, and its prominent politicians are accused of collaborating with foreign intelligence services and nepotism. Yet this has not led to a significant drop in the party\u2019s ratings. Under these circumstances, democratic forces employ a \u2018firewall\u2019 strategy, refusing any form of cooperation with the AfD, let alone a coalition. So far, these commitments are being upheld, yet this strategy has a downside. Four out of the six governments over the past 20 years have consisted of the CDU\/CSU and the SPD, whereas in the preceding half-century this format was used only once. The absence of a traditional opposition party \u2013 be it the Conservatives or the centre-left \u2013 has a negative impact on the balance of power in the country.<\/p>\n
At the state level, minority governments are formed relying on the support of the Left Party, and even the radical leftists from \u2018Sahra Wagenknecht\u2019s Alliance\u2019 are forced to become coalition partners of the Democrats. Following the results of a series of elections in 2026, the number of such coalitions based on the principle of \u2018against the far right\u2019 is likely to increase. Against this backdrop, there is a decline in public trust<\/a> in state institutions and the media. This is most evident among young people<\/a>. The personal approval ratings of key politicians, starting with Chancellor Friedrich Merz, have also fallen significantly, with the possible exception of Defence Minister Boris Pistorius<\/a>. A phenomenon of nostalgia<\/a> has emerged in society for the era of Angela Merkel\u2019s rule, which is associated with stability and predictability.<\/p>\n
A team player<\/p>\n
Germany requires enormous financial resources to implement its leadership project. The reform of the Bundeswehr and the implementation of a package of measures to enhance the security of critical infrastructure alone will cost the state budget hundreds of billions of euros. This funding must be generated by economic growth and stable external markets.<\/p>\n
Germany ranks among the world\u2019s top three exporters in a number of indicators. An export-oriented economy is both a strength and a weakness. The advantages lie in significant budget revenues, global recognition of \u2018Made in Germany\u2019 products, technological development and job creation. The disadvantage lies in the economy\u2019s vulnerability and its dependence on conditions in foreign markets and global politics as a whole. Moreover, crises deal a double blow: disruptions to supply chains and rising energy prices, which are felt particularly acutely by the energy-intensive flagship sectors of German industry, such as the chemical industry, car manufacturing and mechanical engineering.<\/p>\n
The total damage<\/a> suffered by Germany from the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020\u20132022, Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine and the US trade tariffs already introduced by Donald Trump from the start of 2025 amounted to up to \u20ac1 trillion. A new war against Iran could increase the losses<\/a> by \u20ac40\u201380 billion.<\/p>\n
\nCaught between opposing positions (between Euro-Atlanticists, advocates of strict adherence to international law, pacifists and human rights activists), the ruling coalition had to make decisions that inevitably caused discontent amongst sections of society.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
In foreign policy, Germany is a team player. For Berlin, it is both important and customary to act not in isolation, but in close cooperation with partners within the European Union, NATO and the wider Western community. Yet every new crisis reveals yet another crack in the \u2018edifice\u2019 of the Western world. The reliance on \u2018Merz\u2019s magic\u2019 in dealings with Trump, and the hope that two \u2018businessmen\u2019 would be able to establish a mutually acceptable framework for US-German relations, has not paid off. And opponents of European unity, both within Europe and beyond, are exploiting this.<\/p>\n
The federal government has already had to make a difficult choice three times in less than three months of this year: to oppose Washington or to seek compromises. This was the case in January, at the height of the threats against Greenland and following the attack on Caracas and the subsequent abduction of the then Venezuelan leader Nicol\u00e1s Maduro, and again in March, after the start of the US-Israeli operation against Iran. Caught between opposing positions (between Euro-Atlanticists, advocates of strict adherence to international law, pacifists and human rights activists), the ruling coalition had to make decisions that inevitably caused discontent amongst sections of society.<\/p>\n
\nThe Bundestag has taken an unprecedented decision, exempting budgetary expenditure on security and aid to Kyiv from the \u2018debt brake\u2019. Domestically, it is necessary to continue explaining to the population that Ukraine cannot be left in the lurch, even in the face of national economic problems.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
The Russian-Ukrainian war continues, the bloodiest and largest armed conflict in Europe since the end of the Second World War. Berlin, having unequivocally condemned Moscow\u2019s aggression and become Kyiv\u2019s main ally, has taken on a whole range of financial and diplomatic commitments amidst the unpredictability of the US administration. These processes entail significant costs, and by no means only financial ones. Germany has to convince its European allies of the need to continue and even step up support for Ukraine, and of the reality of Russian threats to Europe, regardless of how far countries lie from the bloc\u2019s eastern border. The Bundestag has taken an unprecedented decision, exempting budgetary expenditure on security and aid to Kyiv from the \u2018debt brake\u2019. Domestically, it is necessary to continue explaining to the population that Ukraine cannot be left in the lurch, even in the face of national economic problems.<\/p>\n
In essence, Germany has no other historical choice but to make a serious bid for leadership and, in this new \u2018world without rules\u2019, to become \u2013 in cooperation with its allies \u2013 that pole of power which is prepared to abide by the rules. Berlin has already taken a number of steps in this direction, initiating a new national and pan-European course. The Federal Republic has succeeded in creating a largely unique model of checks and balances, with functioning state institutions that ensure political competition, freedoms and the rule of law. A developed economy and a high standard of manufacturing provide a reliable financial foundation for politics. Civil society in a country where one in three adults volunteers makes this model sustainable. The main problem is whether German politicians will have the consistency and courage not to stray from the chosen path.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"For decades, Germany operated within clear and well-defined societal parameters. Extremist ideology was branded as marginal and, until…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":838221,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":"","_share_on_mastodon":"0"},"categories":[5310],"tags":[1700,2000,299,1824,240062,3433,115953,240061,28386],"class_list":["post-838220","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-germany","tag-economy","tag-eu","tag-europe","tag-germany","tag-international-solidarity","tag-power","tag-responsibility","tag-rules-based","tag-world-order"],"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/116261105518984418","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/838220","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=838220"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/838220\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/838221"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=838220"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=838220"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=838220"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}