\u201cThe book\u2019s starting point is the Brexit referendum,\u201d Professor Hobolt explains. \u201cBut it doesn’t look at the Brexit referendum as an event, rather how it reshaped British politics and society in the 10 years since.\u201d What interests Professor Hobolt most is how a single political moment altered \u201cpeople\u2019s interior world\u201d, with consequences that continue to shape British democracy today.<\/p>\n
At the heart of the book is a simple but significant claim: Brexit created two new political tribes, Leavers and Remainers, that became central to how people saw themselves and others. \u201cIt became a way that people looked at themselves \u2013 similar to how we might have a partisan identity. It became a social group identity but based on the referendum rather than based on an affiliation and a closeness to a party.\u201d<\/p>\n
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[Brexit] became a social group identity.Forming new political identities<\/p>\n
Most political disagreements do not turn into identities. People hold views on multiple policy areas, for example income tax, without those views defining who they are. What makes Brexit different, Professor Hobolt argues, is that it crossed a threshold from opinion to identity.<\/p>\n
\u201cAnd that’s not just about political views, as in \u2018I want to stay in the EU\u2019 and \u2018I want to leave the EU\u2019,\u201d she says. \u201cIt became a social group identity. And so what we do is we offer a more general theory of what we call issue-based identities.\u201d<\/p>\n
Issue-based identities, as Professor Hobolt defines them, are political identities rooted in positions on specific issues rather than longstanding social categories such as class or religion. Tribal Politics explains that Brexit identities were not simply expressions of existing divisions.<\/p>\n
\u201cWe show how those identities were formed and how they weren’t just an expression of other kind of identities, like class or national identity. And we show the consequences of what it means when you have these tribal identities that meant people started looking at the world differently, looking at the other groups differently, even discriminating against people belonging to the other tribe.\u201d<\/p>\n
The Brexit referendum itself created new lines of political belonging, with powerful consequences.<\/p>\n
The \u201cGoldilocks\u201d conditions for tribalism<\/p>\n
For an issue to generate a political identity, Professor Hobolt argues, it must meet a rare combination of conditions. In Tribal Politics, this is described as a \u201cGoldilocks mixture\u201d of factors.<\/p>\n
\u201cWe identify three factors,\u201d she says. \u201cThese are: issue contestation, issue expression and issue alignment.\u201d<\/p>\n
Issue contestation refers to the combination of high salience and deep division. \u201cYou can imagine issues that are divisive, but not salient,\u201d Professor Hobolt notes. For example, simple like\/dislike scenarios such as liking a particular type of food. Equally, some issues are salient but not divisive, for example particularly harsh laws that wouldn\u2019t be supported by the majority of the population. Brexit was unusual because it became both. \u201cThe public was almost equally split,\u201d she explains, and the issue became \u201cextremely salient\u201d, especially after the referendum result.<\/p>\n
The second factor is issue expression. \u201cWhat does a referendum do?\u201d Professor Hobolt asks. \u201cIt forces you to take a stance and express that you’re compelled to vote. Once you take a side in a vote, you then also find it much harder to go back and change, because that would mean that you have to admit to being wrong.\u201d<\/p>\n
Crucially, that expression did not end with the vote: \u201cwe had some of the largest demonstrations we’ve ever seen, and six million people signed a petition against Brexit. People could continue to engage and express their views and their commitment to their tribe.\u201d<\/p>\n
The final factor, issue alignment, may have mattered most in the British context. \u201cWhat normally happens when you have a very salient issue is that you have something that’s at first really salient, but then it gets absorbed into existing divisions along partisan lines,\u201d Professor Hobolt explains.<\/p>\n
\u201cWhat happened from the very outset with Brexit was that it was a Conservative government under David Cameron that proposed the vote and, in fact, campaigned to remain in the European Union. And the main proponent on the Leave side was Boris Johnson and, second to that, Michael Gove \u2013 two Conservative politicians. If you analyse the coverage, you’re seeing from the outset there was an intra-party Conservative divide. And although the Labour Party was mainly on the Remain side, it wasn’t exclusively. Jeremy Corbyn had a history of being a Eurosceptic, and he was reluctantly campaigning for Remain.\u201d<\/p>\n
This resulted in highly ambiguous, muddled party cues from the two major parties.<\/p>\n
![\"Once](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/brexit-eu-britain-political-identities-1200-x-6282.x3cb1ba39.jpg\")
Once you take a side in a vote, you then also find it much harder to go back and change, because that would mean that you have to admit to being wrong.Brexit identities: why have they lasted so long?<\/p>\n
Political identities typically endure because they are reinforced by institutions including parties, leaders and elections. Brexit identities lacked these organisational structures yet have proved incredibly long-lasting.<\/p>\n
\u201cThe most salient political identity that we normally think of is partisanship,\u201d Professor Hobolt explains. Parties provide \u201ca very clear set of leaders\u201d and \u201congoing institutionalised competition around power\u201d, neither of which were offered by Brexit identities.<\/p>\n
And yet a decade later, \u201ctwo thirds of people say: I feel like a Leaver, I feel like a Remainer.\u201d More strikingly, \u201cthe emotional resonance of those identities is still higher than belonging to or feeling attached to the Conservative and Labour Party.\u201d<\/p>\n
Professor Hobolt admits this persistence surprised her. \u201cI would have thought that after COVID, where Brexit really fell off the agenda, that people would have decided it didn\u2019t matter,\u201d she says. \u201cBut it has had more of a stickiness. I wouldn\u2019t have expected it to be salient for people quite that long.\u201d<\/p>\n
When elites create mass division<\/p>\n
One of the book\u2019s most striking arguments is that Brexit became an identity issue despite widespread public indifference beforehand.<\/p>\n
\u201cBritish people mostly didn’t care that much about the EU,\u201d she says. \u201cIt wasn’t seen as a top issue ahead of Cameron’s decision to call the referendum.\u201d When he announced the vote, \u201cit was about two per cent of the British populace that said that the EU was in any way the top issue.\u201d<\/p>\n
The referendum, she argues, emerged from elite conflict rather than popular demand. \u201cIt had much more to do with intra-party politics,\u201d she explains. Once unleashed, however, it produced consequences elites could not control.<\/p>\n
\u201cThis means that referendums can often have elite-defining consequences. First of all, you don’t necessarily get the outcome you want, but they can have these longstanding consequences in how people look at politics.\u201d<\/p>\n
![\"We](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/brexit-eu-britain-political-identities-1200-x-6283.x97772e0b.jpg\")
We are living through a time where voters are more volatile.How Brexit shaped our tribal perceptions<\/p>\n
As Brexit identities solidified, they reshaped not just opinions but perceptions of reality itself.<\/p>\n
\u201cPeople are ultimately social beings, and we operate in the world with social identities,\u201d says Professor Hobolt. These identities provide belonging and self esteem, but they also create out-groups. \u201cTo have that\u201d, she explains, \u201cyou tend to need to feel that your group is superior\u201d.<\/p>\n
This dynamic fuels confirmation bias. \u201cWhen our preferred party is in government, we like to think that the economy generally is doing a lot better than it actually is.\u201d Brexit intensified this pattern. Remainers and Leavers interpreted economic shocks, energy crises and political failures through radically different lenses.<\/p>\n
\u201cIf you feel that Brexit was a terrible decision and you identify as a Remainer,\u201d she says, \u201cyou would process information in a way that’s consistent with that identity.\u201d On the other side, \u201cyou think it’s nothing to do with Brexit.\u201d<\/p>\n
The result is reinforcing divergence. \u201cYou become more and more convinced that you are right, the others are wrong.\u201d<\/p>\n
![\"We](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/brexit-eu-britain-political-identities-1200-x-6284.xe1de2045.jpg\")
We could see more of that type of tribal politics that’s really rooted around issues.<\/p>\n
In Tribal Politics, Professor Hobolt outlines four scenarios for Britain\u2019s political trajectory: restoration; revival; realignment; and replacement.<\/p>\n
Restoration, which is a return to traditional left-right politics, appears unlikely. \u201cIt\u2019s certainly not where we are\u201d.<\/p>\n
Revival, where Brexit re-emerges as the central dividing line, would require political entrepreneurs willing to reopen the issue. \u201cThat’s not on the cards right now\u201d.<\/p>\n
Realignment, however, is already visible. \u201cIt\u2019s not Brexit that’s at the top of the agenda,\u201d Professor Hobolt explains, \u201cbut the issues that aligned with that divide, what one might call culture war issues – immigration, sovereignty and multiculturalism \u2013 continue to structure political conflict.\u201d<\/p>\n
The most dramatic scenario is replacement: \u201cthe collapse of party politics and party competition in Britain, as we know it\u201d. With parties such as Reform UK and the Greens drawing support from clearly defined Brexit tribes, Professor Hobolt suggests the groundwork for fragmentation is already in place.<\/p>\n
Democracy after tribalism<\/p>\n
Another big change to emerge from Brexit was a movement of people taking part in the political process. \u201cPeople voted who hadn’t voted in many, many elections,\u201d she says.<\/p>\n
Whether future political moments generate similar identities remains uncertain. \u201cWe are living through a time where voters are more volatile,\u201d Professor Hobolt reflects. \u201cI can’t necessarily predict which ones, but we could see more of that type of tribal politics that\u2019s really rooted in issues.\u201d<\/p>\n
Ten years on, Brexit\u2019s deepest legacy may not be Britain\u2019s changed relationship with Europe, but the lesson it offers about how quickly, and lastingly, democratic societies can fracture along new lines of identity.<\/p>\n
Professor Sara Hobolt was interviewed by Helen Flood, Media Relations Officer at LSE.<\/p>\n
Professor Sara Hobolt will be one of the speakers at an LSE event,\u00a0Ten years on: Brexit and Britain’s political future<\/a>, on 8 June 2026.<\/p>\n LSE Research Showcase is a series of 20-minute talks from LSE researchers to enjoy on your coffee break. Catch up on YouTube<\/a>.<\/p>\n