{"id":86696,"date":"2025-05-09T06:50:07","date_gmt":"2025-05-09T06:50:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/86696\/"},"modified":"2025-05-09T06:50:07","modified_gmt":"2025-05-09T06:50:07","slug":"us-trade-chief-brexit-liberated-the-uk","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/86696\/","title":{"rendered":"US Trade Chief: Brexit liberated the UK"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer is in a good mood. \u201cThis is a job that goes up and down, but I\u2019m on an\u00a0up today\u201d, he tells UnHerd in his first major interview with a European outlet, conducted just ahead of the news conference in which the US-UK trade deal was announced. And he leaves no doubt about how the long-sought arrangement came about: \u201cBrexit liberates Britain to work with us in meaningful ways\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>Note well, though: it\u2019s a\u00a0trade agreement, not a\u00a0free-trade deal. The difference means a lot to Greer, a lawyer who served as a senior aide to Robert Lighthizer, President Trump\u2019s trade envoy during his first term and a ferocious critic of neoliberal globalisation. Having assumed his former boss\u2019s job in the second term, Greer also channels his worldview.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cWhen people talk about a free-trade deal,\u201d he tells me, \u201cthe objective is: \u2018Let\u2019s just liberalise as much as we can, as quickly as we can, and we\u2019ll just see where the chips fall economically. And let\u2019s be as expansive as possible in the things that we\u2019re covering.\u2019 And as you know, my view is different.\u201d To Greer, trade is only worthwhile if it\u2019s \u201creciprocal, fair, balanced, and contributes to the economic security of the United States\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>The new UK-US deal \u2014 an \u201cagreement in principle\u201d, he insists, not the final document \u2014 reflects this narrower account of trade. \u201cWe are being somewhat picky about areas where we want to increase trade or maintain trade.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>For starters, \u201cwe are essentially maintaining our tariffs as a general matter\u201d, says Greer. That is, the Trump administration\u2019s 10% levy will remain in place as a sort of default. However, \u201cthere are areas where the United Kingdom [has] had higher tariffs and barriers to our products, where they will bring those down. On our side, we will find appropriate accommodation, consistent with US economic and national security interests, on things like autos and steel, while protecting our own industries.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>But is there any pathway for Britain to escape the 10% tariff altogether? \u201cThe main thing for Britain\u201d, he says, \u201cis they have an opportunity to go into the economic-security fold of the United States\u201d, particularly with respect to sectors that Washington otherwise considers security-sensitive, such as automotives, pharmaceuticals, and semiconductors.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cObviously,\u201d he adds, \u201cthe British want to be able to take care of other sectors in their economy, etc. And there is a discussion to be had on that. But the nature of our national emergency\u201d \u2014 persistently high, across-the-board trade deficits \u2014 \u201cmeans that we need to be able to keep that 10%, and we expect that average tariff rates will remain high.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Still, the agreement \u2014 the holy grail of UK politics for nearly a decade \u2014 was only made possible by Britain\u2019s decision to leave the European Union. \u201cBrexit made it possible for the UK to do this,\u201d Greer tells me. \u201cEspecially with respect to tariff levels. The UK now controls its own tariff levels and can make its own decisions about what it wants to protect and what it doesn\u2019t.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Likewise, on non-tariff barriers such as regulatory hassles, \u201cthe UK now has sovereignty over these matters.\u201d Here, one sticking point \u2014 the bane of US, UK, and European negotiators for at least the past two decades \u2014 has to do with Europe\u2019s more stringent standards on agricultural products, particularly animal protein. Were \u201cchlorinated chickens\u201d a difficulty during Greer\u2019s discussions with his counterparts?<\/p>\n<p>\u201cThe agreement \u2014 the holy grail of UK politics for nearly a decade \u2014 was only made possible by Britain\u2019s decision to leave the European Union.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>\u201cThey certainly came up,\u201d he says, \u201cbecause that\u2019s where we suffer so many barriers to the UK market\u201d. Avoiding directly answering the poultry question, Greer says Washington anticipates \u201can expanded quota for American beef\u201d, \u201ca reduced on duty on that quota for beef\u201d, and \u201ca reduced tariff for American ethanol\u201d. As for agricultural sanitary questions, \u201cwith any country you have to comply with their import rules, but we\u2019re very happy to have that conversation with them\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>The haggling around these and other issues wasn\u2019t easy. \u201cI work directly with Varun Chandra,\u201d a special adviser to Prime Minister Keir Starmer, \u201cand Johnny Reynolds\u201d, Britain\u2019s secretary of state for business and trade. \u201cThese folks were professional, dedicated, and\u00a0very tough\u00a0negotiators, but at the same time very committed\u201d to the special alliance.<\/p>\n<p>Negotiations with Brussels are likely to prove even hairier. When I ask Greer which other trade conversations are advancing productively, he mentions India, Japan, South Korea, Switzerland, Israel, Jordan, and the Philippines \u2014 but not the European Union. \u201cIt\u2019s a variety of economies,\u201d he notes. \u201cThe UK is the sixth largest economy in the world, India is one of the largest economies in the world; but also some smaller economies where it\u2019s also important to make sure that American influence is felt and present.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>As for Brussels, \u201cthey have expressed an interest in negotiating\u201d. The problem is that \u201cthey have philosophical, legal, and cultural aversion to what we\u2019re doing. It can be very challenging. But I have a very friendly relationship with my counterpart there. And I believe that they are strongly interested in a deal. And we\u2019re open to a way forward on that, too. But it\u2019s not as advanced as [with] other economies.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>But if the deepest goal of the tariff regime is to contain China\u2019s rise, and decouple the American economy from the Middle Kingdom\u2019s, shouldn\u2019t Washington take it easier on the Europeans, not least so they\u2019re more likely to collaborate with the United States on issues like Taiwan? Greer disagrees.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cI would just frame that differently,\u201d he says. \u201cI know that that\u2019s a very Washington thing to say. I know people say, \u2018Oh, we\u2019re just aligning everyone against China\u2019. Fundamentally, this is less about tagging one certain foreign country or another. We have this problem of a giant trade deficit. Which has led \u2026 our manufacturing base being diminished, having a lack of working-class jobs, etc.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Fundamentally, it is the erosion of America\u2019s industrial base and working-class security that are Team Trump\u2019s prime objectives. \u201cObviously, China is a big aspect of that\u201d, he grants. \u201cBut we have other countries that send a lot of stuff, too, where they have a lot of over-capacity. So, when we\u2019re looking at agreements, which are essentially modifications of our regime, we\u2019re asking: Are they helping us address our emergency?\u201d<\/p>\n<p>The new accord with Britain meets these criteria: \u201cWe have this deal with the UK, where they\u2019re clearly giving us more market access, and other national-security-related measures, we can find a good accommodation that will ensure that we have protected supply chains. Those are the kinds of outcomes we\u2019re looking for. We\u2019re not trying to create two blocs.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>As one of the chief architects of the \u201cLiberation Day\u201d tariffs, Greer has maintained a relatively low profile, even in the United States. Yet it isn\u2019t Donald Trump who pores over detailed trade tables and the minutiae of agricultural standards \u2014 it is Greer. Has the stock-market reaction to his policy vision made him at least a little queasy?<\/p>\n<p>Not really. \u201cThere are a lot of indicators to the economy\u201d, he replies. \u201cSo, of course, we watch these indicators to see what effect [our policies are having]. We find that the markets sometimes are good indicators. Sometimes they overreact, sometimes they underreact.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Short-term alarm or optimism on Wall Street isn\u2019t the best guide, he insists. \u201cRight now, you have all the so-called smart people saying, \u2018Well, we\u2019re not seeing the effects of the new trade policies on the numbers yet \u2014 but we will!\u2019 But it goes both ways. The first couple of weeks, they went, \u2018Oh, well, look at the markets \u2014 this means everything\u2019s bad.\u2019 And then we got a really good jobs report. The GDP number was a little funky, but not quite as bad as some people thought it was going to be.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Bottom line: \u201cWe are in the middle of a process, and taking any one data point and projecting a policy over the next months or years, it\u2019s a dangerous thing to do. We watch it, we have to assess the indicators, but they can fluctuate based on imperfect information.\u201d The Trump administration, in other words, believes that the US economy has enough juice to weather the epochal transition they have put in motion. And individual trade deals like the one with Britain can reassure market actors along the way.<\/p>\n<p>No wonder Greer\u2019s having an \u201cup\u201d day.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer is in a good mood. \u201cThis is a job that goes up and&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":86697,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5226],"tags":[802,748,32,2000,299,5187,1699,4884,807,285,11653,1201,16,39231,15,978],"class_list":{"0":"post-86696","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-brexit","8":"tag-brexit","9":"tag-britain","10":"tag-donald-trump","11":"tag-eu","12":"tag-europe","13":"tag-european","14":"tag-european-union","15":"tag-great-britain","16":"tag-keir-starmer","17":"tag-politics","18":"tag-premium","19":"tag-trade","20":"tag-uk","21":"tag-uk-us-trade-deal","22":"tag-united-kingdom","23":"tag-us"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/114476550586642184","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/86696","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=86696"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/86696\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/86697"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=86696"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=86696"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=86696"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}