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Contrary to popular narratives, the UK has not seen a collapse in trade with the EU since Brexit, nor has the UK economy become less open. Interrogating the actual data, instead of relying on dubious models, shows that overall UK exports have continued to grow, including to the EU. At the same time, the EU\u2019s share of UK overseas earnings has continued its long-term decline, and the UK is now pocketing over \u00a312 billion per year in savings thanks to no longer having to pay expensive EU membership fees.<\/strong><\/p>\n A glance at the popular press or the pronouncements of Labour government ministers and quangos such as the Office of Budget Responsibility (OBR) would leave an observer with the strong impression that the UK\u2019s trade, and broader economic, performance since Brexit has been disastrous. Exports to the EU have apparently slumped, and the UK economy has become markedly less open, causing a damaging weakening of productivity growth.<\/p>\n In fact, the actual data does not support any of these claims. If we first look at the volume of exports of goods and services to the EU, we can see that for the year 2025, they were 18% higher than in 2015, the year before the Brexit referendum. They were also 3% higher than in 2019. Removing oil and erratic items from the data, 2025 exports of goods and services to the EU were up 21% on 2015 and 5% on 2019 (see Chart 1<\/strong>).<\/p>\n This resilience is all the more surprising given that policy own goals have seriously hampered the UK\u2019s export performance in recent years \u2013 these include sky-high energy prices, the deliberate run-down of North Sea oil and gas, and destructive mandates imposed on the car industry (see here for more detail<\/a>).<\/p>\n Source: ONS<\/p>\n It is true that UK exports of goods to the EU have performed sluggishly since 2018-2019, but that is also true of UK exports to non-EU destinations, which as we have previously argued suggests there are common factors at work on both other than Brexit. One such factor is the complex of policy own goals mentioned above, but another is an ongoing shift in the UK economy away from goods production and exports and towards services.<\/p>\n Notably, at the same time as goods exports have been sluggish, services exports have been extremely buoyant. As a result, total UK exports of goods and services to all destinations have performed fairly well since the Brexit referendum. In 2025, they totalled \u00a3902 billion in 2023 prices, up 22% from 2015 and up 5% from 2019 (see Chart 2<\/strong>).<\/p>\n Services exports now make up nearly 60% of UK exports, while exports of goods to the EU make up less than 20% of total UK exports of goods and services \u2013 half the share they had in 1999. Brexit has given the long decline in the relative importance of EU goods exports a further push, with resources and activity shifting into other sectors with better returns and faster market growth.<\/p>\n Source: ONS<\/p>\n It is important to note that within overall UK services exports, exports to the EU have performed well. In 2025, they were an estimated 54% higher in volume terms than they were in 2015, and 26% higher than in 2019. This is an excellent pace of growth by any standards and is similar to the pace of growth seen in UK services exports to non-EU destinations. There is no evidence from the data that Brexit has done any harm to overall UK services trade with the EU.<\/p>\n Recent years have also seen a recovery in UK financial services exports, again in sharp contrast to popular narratives that claim the City of London has declined post-Brexit. Financial services exports did have a sticky patch after the global financial crisis, growing by only 2.7% per year from 2007-2019. But since 2019, they have grown at 8% per year, similar to overall services exports growth. 2025 was a bumper year, with growth of 11% (see Chart 3<\/strong>). In the first three quarters of 2025, financial services exports to the EU rose 14%.<\/p>\n Source: ONS<\/p>\n Thanks to the resilient performance of overall UK trade, measures of the UK\u2019s economic \u2018openness\u2019 have increased since the Brexit referendum and are little changed since 2018. The ratio of total exports and imports of goods and services to UK GDP (in constant prices) was 63.4% in Q2 2016, 66.2% in Q4 2018 and 66.8% in 2025 (see Chart 4<\/strong>).<\/p>\n There is no evidence here of the 15% decline in economic openness the OBR continues to claim the UK will suffer due to Brexit \u2013 and upon which rests their long-standing and endlessly repeated claim that UK productivity will fall by 4% due to Brexit. The most that could be said is that economic openness, on this measure, has risen modestly faster in three largest EU economies. But even if UK openness had perfectly tracked that in the EU-3 economies (France, Germany, and Italy) it would only be 3% higher \u2013 nowhere near 15%.<\/p>\n Source: Author\u2019s calculations based on ONS data<\/p>\n Overall then, the UK trade data show no signs of the collapse claimed by popular narratives and supporters of close EU ties. This \u2018collapse\u2019 is a statistical mirage created by flawed modelling exercises featuring dubious \u2018counterfactual\u2019 paths for UK trade and\/or GDP which assume a totally implausible super-strong economic performance (matching or even exceeding the US) over recent years in the absence of Brexit (more on this here<\/a>).<\/p>\n What can be said with certainty, however, is that the UK is now getting a significant financial benefit from having left the EU in the form of an end to previously heavy payments to the EU budget. In 2025, net UK payments to EU institutions were just \u00a31.6 billion, compared \u00a314.4 billion in 2020 (see Chart 5<\/strong>).<\/p>\n The UK is thus \u00a312 billion a year better off outside the EU while still showing a resilient trade performance thanks to very strong exports of services. Against this background, the UK government\u2019s current initiative to offer large financial payments to the EU in return for very minor concessions on market access for a few goods sectors looks utterly misconceived. This is even more the case given the very slow growth of the EU market and the EU\u2019s declining share in world output (more here<\/a>).<\/p>\n Source: ONS<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n![\"image](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/image_2026-04-10_114329125.png\" "\\"image")
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