Conflict attrition<\/strong><\/p>\n When Vladimir Putin launched Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, he probably assumed the war would be over in days, with the Ukrainian government quickly capitulating and leaving Russia free to install a puppet regime. But Ukraine chose to fight and the war has ground on past the four-year mark. Russia\u2019s limited territorial gains have evidently come to a halt<\/a> with no prospect of imminent victory. Donald Trump promised to end the war on day one of his presidency; when that didn\u2019t happen, he set a hundred-day deadline for a peace deal, but so far there isn\u2019t one in sight. Even a recent temporary ceasefire to mark the Orthodox Church\u2019s Easter was repeatedly violated<\/a>.<\/p>\n As the war drags on, Russia\u2019s tactics have brought horrendous loss of life on both sides. Putin treats his soldiers\u2019 lives as disposable, throwing wave after wave of troops at Ukrainian lines in what have been called<\/a> \u2018meat grinder\u2019 assaults. Amid pervasive disinformation, casualty estimates vary widely. A project to count confirmed deaths puts Russian military fatalities at over 206,000<\/a>, while some estimates reach 1.3 million. Despite passing new laws<\/a> to call up more people, Russia is reportedly losing soldiers faster<\/a> than it can replace them.<\/p>\n Putin has turned to North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un to help fill the gap: since 2024, North Korean forces have been fighting alongside Russian troops. Over 20,000 have been deployed, mostly in the fiercest fighting in the Kursk region, and they\u2019ve paid a heavy price, with a reported 6,000 casualties<\/a>. Russia has also recruited from neighbouring Central Asian countries and long-term allies such as Cuba. Ukraine too has brought in thousands of foreign fighters, including Colombian mercenaries, to serve in its International Legion. Now Russia is increasingly turning to Africa.<\/p>\n Russia\u2019s African strategy<\/strong><\/p>\n Putin has spent years cultivating relationships with African states, helping Russia resist international isolation and counter pressure from western states. The military relationship has been two-way: Russian mercenaries from the shadowy Wagner Group<\/a>, now closely controlled by the government, have been deployed not just in Ukraine but in as many as 18 African countries<\/a>, including Burkina Faso<\/a>, the Central African Republic<\/a> and Mali<\/a>. In some, they fight alongside government forces against insurgent groups; in others, including Libya, where two rival governments contest power, and Sudan<\/a>, home to a brutal civil war<\/a>, they\u2019re backing one of two sides fighting for power. Wherever they operate, Russian mercenaries are accused of committing human rights atrocities.<\/p>\n For several African states, warmer relationships with Russia have replaced ties with former colonial power France. France historically propped up brutal and corrupt post-independence regimes and maintained an essentially extractive relationship with its former colonies. Its troops, deployed in several Central and West African countries to fight insurgents, were broadly viewed as having failed, and most governments have expelled them or requested their withdrawal.<\/p>\n Russia\u2019s arrival has come with some public support, cast as an alternative to France\u2019s patronising approach that promises more equal partnerships, and drawing on old connections with the Soviet Union. When Wagner forces entered Mali in 2022, crowds lined the roads to greet them, waving Russian flags. Extensive pro-Russia disinformation campaigns typically precede Russia\u2019s military involvement, laying the groundwork for such welcomes.<\/p>\n None of this has made any difference to the insurgencies Russia claims to be combating, and in some countries insurgents have grown stronger. The relationship is also extractive: in return for soldiers, Russia typically receives natural resources, including diamonds and gold, which help sustain a war that, despite Russia\u2019s anti-imperialist posturing in Africa, is fundamentally imperial, since it seeks to conquer and control territory.<\/p>\n Repressive Central and West African governments, several run by military juntas<\/a> or former army leaders who\u2019ve traded their uniforms for civilian clothes, value a partner with no interest in scrutinising their human rights performance. Civil society organisations and media that try to expose human rights abuses by Russian forces come under attack.<\/p>\n From Africa to the frontlines<\/strong><\/p>\n Russia is now exploiting the economic insecurity of many young African men, recruiting them to serve \u2013 and possibly die \u2013 on the Ukrainian front. Extensive civil society research published in February has verified that Russia has so far recruited 1,417 African nationals<\/a>, with the true figure almost certainly higher. The numbers have increased year on year, indicating a systematic plan. Egypt has supplied the most recruits, followed by Cameroon and Ghana. Of 1,417 verified recruits, 316, 22 per cent, have reportedly been killed.<\/p>\n Some recruits have expressed support for Russia online. Others are attracted by the promise of Russian citizenship and wages that far exceed anything they could earn at home. They may compare Russia\u2019s apparent openness, signalled by its recent relaxation of visa requirements, with Europe\u2019s increasing hostility<\/a> towards migrants, even though they may go on to face racism<\/a> from Russian soldiers.<\/p>\n Others who\u2019ve managed to escape report being conned. Fake job adverts made them believe they were signing up for civilian or support roles, including jobs as plumbers and security guards. A Kenyan athlete who served claims<\/a> he was brought to Russia under the pretence of competing in races. On arrival, recruits are forced to sign Russian-language contracts they can\u2019t read, given minimal training and dispatched to the frontlines. The average service length of those killed is just six months, evidence that Russia treats them as expendable. Some are reportedly sent on what are effectively suicide missions.<\/p>\n Intermediaries \u2013 including social media influencers who promote recruitment, travel agencies and people trafficking networks \u2013 are profiting from supplying recruits. In a bizarre political twist, Duduzile Zuma-Sambudla, a daughter of former South African president Jacob Zuma, is among those accused<\/a> of recruiting African men, including some falsely told they\u2019d be trained as bodyguards for her father\u2019s party. In December, South African police arrested five people on charges related to the recruitment of South Africans, including a journalist known for spreading pro-Russia propaganda.<\/p>\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t A group of 11 South African men allegedly lured to fight alongside Russian soldiers in the war against Ukraine arrive at King Shaka International Airport in Durban on 25 February 2026. Photo by Rajesh Jantilal\/AFP.<\/p>\n Pressure for accountability<\/strong><\/p>\n Russia tends to deny recruitment is taking place and shrouds its military operations in secrecy, leaving the families of those killed with little hope of recovering their bodies or receiving compensation. But the evidence has accumulated and the accounts of those who\u2019ve escaped are reaching audiences across the continent.<\/p>\n Several African governments have recently taken action. The government of Togo warned its citizens about the dangers and, when several Togolese soldiers were captured in Ukraine, confirmed they\u2019d been lured there by false promises of jobs and educational opportunities. Last year, the government of Botswana announced it was investigating<\/a> the cases of two young men who believed they were signing up for a short-term military training programme but were forced to fight. In February, Ghana\u2019s foreign minister confirmed that at least 55<\/a> of his country\u2019s citizens had been killed, and he travelled to Ukraine to seek the release<\/a> of Ghanaian prisoners of war. Police in Kenya and South Africa have arrested people trafficking gangs and closed down recruitment agencies. The Kenyan government recently announced<\/a> Russia had agreed to stop recruiting Kenyan citizens, offering evidence that sustained bilateral pressure can produce results.<\/p>\n But many other African governments remain in denial, placing warm relations with Russia above the lives of their citizens. By doing so, they\u2019re making clear that those lives are as disposable to them as they are to Russia.<\/p>\n Far more states must press Russia to end its abusive recruitment practices. And for international partners who claim to care about the welfare of young Africans, there\u2019s a clear starting point: help address the economic conditions that create a ready pool of desperate recruits and drop the hostile migration policies that make Russia, of all places, look like a desirable option.<\/p>\n Cover photo by Rajesh Jantilal\/AFP<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"More than four years into its war on Ukraine, Russia is increasingly recruiting soldiers from African countries to…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":892677,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":"","_share_on_mastodon":"0"},"categories":[7655],"tags":[2740,17032,6178,13071,805,49378,4609,5805,2597,252011,332,182,657,50],"class_list":["post-892676","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-russia","tag-africa","tag-colonialism","tag-conflict","tag-disinformation","tag-foreign-policy","tag-imperialism","tag-international-relations","tag-migrants","tag-military","tag-people-trafficking","tag-russia","tag-social-media","tag-ukraine","tag-youth"],"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/116401232044291428","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/892676","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=892676"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/892676\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/892677"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=892676"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=892676"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=892676"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}<\/p>\n