{"id":96805,"date":"2025-05-13T01:41:08","date_gmt":"2025-05-13T01:41:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/96805\/"},"modified":"2025-05-13T01:41:08","modified_gmt":"2025-05-13T01:41:08","slug":"how-trump-can-pressure-putin-and-reset-his-failed-ukraine-policy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/96805\/","title":{"rendered":"How Trump Can Pressure Putin and Reset His Failed Ukraine Policy"},"content":{"rendered":"

Far from ending the war in 24 hours as he repeatedly promised,<\/a> U.S. President Donald Trump\u2019s Ukraine policy has been a failure. It has now been more than 100 days, and not only has there been no peace agreement or lasting cease-fire, but Trump has become so frustrated by his inability to deliver a deal that he is now threatening<\/a> to walk away from talks altogether. Meanwhile, both sides are suffering<\/a> hundreds of casualties per week along the front lines, and Russia continues to rain down missiles and drones on Ukrainian cities, killing thousands of civilians<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The failure of Trump\u2019s approach was predictable. His assumption was that he could bully Ukraine into giving Russia what it wanted by embracing Russia\u2019s narrative about the war and threatening to cut off U.S. support to Kyiv. But that underestimated both what Russia wanted\u2014Ukraine\u2019s complete subjugation\u2014and a proudly independent Ukraine\u2019s willingness to accept it. Even worse, by failing to include any threat of consequences for Russia if it refused to compromise, Trump gave up much of his leverage without getting anything in return, essentially saying to Moscow, \u201cIf you don\u2019t agree with my plan, I\u2019ll walk away and give you everything you want\u201d\u2014not exactly the art of the deal. If a petulant Trump does now walk away from attempts to broker peace, the result will be the indefinite perpetuation of a brutal war; continued threats to Ukraine\u2019s territory, sovereignty, and democracy; and a further blow to Trump\u2019s dream of appearing to be a diplomatic dealmaker.<\/p>\n

Far from ending the war in 24 hours as he repeatedly promised,<\/a> U.S. President Donald Trump\u2019s Ukraine policy has been a failure. It has now been more than 100 days, and not only has there been no peace agreement or lasting cease-fire, but Trump has become so frustrated by his inability to deliver a deal that he is now threatening<\/a> to walk away from talks altogether. Meanwhile, both sides are suffering<\/a> hundreds of casualties per week along the front lines, and Russia continues to rain down missiles and drones on Ukrainian cities, killing thousands of civilians<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The failure of Trump\u2019s approach was predictable. His assumption was that he could bully Ukraine into giving Russia what it wanted by embracing Russia\u2019s narrative about the war and threatening to cut off U.S. support to Kyiv. But that underestimated both what Russia wanted\u2014Ukraine\u2019s complete subjugation\u2014and a proudly independent Ukraine\u2019s willingness to accept it. Even worse, by failing to include any threat of consequences for Russia if it refused to compromise, Trump gave up much of his leverage without getting anything in return, essentially saying to Moscow, \u201cIf you don\u2019t agree with my plan, I\u2019ll walk away and give you everything you want\u201d\u2014not exactly the art of the deal. If a petulant Trump does now walk away from attempts to broker peace, the result will be the indefinite perpetuation of a brutal war; continued threats to Ukraine\u2019s territory, sovereignty, and democracy; and a further blow to Trump\u2019s dream of appearing to be a diplomatic dealmaker.<\/p>\n

There is an alternative, however, that even Trump should be willing to pursue. It would consist of spelling out costs Moscow will incur if it continues down its current path.\u00a0 This would be an excellent project for Trump\u2019s new national security advisor\/secretary of state, Marco Rubio, who was once a strong supporter of Ukraine\u2019s independence and right to self-defense.\u00a0 And now is the right moment, ahead of possible direct talks between Russia and Ukraine in Turkey later this week\u2014talks that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has pledged<\/a> to attend in person. Trump himself seems to recognize that diplomacy has reached a critical juncture, proclaiming that this week\u2019s meeting will \u201cdetermine whether or not a deal is possible\u201d and that if it is not, European leaders and the United States will \u201cproceed accordingly.\u201d<\/p>\n

Despite Trump\u2019s enduring reluctance to criticize or impose costs on Russia, a rebalancing of Ukraine policy may not be as implausible as it sounds. Trump has periodically hinted at growing irritation with Moscow and even at the possibility<\/a> of a new approach that might include \u201cvery unpleasant\u201d or even \u201cdevastating\u201d things for Russia. After Russian President Vladimir Putin embarrassed<\/a> him by bombing Kyiv on April 24, just when Trump was hoping to announce progress in negotiations, Trump acknowledged that he was \u201cnot happy\u201d with Putin and that the Russian president might be \u201ctapping<\/a>\u201d him along. Last Thursday, Trump added<\/a> a threat of new sanctions on Russia, coordinated with U.S. partners, if Moscow does not agree to an unconditional 30-day cease-fire. Putin said over the weekend he was ready for direct talks<\/a> but ignored the demands for a cease-fire.<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, Trump\u2019s disastrous relationship with Zelensky has improved, with the two presidents holding a positive meeting<\/a> on the margins of Pope Francis\u2019s funeral in Rome on April 26. And on April 30, the United States and Ukraine signed<\/a> an \u201ceconomic partnership agreement\u201d that will give the United States a 50 percent share of revenues from Ukrainian mineral reserves. The deal provided neither the security assurances Ukraine wanted nor the reimbursement for past support Trump was hoping to get, but it does give the United States an interest in Ukraine\u2019s future sovereignty and economic success and would allow Trump to portray future assistance to Ukraine as a contribution to the U.S. economy and not just charity for Ukraine.<\/p>\n

Even Vice President J.D. Vance, who has been highly critical of Zelensky and once said<\/a> he didn\u2019t really \u201ccare what happens to Ukraine one way or another,\u201d said last week that he thought<\/a> the Russians were \u201casking for too much\u201d to end the war.<\/p>\n

Instead of walking away from involvement in peace talks, if Trump wants to succeed as a peacemaker, it would make more sense for him to test the proposition that even somewhat more pressure on Moscow\u2014without requiring the large-scale U.S. financial commitments he opposes\u2014could help end the war.<\/p>\n

For example, Trump could lend his support to a new, bipartisan Russia sanctions package<\/a>, developed by supporters in the Senate such as Lindsey Graham, to intensify economic pressure on Moscow. Building on existing U.S. and European measures to curb Russian oil profits, these new measures would target<\/a> countries and individuals who purchase Russian oil or sovereign debt, which would be applied if Russia refuses to engage in good-faith negotiations for lasting peace or violates future peace agreements. Russia\u2019s economy is already under great strain, with growth sustained only by war spending, persistent double-digit inflation, and 21 percent interest rates. Collapsing oil prices will inflict further pain, and the prospect that even Trump might add to that pain with additional energy sanctions would give Putin pause.<\/p>\n

Second, Trump could direct the Pentagon to spend the remaining $3.8 billion<\/a> that Congress has already authorized in Presidential Drawdown Authority\u2014the ability to transfer defense articles and services from existing U.S. stockpiles\u2014to Ukraine. Even though the United States under Trump has not authorized new assistance to Ukraine for over four months (the longest period since the start of the war), Ukrainians have managed to hold the lines on the battlefield as they take advantage of the assistance that the Biden administration surged in the final weeks. But artillery and ammunition from that transfer is about to run out, just as Russia readies for an intensified summer offensive<\/a>. A new drawdown package financed by the balance of the already authorized funding\u2014or even the threat to send new tranches of assistance to Ukraine until a deal is reached\u2014would not only buy Ukraine time on the battlefield but would be a signal to Putin that the United States is not prepared to abandon Ukraine as Russia hopes and expects.<\/p>\n

Third, Trump could accelerate efforts to improve Ukrainian air defenses, which do not threaten Russia but benefit the U.S. defense industry and save Ukrainian lives, which Trump claims to support. This would mean moving forward with plans, reported<\/a> last week, to provide Ukraine with a refurbished Patriot system from Israel, and asking Congress to support modest additional funding, as part of the Pentagon base budget rather than as a distinct Ukraine supplemental, to increase production and transfer of missile defense systems and interceptors, including Patriots. There is little doubt such a proposal would receive bipartisan support. Additional air defenses would not only help limit civilian casualties in Ukrainian cities but also protect energy infrastructure and give Ukraine greater staying power in the face of ongoing Russian attacks, thereby thwarting Putin\u2019s hopes for a Ukrainian collapse.<\/p>\n

Finally, Trump could seek agreement with the Europeans, who have maintained their strong support for Ukraine even as the United States has backed away, to bolster Ukraine\u2019s long-term deterrence through training, weapons, and financing. Europe would take responsibility for the bulk of the funding, but the United States would sell European allies American weapons and continue to provide unique capabilities, such as intelligence and training on U.S. systems. Ideally, the agreement would include the use of\u2014or at least the threat to use\u2014some $200 billion in Russian assets frozen<\/a> in Europe, to pay for Ukrainian defense and reconstruction. Europeans have been reluctant to take this step for a range of legal and political reasons but might be willing to consider it if it paved the way for continued U.S. support for Ukraine.<\/p>\n

Taken together, these steps would show Putin that he will not achieve a reset with the United States\u2014and capitalize on his personal connection with Trump\u2014so long as the war in Ukraine continues. Indeed, by conspicuously denying Trump the deal he so desperately seeks, Putin risks squandering the warmth Trump has historically displayed toward him. Putin would be forced to understand that even with Trump, his only hope for eventual economic relief would be a comprehensive and lasting peace with Ukraine.<\/p>\n

There is no guarantee that even these steps would get Putin to compromise or abandon his maximalist objectives. He has all along believed he could wait out the West, even at great cost, and Trump\u2019s victory and pivot away from Ukraine seemed to confirm the wisdom of that bet. But now that Trump\u2019s initial approach has failed, there is still time for him to try a different one\u2014without having to cross the political red line of asking Congress for another large supplemental spending bill for Ukraine. Last Sunday, Trump said on NBC\u2019s Meet the Press<\/a> that his support for tougher measures against Moscow \u201cdepends on whether or not Russia is behaving toward coming to a peace\u201d and that he would \u201ctell you about in a month from now, or two weeks.\u201d When that time inevitably comes, increasing pressure on Moscow to agree to peace would be better than just walking away and allowing Ukraine to lose slowly on Trump\u2019s watch.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Far from ending the war in 24 hours as he repeatedly promised, U.S. President Donald Trump\u2019s Ukraine policy…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":96806,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[7654],"tags":[2000,299,332,45269,45270,44376,657,49,771],"class_list":{"0":"post-96805","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-ukraine","8":"tag-eu","9":"tag-europe","10":"tag-russia","11":"tag-shadow-government","12":"tag-shadow-government-2021-2025","13":"tag-trump-100-days","14":"tag-ukraine","15":"tag-united-states","16":"tag-war"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@uk\/114497983831627921","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/96805","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=96805"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/96805\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/96806"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=96805"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=96805"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=96805"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}