A homemade bomb exploded outside an upmarket restaurant in central Moscow on Saturday evening, killing three people and wounding 21 in an apparent attempt to strike a private banquet reportedly held for a senior Russian general.
The National Anti-Terrorism Committee said an unidentified woman tried to carry an improvised explosive device into the prestigious Balzi Rossi on Kudrinskaya Square shortly before 8pm but was stopped by a security guard. The woman, the guard and one guest were killed when the device detonated near the restaurant’s summer terrace.
The likely target was Colonel-General Aleksandr Chayko, appointed commander-in-chief of Russia’s Aerospace Forces in May. The restaurant had been closed for a private banquet, while footage circulated on social media showed preparations around a stage marked ‘Aleksandr 55’. Chayko turned 55 on 27 July.
Russian outlet Agentstvo connected the footage to the venue, though authorities have not confirmed that Chayko attended or formally identified him as the intended target.
The general, who was unexpectedly elevated to command Russia’s air, air-defence and space forces in April 2026, is among the country’s highest-value serving military figures. He previously commanded Russian forces in Syria and led the Eastern Military District during the launch of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
The European Union sanctioned Chayko in March, describing him as the most senior Russian officer on the ground at the invasion’s outset and the lead commander when Russian troops entered Bucha.
Russian political and military leaders had not publicly commented on the bombing by early Sunday, while the Kremlin and Defence Ministry remained silent about reports that Chayko was the intended target, as well as about any possible perpetrator.
Nevertheless, the target profile and recent incidents immediately made a Ukrainian intelligence operation the leading hypothesis: the attackers apparently knew the location of a heavily guarded birthday gathering and selected one of Russia’s most senior commanders. Kommersant reported that the fragmentation bomb was disguised as a gift and may have been detonated remotely as the guard inspected it, possibly without the courier knowing what she was carrying.
The attempted assassination resembles a series of operations linked or attributed to Ukrainian intelligence and security services since 2022. US intelligence assessed that elements of the Ukrainian government authorized the car bombing that killed nationalist commentator Darya Dugina, daughter of Putin ideologist Aleksander Dugin, outside Moscow, although Kyiv denied involvement. This is probably the closest parallel to the current attack; however, the list is rather long.
Ukraine’s SBU acknowledged responsibility for the 2022 explosion on the Crimean Bridge and the 2023 sea-drone strike against the crossing. An SBU source also claimed responsibility for the December 2024 scooter bombing in Moscow that killed Lieutenant-General Igor Kirillov.
Then came June 2025 and Operation Spiderweb. After 18 months of preparation, Ukrainian operatives concealed drones in structures transported by trucks before launching them against strategic bomber bases deep inside Russia. US officials estimated that up to 20 aircraft were hit, including scarce Soviet-era bombers that Russia cannot easily replace.
The significance of Spiderweb is indisputable. First, it forced the Kremlin to reassess and reorganize hinterland protection and the dispersal of its bomber fleet. Second, and more importantly, the operation showed that even Russia’s most valuable military sites were vulnerable deep inside the country.
‘The attempted assassination resembles a series of operations linked or attributed to Ukrainian intelligence and security services’
That psychological pressure has since influenced both official decision-making and daily life. Immediately after Spiderweb, and ever since, Russia expanded cargo inspections, transport surveillance and anti-drone measures. Ramped-up security measures remain in force to this day. Ahead of the 2026 Victory Day parade, Moscow imposed exceptional security restrictions and scaled back the display as officials prepared for possible Ukrainian sabotage. It ultimately did not come, but the result of the weeks-long, intensive, security-dominated preparations was already clear.
Russia’s State Duma election is scheduled for 18–20 September. Meduza reported in June that senior security officials were urging Vladimir Putin to postpone the vote as Ukrainian attacks intensified; the Kremlin denied that any delay was under discussion, and Putin later insisted that the election would proceed.
Regardless of who organized Saturday’s bombing, an apparent attempt to penetrate a guarded VIP party for a top commander at a luxury venue 2.5 kilometres from the Kremlin is likely to deepen the sense that the war is moving closer to Russia’s leadership, possibly reinforcing the pressure and intensifying calls for postponement.
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