The uncertainty is whether Ukraine’s drone advantage is now structural or merely cyclical. Ukraine briefly grabbed the upper hand in early 2025, only for Russia to neutralize that edge as the year went on by adapting to Ukrainian tactics — for instance, by using wide-guided drones to evade Ukrainian electronic warfare.
The Russian military remains a resilient, learning organization. Russian industry can churn out drones and other weaponry at scale. If Ukraine’s drone edge is temporary, its residual weaknesses will soon come back into focus.
Ukraine is still short on manpower. Russian attacks savaged the Ukrainian energy grid last winter, and next winter could be more painful. Moscow has been intensifying its brutal air war against Kyiv and other cities.
The danger is that a pressured Putin will only increase his coercive efforts. The Russian leader has long argued that the conflict with Kyiv is a fight against the West. Over the years, he has used nuclear threats, murderous sabotage and aggressive hybrid warfare to keep Ukraine’s supporters off-balance.
This dimension of the war is heating up. Late last month, a Russian drone struck an apartment building in Romania, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization member. Russian threats against vulnerable Baltic states have grown more menacing.
Putin isn’t preparing for World War III: His military can hardly handle the fight it’s in. But he probably hopes that military intimidation will cause European states to attenuate their support for Ukraine or discourage it from striking Russian cities. Or perhaps he believes that the threat of escalation will bring a favorable diplomatic intervention from President Donald Trump. Some NATO officials even fear that Putin might stage a minor military conflict — an occupation and then a quick withdrawal from territory in Estonia, for example — as a way of discrediting NATO and showing the Europeans that Trump no longer has their back.