The war in Ukraine has transformed.<\/p>\n
In February, when I spoke to Michael Kofman, a senior fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, about the course of the war, he said something counterintuitive: \u201cTime is not on Russia\u2019s side.\u201d<\/p>\n
Russia is much bigger than Ukraine. It has a much larger population and a much larger defense industrial base. History teaches us that wars are often won by the side that can bring more men and more resources to the field of battle.<\/p>\n
But time has passed since that conversation, and Kofman has proved to be correct. The war is not going well for Russia. But how badly is it going, really? And does potential defeat make President Vladimir Putin even more dangerous?<\/p>\n
To answer these questions (and more), I reached out to my friend Kori Schake, a senior fellow and the director of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute. Kori and I traveled together to Ukraine in 2023, and she has visited there since.<\/p>\n
I\u2019ve spoken to Kori before for The Times, and I always find her to be interesting and insightful. Our conversation has been lightly edited for length and clarity.<\/p>\n
Kori, you just got back from Ukraine, and I\u2019m very interested in getting your assessment of the state of the war. And let me start by telling you what the zeitgeist feels like to me, and you can tell me what\u2019s correct about this and what\u2019s incorrect.<\/p>\n
The tide of the war is turning. Ukraine\u2019s deep-strike capabilities are materially harming the Russian economy, and Ukraine\u2019s medium-strike capabilities are harming Russia\u2019s ability to supply its forces in the field. On the battle line, Ukraine is inflicting catastrophic losses on Russia to such an extent that Russian advance has slowed to a crawl, if it\u2019s even advancing at all.<\/p>\n
Therefore, this would be the time, a very good time, for Vladimir Putin to choose a cease-fire. Let\u2019s start with the good news before we get to the bad news. What\u2019s right about that analysis?<\/p>\n
I think almost everything is right about that analysis. There\u2019s clearly been a shift of momentum. The Ukrainian defense industry has got its gears meshing such that it can produce quality products at scale. So, that\u2019s what you\u2019re seeing with the drones, and with the long-range strikes. The Russians have been taking about up to 35,000 casualties a month when their replacement ability is lower than that.<\/p>\n
The sand\u2019s clearly running through the hourglass for the Russians. There\u2019s a stalemate on the ground. President Volodymyr Zelensky is trying to focus attention on the air domain as the place where the war will be won. I think that may be a little bit too optimistic, but the facts on the ground are clearly giving the Ukrainians momentum and giving heart to the fight so that they can continue to endure this.<\/p>\n
So, if almost everything I said was correct, where\u2019s the \u201calmost\u201d in it?<\/p>\n
Well, the Ukrainians are operationalizing a version of what NATO doctrine in the 1980s called \u201cfollow-on forces attack<\/a>.\u201d You hit the logistics lines, you destroy their ability to repair and resupply and reinforce. And they\u2019re doing that extraordinarily well. And they are also driving the war home to Russia with long-range strikes. Where I\u2019m a little bit nervous is that Ukraine has run very short of air defense, and the Russians are targeting civilian targets that Ukraine can no longer effectively protect.<\/p>\n And so the civilian casualty figures are going way up in Ukraine, which tells me that the Russians\u2019 strategy is adapting, and they are letting go of any prospect of military success \u2014 and as they had been trying to do by attacking Ukraine\u2019s energy supplies, they\u2019re trying to break Ukrainian will to fight.<\/p>\n I also have long worried that as Russia loses, Putin would have such a difficult time remaining in control after the costs of an unsuccessful war, that he could do something dramatic, like escalate and attack Ukraine with nuclear weapons in order to say, \u201cWe didn\u2019t need a conventional victory. We achieved regime change with weapons that only Russia and a few other countries have the power to possess.\u201d<\/p>\n I\u2019m glad you brought that up because it\u2019s been hovering in the background from the beginning of this conflict, and it feels as if the nuclear question has receded out of the conversation. Should it come back if Russia\u2019s battlefield fortunes reverse any more than they already have?<\/p>\n Let me answer your question simply. Yes, it should come back into the center of the conversation. But not as the Biden administration projecting its anxiety about it into the public realm.<\/p>\n Instead, I think, NATO commanders have got a better handle on it \u2014 which is to say that Russia will not succeed no matter what type of weapon it uses, and if Russia should use a nuclear weapon, we could join the war on the side of Ukraine, we will send NATO disaster assistance teams to Ukraine, we will make sure Vladimir Putin ends up in The Hague.<\/p>\n We\u2019re not powerless in Russia\u2019s decision-making. And just because it threatens or attempts to enact a nuclear use doesn\u2019t mean we\u2019re shy of penalties we can apply before, during and after.<\/p>\n When do you get nervous about nuclear weapons? What are the particular lines you would look at? So here\u2019s one I\u2019ve thought of, and you can tell me if you think I\u2019m wrong: if, in fact, there was a Ukrainian thrust that cut off Crimea, or if Putin thought Crimea might fall. To me, that might be one of his red lines.<\/p>\n I\u2019m nervous about the Crimea scenario you just outlined. I\u2019m nervous about the Russians being driven out of territory in Ukraine, and wanting to look like they\u2019re winning, even as they\u2019re losing. Those are the two that really strike me.<\/p>\n But we have the ability to monitor very carefully any movement toward nuclear use. And we would have the ability to interdict it. We are not the only country that would have the ability to interdict it, and conveying that to the Russians, repeatedly and early on, would be, in my judgment, a pretty effective deterrent, because the only thing worse for Russia than losing a war in Ukraine is being incapable of defending its own territory against intervention by the United States or other NATO allies.<\/p>\n Let\u2019s talk about Russian escalation short of nuclear weapons. When we were in Ukraine together in 2023, I vividly remember the defense minister talking about how Ukraine was genuinely worried about sheer numbers. I believe the phrase he used was \u201ca million men with Kalashnikovs are dangerous.\u201d<\/p>\n What are the prospects of Russia moving toward total mobilization? In other words, how many more men can Russia pull into this fight if it chooses to go all in short of nuclear weapons?<\/p>\n I\u2019m skeptical that Russia has much margin for horizontal escalation, for putting more forces in the fight \u2014 in part because the cost of recruiting them has gone way up. Because Vladimir Putin is not confident enough of his control of the country to mobilize men for the war in Moscow and St. Petersburg. And because the Russians had to appeal to the North Koreans for troops to be able to stay in the fight.<\/p>\n And press reports suggest that they are scamming Kenyans and others into service by pretending that they are coming on work permits to Russia. So, if Russia had the ability to throw more soldiers into the fight, I think it would have already done it by now.<\/p>\n Let\u2019s talk about support for Russia from the outside. We\u2019ve seen North Korea deploy troops. China has an immense defense industrial capacity. To what extent is China supporting Russia, and what is the prospect of China escalating its support for Russia to try to guarantee that Russia at the very least doesn\u2019t lose the war?<\/p>\n China clearly wants Russia not to lose the war. And it is not unhappy with a Russian bloodletting that is also a Ukrainian bloodletting because it keeps Europe and the United States focused on Europe rather than on Chinese predatory actions in the South China Sea and in and around Taiwan.<\/p>\n China clearly likes to see it go on, but it\u2019s been very careful to keep its banks largely out of the range of potential sanctions and to provide material equipment but not in the form of missiles or easily identifiable military kit. So it\u2019s requiring some reverse engineering for the Russians to get Chinese parts.<\/p>\n And it\u2019s clearly not providing soldiers, which the Chinese have a surfeit of and could. So, I think they like it to keep going, but they\u2019ve got bigger fish to fry.<\/p>\n Let\u2019s look at support on the other side of the equation. As of right now, what is the status of American support for Ukraine? Everything from are we still doing intel sharing to what kind of weapons are we providing, or selling, and what kind of aid are we providing beyond sales?<\/p>\n The American government is not providing any new financial support packages to Ukraine, which is a big change and makes it hard for Ukraine to keep its government up and functioning, and to keep providing assistance to victims of the war.<\/p>\n We are no longer directly providing military equipment to Ukraine, but we are permitting NATO allies to purchase it and provide it to Ukraine. So, there\u2019s still a pipeline of American weaponry that allies are paying for.<\/p>\n The most important thing we can provide to Ukraine and are providing to Ukraine is intelligence support. You\u2019ll remember that the Trump administration cut it off for about a week, early on in the second term, but that quickly got reversed and hasn\u2019t been interrupted.<\/p>\n I think the two parts of the American government that continue to be strongly in support of Ukraine being able to defend itself are the C.I.A. and the American military. I\u2019m sorry, I should have also put the N.S.A. in that category. And so, a lot of targeting information, a lot of battle damage assessment, access to satellite imagery \u2014 lots of good cooperation is going on there. And at this point, that is what Ukraine needs that only we can provide, and we are providing.<\/p>\n When I was in Odesa for the Black Sea Security Forum a little bit ago, I was really struck by the number of American veterans of military service and of the intelligence community who are swarming in and around Ukraine because they understand that Ukrainian sovereignty is in America\u2019s interest, and that Ukraine deserves our cooperation and support. It gets showcased in Matt Gallagher\u2019s wonderful novel \u201cDaybreak,\u201d about American veterans who go to fight in Ukraine. And I actually saw the dynamic that the novel outlines in real time when I was in Odesa.<\/p>\n I recall the same thing from Kyiv when we were there. It was swarming with Americans who were helping in all kinds of different capacities. It was really striking.<\/p>\n Yeah, veterans who were medics were going to volunteer. I was sitting near a young man on the plane on the way to Moldova who was making his way to Ukraine, and he said, \u201cI don\u2019t have any skills. I\u2019ll just unpack boxes and do whatever needs doing.\u201d<\/p>\n It\u2019s a reminder how often the American government fails in foreign assistance, and American charities, faith groups and just average Americans want to do something good in the world.<\/p>\n We are more than our government, thankfully.<\/p>\n Absolutely.<\/p>\n Right now, Kyiv is vulnerable to missiles because Ukraine is apparently exhausting its supply of Patriot interceptors. There is a deal that is being struck to allow Ukraine to manufacture interceptors, but unless I\u2019m wildly incorrect, they\u2019re not going to be fielded anytime soon. There is a long ramp-up to manufacturing missiles. In the meantime, what is the prospect of protecting Ukrainian airspace?<\/p>\n The prospects are dim of protecting Ukrainian airspace. I mean, of the 68 missiles Russia reportedly shot overnight and early on July 6, none of the 20-plus ballistics were intercepted, and they were incredibly destructive to civilian lives and infrastructure. But what the agreement does is convey two really important political symbols. Domestically, it conveys to Ukrainians that help will come if you continue to hold out. And the message it sends to Putin and the Russians is, \u201cWe\u2019re going to continue to fight on for the sovereignty of Ukraine, and assistance is going to come to them if they continue to hold out.\u201d So, it\u2019s a message domestically that Zelensky can reassure his own people with, and it\u2019s a threat to the Russians.<\/p>\n The European Union and Britain are stepping forward with a very large loan for Ukraine. You are seeing the European defense establishment sort of rousing itself and the European defense industrial base rousing itself. But again, all of that takes time. As of right now, is Ukraine primarily in the fight because of the emerging Ukrainian defense industrial base? Or has Europe been able to fill a larger gap than we thought?<\/p>\n Europeans have rushed to fill the gap, and nobody more so than Germany. It\u2019s really striking how serious-minded the Germans have been about accepting that Ukraine sovereignty is the leading edge of Europe\u2019s security. Rheinmetall, the big German weapons manufacturer, is co-producing both in Ukraine and in Germany. The Norwegians, the Swedes, the Finns, the Danes are clearing out their own stockpiles and buying U.S. weapons in order to provide near-term support to Ukraine.<\/p>\n But exactly as you suggest, David, the Ukrainians have had a shrewd strategy of understanding that it\u2019s not good enough to rely on outside assistance forever, and they used the time of American assistance and now of European assistance to build their own at home.<\/p>\n The way that they are adapting is something that the American military couldn\u2019t or wouldn\u2019t do because it fights connected. The Ukrainians fight more autonomously unit by unit, so they have an internal market of weapons deliveries, and if it works, you buy more, and if you use it well, you get more opportunities.<\/p>\n They\u2019re really innovating fast, and what looks to American military eyes as quite sloppy and hard to scale is unquestionably working for them.<\/p>\n It almost sounds like a free-market approach to weapons procurement in the middle of a war.<\/p>\n It absolutely is. And the innovation rate of the Ukrainian military is what has prevented them from losing.<\/p>\n You know, David, the most poignant thing I heard when I was in Ukraine was one of their military commanders saying how much he wished that in 2022 Ukraine had the military it has now. Because it could have won the war in 2022 if it had a military as rapidly innovative, as battle-hardened, as judicious as the Ukrainian military today.<\/p>\n Russia has innovated as well. It has these Rubicon drone units, for example. Is it the case that you are having a sort of a seesaw integration cycle where one innovates and the other one responds? Or has Ukraine been consistently ahead of the curve? How much has the Russian military transformed during this conflict?<\/p>\n In general, Ukraine innovates quickly and struggles to scale and standardize what works across its forces. And the Russians have the reverse virtues and the reverse vulnerabilities. They are slow to integrate, but good, once they have a solid answer, at standardizing it across their forces.<\/p>\n Where Russia has successfully innovated is in areas where it has traditional strengths \u2014 electronic warfare, for example. But what the Russians are not good at is imaginative innovation. And there, they have regularly lagged behind Ukraine, and then had to figure out what the Ukrainians were doing and figure out how to copy it.<\/p>\n We\u2019ve talked about Russian manpower, we\u2019ve talked about Russian innovation. Now let\u2019s talk about the Russian economy and defense industrial base. We\u2019re four years into a war that is consuming men and material at a staggering rate \u2014 at rates we haven\u2019t seen in Europe since the world wars. And Russia\u2019s still in the fight.<\/p>\n This is now a war economy that we\u2019re dealing with, and how formidable will that war economy be after the war is over?<\/p>\n Something like 40 percent of Russian government spending is on military and security, and the Russians have completely shifted their economic model and their manufacturing to war production \u2014 and compromising their future in the process.<\/p>\n They\u2019re essentially eating their seed corn by making the war effort the central element of their economy. You don\u2019t see innovation in other places, you don\u2019t see business start-ups in other places.<\/p>\n My nominee for Bond villain is the head of the Russian Central Bank<\/a> because the fact that she has kept the economy functioning at all these four years is an act of real genius, but at some point, it\u2019s going to break, and we may not be very far from that point. The Russians are cutting into their financial reserves in order to support the war effort.<\/p>\n Our war in Iran was a huge economic boon for Russia, because we temporarily lifted restrictions on sales of their oil.<\/p>\n If the war ended tomorrow, it would be uncontroversial to say that Ukraine is a more powerful military right now than it was before the war, almost without question. Maybe one of the most powerful militaries in the world.<\/p>\n Yeah.<\/p>\n As for Russia, if the war ends today, is it less powerful than it was when it started? Or does the fact that it has ramped up its defense industry \u2014 and has a drone-trained and drone-experienced army in a way that no NATO country does \u2014 mean that Russia is (perversely enough) more powerful, or has it been weakened?<\/p>\n Russia has, in my judgment, unquestionably been weakened. I saw an estimate that the life span of Russian recruits from the moment they arrive at training is between 10 days and three weeks.<\/p>\n That\u2019s not a military good at warfare. That\u2019s not a military that is culling a cadre of battle-hardened leaders who make good judgments. That is a heavily conscripted army that\u2019s being fed into a meat grinder.<\/p>\n