That is the central problem. The deal could protect Ukraine from one part of Russia\u2019s war while removing one of Ukraine\u2019s few means of reaching the system that sustains it.<\/p>\n
The Proposal Is Smaller Than the War<\/p>\n
There is no agreement yet.<\/p>\n
A Ukrainian source told Reuters that U.S. and Ukrainian officials had discussed a possible halt to aerial attacks as part of a renewed diplomatic push.<\/p>\n
The Kremlin says it has received no specific proposal<\/a> and will judge whatever emerges against Russian interests.<\/p>\n The missing details are substantial. A ceasefire covering attacks on cities would be very different from one that barred strikes on military facilities or energy infrastructure.<\/p>\n Russia\u2019s Tu-160 Bomber. Image Credit: Creative Commons.<\/p>\n Russian Tu-160 bomber. Image Credit \u2013 Creative Commons.<\/p>\n Russia\u2019s Tu-160 bomber. Image Credit: Creative Commons.<\/p>\n Glide bombs near the front pose another problem. So does verification.<\/p>\n Each side has strong incentives to define an attack narrowly when it launches one and broadly when the other side does.<\/p>\n Even the broadest air ceasefire would leave the war\u2019s main political questions untouched. Russia would still occupy roughly a fifth of Ukraine<\/a>.<\/p>\n Moscow\u2019s territorial demands remain intact, and Kyiv still lacks the kind of security settlement that would make a pause something other than time bought before the next round.<\/p>\n What remained would be the part of the war in which Russia\u2019s material advantages count most.<\/p>\n The Ground War Favors Russia, Slowly<\/p>\n That does not mean Russia is breaking through. Its advances remain painfully slow and hugely expensive.<\/p>\n Over the year ending July 21, Russian forces gained roughly 1,100 square miles<\/a>, about half of one percent of Ukraine\u2019s territory.<\/p>\n In the four weeks before that date, the net gain was only ten to fifteen square miles, depending on the map used.<\/p>\n Those numbers describe an attritional front whose movement, slight as it is, continues to favor Russia.<\/p>\n The ground war is where Russia\u2019s size still counts most.<\/p>\n Ukraine is defending a front of roughly 800 miles<\/a> while dealing with persistent personnel shortages and heavy dependence on outside supply.<\/p>\n Russia has its own recruitment problems<\/a> and has paid an extraordinary price for limited gains.<\/p>\n It can still replace losses, feed units into repeated assaults, and force Ukraine to spend scarce manpower holding every sector that Moscow chooses to press.<\/p>\n A ceasefire in the air would not make that campaign cheap. It would leave it available.<\/p>\n Moscow does not need to believe a decisive breakthrough is imminent.<\/p>\n It needs to believe that the current exchange wears Ukraine down faster than it wears Russia down. The Kremlin\u2019s conduct suggests that it still does.<\/p>\n Ukraine\u2019s Deep Strikes Are Leverage<\/p>\n Ukraine\u2019s long-range campaign has not forced Vladimir Putin to change his war aims. It may never do so. That is too demanding a standard for judging its value.<\/p>\n The strikes compel Russia to defend a rear area extending hundreds of miles from the front. They have hit refineries and military facilities, as well as shipping in the Sea of Azov.<\/p>\n In July, Reuters reported that the campaign had helped force Moscow to ban diesel exports<\/a> and restrict shipping. Domestic gasoline production had fallen to roughly 65 percent of capacity. Kyiv has since created a dedicated long-range command<\/a> to intensify the pressure.<\/p>\n The campaign will not win the war by itself. It makes the war harder to sustain and forces Moscow to keep air defenses around sites that would otherwise enjoy sanctuary.<\/p>\n It has not forced a settlement. Moscow<\/a> would still plainly prefer to see it stopped.<\/p>\n Russia\u2019s Tu-22M3 bomber. Image Credit: Creative Commons.<\/p>\n The proposed ceasefire could require Ukraine<\/a> to suspend part of that leverage before serious negotiations begin. Russia would give up a punishing campaign against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure.<\/p>\n Kyiv would surrender a growing capacity to strike the assets Russia<\/a> uses to finance and support the war.<\/p>\n Then both sides would return to a ground contest whose burdens fall unevenly.<\/p>\n Washington Should Tie the Two Wars Together<\/p>\n The United States should still pursue an agreement that stops attacks on civilians and critical infrastructure. The humanitarian case is overwhelming. Reducing the risk of an uncontrolled escalation has value of its own.<\/p>\n Washington should not pursue a blanket air ceasefire while allowing Russia\u2019s ground offensive to continue unchanged.<\/p>\n The ceasefire has to reach the ground war as well. A broad halt to aerial attacks should come with a halt to major offensive operations along the front.<\/p>\n If Moscow refuses, the air arrangement should be narrower.<\/p>\n Civilian targets and essential public infrastructure would be protected, while Ukraine retained the ability to strike military assets directly sustaining Russian operations.<\/p>\n That will be harder to negotiate. Russia will prefer a deal that protects its rear while leaving its army free to move, which is precisely why Washington should resist it.<\/p>\n A quieter night in Kyiv<\/a> would matter.<\/p>\n The United States should secure that relief without stripping Ukraine of leverage while Russian units keep pressing forward.<\/p>\n If it cannot, the ceasefire may save lives in the short term and still leave Ukraine facing a war shifted toward the terrain Moscow finds more favorable.<\/p>\n MORE \u2013 China\u2019s J-20 Stealth Fighter Was Built to Fight the US Air Force<\/a>\u00a0<\/p>\n About the Author: Dr. Andrew Latham<\/p>\n Andrew Latham<\/a> is a professor of international relations and political theory at Macalester College in Saint Paul, MN. You can follow him on X: @aakatham<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"An air ceasefire would take Russian missiles out of Ukrainian skies. It could also take pressure off the…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":22009,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[1247,373,213,25,4456,1162,26,72,81],"class_list":["post-22008","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-news","tag-air-force","tag-featured","tag-military","tag-russia","tag-russian-air-force","tag-sea-of-azov","tag-ukraine","tag-war-in-ukraine","tag-world-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/22008","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=22008"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/22008\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/22009"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=22008"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=22008"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=22008"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}![\"Tu-160\"](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/Russia-25.jpg\")
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