![\"Russian](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/Ukraine-Tank-e1656943925101.jpg\")
<\/p>\nThe war in Ukraine has settled into a pattern. The front line barely moves from month to month, while Russian missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian cities have intensified.<\/p>\n
Diplomacy between Washington, Kyiv, and Moscow has produced talk of peace, but no proposal that either government has had to answer.<\/p>\n
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Russian T-80 tank. Image Credit: Creative Commons.<\/p>\n
![\"Ukraine](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/Ukraine-2.jpg\")
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Russian T-80 tank. Image Credit: Creative Commons.<\/p>\n
Trump has said repeatedly that he wants the war over.<\/p>\n
President Trump should put a concrete armistice proposal before Vladimir Putin now.<\/p>\n
He should do it without pretending Russia and Ukraine are ready to make peace, and without assuming Moscow will agree.<\/p>\n
The point is to force a decision the Kremlin has so far avoided: will Russia stop on the line it holds, or does Putin still believe more war will buy him better terms?<\/p>\n
That question became harder to ignore on Wednesday.<\/p>\n
Russia fired 24 ballistic missiles, four Zircon or Oniks missiles and 115 drones at Kyiv and the surrounding region.<\/p>\n
Seventeen people were killed and 44 wounded<\/a>.<\/p>\n Ukraine intercepted most of the drones and none of the missiles, exposing how badly its shortage of Patriot interceptors has altered the balance over its cities.<\/p>\n Thomas Graham<\/a>, a Russia specialist at the Council on Foreign Relations, is right that Trump should revive diplomacy before Ukraine disappears behind Washington\u2019s war with Iran and whatever crisis comes next.<\/p>\n He is less persuasive when he describes the moment as ripe for resolution.<\/p>\n The latest barrage looked like the work of a government testing how much more pressure it can apply before the terms improve.<\/p>\n That makes an armistice harder to obtain.<\/p>\n It also makes the attempt more useful.<\/p>\n The War Is Not Ready for Peace<\/p>\n A peace settlement would have to resolve the status of occupied territory and Ukraine\u2019s future relationship with the West.<\/p>\n Sanctions would also have to be addressed. Neither government has moved close enough to the other for those questions to be settled now.<\/p>\n An armistice asks less.<\/p>\n It stops organized fighting while leaving the political dispute where it is.<\/p>\n Exhaustion alone does not produce compromise. States accept bad bargains when they conclude that waiting will leave them worse off. Russia has not publicly reached that point.<\/p>\n Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on July 24<\/a> that Moscow would wait for new American proposals while continuing to pursue \u201ctotal victory\u201d by military means.<\/p>\n Russia<\/a> could talk to Trump and keep fighting Ukraine. From Moscow\u2019s perspective, the two activities fit together.<\/p>\n The present ambiguity serves Putin.<\/p>\n He can describe Russia as open to negotiations while blaming Kyiv and Europe for the absence of progress.<\/p>\n The attacks continue as Washington searches for another formula<\/a>.<\/p>\n Nothing in that posture requires him to decide whether he will stop short of the political submission Russia<\/a> has demanded from Ukraine.<\/p>\n A specific armistice would put that question on the table.<\/p>\n Russian T-14 Armata Tank. Image Credit: Social Media Screenshot.<\/p>\n Su-57 Felon. Image Credit: Russian Government.<\/p>\n Why Putin Might Take It<\/p>\n There is a danger of designing an offer mainly to elicit a Russian refusal. That would be diplomacy as theatre, and Moscow would recognize it immediately.<\/p>\n The proposal has to contain something Putin could rationally accept.<\/p>\n Russia would retain de facto control of the territory its forces hold when the fighting stops, and Ukrainian strikes inside Russia would end.<\/p>\n Sustained compliance could later bring limited sanctions relief. Moscow could take those gains without renouncing its territorial claims.<\/p>\n Russia\u2019s advances have slowed<\/a>, while Ukraine continues to hit targets deep inside Russia<\/a>.<\/p>\n Western military support could also recover before Russian forces secure everything the Kremlin claims.<\/p>\n An armistice would bank what Moscow has already taken and remove the risk that another year leaves it in a worse position.<\/p>\n Putin may prefer the gamble.<\/p>\n Zelensky said last Saturday<\/a> that Ukraine had run out of Patriot interceptors, and newly manufactured missiles would take at least a year<\/a> to arrive even if Washington and Kyiv complete a production agreement.<\/p>\n Russia can see the opening.<\/p>\n Wednesday\u2019s barrage was part of a summer campaign exploiting it.<\/p>\n Washington therefore does not know whether Moscow sees the current line as an acceptable stopping point or merely a platform for the next advance. It should find out.<\/p>\n What the Armistice Has to Do<\/p>\n Fighting would cease on the line held at the time the agreement takes effect.<\/p>\n Neither army would withdraw first.<\/p>\n Ukraine would keep its legal claim to occupied territory, while Russia would be permitted to reserve its own claims for later negotiations.<\/p>\n The military line would freeze without turning occupation into lawful possession.<\/p>\n The harder issue is Ukraine\u2019s position afterward. Russia will seek limits on the Ukrainian armed forces<\/a> and an end to Western support.<\/p>\n Washington cannot accept an arrangement that lets Russia rebuild while Ukraine is gradually made less defensible.<\/p>\n That would create a pause on terms favorable to the side most likely to restart the war.<\/p>\n Ukraine must retain enough force, backed by continued outside assistance, to make another invasion costly. Monitoring arrangements can manage incidents, and sanctions relief<\/a> can be staged.<\/p>\n The essential condition is that Russia cannot obtain at the negotiating table the Ukrainian vulnerability it failed to impose on the battlefield.<\/p>\n This will be difficult for Kyiv as well. An armistice would leave occupied territory beyond Ukrainian control for an indefinite period.<\/p>\n Ukraine could preserve its claim, but it would have to suspend any attempt to recover that land by force. That is an ugly bargain.<\/p>\n Wars often end this way when neither side can dictate the settlement, and both can prevent the other from doing so.<\/p>\n The Counteroffer Is the Answer<\/p>\n Moscow is unlikely to respond with a simple yes or no. It will probably welcome negotiations and attach conditions that transfer the decision back to Kyiv.<\/p>\n Washington will need a standard for judging the response.<\/p>\n Russia may bargain over monitoring or the timing of sanctions relief.<\/p>\n A demand that Ukraine withdraw from territory it still holds, or accept limits that leave it exposed to another attack, would amount to rejection, whatever language Moscow wraps around it.<\/p>\n The question is whether Russia will stop fighting without first requiring Ukraine to concede what Russian forces have not taken.<\/p>\n If Moscow stays within that boundary, Washington and the Europeans will need an enforcement plan before the agreement is signed.<\/p>\n They must decide what constitutes a serious violation and what the consequences are if Russia attacks again.<\/p>\n A document without that machinery would invite Moscow to test how much ambiguity the alliance will tolerate.<\/p>\n If Moscow refuses, Washington can stop treating the stalemate as a failure to discover the right diplomatic formula.<\/p>\n The next task would be to alter the expectations surrounding Russia\u2019s answer by strengthening Ukrainian air defense and maintaining economic pressure.<\/p>\n The purpose would be to deny Moscow the relatively cheap gains it thinks another year may bring.<\/p>\n Washington Has to Use the Answer<\/p>\n Trump cannot manufacture a peace settlement from positions that remain irreconcilable. He can establish whether Putin is willing to stop before Russia has won everything it says it is owed.<\/p>\n That result will matter after the envoy\u2019s visit and presidential claims fade from the news cycle.<\/p>\n An accepted armistice would create a quieter front, but the underlying conflict would remain, and deterrence would still have to be maintained.<\/p>\n A Russian refusal would pose a different problem.<\/p>\n Washington would have to resist the familiar urge to produce another proposal rather than confront what the answer says about the balance of power.<\/p>\n The offer is worth making because either response carries consequences. It will matter only if Washington is prepared to act on the one it receives.<\/p>\n About the Author: Dr. Andrew Latham<\/p>\n Andrew Latham<\/a> is a professor of international relations and political theory at Macalester College in Saint Paul, MN. You can follow him on X: @aakatham<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"The war in Ukraine has settled into a pattern. 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<\/p>\n![\"Su-57](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/Su-57-Felon.jpg\")
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