{"id":24910,"date":"2026-08-06T05:35:11","date_gmt":"2026-08-06T05:35:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/24910\/"},"modified":"2026-08-06T05:35:11","modified_gmt":"2026-08-06T05:35:11","slug":"learning-from-ukraine-semi-autonomy-can-deliver-combat-mass","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/24910\/","title":{"rendered":"Learning from Ukraine: semi-autonomy can deliver combat mass"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"850\" height=\"567\" class=\"alignnone size-full wp-image-101191\" src=\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/W2_4468.jpg\"  \/><\/p>\n<p>Generating operational mass in the Indo-Pacific requires new approaches to projecting, sustaining and employing military power across vast distances and contested environments. This must be achieved despite constraints in workforce and industrial capacity that can undermine sustainment in high-intensity warfare. A possible solution to this challenge is to embrace rapidly evolving, semi-autonomous uncrewed systems, while adapting defence industry to exploit rapid, continuous modernisation.<\/p>\n<p>Current defence development emphasises spending on small numbers of advanced, complex and expensive crewed platforms. This is increasingly out of step with the very rapid innovation cycles associated with semi-autonomous uncrewed systems. Such systems \u2013 if acquired at low cost, in volume and at a rapid pace \u2013 offer the ability to quickly build combat mass \u2013 bringing together quantitative superiority and military effects in the right place and right time. Continuous modernisation, demonstrated by Ukraine\u2019s rapid evolution of autonomous drones, also allows for rapid innovation of these uncrewed systems at a lower cost.<\/p>\n<p>At the 2026 ASPI Defence Conference in June, a panel explored the role of uncrewed semi-autonomous systems. The discussion focused on developing operational mass to enable the ADF to better project, sustain and employ military power across the Indo-Pacific.<\/p>\n<p>New approaches are seen in Ukraine\u2019s adaptation in response to Russia\u2019s aggression since 2014. Although Australia\u2019s strategic geography and operational environment differ significantly from Ukraine\u2019s, the principles of rapid innovation, acquisition and continuous modernisation are highly relevant. During the ASPI conference, Ukrainian Ambassador to Australia Vasyl Myroshnychenko described Ukraine\u2019s approach:<\/p>\n<p>In the past four years, what we\u2019ve been able to achieve is a unique ecosystem where we have soldiers, where we have startups, where we have volunteers and government agencies all fused together, working on products where you can develop a product from prototype to actual use on the battlefield in a matter of weeks.<\/p>\n<p>He noted that even long-range missiles could be produced in around 18 months, and he argued that advantage lay in an \u2018innovation loop from the battlefield information to manufacturing, R&amp;D and then to basically providing it back to the battlefield.\u2019 The key is \u2018not how you innovate but how quickly you adapt to change, because three months later it becomes obsolete.\u2019 He also raised electromagnetic warfare and uncrewed systems as important areas for collaboration between Ukraine and Australia.<\/p>\n<p>For Australia, where capability development and acquisition processes often last years or even decades, applying this rapid innovation and adaptation model would be challenging. But it\u2019s one that Australia should embrace to keep pace with China\u2019s growing military power. Air Vice-Marshal Nicholas Hogan, head of air force capability, brought up industry\u2019s role during the panel:<\/p>\n<p>It takes a bit of time to get industry right, and then once industry\u2019s working and then it starts moving forward \u2026 then they\u2019re able to pump out at mass and then decrease the per-unit cost.<\/p>\n<p>Still, it\u2019s not simply a case of industry making the same item quickly and in large numbers. As Mark Palmer, vice president at Shield AI Australia, said:<\/p>\n<p>What we\u2019ve learned is that you have to be able to evolve. You have to be able to look at weaknesses, look at what\u2019s being exploited and you have to evolve. It\u2019s a continual game against each other on the tactics, and it\u2019s almost always being won by the one that evolves quicker.<\/p>\n<p>Palmer made the further point that even semi-autonomous systems were not immune: \u2018if it\u2019s autonomy that doesn\u2019t evolve, doesn\u2019t change, it can actually become a weakness.\u2019<\/p>\n<p>Real evolution often occurs in wartime, in a different operational environment than during development and testing. Modern warfare takes place in a highly contested environment, often with degraded communications and denial of critical capabilities, such as GPS.<\/p>\n<p>So, for Australia the lessons from Ukraine are vital to developing future semi-autonomous systems with a future highly denied environment in mind. Rather than a human in the loop remotely operating a drone, be it an MQ-28 Ghost Bat or an MQ-4C Triton, the ADF may need to shift to people being on the loop \u2013 only overseeing what the machines do. This will allow it to rely more heavily on AI and autonomy to make critical mission decisions in a complex and fast-moving military operational environment.<\/p>\n<p>Drawing on Shield AI\u2019s experience in Ukraine, Palmer noted that this approach \u2018allowed us to put some of the decision making into the front line\u2019. For these capabilities to reach their full operational potential, it will be essential to devolve that decision-making on how best to use autonomous systems down the chain of command. That will be a major military and political challenge for the ADF, given Australia\u2019s need to comply with <a href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.org.au\/aukus-pillar-two-lunges-for-an-operational-capability-underwater\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">obligations<\/a> under international humanitarian law and given a political need for oversight of rapidly moving military operations.<\/p>\n<p>Hogan highlighted this issue when discussing accountability and AI as potential barriers to generating operational mass. He argued that \u2018the barrier from our side of the house is looking at the way we culturally adapt, because data isn\u2019t the problem. It\u2019s the software, and the amount of autonomy that we allow us to take on with the social licence that may be granted to us by the Australian public.\u2019 Getting past this cultural barrier was critical for industry to adapt and deliver capabilities quickly, he said.<\/p>\n<p>For Australia \u2013 as for Ukraine \u2013 time is short. Myroshnychenko noted that, in relation to the war in Ukraine, \u2018there\u2019s so much at stake for Australia\u2019. And beyond it was the larger struggle with Russia and China. The central challenge, he argued, was not necessarily about technology but rather about \u2018the leadership of the country and civil society and how well aware they are about the threats\u2019.<\/p>\n<p>Responding to this challenge will require governments to embrace innovation, recognise the rapidly deteriorating global security environment and adapt to how military technology is changing the character of warfare. Ukraine has been forced to make that shift, and the question now is whether Australia will do so before circumstances demand it.<\/p>\n<p>Myroshnychenko concluded, \u2018it\u2019s very difficult to achieve what we want to achieve in a peaceful environment where there\u2019s no visible threat or it\u2019s never actually in a public domain.\u2019 The starting point for exploiting semi-autonomous systems within the ADF must therefore be a frank conversation with the Australian public about the prospect of future conflict and how we must adapt to that emerging reality.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Generating operational mass in the Indo-Pacific requires new approaches to projecting, sustaining and employing military power across vast&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":24911,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[4277,8846,8847],"class_list":["post-24910","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-news","tag-autonomous-systems","tag-military-capability","tag-uncrewed-systems"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/24910","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=24910"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/24910\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/24911"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=24910"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=24910"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=24910"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}