Ukraine occupies a\u00a0central place in the Kremlin\u2019s imperial worldview. Preventing the conso\u00adli\u00addation of a\u00a0sovereign, democratic and Euro-Atlantic-oriented Ukraine has become one of Russia\u2019s main strategic priorities. Following the full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022, diplo\u00admatic relations between the two countries were severed, and inter\u00adaction has since been limited to commu\u00adni\u00adcation relating to wartime arran\u00adge\u00adments, including prisoner exchanges, third-party mediation and technical negotia\u00adtions. Within this context, Russian infor\u00admation opera\u00adtions seek to exploit several overlapping societal vulnerabi\u00adlities and strategic depen\u00addencies in Ukraine. These include fragmented trust in political insti\u00adtution, war fatigue and mobili\u00adsation-related anxiety, depen\u00addence on digital platforms (parti\u00adcu\u00adlarly Telegram) as primary sources of breaking news and security updates, and Ukraine\u2019s continued reliance on sustained inter\u00adna\u00adtional political, military and financial support.[2]<\/a> Rather than creating these vulnerabi\u00adlities, Russian FIMI seeks to amplify existing societal tensions, deepen uncer\u00adtainty and erode public resilience over time, as it does in other countries targeted by the\u00a0Kremlin.<\/p>\n Russian infor\u00admation opera\u00adtions also syste\u00adma\u00adti\u00adcally weaponise history, identity and socio-economic grievances to both legitimise the war and undermine Ukrainian sovereignty.[3]<\/a> Histo\u00adrical narra\u00adtives portray Kyivan Rus and figures such as Volodymyr the Great as part of an exclu\u00adsively Russian histo\u00adrical tradition, while cities such as Odesa are presented as inher\u00adently \u201cRussian\u201d. Russia likewise exploits the memory of the World War II by portraying the Ukrainian government as \u201cNazi\u201d and framing the invasion as a\u00a0process of \u201cdenazi\u00adfi\u00adcation\u201d and histo\u00adrical justice. In the tempo\u00adr\u00adarily occupied terri\u00adtories, these histo\u00adrical narra\u00adtives are reinforced through socio-economic messaging portraying Russia as the guarantor of security, recon\u00ads\u00adtruction and public services while depicting Ukraine as incapable of governing its own territory and providing for its own people.[4]<\/a> Russian FIMI is therefore insepa\u00adrable from the broader campaign against Ukrainian statehood. At the same time, cyber opera\u00adtions reinforce these efforts by enabling espionage, infor\u00admation theft and the manipu\u00adlation of digital infor\u00admation that can subse\u00adquently be incor\u00adpo\u00adrated into broader influence campaigns across\u00a0Ukraine.<\/p>\n Part II. The Russian FIMI playbook in\u00a0Ukraine<\/p>\n a) Strategic\u00a0objectives<\/p>\n Within the broader military and political strategy, Russian FIMI pursues a\u00a0defined set of objec\u00adtives and is designed to shape the psycho\u00adlo\u00adgical, political, and strategic condi\u00adtions of the war. In Ukraine, Russian infor\u00admation opera\u00adtions seek to undermine trust in political and military leadership, weaken confi\u00addence in public insti\u00adtu\u00adtions, reduce support for mobili\u00adsation, increase percep\u00adtions of inevi\u00adtable defeat, and erode societal resilience.[5]<\/a> These messages interact with the wider experience of war, including repeated attacks on residential areas and critical infra\u00adstructure, which intensify fear, exhaustion and percep\u00adtions of insecurity amongst the affected\u00a0population.<\/p>\n b) Target\u00a0audiences<\/p>\n Russian FIMI campaigns are highly audience-specific. Ukrainian monitoring organi\u00adsa\u00adtions identify residents of government-controlled terri\u00adtories, residents of tempo\u00adr\u00adarily occupied terri\u00adtories, frontline commu\u00adnities, military personnel and their families, internally displaced persons, and younger social media users as distinct target audiences.[6]<\/a>,[7]<\/a> Messaging, emotional framing and disse\u00admi\u00adnation channels are tailored to each group, allowing Russian actors to exploit different vulnerabi\u00adlities while pursuing common strategic objec\u00adtives. This level of audience segmen\u00adtation reflects an adaptive influence strategy that responds to the realities of wartime rather than relying on uniform mass\u00a0messaging.<\/p>\n c) Dominant\u00a0narratives<\/p>\n Russian narra\u00adtives reinforce one another and support broader strategic objec\u00adtives. Central messages portray Ukraine as an artificial state lacking genuine sovereignty and histo\u00adri\u00adcally belonging within Russia\u2019s sphere of influence.[8]<\/a> Here, the Ukrainian government is depicted as corrupt, extremist and \u201cNazi\u201d, while the invasion is framed as a\u00a0legitimate process of \u201cdenazi\u00adfi\u00adcation\u201d and histo\u00adrical justice. Additional narra\u00adtives target both Ukrainian and inter\u00adna\u00adtional audiences with claims that Ukraine is losing the war, mobili\u00adsation is unjust or pointless, Western assis\u00adtance is ineffective or misap\u00adpro\u00adpriated, and Kyiv is obstructing peace. The Kremlin\u2019s campaigns have also incre\u00adasingly targeted Ukraine\u2019s European integration by portraying EU and NATO membership as unattainable or respon\u00adsible for prolonging the war, while simul\u00adta\u00adneously exploiting bilateral tensions between Ukraine and individual European partners.[9]<\/a> Currently, this includes disputes with Poland over histo\u00adrical memory, agricul\u00adtural trade and political\u00a0support.<\/p>\n d) Tactics, techniques and proce\u00addures (TTPs)<\/p>\n Russian FIMI campaigns rely on a\u00a0broad spectrum of opera\u00adtional techniques designed to give false or misleading content the appearance of authen\u00adticity, indepen\u00addence and widespread public support.[10]<\/a> These include coordi\u00adnated ampli\u00adfi\u00adcation through bot networks and fake accounts; imper\u00adso\u00adnation of Ukrainian insti\u00adtu\u00adtions, public officials and media outlets; the disse\u00admi\u00adnation of forged documents and fabri\u00adcated screen\u00adshots; and the manipu\u00adlation of authentic material through selective editing or removal from its original context. Kremlin-aligned narra\u00adtives are frequently laundered through anonymous Telegram channels, pseudo-local news outlets and osten\u00adsibly independent commen\u00adtators before being amplified across multiple platforms. Campaigns are also synchro\u00adnised with military develo\u00adp\u00adments, mobili\u00adsation decisions, diplo\u00admatic disputes and attacks on civilian infra\u00adstructure, allowing Russian actors to exploit moments of heigh\u00adtened uncer\u00adtainty and emotional vulnerability. Cyber-enabled activities, including hacking, data theft and infor\u00admation leaks, can provide additional material for subse\u00adquent influence opera\u00adtions. In the tempo\u00adr\u00adarily occupied terri\u00adtories, these techniques are reinforced through syste\u00admatic censorship of Ukrainian infor\u00admation sources and the monopo\u00adli\u00adsation of local media, creating a\u00a0controlled infor\u00admation environment in which independent reporting and alter\u00adnative inter\u00adpre\u00adta\u00adtions of events are incre\u00adasingly difficult to\u00a0access.<\/p>\n e) Actors<\/p>\n Russian FIMI campaigns are imple\u00admented through a\u00a0layered ecosystem that combines state insti\u00adtu\u00adtions, state-controlled media, occupation autho\u00adrities and proxy actors.[11]<\/a> At the strategic level, the Presi\u00addential Adminis\u00adtration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Russian intel\u00adli\u00adgence services play central roles in setting, producing and disse\u00admi\u00adnating strategic messaging. Russian state-controlled media remain central disse\u00admi\u00adnators of narra\u00adtives despite the reduction of the extent of their direct reach within Ukraine due to restric\u00adtions intro\u00adduced in the years following 2014. Disse\u00admi\u00adnation is further enabled through local colla\u00adbo\u00adrators, occupation media, anonymous Telegram adminis\u00adtrators, pseudo-local news outlets and coordi\u00adnated inauthentic social media networks that adapt and amplify pro-Kremlin messaging while obscuring direct state invol\u00advement.[12]<\/a> This decen\u00adtra\u00adlized, multi-channel disse\u00admi\u00adnation model increases the perceived credi\u00adbility of Russian influence campaigns and compli\u00adcates attribution.<\/p>\n f) Infor\u00admation\u00a0channels<\/p>\n Russian influence opera\u00adtions rely on a\u00a0diverse media ecosystem tailored to the Ukrainian infor\u00admation environment. Telegram has become the principal platform for influence opera\u00adtions due to its widespread use in Ukraine, the promi\u00adnence of anonymous channels and compa\u00adra\u00adtively limited content moderation.[13]<\/a> Moreover, Telegram often functions as the entry point for narra\u00adtives that are subse\u00adquently amplified through short-form videos, pseudo-news content and coordi\u00adnated social media accounts on other platforms. Telegram\u2019s role is especially important during periods of acute uncer\u00adtainty, when users seek immediate infor\u00admation about attacks, mobili\u00adsation or frontline develo\u00adp\u00adments. Russian actors also exploit TikTok, YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram to reach different demographic groups. In addition, television, radio, and pseudo-local news outlets in the tempo\u00adr\u00adarily occupied terri\u00adtories have been brought under Russian control and integrated into occupation gover\u00adnance.[14]<\/a><\/p>\n Part III. Ukrainian resilience and remaining\u00a0challenges<\/p>\n Ukraine\u2019s response to Russian FIMI has evolved into a\u00a0compre\u00adhensive whole-of-society effort involving government insti\u00adtu\u00adtions, civil society organi\u00adsa\u00adtions, independent media, resear\u00adchers and inter\u00adna\u00adtional partners.[15]<\/a> Respon\u00adsi\u00adbility for monitoring, analysing and responding to infor\u00admation manipu\u00adlation is distri\u00adbuted across a\u00a0broad ecosystem of actors with comple\u00admentary roles. Government insti\u00adtu\u00adtions, including the Centre for Countering Disin\u00adfor\u00admation, work alongside specia\u00adlised civil society organi\u00adsa\u00adtions such as CAT-UA, Internews Ukraine and the Institute of Mass Infor\u00admation (IMI). Independent analy\u00adtical and media organi\u00adsa\u00adtions, including Detector Media, Vox Ukraine, Texty.org.ua and StopFake, complement these efforts by monitoring emerging narra\u00adtives, exposing influence opera\u00adtions, fact checking and seeking to strengthen public resilience. Together, these actors have created a\u00a0distri\u00adbuted resilience ecosystem that combines insti\u00adtu\u00adtional capacity with independent expertise and conti\u00adnuous societal\u00a0engagement.<\/p>\n This insti\u00adtu\u00adtional ecosystem has also been evolving in response to the changing character of the war. During Mykhailo Fedorov\u2019s tenure as Minister of Defence (January-July 2026), the ministry signi\u00adfi\u00adcantly increased the emphasis on military innovation and cognitive warfare, reflecting an even greater effort to integrate infor\u00admation effects more syste\u00adma\u00adti\u00adcally into defence planning. Although some of the reforms are insti\u00adtu\u00adtio\u00adnally fragile due to Fedorov\u2019s dismissal in July 2026, they illus\u00adtrate how rapidly Ukraine\u2019s under\u00adstanding of the infor\u00admation domain is developing under wartime\u00a0conditions.<\/p>\n At the same time, resilience remains uneven and should not be understood as immunity. Russia continues to adapt its tactics, narra\u00adtives and disse\u00admi\u00adnation methods in response to Ukrainian counter\u00adme\u00ada\u00adsures. Long-term war fatigue, mobili\u00adsation-related anxiety, longstanding distrust in insti\u00adtu\u00adtions and the continued dominance of Telegram as one of the key digital sources of infor\u00admation create oppor\u00adtu\u00adnities for influence opera\u00adtions that exploit existing societal tensions.[16]<\/a> Residents of tempo\u00adr\u00adarily occupied terri\u00adtories remain parti\u00adcu\u00adlarly vulnerable because their access to independent Ukrainian infor\u00admation is severely restricted and Russian-controlled media environ\u00adments dominate everyday infor\u00admation consumption.[17]<\/a><\/p>\n Ukraine\u2019s experience nevert\u00adheless demons\u00adtrates that effective responses to FIMI must extend well beyond debunking false infor\u00admation or removing online content. They require sustained and persistent investment in trusted public insti\u00adtu\u00adtions, independent journalism, strategic commu\u00adni\u00adca\u00adtions, media literacy campaigns, civil society partner\u00adships and conti\u00adnuous adapt\u00adation to an evolving threat environment. The Ukrainian example\u00a0 also illus\u00adtrates that resilience is not a\u00a0fixed outcome but an ongoing process that must evolve quickly and efficiently.<\/p>\n Part IV. Impli\u00adca\u00adtions for Germany and the European\u00a0Union<\/p>\n As discussed throughout this paper, the Ukrainian case demons\u00adtrates that Russian foreign infor\u00admation manipu\u00adlation and inter\u00adfe\u00adrence (FIMI) cannot be understood as an isolated disin\u00adfor\u00admation problem. During the full-scale invasion, infor\u00admation opera\u00adtions have functioned alongside military action, cyber opera\u00adtions, diplo\u00admatic pressure and occupation gover\u00adnance as part of a\u00a0broader strategy to weaken Ukraine\u2019s capacity and willingness to resist. This has important impli\u00adca\u00adtions for Germany and the European Union. It means that countering FIMI is not solely a\u00a0question of content moderation or strategic commu\u00adni\u00adca\u00adtions, but of streng\u00adthening democratic resilience as an integral component of European security policy through whole-of-society approaches.<\/p>\n The European Union has made signi\u00adficant progress in developing a\u00a0more coordi\u00adnated response to FIMI. The European External Action Service (EEAS) FIMI framework, sanctions against Russian state-controlled media, the Digital Services Act, support for independent journalism, and increased coope\u00adration with Ukrainian insti\u00adtu\u00adtions have all streng\u00adthened Europe\u2019s capacity to identify, expose and respond to foreign infor\u00admation manipulation.<\/p>\n The Ukrainian experience nevert\u00adheless highlights several limita\u00adtions of current European approaches. Much of the existing policy framework remains reactive, focusing on identi\u00adfying and responding to individual campaigns after they emerge. Ukraine demons\u00adtrates that Russian influence opera\u00adtions are adaptive, long-term and integrated with broader military, political and diplo\u00admatic objec\u00adtives. Addressing such campaigns therefore requires responses that\u00a0 include stronger insti\u00adtu\u00adtional resilience, sustained public trust, independent media and platform ecosystems, and closer integration between strategic commu\u00adni\u00adca\u00adtions, cyber security, intel\u00adli\u00adgence and civil\u00a0society.<\/p>\n A second lesson concerns the value of Ukrainian expertise. Over more than a\u00a0decade of confronting Russian infor\u00admation opera\u00adtions, and more than four years of full-scale war, Ukraine has developed practical knowledge that extends far beyond individual tools or techno\u00adlogies. Expertise has accumu\u00adlated across government insti\u00adtu\u00adtions, civil society organi\u00adsa\u00adtions, independent media, resear\u00adchers and technology specia\u00adlists, creating a\u00a0uniquely mature under\u00adstanding of how Russian influence opera\u00adtions evolve over time and in parallel with military action. European coope\u00adration should therefore incre\u00adasingly move beyond tradi\u00adtional donor-recipient relati\u00adonships towards even more syste\u00admatic knowledge exchange and insti\u00adtu\u00adtional partner\u00adships, in which Ukrainian practi\u00adtioners contribute directly to policy develo\u00adpment, profes\u00adsional training, capability develo\u00adpment and early-warning mecha\u00adnisms. Moreover, partners still need faster infor\u00admation-sharing, stronger joint early-warning systems and more syste\u00admatic cross-countries coordi\u00adnation.[18]<\/a><\/p>\n Finally, the Ukrainian experience suggests that democratic states should move beyond a\u00a0predo\u00admi\u00adnantly reactive approach to countering FIMI. This does not imply mirroring autho\u00adri\u00adtarian infor\u00admation manipu\u00adlation or engaging in disin\u00adfor\u00admation. Instead, it includes timely strategic commu\u00adni\u00adcation, coordi\u00adnated public attri\u00adbution of hostile activities, the release of credible intel\u00adli\u00adgence where appro\u00adpriate, pre-bunking and inocu\u00adlation efforts, and the integration of infor\u00admation activities into broader political and security strategies. This evolution mirrors broader develo\u00adp\u00adments in Ukrainian cyber strategy, where resilience has incre\u00adasingly been comple\u00admented by deter\u00adrence and carefully governed offensive capabi\u00adlities.[19]<\/a> Similar lessons can be drawn for the infor\u00admation\u00a0domain.<\/p>\n Democratic approaches to FIMI should therefore evolve from those aimed solely at protecting the infor\u00admation environment towards approaches that proac\u00adtively shape condi\u00adtions such that hostile influence opera\u00adtions become less effective and adver\u00adsarial narra\u00adtives gain traction. In doing so, democratic states should seek not only to strengthen resilience against hostile influence, but also to shape the infor\u00admation environment in ways that reinforce democratic security and increase the costs of autho\u00adri\u00adtarian infor\u00admation\u00a0operations.<\/p>\n [1]<\/a> FIMI as part of Russian war machine: Ukraine\u2019s fight \u2013 Ukrainian\u00a0Prism<\/a><\/p>\n [2]<\/a> Ukrainian Resis\u00adtance to Russian Disin\u00adfor\u00admation: Lessons for Future Conflict |\u00a0RAND<\/a><\/p>\n [3]<\/a> Analy\u00adtical Report: Histo\u00adrical Context of Russian Propa\u00adganda \u2013 PR\u00a0Army<\/a><\/p>\n [4]<\/a> Examining Disin\u00adfor\u00admation: Perspec\u00adtives on Residents from Occupied and Freed Terri\u00adtories on Social Media: Detector\u00a0Media<\/a><\/p>\n [5]<\/a> FIMI as part of Russian war machine: Ukraine\u2019s fight \u2013 Ukrainian\u00a0Prism<\/a><\/p>\n [6]<\/a> Media Audience Segments in Ukraine: Research Results \/\u200b LMF<\/a><\/p>\n [7]<\/a> Examining Disin\u00adfor\u00admation: Perspec\u00adtives on Residents from Occupied and Freed Terri\u00adtories on Social Media: Detector\u00a0Media<\/a><\/p>\n [8]<\/a> \u00ab\u042f\u043a \u0440\u043e\u0441\u0456\u0439\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0456\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0456\u0439\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u043a\u043e\u0440\u0430\u0431\u0435\u043b\u044c \u043f\u0456\u0448\u043e\u0432 \u043d\u0430\u2026 \u041d\u0430\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0434\u0438 \u043f\u0456\u0434 \u0447\u0430\u0441 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u043d\u043e\u043c\u0430\u0441\u0448\u0442\u0430\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0457 \u0432\u0456\u0439\u043d\u0438\u00bb<\/a><\/p>\n [9]<\/a> Results of pro-Russian infor\u00admation manipu\u00adlation and disin\u00adfor\u00admation monitoring targeting Ukraine-EU relations during June \u2013 August, 2025 |\u00a0EEAS<\/a><\/p>\n [10]<\/a> Strategic Narra\u00adtives and Infor\u00admation Warfare: Russian FIMI Campaigns against Ukraine\u2019s Armed Forces in the Context of War and Societal Impact \u2013 dif.org.ua<\/a><\/p>\n [11]<\/a> The Archi\u00adtecture of Russia\u2019s FIMI Opera\u00adtions \u2013 EUvsDisinfo<\/a><\/p>\n [12]<\/a> StratCom | NATO Strategic Commu\u00adni\u00adca\u00adtions Centre of Excel\u00adlence Riga,\u00a0Latvia<\/a><\/p>\n [13]<\/a> Over One-Third of Ukrai\u00adnians Turn to News Exclu\u00adsively from Social Media | Internews\u00a0Ukraine<\/a><\/p>\n [14]<\/a> Examining Disin\u00adfor\u00admation: Perspec\u00adtives on Residents from Occupied and Freed Terri\u00adtories on Social Media: Detector\u00a0Media<\/a><\/p>\n [15]<\/a> Ukrainian Resis\u00adtance to Russian Disin\u00adfor\u00admation: Lessons for Future Conflict |\u00a0RAND<\/a><\/p>\n [16]<\/a> FIMI as Part of Russian War Machine: Ukraine\u2019s fight \u2013 Ukrainian\u00a0Prism<\/a><\/p>\n [17]<\/a> Hybrid CoE Research Report 11. How Ukraine fights Russian disin\u00adfor\u00admation: Beehive vs\u00a0mammoth<\/a><\/p>\n [18]<\/a> Time to Take a\u00a0Step Forward from Analysis to a\u00a0Collective Response \u2013 EUvsDisinfo<\/a><\/p>\n [19]<\/a> Offense Is the Best Defense | Orange Cyber\u00adde\u00adfense CERT Threat\u00a0Research<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n![\"Textende\"](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/textende.png\")
<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Part I. Country context and strategic relevance:\u00a0Ukraine Ukraine represents the most advanced contem\u00adporary case of Russian foreign infor\u00admation…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":37008,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[12916,12917,12918,12919,12920,12921,12922,12923,12924,12925,26],"class_list":["post-37007","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-news","tag-eo_sl","tag-europas-osten","tag-op-plus","tag-opplus-desinformation","tag-ostliche-partnerschaft","tag-ostliche-partnerschaft-plus","tag-policy-brief","tag-policy-brief-ostliche-partnerschaft","tag-publikationen","tag-russland","tag-ukraine"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/37007","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=37007"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/37007\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/37008"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=37007"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=37007"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ukraine\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=37007"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}