OK, pencils down.

The 2025 NBA Draft is complete, after two days and the usual rapid-fire series of trades at the end — 44 of the final 47 picks changed hands at least once. Congrats to Boston (28), Chicago (43), and Cleveland (58) for holding onto their picks for the entire eight-year cycle during which draft picks may be dealt.

And now, as ever, it’s time to play 52-pickup on the leftover bits and pieces, the stuff that didn’t command A-1 headlines but was notable enough to get attention. As a reminder, my pick-by-pick analysis is here, but a few leftover topics require me to dive in more deeply.

Here, without further ado, is my best, worst and weirdest of the 2025 draft:

Best worst move: The Blazers’ trade down and Yang Hansen pick

On one hand, I want to like what Portland did. They only moved down five spots in the draft and got an unprotected future first for it! And two seconds. Holy moly. Portland squeezed that asset tree for all it was worth and then still got their guy in Yang after moving down from 11 to 16. They’re also probably correct that they couldn’t move down much further because the Nets would have used one of their five first-round picks on Yang.

It’s the “their guy” part where I’m struggling, because I’m worried the ghost of Papagiannis lives on with this deal.

One area where I think NBA teams struggle is calibrating overseas prospect performance back to the NBA, even though the parallels are clear for anyone who wishes to study them. The fact that Yang wasn’t the best player in the Chinese league should be an immediate red flag as a first-round candidate; this is a league where guys like Kenny Lofton Jr., Harry Giles, Tacko Fall and T.J. Leaf are just wrecking people night after night, and Yang was … solid. Good, even. But not dominant.

To use a few recent comparisons, this wasn’t Alperen Şengün wrecking the Turkish league as an 18-year-old or teenaged Dario Šarić and Jusuf Nurkić clowning guys in the Adriatic League. On Yang’s own team, NBA rejects Quinndary Weatherspoon and Jordan Mickey were the more valuable performers; Yang was the team’s third option. While Yang threw some spicy passes at the combine (where his 22 points and 8 assists in 31 minutes certainly made an impression), he had a negative assist-turnover rate in the Chinese league for the season. He’s also 20 — a year older than the one-and-dones in this draft.

Maybe I’m wrong here and Yang blows up and makes me eat my words. But historically, data from overseas professional leagues is more predictive than the numbers from the NCAA. They don’t paint a favorable picture for the Blazers’ gamble here.

Most historic move: New Orleans’s trade-up

Sorry to drive the truck over the Pels again, but give me one more second here. Look, we’ll see if Derik Queen becomes a player. But in terms of asset value, New Orleans trading a likely future lottery pick to Atlanta for the right to move up from 23 to 13 might be the single worst draft move I’ve seen in (redacted) years of doing this. Your odds of winning that swap are small, and the risk of losing it massively is significant.

At this late hour, only two other historically bad “worst asset move” contenders come to mind. The first is the Clippers trading out of the second pick and Antonio McDyess in 1995 to move down to 15th, so they could add Rodney Rogers. The second is the Wizards trading the sixth pick in the 2009 draft to Minnesota for Mike Miller and Randy Foye instead of, say, drafting Steph Curry.

Yes, other draft-night moves have turned out worse based strictly on player evaluation — the Jayson Tatum-Markelle Fultz trade comes to mind, obviously, or Dirk Nowitzki for Robert Traylor. But in terms of wasting a highly valuable asset for an extremely questionable return, this one is an all-timer.

Biggest question: Was the Atlanta deal there for anyone else?

In our shock over the New Orleans deal, we didn’t tackle some other, deeper mysteries. Such as… did somebody drop the bag before Atlanta picked it up?

We’ll likely never know, but this is the one piece of draft night forensics that most interests me. The Pelicans picked Jeremiah Fears with the seventh pick, and then immediately set their sights on adding Queen by moving up from pick No. 23. So, it seems obvious they were calling every team between picks eight and 12 and making offers to move up.

Was that same juicy pick — the better of New Orleans or Milwaukee’s unprotected 2026 first — on the table for everyone they called before they got to Atlanta at 13, or did the Pels up their offer out of desperation after the first few teams hung up? Did Toronto like Collin Murray-Boyles so much that they turned it down, or was it never offered? Did Portland prefer the deal they already had with Memphis? Did Chicago’s phones work? I have questions.

Often in the NBA, it’s about the deals you didn’t do — I could give you countless examples from seven years in Memphis. In that vein, it seems there might be some undone deals for a few teams to think about between now and when Atlanta makes that pick in 2026.

Best non-lottery fit: Jase Richardson, Orlando

OK, let’s spin this positive for a minute. I thought Richardson fared the best of any non-lottery player in terms of landing in a favorable situation, and that the Magic, in turn, helped themselves by nabbing him at 25. Richardson’s biggest weaknesses are that he’s small (6-1 at the combine) but not really a point guard, and extremely left-handed. But he can shoot, and he can guard the other team’s point guard.

Enter the Magic. Orlando keeps the ball in the hands of its forwards, Paolo Banchero and Franz Wagner, most of the time. When they aren’t handling the rock, Desmond Bane probably will be. Ergo, a “point” guard like Richardson doesn’t really need to be a point guard, and instead can roam the perimeter hunting catch-and-shoots or quick catch-and-gos to get in the lane. Even his handedness is less of an issue in Orlando — every other roster player on the team is a righty.

Jase Richardson might have been an awkward fit elsewhere, but not in Orlando. (Kevin C. Cox/Getty Images)Weirdest night: Brooklyn using all five firsts

The Nets had five first-round picks, four of which came late in the round, and ended up using all five of them rather than a) consolidating some of them to move up or b) trading out for future picks. It seems that the trade-out market was extremely limited based on Oklahoma City’s experience (see below), but the Nets also made a roster crowd for themselves by not taking any stash players with their picks at the end of the first round. (Real Madrid’s Hugo González, who went 28th to Boston, would have been one obvious candidate.)

Not only did Brooklyn select five draft rookies to add to the roster, joining the 53 people they had high-fiving in the draft room, but they added significant positional and skill overlap. I’m not sure how these dudes play with each other. Not one of the players they took is renowned as much of a shooter, but guards Nolan Traore, Ben Saraf, and forwards Egor Demin and Danny Wolf all are “ball-in-hand” players who operate best when they can orchestrate pick-and-rolls. It’s going to create some problems if multiple members of this draft class are on the court together, making life harder for the others by not spacing the floor and always needing the ball.

Speaking of which…

Most underrated story: Roster jams

At least three teams left the draft with more players than I expected, and now have to make some hard decisions about how to end up at the league maximum of 15 players.

Let’s start with the Nets again. Brooklyn selected five rookies and likely wants to keep restricted free agent Ziaire Williams, Cam Thomas and Day’Ron Sharpe, which takes them to eight. They also have Cam Johnson, Nic Claxton, Terance Mann, Dariq Whitehead and Noah Clowney under contract, which makes 13. They have more cap space than any team in the league and likely want to use it to take in more contracts from other teams … and then use their room exception … and that’s before we even get into their options on players like Jalen Wilson and Tyrese Martin, who played contributing roles a year ago, or veterans like D’Angelo Russell or De’Anthony Melton.

The problem isn’t intractable, but if the Nets bring in multiple contracts into their cap space, they might need to buy out at least one of them immediately; that’s a bummer because they’d probably rather keep that kind of money on their books for in-season trade opportunities. They can possibly cut Whitehead, who has done little in his first two pro seasons, or trade Johnson, who will have a market. What’s clear, however, is that for the Nets to maximize their bounty of cap space — something no other team has — they will need to make some cuts, including some players they might have preferred to keep.

Brooklyn isn’t alone. Oklahoma City has 16 roster players after taking Thomas Sorber with the 15th pick, and the Thunder essentially had to punt their pick at 24 so as not to make the problem worse. If you’re wondering why the Nets didn’t trade out for future picks with one of their five firsts, the Thunder’s return on pick No. 24 might be a tell — they got a 2027 Spurs pick that is protected 1 through 16 for their trouble. Yeah, not exactly a bounty. But Oklahoma City was in a position where it had to take whatever the market would spit out; picking at 24 and rostering the player only would have worsened the problem. Where’s Josh Huestis when you need him?

With the roster still heavy, one wonders how the Thunder might get out of this, especially if they want to use their room below the tax line to add to the roster. Ousmane Dieng hardly played last year and makes $6 million, so he’s an obvious candidate to be part of a trade. Another, sneaky possibility: What if the Thunder decline Ajay Mitchell’s $3 million team option and sign him to a two-way, with a wink and nod, they’ll take care of him later? It would at least kick the can down the road if the Thunder can’t find an immediate solution this week.

Also, check out Charlotte. The Hornets added four draft rookies after using picks Nos. 4, 29, 33 and 34, with the 29th pick coming courtesy of trading Mark Wiliams for old friend Vasa Micić. While the Hornets can buy out Micić, they had nine other guaranteed contracts on their books before they added the four rookies. That makes 13, and that total doesn’t include hustling big man Moussa Diabaté, or free agent guard Tre Mann, or locker room sage Taj Gibson, or any other player the Hornets might try to sign with exception money given their still-ample room below the tax line.

Finally, there’s the Grizzlies. Theirs isn’t an issue of roster spots as much as money. They need to generate about $10 million in cap room to sign Jaren Jackson, Jr., to a renegotiated contract plus an extension that pays him 30 percent of next year’s maximum. It seemed the Grizzlies might do so by moving back in the draft and trading John Konchar and Jay Huff, but Memphis increased its cap number by trading up five spots (the 11th pick will make about $1.3 million more than the 16th pick). They also surrendered some of the draft capital that otherwise could be used to incentivize teams to take on Konchar and Huff’s salary.

So, what now? Options remain. Memphis could stretch Cole Anthony’s contract if it were desperate; although that seems suboptimal, it’s at least a backstop. Trading Kentavious Caldwell-Pope for a lower-salaried player is another possibility.  Or, maybe they circle back to a Konchar and Huff deal that costs them more draft capital (likely multiple seconds).

One thing is clear: I expected both Dieng, above, and Konchar to have new addresses by the end of the draft. Surprisingly, they’re still here.

Best slide into a good landing spot: Kasparas Jakučionis, Miami

Jakučionis’ tumble down the draft board was a bit surprising given where several draft analysts had rated him, but in the end, it’s hard to argue with where he landed.

Miami has a clear need for a ball-handling combo guard, especially after Terry Rozier turned into a pumpkin last season. This is a team that pressed Alec Burks into service as a starter a year ago, and whose starting point guard (Davion Mitchell) is more of a defensive specialist. Trades can always shift the chessboard, obviously, but Jakučionis might get minutes running the second unit right away — especially if 2023 first-rounder Jaime Jaquez, Jr. can’t rediscover his mojo after a baffling sophomore slump.

Biggest reach, sane front office division: Memphis’ Cedric Coward

The Grizzlies made a pretty large bet on Coward, gambling first that he wasn’t going to get to them at pick No. 16, and second that the extravagant price they paid to move up just five spots in the draft was worth his upside. The Grizzlies surrendered a 2028 Orlando unprotected first-round pick and two future seconds, in addition to their pick at 16. Pull yourself out of draft world and teleport to the trade deadline, and think of what this pick package would bring in; it likely gets you a solid starter, if not more.

Memphis bet that the combination of Coward’s fit (they’ve been looking for a big 3-and-D wing ever since Dillon Brooks left) and potential upside to be a plus starter on a cap-friendly rookie contract (we’ll see) was worth pushing those chips into the table.

The Grizzlies certainly didn’t trade Desmond Bane for four firsts from the Magic just so they could wait til the 2028 draft and pick somebody; this was always going to be trade capital, and the Grizzlies have fared well on some other draft night trade-ups. (Including the one that got them Bane.) But this asset push implies a pretty huge valuation on Coward; we’ll see if he lives up to it.

Question that may only interest me: Future pick protections

Golden State sent a 2032 second-round pick to Memphis that only conveys if it is picks 51 through 60.

But, what if it’s a 32-team league by then? Or even 34? If Adam Silver decides to add Seattle, Las Vegas, Mexico City and Montreal in the next seven years, suddenly we would have 64 or 68 picks instead of 60, and those draft pick protections would get thrown sideways.

Perhaps that’s an easy one to resolve — most of these are intended to only convey if they’re in the last five or last 10 picks in the second round, and that makes adjusting them simple. But some could be more complicated. For instance, what of the top-20 protected first-round pick that Golden State owes Washington in 2030? In a 32 or 34-team league, does that get adjusted to top-21 or top-22 protected?

Of all the issues to deal with in expansion, this is probably the smallest. But that Golden State protection seven years out got me wondering.

Best pick nobody is talking about: Thomas Sorber, Oklahoma City

Let’s close on a happy note. With a nod to the Raptors’ selection of Murray-Boyles at No. 9 and the Bulls’ pick of Noa Essengue at No. 12, both of whom I think could turn out great and haven’t generated much chatter that I’ve seen, it’s time to talk about the world champs.

I like the Sorber pick for soooooo many reasons.

Did they get value? Yes — I had Sorber 10th on my board and the Thunder picked him at 15.

Did they get a roster fit? Yes — the Thunder’s biggest weakness is their lack of widebody fives, and Sorber answers that.

Did they set themselves up for the future? Yes — the Thunder may need to decline Isaiah Hartenstein’s team option a year from now because of their impending cap and tax situation, and Sorber could be ready to take over a major role in the frontcourt rotation by then.

Can they maximize the player? Again, I think yes. Sorber has an incipient face-up game from 15 feet but needs to smooth out his J to really make it work; the Thunder have arguably the best shooting coach in the league in Chip Engelland.

Look, Cooper Flagg will be the best pick in the draft, and I think the top four picks will all have excellent careers. Historically, nothing is guaranteed once we get deeper into the first round. But the Thunder gave themselves a great chance of having a successful pick, not that they need more help.

(Top photo of Yang Hansen: Mike Lawrie/Getty Images)