Toplines
The US Coast Guard seized two oil tankers with links to Russia for attempting to bypass US sanctions against Venezuelan oil. US officials confirmed on January 7 that US Coast Guard forces boarded and seized the Bella-1, also known as the Marinera, and the M/T Sophia oil tankers in the North Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean Sea, respectively.[1] US Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem stated that both vessels had either last docked in Venezuela or were en route to Venezuela at the time of the US operations.[2] The Bella-1 appears to have been about 300 kilometers south of Iceland when US forces boarded the vessel.[3] The Bella-1 was reportedly not transporting any oil, and the M/T Sophia was reportedly transporting about 1.8 to 2 million barrels of Venezuelan crude oil when US forces detained the vessels. A US official told Western media outlets that Russia deployed a submarine and other naval assets to escort the Bella-1 before the US operation to seize the vessel.[4] The Bella-1 is linked to Louis Marine Shipholding Enterprises S.A, which the United States sanctioned in 2024 for carrying cargo in support of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF).[5] The Bella-1 previously flew a Panamanian flag, but the Russian Ministry of Transport stated on January 7 that it authorized the Bella-1 to fly the Russian flag under the name Marinera as of December 24.[6] The M/T Sophia is linked to Sunne Co Limited, which the United States sanctioned in January 2025 for participating in the Russian economy and shipping Russian crude oil sold for well above the $60 per barrel price cap on Russian oil in violation of US sanctions.[7] White House Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that the United States was carrying out a court order for the detention of the Bella-1 and arrest of its crew and will bring its crew to the United States for prosecution.[8] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated that it is closely monitoring the situation regarding the US seizure of the Bella-1 and acknowledged that Russian citizens were among its crew.[9] The Russian MFA called for the United States to treat the Russian citizens well and to “not impede their speedy return” to Russia.[10]
US, Ukrainian, and Coalition of the Willing officials continued talks in Paris on January 7, and details of the potential security guarantees for Ukraine are beginning to emerge. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on January 7 that he met with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner as part of continuing negotiations.[11] Newly-appointed Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Kyrylo Budanov stated on January 7 that the negotiations achieved “tangible results” but that he cannot disclose further details.[12] Zelensky summarized, on January 6, details of the Coalition of the Willing decisions thus far regarding a post-war multinational force and ceasefire monitoring mechanisms in Ukraine.[13] Zelensky stated that the states determined the countries that will take the lead in guaranteeing a ceasefire on the ground, in the sea, and in the sky, as well as in reconstructing Ukraine; and the command and control structure of a multinational force that would deploy to Ukraine. The technical details of this arrangement are not public as of this writing. Zelensky stated that the coalition states still need to work out the monitoring mechanism itself and the size and components of the post-war Ukrainian military. Zelensky stated that Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and France determined the deployment, quantity, weapons, and components of the militaries necessary for a multinational peacekeeping force. Ukraine, France, and the United Kingdom signed a declaration of intent on January 6 stating that France and the United Kingdom intend to deploy armed forces to Ukraine as part of a multinational force; involve the multinational force in deterrence operations in the land, sea, and air; help construct, protect, and use facilities for material, weapons, military equipment, and strategic reserves in Ukraine; and create a negotiating group to form an international agreement with other Coalition of the Willing member states.[14] European leaders indicated that Belgium will contribute to coalition obligations in the sea and air and will also support training Ukrainian forces; that Sweden is willing to provide Gripen fighter jets for aerial surveillance, maritime resources for Black Sea demining, and to train Ukrainian forces; and that Germany, Spain, and Lithuania may deploy ground forces to Ukraine after the war as part of the multinational force.[15]
Zelensky also indicated that there was progress in “bilateral security guarantees” and “trilateral” documents, possibly referring to US-Ukrainian security guarantees and US-Ukraine-Russia peace agreements, and that he expects to sign these documents in the near future.[16] Zelensky stated that Ukraine and the United States still need to work out territorial issues and control over the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), however, and that he may discuss these issues with US President Donald Trump directly if the US and Ukrainian delegations do not make further progress in negotiations.
Russian forces are likely unable to simultaneously replace losses suffered in Ukraine and build out their strategic reserves. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on January 7 that the Russian military command only formed four new divisions out of 17 maneuver divisions and up to nine brigades that Russia had planned to form in 2025.[17] These divisions are the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), the 71st Motorized Rifle Division (14th Army Corps [AC], LMD), the 55th Naval Infantry Division (formerly 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, Pacific Fleet), and the 120th Naval Infantry Division (formerly 336th Naval Infantry Regiment, Baltic Fleet), and are likely not staffed at their doctrinal end strength. Mashovets noted that Russian forces have abandoned forming motorized rifle divisions according to prewar structures in favor of forming assault infantry- and light vehicle-heavy divisions that field limited armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) and trucks with minimal organic air defense, artillery, and logistics elements.[18] The Russian inability to form divisions to the pre-2022 template for mechanized divisions is consistent with ISW’s assessment that wartime equipment losses, insufficient AFV production, and tactical shifts favoring massed infantry assaults and infiltration missions over mechanized assaults have resulted in Russian forces optimizing for positional warfare.[19] Mashovets also assessed that Russian forces are unlikely to generate a surplus of over 70,000 troops in 2026 to generate a strategic reserve, a number insufficient to form the planned 17 maneuver divisions.[20] Then-Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated on December 27 that Russia has not yet developed a strategic reserve to its desired capabilities as it “constantly” activates its operational reserve to support ongoing combat operations in Ukraine.[21] Data from the Ukrainian General Staff indicates that Russian forces suffered about 416,570 casualties throughout 2025, for a daily average of 1,141 casualties, roughly the loss of a division’s worth of personnel every 10 days.[22] Mashovets assessed that Russian forces will likely suffer increased casualties in 2026 while storming increasingly fortified Ukrainian positions, including Ukraine’s Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast.[23]
Key Takeaways
- The US Coast Guard seized two oil tankers with links to Russia for attempting to bypass US sanctions against Venezuelan oil.
- US, Ukrainian, and Coalition of the Willing officials continued talks in Paris on January 7, and details of the potential security guarantees for Ukraine are beginning to emerge.
- Russian forces are likely unable to simultaneously replace losses suffered in Ukraine and build out their strategic reserves.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kharkiv and Pokrovsk directions. Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and in the Hulyaipole direction.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in The Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their mid- and long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure overnight on January 6 to 7, and Ukrainian military officials reported additional Ukrainian strikes since December 31. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 7 that Ukrainian forces struck the Oskolneftesnab oil depot near Kotel, Belgorod Oblast (about 90 kilometers from the frontline), causing a large fire.[24] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the oil depot provides fuel for Russian forces. A geolocated image published on January 6 shows a large fire at an oil depot near Kotel, and Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov acknowledged that Ukrainian forces struck the Kotel oil depot.[25] The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that Ukrainian strikes against the Temp oil depot near Rybinsk, Yaroslavl Oblast on December 30 to 31 damaged two RVS-5000 vertical tanks.[26] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on January 7 that Ukrainian forces recently struck several Russian energy and defense facilities, including the Afipsky Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai overnight on January 2 to 3; the Yaroslavl Oil Refinery in Yaroslavl Oblast; the Kirovo-Chepetsky Chemical Plant in Kirov Oblast, and the Dorogobuzh Chemical Plant near Novomykhailovskoye, Smolensk Oblast overnight on January 5 to 6.[27] Brovdi also confirmed that Ukrainian forces struck the Novokuybyshevsk Oil Refinery in Samara City overnight on January 1 to 2. ISW observed geolocated footage of a fire at the refinery published on January 2.[28]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border
Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[29]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on January 7 that elements of the Russian 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) seized Andriivka (north of Sumy City), which Russian sources claimed Russian forces had seized as of December 27, indicating that Russian forces likely lost positions in the area since December 27.[30]
Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Varachyne, Bilovody, and Oleksiivka and toward Andriivka, Nova Sich, and Khrapivshchyna; northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka; and southeast of Sumy City near Hrabovske and toward Krasnopillya on January 6 and 7.[31]
A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that elements of the Russian 34th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are struggling to advance toward Ryasne (southeast of Sumy City) from Hrabovske.[32]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the Russian Chechen 349th Akhmat-Russia Motorized Rifle Regiment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Velyka Berizka (northwest of Sumy City along the international border).[33] Elements of the 34th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade are reportedly operating west of Hrabovske.[34]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City.
Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in northern Kharkiv oblast.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 7 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in western Vovchanski Khutory (northeast of Kharkiv City).[35]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Zelene, Buhruvatka, Vilcha, Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Lyman, Starytsya, Prylipka, and Tykhe and toward Ternova on January 6 and 7.[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Symynivka (northeast of Kharkiv City).[37]
A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that 25 servicemembers from the Russian 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), including 16 wounded, are bogged down in forests west of Vovchansk without the strength to either advance or even consolidate their position.[38] The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command declared about 40 servicemembers of the 3rd Battalion of the 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment missing in action (MIA) since the start of 2026 and implied that these servicemembers were in fact killed in action (KIA).
Order of Battle: Drone operators and artillery elements of the Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion (reportedly of the Southern Military District [SMD]) and 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], LMD) are striking Ukrainian forces in western Vovchanski Khutory.[39]
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove and toward Khatnie and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne on January 6 and 7 but did not advance.[40]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2
Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger indicated that Ukrainian forces control areas of central Kupyansk.[41] ISW does not assess that this change occurred in the previous 24 hours.
Assessed Russian infiltration: ISW assesses that Russian forces operating in eastern Kupyansk maintain a connection to Russian infiltrators operating in the northern outskirts of Kupyansk. ISW does not assess that this change in control of terrain occurred in the previous 24 hours and continues to assess that Russian forces that previously infiltrated into Kupyansk are still operating in the town.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk) and to the eastern outskirts of Tyshchenkivka (northwest of Kupyansk).[42]
Russian forces attacked toward Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Dvorichanske and Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Odradne; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka, Pishchane, and Kurylivka on January 6 and 7.[43]
Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions near Kupyansk.[44] Elements of the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], LMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Kupyansk direction.[45]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 7 but did not make confirmed advances.
Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on January 6 and the Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger indicated on January 6 that Ukrainian forces have likely liberated Nova Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova), an area which Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces control.[46] The milblogger also indicated that Ukrainian forces maintain control over northern Bohuslavka (north of Borova), an area which Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces control.[47]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Borivska Andriivka and toward Nova Kruhlyakivka and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka and Novovodyane and toward Cherneshchyna and Novoserhiivka on January 6 and 7.[48]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st GTA) are striking Ukrainian forces south of Nova Kruhlyakivka.[49]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on January 7 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Derylove, Shandryholove, and Serednie and toward Drobysheve and Svyatohirsk; north of Lyman near Karpivka and toward Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; and east of Lyman near Zarichne on January 6 and 7.[50]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on January 7 that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a Russian fuel and lubricants warehouse near occupied Sorokyne (southeast of Luhansk City and about 135 kilometers from the frontline) on an unspecified date between January 2 and 7.[51]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on January 7 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Zakitne, Dibrova, and Ozerne; south of Siversk near Fedorivka and Svyato-Pokrovske; and southwest of Siversk near Riznykivka and Vasyukivka and toward Bondarne on January 6 and 7.[52]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported on January 7 that Russian forces have intensified offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction from the Serebryanske forest (northeast of Siversk) and from areas near Dronivka (northwest of Siversk).[53] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are attempting to cross the Siverskyi Donets River under the cover of fog with groups of four to five servicemembers in rubber boats from Platonivka (northwest of Siversk) in order to establish a stable crossing. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported on January 7 that Russian forces are attempting to move supplies through the Serebryanske forest to small groups of Russian servicemembers attempting to bypass Dronivka.[54]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Kalenyky and Kryva Luka (both west of Siversk).[55]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on January 7 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in eastern Kostyantynivka, east of and in eastern Minkivka (northeast of Kostyantynivka), north of Mayske (northeast of Kostyantynivka), on the north bank of the Kleban-Byk Reservoir west of Ivanopillya (south of Kostyantynivka); and northeast and marginally north of Yablunivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka).[56]
Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar, Minkivka, Mayske, and Novomarkove; west of Kostyantynivka toward Mykolaipillya; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Kleban-Byk, Oleksandro-Shultyne, Katerynivka, and Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya and toward Illinivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka on January 6 and 7.[57]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Chechen 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kostyantynivka.[58] First-person view (FPV) drone operator elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD), including its 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment and 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion, are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near various locations west and southwest of Druzhkivka.[59]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on January 7 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar; east of Dobropillya near Shakhove, Nove Shakhove, Dorozhnie, and Toretske, and toward Novyi Donbas; and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Ivanivka on January 6 and 7.[60]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) reportedly continue to operate near Shakhove.[61]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on January 7 but did not make confirmed advances.
Assessed Russian infiltration: ISW assesses that Russian forces have infiltrated north of Pokrovsk, given that the available evidence about the situation north of Pokrovsk suggests that Russian and Ukrainian positions are intermixed in the industrial areas north of Pokrovsk. ISW does not assess that this change took place in the previous 24 hours.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk) and advanced northwest of Pokrovsk.[62]
Refinement of areas under Russian claims: A Russian milblogger indicated on January 7 that Ukrainian forces advanced northwest of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk), an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[63]
Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Novooleksandrivka; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and toward Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhetske and Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near and within Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Novopidhorodne, and Molodetske on January 6 and 7.[64] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hryshyne and Udachne.[65]
The commander of a Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on January 7 that Ukrainian drone operators continue to maintain fire control over Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the Pokrovsk direction and that Russian forces can only safely use vehicles five to seven kilometers from the frontline.[66] The commander reported that Ukrainian fire control in the sector slows Russian resupply efforts by forcing Russian servicemembers to dismount and deliver supplies on foot to Russian drone and mortar crews near the frontline.
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) reportedly continue to operate near Myrnohrad.[67] Elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating west of Rodynske.[68] Drone operators of the 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Novooleksandrivka.[69]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on January 7 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near and within Novopavlivka; northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka, Bilyakivka, and Novomykolaivka; and south of Novopavlivka near Dachne and FIliya on January 6 and 7.[70]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Novopavlivka.[71]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on January 7 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Zelenyi Hai and Ivanivka and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Verbove, Vyshneve, Sichneve, Stepove, Oleksiivka, and Krasnohirske on January 6 and 7.[72]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that a Ukrainian drone strike targeted a logistics depot of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division in an unspecified location in occupied Donetsk Oblast overnight.[73] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on January 7 that Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against a deployment point in Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk and roughly 20 kilometers from the frontline) and a command post in Hirnyk (southeast of Pokrovsk and roughly 25 kilometers from the frontline) of the 76th Airborne (VDV) Division on an unspecified date between January 2 and 7.[74]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Hulyaipole.[75] ISW assesses that the presence of a Russian position farther west within northern Hulyaipole indicates that the Russian forward edge of battle area (FEBA) is farther south than ISW previously assessed in northern Hulyaipole.
Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 7 shows Russian forces operating farther west within northern Hulyaipole in what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the FEBA at this time.[76]
Russian forces attacked near and within Hulyaipole; northwest of Hulyaipole near Pryluky; north of Hulyaipole near Zelene, Dobropillya, Varvarivka, and Yehorivka; and northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke, Rybne, and Zlahoda on January 6 and 7.[77]
A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported on January 6 that Ukrainian forces cleared Russian small groups that infiltrated into the Ukrainian near rear in Svyatopetrivka (northwest of Hulyaipole), Olenokostyantynivka (north of Hulyaipole), Staroukrainka (west of Hulyaipole), Pryluky, Varvarivka, and Zelene and near Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole) on January 5.[78] The source noted that Russian forces exploited unfavorable weather conditions that degraded Ukrainian drone operations to infiltrate the Ukrainian near rear and engaged Ukrainian drone operators and artillery crews with small arms.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are striking Ukrainian vehicles in Ternuvate (northwest of Hulyaipole).[79] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are striking Ukrainian positions northwest of Dorozhnyanka (south of Hulyaipole).[80]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 7 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced into central Novoyakovlivka, in northern Prymorske, and north of Stepnohirsk (all northwest of Orikhiv).[81]
Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Bilohirya and Mala Tokmachka, south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka, west of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka, Stepnohirsk, and Plavni, and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske and Lukyanivske and toward Novoyakovlivka on January 6 and 7.[82]
Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on January 7 that Russian forces attempted to infiltrate Ukrainian lines near Malokaterynivka (just north of Prymorske and northwest of Orikhiv) several times at the end of 2025, moving along the bed of the former Kakhovka Reservoir, which largely dried up following the Russian detonation of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant Dam in early June 2023.[83] Voloshyn reported that Ukrainian forces eliminated the infiltration groups and that Russian forces continue constant artillery and drone strikes against Malokaterynivka.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in Prymorske.[84]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on January 7 that Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against a Russian ammunition depot in occupied Novokazankuvate (southeast of Orikhiv and about 31 kilometers from the frontline) and logistics hubs in occupied Khliborobne (southeast of Hulyaipole and about 24 kilometers from the frontline) and Sofiivka (about 75 kilometers from the frontline) on unspecified dates between January 2 and 7.[85]
Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on January 7 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge on January 7.[86]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 299th and 331st VDV regiments (both 98th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Kherson direction.[87]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Crimea. Brovdi reported on January 7 that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a Russian artillery ammunition depot in occupied Mizhirya (roughly 217 kilometers from the frontline) on an unspecified date between January 2 and 7.[88]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 6 to 7. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from Taganrog, Rostov Oblast and 95 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones – of which about 60 were Shahed-type drones – from the directions of Oryol City; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[89] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 81 drones and that 14 drones struck eight locations. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Acting Head Vladyslav Haivanenko reported on January 7 that a Russian strike against residential infrastructure in Dnipro City wounded at least 10 people, including two children.[90] Kryvyi Rih Defense Council Head Oleksandr Vikul reported on January 7 that Russian strikes against Kryvyi Rih wounded three civilians.[91] Ukrainian officials reported on January 7 that Russian forces struck port and commercial infrastructure in Odesa Oblast and Zaporizhzhia City, killing two civilians and wounding eight.[92]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing Significant To Report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
Endnotes
[1] https://x.com/KristiNoem/status/2008916310332170487; https://x.com/US_EUCOM/status/2008897287691399504; https://www.southcom.mil/News/PressReleases/Article/4372191/maritime-interdiction-operation-jan-7-2026/; https://twitter.com/Southcom/status/2008905619424620879
[2] https://x.com/KristiNoem/status/2008916310332170487
[3] https://www.9news.com.au/world/us-begins-operation-to-seize-venezuela-linked-oil-tanker/6fd704f8-8ffa-4195-a26e-d738451f2820; https://global.espreso dot tv/sanctions-russia-russia-deploys-submarine-to-shield-oil-tanker-from-us-seizure-attempt
[4] https://www.foxnews.com/world/venezuela-oil-tanker-marinera-evades-us-interception-adopting-russian-identity-fleeing-atlantic; https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/russia-sends-submarine-to-escort-tanker-the-u-s-tried-to-seize-off-venezuela-4bd78dc7; https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-seizing-venezuela-linked-oil-tanker-after-weeks-long-pursuit-2026-01-07/; https://www.axios.com/2026/01/07/trump-russia-oil-tanker-seize-bella-venzuela; https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-interdict-tanker-carrying-venezuelan-oil-after-maduros-capture/;
[5] https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=49248; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2399
[6] https://t.me/MFARussia/27961; https://t.me/Mintrans_Russia/8235
[7] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2777; https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=51707
[8] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pqzh65k7ekw; https://suspilne dot media/1208058-ssa-suditimut-rosijskih-spivrobitnikiv-z-zahoplenogo-tankera-pid-rosijskim-praporom-bilij-dim/
[9] https://tass. dot u/politika/26103551; https://tass dot ru/politika/26103559
[10] https://tass dot ru/politika/26103559
[11] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/prezident-obgovoriv-zi-stivenom-vitkoffom-i-dzharedom-kushne-102321
[12] https://x.com/Kyrylo_Budanov/status/2008831555553173931; https://suspilne dot media/1207218-sbu-rozslidue-informaciu-pro-rosijsku-skolu-pri-monastiri-pidsumki-koalicii-ohocih-1414-den-vijni/?
[13] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/zayava-prezidenta-ukrayini-pid-chas-spilnogo-z-emmanyuelem-m-102309
[14] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/695e27f68832ab3a48513804/Declaration_of_intent_between_the_UK_France_and_Ukraine.pdf
[15] https://x.com/Bart_DeWever/status/2008645802340581835; https://x.com/SwedishPM/status/2008657283279106227; https://suspilne dot media/1207246-svecia-gotova-nadati-ukraini-vinisuvaci-gripen-ta-dopomogti-z-rozminuvannam-cornogo-mora-pisla-zaversenna-vijni/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/07/vynyshhuvachi-gripen-ta-rozminuvannya-chornogo-morya-shvecziya-pidtrymaye-ukrayinu-pislya-dosyagnennya-myru/; https://abcnews.go.com/International/france-uk-commit-deploying-troops-ukraine-ceasefire-agreed/story?id=128958047; https://efe dot com/espana/2026-01-06/sanchez-tropas-espana-mision-paz-ucrania/; https://www.lrt dot lt/naujienos/pasaulyje/6/2799103/zemaitaitis-ir-kaunas-sutaria-kad-lietuva-i-ukraina-galetu-siusti-kariu-ivedus-taika
[16] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/zayava-prezidenta-ukrayini-pid-chas-spilnogo-z-emmanyuelem-m-102309
[17] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3174
[18] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3176; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3177
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/future-of-war/the-russian-military-forecasting-the-threat/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-1-2025/
[20] https://t.me/poluavtobia/389546; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-1-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_21-22/
[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-27-2025/
[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2025/
[23] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3176
[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33507
[25] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/7044; https://t.me/vvgladkov/18246
[26] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2025/
[27] https://t.me/robert_magyar/1834
[28] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2026/
[29] https://t.me/destruction_team/141; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10956
[30] https://t.me/motopatriot78/47193; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-27-2025/
[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33512; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33492; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33490; https://t.me/uvkkursk/173; https://t.me/severnnyi/6264; https://t.me/wargonzo/31569; https://t.me/dva_majors/86269; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47164
[32] https://t.me/severnnyi/6269
[33] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/6289
[34] https://t.me/motopatriot78/47164
[35] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2008781104782905433; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2008782208048541833; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/6287
[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33512; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19883; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33492; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19881; https://t.me/rusich_army/27731; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33490; https://t.me/dva_majors/86269; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38225; https://t.me/wargonzo/31569; https://t.me/severnnyi/6264; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38248
[37] https://t.me/rusich_army/27731
[38] https://t.me/severnnyi/6276
[39] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2008781104782905433; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2008782208048541833; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/6287
[40] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38248; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38225; https://t.me/wargonzo/31569; https://t.me/dva_majors/86269
[41] https://t.me/rybar/76561
[42] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/193422; https://t.me/wargonzo/31569
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33512; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19883; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33492; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19881; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33490 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/86269; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/107037; https://t.me/severnnyi/6264; https://t.me/wargonzo/31569; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/193483; https://t.me/notes_veterans/26508; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38248
[44] https://t.me/notes_veterans/26508; https://t.me/epoddubny/26003; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/21899
[45] https://t.me/motopatriot78/47168; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47174; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47186; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47199; https://t.me/dva_majors/86273
[46] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2008619475093119394; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2008619477584539676; https://t.me/boevoekteschenie/1410; https://t.me/rybar/76535
[47] ttps://t.me/rybar/76535
[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33512; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19883; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19881; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33490; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33492
[49] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2008619475093119394 https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2008619477584539676 https://t.me/boevoekteschenie/1410
[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33512; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19883; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19881; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33490; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33492; https://t.me/wargonzo/31569
[51] https://t.me/robert_magyar/1834; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/07/za-6-dniv-zavdano-udariv-po-21-ob%ca%bcyektu-vglyb-vorozhyh-ta-okupovanyh-terytorij-sbs-zsu/
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33492; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33490; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33512; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38240; https://t.me/wargonzo/31569
[53] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/07/pid-dronivkoyu-dronamy-po-gumovyh-chovnah-i-rosiyanah-na-zaliznychnomu-mostu-byut-operatory-bpla-na-slovyanskomu-napryamku/
[54] https://t.me/sloaembr_81/347; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1207286-rosijska-armia-nakopicuetsa-v-serebranskomu-lisi-sob-zahopiti-dronivku-na-doneccini-81-oaembr/
[55] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/193460
[56] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/193422; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38233; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/193478; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47187
[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33512; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33492; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33490; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/193478; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38233; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38235; https://t.me/wargonzo/31569
[58] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/6288
[59] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14864; https://vk dot ru/wall-221012943_6830; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/49068
[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33512; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33492; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33490; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38237; https://t.me/wargonzo/31569; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47164; https://t.me/rusich_army/27723
[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/47168; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47174; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47186; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47199
[62] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/193428
[63] https://t.me/motopatriot78/47181
[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33512; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33492; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33490; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69916; https://t.me/wargonzo/31569; https://t.me/rusich_army/27723; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69916;
[65] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/193428; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47181
[66] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/07/do-minometiv-idut-vyklyuchno-pishky-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-rosiyan-zmusyly-vidmovytys-vid-tehniky/
[67] https://t.me/motopatriot78/47168; https://t.me/motopatriot78/471744; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47185
[68] https://t.me/motopatriot78/47188
[69] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14871
[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33512; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33492; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33490; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69916; https://t.me/wargonzo/31569
[71] https://t.me/motopatriot78/47164
[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33512; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33492; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33490
[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33507
[74] https://t.me/robert_magyar/1834; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/07/za-6-dniv-zavdano-udariv-po-21-ob%ca%bcyektu-vglyb-vorozhyh-ta-okupovanyh-terytorij-sbs-zsu/
[75] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10952; https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1GLntUjD6m/?mibextid=wwXIfr
[76] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10952; https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1GLntUjD6m/?mibextid=wwXIfr
[77] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33512; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33492; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33490
[78] https://t.me/OSHP_225/5239; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/23047 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/07/shturmovyky-zachyshhayut-vid-okupantiv-sela-navkolo-gulyajpolya/
[79] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2008649243603726598 https://t.me/boris_rozhin/193233
[80] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2008805110185697353 https://t.me/voin_dv/18280
[81] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/193422; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/193478; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69918
[82] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33512; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1207480-okupanti-namagalisa-vijti-do-malokaterinivki-na-zaporizzi-po-dnu-kahovskogo-vodoshovisa-sili-oboroni-pivdna/; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69918; https://t.me/wargonzo/31569; https://t.me/dva_majors/86269; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47183
[83] https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1207480-okupanti-namagalisa-vijti-do-malokaterinivki-na-zaporizzi-po-dnu-kahovskogo-vodoshovisa-sili-oboroni-pivdna/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-3-2025/
[84] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38231; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38225
[85] https://t.me/robert_magyar/1834
[86] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33512; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33492
[87] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38231
[88] https://t.me/robert_magyar/1834
[89] https://t.me/kpszsu/51802
[90] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/26827; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1207258-semero-poranenih-sered-nih-diti-aki-naslidki-masovanogo-obstrilu-dnipra/
[91] https://t.me/vilkul/14419; https://t.me/vilkul/14418
[92] https://t.me/OleksiiKuleba/7867; https://t.me/odeskaODA/13424; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/31234