{"id":12614,"date":"2025-06-25T04:49:10","date_gmt":"2025-06-25T04:49:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/12614\/"},"modified":"2025-06-25T04:49:10","modified_gmt":"2025-06-25T04:49:10","slug":"beijing-turns-to-cautious-diplomacy-in-irans-war-with-israel","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/12614\/","title":{"rendered":"Beijing turns to cautious diplomacy in Iran’s war with Israel"},"content":{"rendered":"

When Israel attacked Iran<\/a> nearly two weeks ago, the Chinese government, a longtime friend of Iran, jumped into action \u2014 at least, when it came to words. It condemned the attacks. Its leader, Xi Jinping, got on the phone with the Russian leader and urged a ceasefire. Its foreign minister spoke with his counterpart in Iran.<\/p>\n

But that\u2019s where China<\/a> stopped. The usual rhetoric was delivered. De-escalation and dialogue were trumpeted. Yet China offered no material support.<\/p>\n

Despite Beijing\u2019s clout as a near-peer rival to the United States and its ambition to play a bigger role on the world stage, Beijing refrained from offering military support to Iran, let alone getting directly involved in the conflict. The decision underscored the limitations it faces in the Middle East.<\/p>\n

\u201cBeijing lacks both the diplomatic capabilities and the risk appetite to quickly intervene in, and to think it can successfully navigate, this fast-moving and volatile situation,\u201d said Jude Blanchette, director of the China Research Center at RAND. <\/p>\n

Given the tangled politics of the Middle East, where China holds substantial economic and energy stakes yet wields minimal military influence, Beijing \u201cisn\u2019t inclined to stick its neck out,\u201d Blanchette added. Instead, the Chinese government opts to remain \u201ca measured, risk\u2011averse actor.\u201d<\/p>\n

China weighs commercial interests<\/p>\n

Zhu Feng, dean of the School of International Relations at Nanjing University in eastern China, said volatility in the Middle East is not in China\u2019s interests.<\/p>\n

\u201cFrom China\u2019s point of view, the Israel-Iran conflicts challenge and impact China\u2019s business interests and economic security,\u201d Zhu said. \u201cThis is something China absolutely does not want to see.\u201d<\/p>\n

After the Iranian parliament floated a plan to shut down the strategically located Strait of Hormuz over the weekend, China spoke against it. \u201cChina calls on the international community to step up efforts to de-escalate conflicts and prevent regional turmoil from having a greater impact on global economic development,\u201d said Guo Jiakun, a spokesman for the Chinese foreign ministry.<\/p>\n

On Tuesday, following the ceasefire announcement<\/a>, U.S. President Donald Trump wrote in a social media post: \u201cChina can now continue to purchase Oil from Iran,\u201d suggesting the ceasefire would prevent the disruption of Iranian oil production.<\/p>\n

A 2024 report by the U.S. Energy Information Administration contained estimates suggesting that roughly 80% to 90% of the oil exported by Iran went to China. The Chinese economy could struggle to preserve its industrial production without the roughly 1.2 million barrels of oil and other fossil fuels provided by Iran.<\/p>\n

Craig Singleton, senior China fellow at the Washington-based think tank Foundation for Defense of Democracies, summed up Beijing\u2019s responses as \u201csteady oil buys and ritual calls for \u2018dialogue\u2019.\u201d <\/p>\n

\u201cThat\u2019s about it,\u201d Singleton said. \u201cNo drones or missile parts, no emergency credit line. Just words calibrated to placate Tehran without rattling Riyadh or inviting U.S. sanctions.\u201d<\/p>\n

Beijing\u2019s muted responses also expose the gap between China\u2019s great-power rhetoric and its real reach in the region. Said Singleton: \u201cChina\u2019s Gulf footprint is commercial, not combat-ready. When missiles fly, its much-touted strategic partnership with Iran shrinks to statements. Beijing wants discounted Iranian oil and a \u2018peace-broker\u2019 headline, while letting Washington shoulder the hard-power risks.\u201d<\/p>\n

In statements, China sides with Iran and pledges to mediate<\/p>\n

Since the onset of the war, Beijing \u2014 which brokered a diplomatic rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023 \u2014 stood by Iran\u2019s side and urged talks.<\/p>\n

At the United Nations, China, a permanent member of the Security Council, teamed up with Russia and Pakistan in putting forward a draft resolution condemning \u201cin the strongest terms\u201d the attacks against peaceful nuclear sites and facilities in Iran. They called for \u201can immediate and unconditional ceasefire\u201d even though the United States, another permanent member on the council, is almost certain to veto the proposal.<\/p>\n

Shortly after Israel attacked Iran, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi had a phone call with his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, and told him that \u201cChina explicitly condemned Israel\u2019s violation of Iran\u2019s sovereignty, security and territorial integrity.\u201d Wang, using common diplomatic language, said China was \u201cready to maintain communication with Iran and other relevant parties to continue playing a constructive role in de-escalating the situation.\u201d<\/p>\n

Wang later spoke with foreign ministers of Oman and Egypt; both nations are key mediators in the region. And late last week, before the U.S. got involved militarily, Xi spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin; the two agreed to stay in closer contact over Iran and work toward de-escalation. But China stayed away from any direct involvement, and Russia also had muted responses<\/a> to the Israel-Iran conflict.<\/p>\n

Iran is an important link in Xi\u2019s ambitious global project Belt and Road Initiative, and in 2023 joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a security group by Russia and China to counter the U.S.-led NATO. It has conducted joint exercises with China, including this year\u2019s \u201cMaritime Security Belt 2025\u201d in the Gulf of Oman, in which Russia also took part. On Wednesday, Beijing will convene a meeting of defense ministers of SCO member nations.<\/p>\n

As important as Iran is to China, it is only part of Beijing\u2019s calculus, according to an analysis by the Soufan Center, a New York-based organization that focuses on global security challenges.<\/p>\n

In an intel brief, the center said the conflict has revealed that Beijing\u2019s support for its partners, especially those in confrontation with the United States, \u201cis limited by a complex matrix of interests, including its desire to avoid alienating major economic partners and escalating tensions with the West.\u201d<\/p>\n

___<\/p>\n

AP researcher Yu Bing in Beijing and writers Edith M. Lederer at the United Nations and Josh Boak in Washington contributed to this report.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"When Israel attacked Iran nearly two weeks ago, the Chinese government, a longtime friend of Iran, jumped into…\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":12615,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[97,13214,9710,74,13212,13216,7838,69,57,2055,3464,83,3461,13213,50,80,274,13217,96,103,107,11762,13215],"class_list":{"0":"post-12614","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-world","8":"tag-2024-2025-mideast-wars","9":"tag-asia-pacific","10":"tag-beijing","11":"tag-china","12":"tag-china-government","13":"tag-craig-singleton","14":"tag-diplomacy","15":"tag-donald-trump","16":"tag-general-news","17":"tag-government-and-politics","18":"tag-international-agreements","19":"tag-iran","20":"tag-iran-government","21":"tag-merle-haggard","22":"tag-news","23":"tag-politics","24":"tag-vladimir-putin","25":"tag-wang-yi","26":"tag-war-and-unrest","27":"tag-world","28":"tag-world-news","29":"tag-xi-jinping","30":"tag-zhu-feng"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@us\/114742202558883996","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12614","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=12614"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12614\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/12615"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=12614"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=12614"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=12614"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}