{"id":252748,"date":"2025-09-25T04:29:10","date_gmt":"2025-09-25T04:29:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/252748\/"},"modified":"2025-09-25T04:29:10","modified_gmt":"2025-09-25T04:29:10","slug":"the-united-states-regulates-artificial-intelligence-with-export-controls","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/252748\/","title":{"rendered":"The United States Regulates Artificial Intelligence with Export Controls"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>The United States shifts from unregulated cyberspace to cross-border controls.<\/p>\n<p>With a Biden Administration <a href=\"https:\/\/www.federalregister.gov\/documents\/2025\/01\/15\/2025-00636\/framework-for-artificial-intelligence-diffusion\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">regulation<\/a> issued early this year, the United States became one of the first countries to regulate artificial intelligence (AI) through export controls.<\/p>\n<p>The move is consistent with similar efforts by other countries to place limits on where their most advanced technology may be exported to, including <a href=\"https:\/\/gazette.gc.ca\/rp-pr\/p2\/2024\/2024-06-19\/html\/sor-dors112-eng.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Canada<\/a>, the <a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/PDF\/?uri=OJ:L:2021:206:FULL&amp;from=EN\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">European Union<\/a>, the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legislation.gov.uk\/uksi\/2024\/346\/made\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">United Kingdom<\/a>, and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.aph.gov.au\/Parliamentary_Business\/Tabled_Documents\/7054\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Australia<\/a>. But the U.S. rule is innovative for its specific <a href=\"https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/emissary\/2025\/01\/ai-new-rule-chips-exports-diffusion-framework?lang=en\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">focus<\/a> on AI. The <a href=\"https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/?lang=en\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Carnegie Endowment for International Peace<\/a>, a foreign policy think tank, <a href=\"https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/emissary\/2025\/01\/ai-new-rule-chips-exports-diffusion-framework?lang=en\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">described<\/a> the rule as an \u201cambitious act of economic and technological policymaking.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>The U.S. Department of Commerce <a href=\"https:\/\/www.federalregister.gov\/documents\/2025\/01\/15\/2025-00636\/framework-for-artificial-intelligence-diffusion\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">published<\/a> the final rule in January 2025, with the aim of enabling U.S. companies to \u201csafely export AI technology abroad,\u201d as <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/blog\/what-know-about-new-us-ai-diffusion-policy-and-export-controls\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">described<\/a> by <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/expert\/michael-c-horowitz\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Michael C. Horowitz<\/a> at the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Council of Foreign Relations<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Broadly, the rule enables U.S. companies to export AI chips and capabilities abroad, and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.federalregister.gov\/documents\/2025\/01\/15\/2025-00636\/framework-for-artificial-intelligence-diffusion\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">exempts<\/a> U.S. allies from regulations that limit the quantity of exportable chips. By contrast, under the rule, the United States would not export AI chips to \u201ccountries of concern,\u201d meaning countries where the United States has arms embargos. The rule was reinforced by the current Administration when President Donald J. Trump issued an <a href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/presidential-actions\/2025\/01\/america-first-trade-policy\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">executive order<\/a> intended to \u201cidentify and eliminate loopholes in existing export controls.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Historically, the regulation of AI in the United States has been limited by the fear that excessive regulation might kill AI just as it is taking off, as industry <a href=\"https:\/\/pluribusnews.com\/news-and-events\/lawmakers-are-warned-that-ai-regulation-could-stifle-innovation\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">points out<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>But, in recent years, the United States has <a href=\"https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/understanding-biden-administrations-updated-export-controls\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">shifted<\/a> toward controls on emerging technology. Late last year, the Biden Administration <a href=\"https:\/\/www.federalregister.gov\/documents\/2025\/01\/15\/2025-00636\/framework-for-artificial-intelligence-diffusion\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">issued<\/a> a final rule amending export controls for semiconductors. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.csis.org\/people\/gregory-c-allen\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Gregory C. Allen<\/a> at the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.csis.org\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Center for Strategic and International Studies<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/understanding-biden-administrations-updated-export-controls\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">writes<\/a> that the 2024 rule aims to prevent China from accessing advanced AI chips and to restrict China\u2019s ability to obtain or domestically produce alternatives.<\/p>\n<p>This year\u2019s Commerce Department rule follows similar <a href=\"https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/understanding-us-allies-current-legal-authority-implement-ai-and-semiconductor-export\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">measures<\/a> adopted by the U.S. government to restrict China\u2019s access to artificial intelligence and advanced semiconductor technologies, which has been a government policy focus since 2022.<\/p>\n<p>Digital sovereignty or \u201cthe ability to have control over your own digital destiny,\u201d as <a href=\"https:\/\/www.weforum.org\/stories\/authors\/sean-fleming\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Sean Fleming<\/a> at the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.weforum.org\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">World Economic Forum<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.weforum.org\/stories\/2025\/01\/europe-digital-sovereignty\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">puts it<\/a>, is an issue of growing importance. As scholars <a href=\"https:\/\/ecdpm.org\/application\/files\/7816\/8485\/0476\/Global-approaches-digital-sovereignty-competing-definitions-contrasting-policy-ECDPM-Discussion-Paper-344-2023.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">argue<\/a>, the competition for control over the infrastructure, data, and design of technology reflects broader debates over sovereignty by countries wishing to control their own affairs.<\/p>\n<p>In August of last year, the European Union <a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R1689\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">passed<\/a> a regulation seeking to \u201charmonize\u201d the development, commercialization, and use of AI technologies. According to the European Commission, the rules <a href=\"https:\/\/digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/regulatory-framework-ai\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">aim<\/a> to \u201cfoster trustworthy AI\u201d in Europe. The regulation <a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R1689\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">classifies<\/a> AI applications into different risk categories based on their potential impact on individuals and society.<\/p>\n<p>Unlike the U.S. rule issued this year, the European approach does not target particular countries and instead <a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R1689\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">focuses<\/a> on regulating the risk category of the type of AI. Scholars <a href=\"https:\/\/policyreview.info\/articles\/analysis\/general-purpose-ai-regulation-and-ai-act\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">argue<\/a> that the European regulation has the potential to become a global benchmark for governance and regulation of AI.<\/p>\n<p>By contrast, China <a href=\"https:\/\/asiasociety.org\/policy-institute\/chinas-emerging-approach-regulating-general-purpose-artificial-intelligence-balancing-innovation-and\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">takes<\/a> a state-run approach, with a top priority to \u201cretain control of information.\u201d China is also <a href=\"https:\/\/asiasociety.org\/policy-institute\/chinas-emerging-approach-regulating-general-purpose-artificial-intelligence-balancing-innovation-and\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">encouraging<\/a> domestic innovation in generative AI. In a report to Congress, the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uscc.gov\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">U.S.\u2013China Economic Security Review Commission<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uscc.gov\/sites\/default\/files\/2021-11\/2021_Annual_Report_to_Congress.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">reported<\/a> that China is investing in nonstate actors, including corporations, to further its technology development goals and policy objectives. The Commission was <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uscc.gov\/about-us\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">established<\/a> in 2000 to report to Congress on the national security implications of the U.S.\u2013China relationship.<\/p>\n<p>China\u2019s government-led approach to digital sovereignty and regulation of AI has contrasted with the traditional approach in the United States, where advocates for an unregulated cyberspace, especially within big tech, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.weforum.org\/stories\/2025\/01\/europe-digital-sovereignty\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">play<\/a> a dominant role.<\/p>\n<p>But, the United States\u2019 new rule limiting the export of AI reflects a fundamental shift in how the United States <a href=\"https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/emissary\/2025\/01\/ai-new-rule-chips-exports-diffusion-framework?lang=en\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">approaches<\/a> the regulation of internet and technology, bringing it closer to a government-led approach.<\/p>\n<p>Google has <a href=\"https:\/\/ai.google\/static\/documents\/recommendations-for-regulating-ai.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">stated<\/a> that it builds compliance with regulations into product development and prefers regulations to be stable and predictable. For this reason, whatever approach big players in AI technology take moving forward, companies such as Google would prefer the approach to be coordinated, as <a href=\"https:\/\/dig.watch\/updates\/googles-opportunity-agenda-global-approach-to-responsible-ai-regulation\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">noted<\/a> by the <a href=\"https:\/\/dig.watch\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Digital Watch Observatory<\/a>. The <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cigionline.org\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Centre for International Governance Innovation<\/a>, a Canadian thinktank, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cigionline.org\/static\/documents\/DPH-paper-Niazi.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">states<\/a> that corporations as non-state actors may <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cigionline.org\/static\/documents\/DPH-paper-Niazi.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">play<\/a> a role in either new efforts at multilateral cooperation or in standard setting efforts.<\/p>\n<p>Ultimately, the United States\u2019 unilateral rulemaking effort may push other countries to enact similar measures, pulling the world closer together on AI regulation, as the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Brookings Institution<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/articles\/the-eu-and-us-diverge-on-ai-regulation-a-transatlantic-comparison-and-steps-to-alignment\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">points out<\/a>. But, as scholars <a href=\"https:\/\/www.fordhamilj.org\/iljonline\/k73pddfmra65ecd-fxc5k-bdazp-npp5j-l8be9-kbndm-tlwlf-2pnhz-hpjc3-2bxkm-9egc4-4acpz-ez2w6\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">argue<\/a>, universal collaboration on AI regulation is unlikely.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"The United States shifts from unregulated cyberspace to cross-border controls. With a Biden Administration regulation issued early this&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":252749,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[21],"tags":[691,2279,738,158,67,132,68],"class_list":{"0":"post-252748","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-artificial-intelligence","8":"tag-ai","9":"tag-ai-regulation","10":"tag-artificial-intelligence","11":"tag-technology","12":"tag-united-states","13":"tag-unitedstates","14":"tag-us"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@us\/115263056316973929","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/252748","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=252748"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/252748\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/252749"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=252748"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=252748"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=252748"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}