Last month, Zelenskiy described the attacks on the oil sector, which funds and fuels Moscow\u2019s war effort, as \u201cthe sanctions that work the fastest<\/a>\u201d. Reuters can reveal the scale of the campaign and the strategy behind it, drawing on data from independent researchers, footage of some attacks, plus interviews with seven Ukrainian sources with knowledge of the strikes.<\/p>\n Ukraine has launched at least 58 attacks on key Russian energy sites since the start of August, sending drones as far as about 2,000 km (1,200 miles) into Russian territory to bomb refineries, pumping stations, storage depots and export terminals, according to data compiled by UK-based non-profit group Open Source Centre (OSC). <\/p>\n That compares with just one such strike in June and two in July.<\/p>\n A senior Ukrainian government source, who requested anonymity to discuss security matters, told Reuters the primary goal of the campaign was to create shortages of key products like gasoline and diesel within Russia, making it harder for Moscow to push forward on the front lines.<\/p>\n The impact is being felt. <\/p>\n Drone strikes at various refineries knocked out around 17% of Russia\u2019s refining capacity in mid-August, or 1.2 million barrels per day, which rose to 21%, or 1.4 million barrels per day, by the end of that month, according to Reuters calculations<\/a>.<\/p>\n Domestic gasoline prices in Russia have risen by about a tenth and sporadic queues have appeared<\/a> at filling stations. The strikes on refining have also served to push more crude towards export, reshaping Russia\u2019s energy trade, according to LSEG data. <\/p>\n The recent attacks are not the first time Ukraine has launched long-range drones, or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), at Russian energy installations. But the frequency of attacks is the highest since Moscow\u2019s full-scale invasion of February 2022, as the range and payloads of drones grow.<\/p>\n Russia, for its part, has been pummelling Ukraine\u2019s power and natural gas facilities in the last two months, causing widespread blackouts and water shortages across the country.<\/p>\n Aug. 15. Russia – U.S. summit<\/p>\n Putin and Trump meet in Alaska to discuss the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian Aug. 15. Russia – U.S. summit<\/p>\n Putin and Trump meet in Alaska to discuss the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian Aug. 15. Russia – U.S. summit<\/p>\n Putin and Trump meet in Alaska to discuss the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian Aug. 15. Russia – U.S. summit<\/p>\n Putin and Trump meet in Alaska to discuss the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian Visual calendar showing Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil refineries since June.<\/p>\n Source: Open Source Centre<\/p>\n The Kremlin didn\u2019t respond to a request for comment for this article. Russian officials have said no external power will force them to change course in the conflict and that attacks on the oil industry are dangerously escalatory.<\/p>\n Russia\u2019s energy industry isn\u2019t under critical threat, as Kyiv itself acknowledges.<\/p>\n Sergey Vakulenko, an oil and gas specialist at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, said only repeated successful strikes on refineries could knock the facilities out of service.<\/p>\n \u201cRussia\u2019s oil refineries are facing a lot of problems, but things are far from catastrophic,\u201d he wrote in a report. \u201cHow the situation develops in the coming months depends on whether Ukraine is able to maintain the pace of \u2026 or even ramp up attacks.\u201d<\/p>\n How Ukraine attacks oil facilities deep in Russia <\/p>\n Drone Antonov<\/p>\n N-196 Liutyi<\/p>\n Ukrainian forces prepare<\/p>\n drones for launch on roads,<\/p>\n fields or abandoned<\/p>\n airstrips.<\/p>\n Soldiers load the<\/p>\n explosive payload<\/p>\n (50-75 kg) and<\/p>\n configure the drone\u2019s<\/p>\n flight path.<\/p>\n Missions often involve<\/p>\n 20 to 30 strike and<\/p>\n decoy drones, but some<\/p>\n can be considerably<\/p>\n larger.<\/p>\n Ukrainian forces prepare drones<\/p>\n for launch on roads, fields<\/p>\n or abandoned airstrips.<\/p>\n Soldiers load the<\/p>\n explosive payload<\/p>\n (50-75 kg) and<\/p>\n configure the drone\u2019s<\/p>\n flight path.<\/p>\n Missions often involve<\/p>\n 20 to 30 strike and<\/p>\n decoy drones, but some<\/p>\n can be considerably<\/p>\n larger.<\/p>\n Ukrainian forces prepare drones<\/p>\n for launch on roads, fields<\/p>\n or abandoned airstrips.<\/p>\n Soldiers load the<\/p>\n explosive payload<\/p>\n (50-75 kg) and<\/p>\n configure the drone\u2019s<\/p>\n flight path.<\/p>\n Missions often involve<\/p>\n 20 to 30 strike and<\/p>\n decoy drones, but some<\/p>\n can be considerably<\/p>\n larger.<\/p>\n Soldiers load the<\/p>\n explosive payload (50-75 kg)<\/p>\n and configure the drone\u2019s<\/p>\n flight path.<\/p>\n Ukrainian forces prepare drones<\/p>\n for launch on roads, fields<\/p>\n or abandoned airstrips.<\/p>\n Missions often involve<\/p>\n 20 to 30 strike and<\/p>\n decoy drones, but some<\/p>\n can be considerably<\/p>\n larger.<\/p>\n Ukrainian forces prepare drones<\/p>\n for launch on roads, fields<\/p>\n or abandoned airstrips.<\/p>\n Soldiers load the<\/p>\n explosive payload (50-75 kg)<\/p>\n and configure the drone\u2019s<\/p>\n flight path.<\/p>\n Missions often involve<\/p>\n 20 to 30 strike and<\/p>\n decoy drones, but some<\/p>\n can be considerably<\/p>\n larger.<\/p>\n An illustration showing Ukrainian forces preparing drones for launch on roads, fields or abandoned airstrips. Soldiers load the explosive payload (50-75 kg) and configure the drone\u2019s flight path. Strike missions often involve 20 to 30 drones and decoys, but some can be considerably larger.<\/p>\n Following Russia\u2019s invasion, Western allies prohibited Kyiv from firing the weapons they provided at targets deep inside Russian territory for fear of escalating the conflict, leading Ukraine to develop its own drone capabilities.<\/p>\n Both sides in the war produced between about 1.5 and 2 million military drones of all types last year, according to officials, underlining the rapid expansion of aerial warfare. Zelenskiy said in November last year that Ukraine would produce at least 30,000 long-range drones in 2025.<\/p>\n The Ukrainian Liutyi and FP-1 long-range drones, powered by small engines and able to fly in excess of 1,000 km, are among the workhorses of the campaign to hit energy assets.<\/p>\n The Liutyi drone is<\/p>\n powered by a gasoline<\/p>\n engine and three-blade<\/p>\n propeller.<\/p>\n Advanced navigation<\/p>\n systems help drones resist<\/p>\n signal jamming or false<\/p>\n location signals designed<\/p>\n to trick them into veering<\/p>\n off course.<\/p>\n Ukraine uses much cheaper<\/p>\n drone models as decoys to<\/p>\n soak up fire from Russian air<\/p>\n defences.<\/p>\n The Liutyi drone is powered<\/p>\n by a gasoline engine and<\/p>\n three-blade propeller.<\/p>\n Advanced navigation systems help<\/p>\n drones resist signal jamming or false<\/p>\n location signals designed to trick<\/p>\n them into veering off course.<\/p>\n Ukraine uses much cheaper<\/p>\n drone models as decoys to soak<\/p>\n up fire from Russian air defences.<\/p>\n The Liutyi drone is powered<\/p>\n by a gasoline engine and<\/p>\n three-blade propeller.<\/p>\n Advanced navigation systems help<\/p>\n drones resist signal jamming or<\/p>\n false location signals designed to<\/p>\n trick them into veering off course.<\/p>\n Ukraine uses much cheaper<\/p>\n drone models as decoys to soak<\/p>\n up fire from Russian air defences.<\/p>\n Advanced navigation systems help<\/p>\n drones resist signal jamming or false<\/p>\n location signals designed to trick<\/p>\n them into veering off course.<\/p>\n The Liutyi drone is powered<\/p>\n by a gasoline engine and<\/p>\n three-blade propeller.<\/p>\n Ukraine uses much cheaper drone<\/p>\n models as decoys to soak up fire<\/p>\n from Russian air defences.<\/p>\n Advanced navigation systems help<\/p>\n drones resist signal jamming or false<\/p>\n location signals designed to trick<\/p>\n them into veering off course.<\/p>\n The Liutyi drone is powered<\/p>\n by a gasoline engine and<\/p>\n three-blade propeller.<\/p>\n Ukraine uses much cheaper drone<\/p>\n models as decoys to soak up fire<\/p>\n from Russian air defences.<\/p>\n An illustration showing Ukrainian drones in flight. Powered by a gasoline engine and three-blade propeller, the Liutyi drone cruises at 300 km\/h. Advanced navigation systems help Liutyi drones resist GPS jamming and reach their targets. In the same attack, Ukraine uses much cheaper drone A source with knowledge of Ukraine\u2019s long-range attacks against Russian energy facilities said that operations typically include between 20 and 30 drones designed to dive into targets laden with explosives, with a smaller number of decoys sometimes sent beforehand to drain Russia\u2019s air defences.<\/p>\n Sometimes drone fleets can be much larger \u2014 Zelenskiy said at a news briefing in early October that up to 300 drones had been deployed in a single operation.<\/p>\n Ukraine\u2019s main challenge is scale. Though it is constantly increasing production, it doesn\u2019t have enough drones to routinely overwhelm Russia\u2019s air defences, while Russia is also improving its interception rate, meaning a smaller proportion are reaching their targets, according to the source. <\/p>\n Satellite imagery verified by Reuters also shows what appear to be anti-drone nets and structures over key parts of the Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat refinery located some 1,400 km away from the Ukrainian border.<\/p>\n Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat Refinery<\/p>\n Image: Google Earth (May 18, 2025)<\/p>\n 2025 Planet Labs PBC (Sept. 21, 2025)<\/p>\n Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat Refinery<\/p>\n Google Earth (May 18, 2025)<\/p>\n 2025 Planet Labs PBC (Sept. 21, 2025)<\/p>\n Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat Refinery<\/p>\n Google Earth (May 18, 2025)<\/p>\n 2025 Planet Labs PBC (Sept. 21, 2025)<\/p>\n Satellite images showing anti-drone nets built around key parts of oil and gas facilities at Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat Refinery and Novokuibyshevsk Refinery.<\/p>\n The source familiar with Ukraine\u2019s attacks said various means were used for navigation and targeting drone strikes.<\/p>\n One of the main methods is visual navigation, where the drone uses an on-board camera to match features on the ground to a pre-loaded map. Unlike GPS-guided navigation, this cannot be hacked or jammed by Russian electronic warfare systems.<\/p>\n Another common way is to use advanced satellite-navigation antennas designed to block out unusual signals that seek to jam or disorient the system, while the craft continues to receive its real position from satellites in space.<\/p>\n A Liutyi drone can reach a Russian refinery after flying as far as 1,000 Drones are<\/p>\n pre-programmed<\/p>\n to hit key targets<\/p>\n at facilities.<\/p>\n During the attack,<\/p>\n they dive at a steep<\/p>\n angle and maximum<\/p>\n speed to hit the target.<\/p>\n A Liutyi drone can reach a Russian refinery after flying as far as 1,000 Drones are<\/p>\n pre-programmed<\/p>\n to hit key targets<\/p>\n at facilities.<\/p>\n During the attack,<\/p>\n they dive at a steep<\/p>\n angle and maximum<\/p>\n speed to hit the target.<\/p>\n A Liutyi drone can reach a Russian refinery after flying as far as 1,000 Drones are<\/p>\n pre-programmed<\/p>\n to hit key targets<\/p>\n at facilities.<\/p>\n During the attack,<\/p>\n they dive at a steep<\/p>\n angle and maximum<\/p>\n speed to hit the target.<\/p>\n A Liutyi drone can reach a Russian refinery after flying as far as 1,000 Drones are<\/p>\n pre-programmed<\/p>\n to hit key targets<\/p>\n at facilities.<\/p>\n During the attack,<\/p>\n they dive at a steep<\/p>\n angle and maximum<\/p>\n speed to hit the target.<\/p>\n A Liutyi drone can reach<\/p>\n a Russian refinery after flying<\/p>\n as far as 1,000 km or more from<\/p>\n Ukrainian-controlled territory.<\/p>\n Drones are<\/p>\n pre-programmed<\/p>\n to hit key targets<\/p>\n at facilities.<\/p>\n During the attack, they dive<\/p>\n at a steep angle and maximum<\/p>\n speed to hit the target.<\/p>\n An illustration showing a Liutyi drone reaching a Russian refinery after flying from Ukrainian-controlled territory \u2014 a distance of 1,000 km or more. Drones fly over the facility to identify and lock onto key targets. Once locked, they dive at a steep angle and maximum speed to hit with precision.<\/p>\n What the Ukrainians are targeting<\/p>\n The dozens of Ukrainian drone attacks identified by the OSC, from August to Oct. 13, have targeted various types of facilities across Russia\u2019s complex oil system, including refineries needed to produce domestic petroleum products, depots for storing oil, pumping stations critical to maintaining flow along pipelines and export terminals at ports. <\/p>\n The OSC based its data on statements from one or both sides in the war describing attacks. In most cases, the attacks were corroborated by online videos and social media posts by witnesses. In some cases, it was possible to review satellite imagery of the aftermath of attacks.<\/p>\n 18 attacks<\/p>\n since June 1, 2025<\/p>\n Critical to pipeline operations,<\/p>\n pumping stations are often in<\/p>\n remote locations with limited<\/p>\n defences against aerial drones.<\/p>\n Ukraine has disrupted a<\/p>\n significant amount of<\/p>\n Russia’s oil refining<\/p>\n capacity.<\/p>\n Ukraine’s attacks on oil<\/p>\n infrastructure have contributed<\/p>\n to gasoline shortages within<\/p>\n Russia.<\/p>\n Most export pipelines supplied European markets, but those exports have Sea and aerial drones have targeted<\/p>\n port terminals, hampering Russia’s<\/p>\n ability to export oil.<\/p>\n Ukraine has disrupted a<\/p>\n significant amount of Russia’s<\/p>\n oil refining capacity.<\/p>\n 18 attacks<\/p>\n since June 1, 2025<\/p>\n Critical to pipeline operations,<\/p>\n pumping stations are often in<\/p>\n remote locations with limited<\/p>\n defences against aerial drones.<\/p>\n Ukraine’s attacks on oil<\/p>\n infrastructure have contributed<\/p>\n to gasoline shortages within<\/p>\n Russia.<\/p>\n Most export pipelines supplied<\/p>\n European markets, but those<\/p>\n exports have plummeted since 2022.<\/p>\n Sea and aerial drones have targeted<\/p>\n port terminals, hampering Russia’s<\/p>\n ability to export oil.<\/p>\n Ukraine has disrupted a<\/p>\n significant amount of Russia’s<\/p>\n oil refining capacity.<\/p>\n 18 attacks<\/p>\n since June 1, 2025<\/p>\n Critical to pipeline operations,<\/p>\n pumping stations are often in<\/p>\n remote locations with limited<\/p>\n defences against aerial drones.<\/p>\n Ukraine’s attacks on oil<\/p>\n infrastructure have contributed<\/p>\n to gasoline shortages within<\/p>\n Russia.<\/p>\n Most export pipelines supplied<\/p>\n European markets, but those<\/p>\n exports have plummeted since 2022.<\/p>\n Sea and aerial drones have targeted<\/p>\n port terminals, hampering Russia’s<\/p>\n ability to export oil.<\/p>\n 18 attacks<\/p>\n since June 1, 2025<\/p>\n Critical to pipeline operations,<\/p>\n pumping stations are often in<\/p>\n remote locations with limited<\/p>\n defences against aerial drones.<\/p>\n Ukraine has disrupted a<\/p>\n significant amount of Russia’s<\/p>\n oil refining capacity.<\/p>\n Ukraine’s attacks on oil<\/p>\n infrastructure have contributed<\/p>\n to gasoline shortages within<\/p>\n Russia.<\/p>\n Most export pipelines supplied<\/p>\n European markets, but those<\/p>\n exports have plummeted since 2022.<\/p>\n Sea and aerial drones have targeted<\/p>\n port terminals, hampering Russia’s<\/p>\n ability to export oil.<\/p>\n A diagram showing how different oil and gas facilities interconnect in Russia\u2019s oil and gas industry. The number of attacks by Ukraine on each facility type is shown.<\/p>\n Note: Some facilities may have been targeted multiple times.<\/p>\n Source: Open Source Centre, Reuters reporting.<\/p>\n More than half of the strikes \u2014 29 \u2014 were aimed at oil refineries in the European part of Russia, stretching from the Black Sea\u2019s Krasnodar region, to facilities near Moscow and St Petersburg and the Ukhta refinery near the Arctic Circle, the data showed. The most distant refinery targeted, in Tyumen, was 1,992 km into Russian territory.<\/p>\n Three refineries \u2014 the Syzran and Saratov plants in Volga region and the southern Afipsky facility \u2014 have been attacked at least three times in the last two months, according to the data.<\/p>\n Ukraine also carried out at least 18 attacks on pumping facilities. From Aug. 13 to Aug. 22, three Ukrainian attacks targeted western Russia\u2019s Unecha and Nikolskoye stations, which lie on the Soviet-built Druzhba pipeline, Russia\u2019s export artery to Hungary and Slovakia.<\/p>\n There have also been six Ukrainian attacks on Russian export terminals in the Black and Baltic seas using air and sea-borne drones, according to the OSC.<\/p>\n Gazprom<\/p>\n Neftekhim<\/p>\n Salavat<\/p>\n Refinery<\/p>\n Attack: May 9, 2024<\/p>\n Targets fluid catalytic cracking unit.<\/p>\n Attack: Sept. 18, 2025<\/p>\n Strikes an area known as the heart of the refinery (ELOU-AVT-4) that Attack: Sept. 24, 2025<\/p>\n Hits main processing unit (ELOU-AVT-6), which handles 60% of output and Gazprom<\/p>\n Neftekhim<\/p>\n Salavat<\/p>\n Refinery<\/p>\n Attack: May 9, 2024<\/p>\n Targets fluid catalytic cracking unit.<\/p>\n Attack: Sept. 18, 2025<\/p>\n Strikes an area known as the heart of the refinery (ELOU-AVT-4) that Attack: Sept. 24, 2025<\/p>\n Hits main processing unit (ELOU-AVT-6), which handles 60% of output and Gazprom<\/p>\n Neftekhim<\/p>\n Salavat<\/p>\n Refinery<\/p>\n Attack: May 9, 2024<\/p>\n Targets fluid catalytic cracking unit.<\/p>\n Attack: Sept. 18, 2025<\/p>\n Strikes an area known as the heart of the refinery (ELOU-AVT-4) that Attack: Sept. 24, 2025<\/p>\n Hits main processing unit (ELOU-AVT-6), which handles 60% of output and Gazprom Neftekhim<\/p>\n Salavat Refinery<\/p>\n Attack: May 9, 2024<\/p>\n Targets fluid catalytic cracking unit.<\/p>\n Attack: Sept. 18, 2025<\/p>\n Strikes an area known as the heart of the refinery (ELOU-AVT-4) that Attack: Sept. 24, 2025<\/p>\n Hits main processing unit (ELOU-AVT-6), which handles 60% of output and An annotated satellite image showing parts of the Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat Refinery that were attacked on May 9, 2024; September 18, 2025; and September 24, 2025. On May 9, the target was the fluid catalytic cracking unit. On September 18, the first stage of refining (ELOU-AVT-4), which removes water and salts from crude oil, and is known as the heart of the refinery. On September 24, the main processing unit (ELOU-AVT-6), which handles 60% of output, refining up to 6 million tons of oil and gas annually.<\/p>\n Fuel shortages have occurred sporadically across Russia in recent weeks and Russia has introduced a partial ban on diesel exports until the end of the year while extending an existing ban on gasoline exports.<\/p>\n One result of the disruptions has been a decrease in refining and an increase in the amount of unprocessed crude which Russia now needs to export to avoid \u00a0oil output cuts.<\/p>\n Russia exports both oil and refined products. Its crude sales mainly go to China, India and Turkey while products can be exported to many more destinations. Crude buyers might be unwilling to increase purchases further without deeper discounts than currently offered, several traders involved in Russian oil sales said.<\/p>\n Mykhailo Gonchar, a Ukrainian energy expert and president of the Kyiv-based Centre for Global Studies Strategy XXI, said interruptions to oil and product flows caused by damage to pumping stations would likely complicate the operations of state oil pipeline firm Transneft, though for disruptions to become critical Ukraine would need to continue to strike refineries and terminals on the Black Sea and Baltic Sea.<\/p>\n The Ukrainian campaign also means Russia must spend to repair these installations: \u201cIt\u2019s big money,\u201d Gonchar added.<\/p>\n The impact on Russia\u2019s war economy<\/p>\n Oil and gas sales are the single biggest source of revenue for the Russian state, accounting for between a third and half of federal budget proceeds over the past decade. The trade has been strained by Western sanctions<\/a> imposed over the war as well as the recent drone onslaught.<\/p>\n Oil and gas is expected to drop to about a quarter of Moscow\u2019s overall revenue in 2025, according to official estimates.<\/p>\n A bar chart showing the oil and gas revenue and the non oil and gas revenue for the Russian government as of August 2025. Oil and gas accounted for 25.4% of government revenue in 2025.<\/p>\n Source: Ministry of Finance, Russia<\/p>\n In August, Russia\u2019s revenue from sales of crude oil and oil products slumped to one of the lowest levels seen since the start of the conflict<\/a> in Ukraine, according to the International Energy Agency. <\/p>\n The dip to near 5-year lows is reducing tax revenues and exacerbating Russia\u2019s economic slowdown, the agency said. Kremlin officials have said the Russian economy is not stagnating and pointed to forecast growth rates similar to those of EU countries.<\/p>\n A bar chart showing the share of oil and gas revenue and the non oil and gas revenue for the Russian government between 2019 and 2028. Oil and gas revenue\u2019s share is forecast to fall.<\/p>\n Note: Data for 2025 and onward are government budget estimates.<\/p>\n Source: Ministry of Finance, Russia<\/p>\n Meanwhile, Ukraine\u2019s strikes have curbed Russian refinery runs and contributed to shortages of certain fuel grades.<\/a> This, along with high borrowing costs, has left private filling stations unable to afford to stockpile fuel, according to traders and retailers.<\/p>\n Gasoline prices have shot up 9.5% and diesel more than 3% since February, while shortages have led to rationing in Russian-occupied Crimea<\/a>.<\/p>\n A chart showing the percentage change in the weekly price of automobile gasoline and diesel fuel in Russia since February 3, 2025. Gasoline and diesel prices have increased by over 9% and 3%, respectively.<\/p>\n Note: Weekly prices rebased as of Feb. 3, 2025.<\/p>\n Source: Federal State Statistics Service, Russia<\/p>\n The disruptions to Russia\u2019s refineries have upset the usual balance of Russia\u2019s oil and gas trade. <\/p>\n Normally, about half of all crude oil produced is refined in Russia and used to supply domestic demand or exported as refined products. The bulk of crude oil exports is sent to markets in Asia.<\/p>\n Refined<\/p>\n products<\/p>\n exported<\/p>\n Refined products<\/p>\n exported<\/p>\n Refined products<\/p>\n exported<\/p>\n A diagram showing the flow of Russian crude oil. About half is refined and then either exported as refined products or used to satisfy domestic demand. The other half is exported directly, and about 70% of that is received by Chinese and Indian importers.<\/p>\n Note: Figures are approximate values.<\/p>\n Source: S&P Global Commodities at Sea, Reuters reporting<\/p>\n Refinery stoppages have led Russia to increase crude oil exports as exports of refined products have dropped. Around 3 million tonnes of refined oil products were shipped from Russian ports in September, significantly less than the monthly average of 4.7 million tonnes in 2025, while crude oil volumes were about 10% higher.<\/p>\n Line charts showing shipped monthly volumes of refined products of oil and crude products from Russian ports. In September 2025, shipping values of refined products fell while that of crude products increased.<\/p>\n Note: Monthly departures of shipments of crude and refined products from Russian ports. Refined products include diesel, gas oil, gasoline, jet fuel, naphtha and other refined products.<\/p>\n Source: LSEG<\/p>\n Most of Russia\u2019s federal revenue from oil and gas is paid by producers through mineral extraction taxes at the oil field. So increases to crude oil exports have allowed producers to maintain output despite potential refining bottlenecks, helping Moscow maintain the revenues coming in for the time being.<\/p>\n Any change in producers\u2019 output has a direct impact on Moscow\u2019s bottom line \u2014 exactly what Kyiv hopes will force Putin to the negotiating table where years of Western economic sanctions have failed.<\/p>\n Some Russian petrol stations are experiencing shortages of certain fuel grades following the Ukrainian attacks. REUTERS<\/p>\n American influence<\/p>\n Ukraine\u2019s strikes have played out against the backdrop of a shifting political landscape since Trump came to power in January. <\/p>\n Despite providing billions of dollars in aid to Ukraine, U.S. officials under Trump\u2019s predecessor Joe Biden had asked Kyiv not to attack Russian oil infrastructure, a senior Ukrainian government source said. <\/p>\n Under Trump, there has been no such request so far, the source told Reuters. <\/p>\n A senior U.S. official and a source familiar with the matter told Reuters that the United States has been sharing intelligence<\/a> with the Ukrainians to help them strike Russian energy targets.\u00a0 <\/p>\n The U.S. State Department declined to comment for this article, while the White House didn\u2019t respond to queries.<\/p>\n Kyiv has nonetheless been buffeted by Trump\u2019s unpredictable approach, which saw him clash with Zelenskiy in February, court Putin at a summit in Alaska and, at one point, stop arms supplies and intelligence-sharing with Kyiv.<\/p>\n U.S. President Donald\u00a0Trump\u00a0engaged in a flurry of diplomacy in August, meeting Russian leader Vladimir Putin in Alaska days before hosting Ukraine\u2019s Volodymyr Zelenskiy at the White House – six months after their Oval Office spat. REUTERS\/Kevin Lamarque<\/p>\n
\n war.<\/p>\n
\n war.<\/p>\n
\n war.<\/p>\n
\n war.<\/p>\n
\nmodels as decoys to confuse Russian air defences.<\/p>\n
\n km or more from Ukrainian-controlled territory.<\/p>\n
\n km or more from Ukrainian-controlled territory.<\/p>\n
\n km or more from Ukrainian-controlled territory.<\/p>\n
\n km or more from Ukrainian-controlled territory.<\/p>\n
\n plummeted since 2022.<\/p>\n
\n removes water and salts from crude oil.<\/p>\n
\n can refine up to 6 million tons of oil and gas, annually.<\/p>\n
\n removes water and salts from crude oil.<\/p>\n
\n can refine up to 6 million tons of oil and gas, annually.<\/p>\n
\n removes water and salts from crude oil.<\/p>\n
\n can refine up to 6 million tons of oil and gas, annually.<\/p>\n
\n removes water and salts from crude oil.<\/p>\n
\n can refine up to 6 million tons of oil and gas, annually.<\/p>\n
\nMoscow\u2019s latest budget estimates forecast oil and gas revenues will continue make up an ever smaller share of overall revenue in the coming years.<\/p>\n![\"U.S.](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/trump-putin.jpeg\")
![\"Ukrainian](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/us\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/trump-zelensky.jpeg\")
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